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








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THE CHURCH IN 1905

THE year 1905 is past and gone. In many respects it will be an eventful one in history. Political events of capital importance for Europe, and for the world, have succeeded one another with alarming rapidity. The fall of Port Arthur, the defeat at Mukden, the capture or annihilation of the Russian fleet, shattered the political power of the Muscovite Empire for generations, while they brought to a crisis at home the long-increasing demand for representative government. By the peace of Portsmouth and the offensive and defensive alliance with England, Japan, which till recent days was a negligible factor in political concerts, is advanced to the rank of a first-rate power, and the prospect of the awakening and resurrection of the Eastern races has reached a new stage on the road of probability. Nor has Western Europe been unaffected by these events. France, obliged by the Russian defeats to seek some new safeguard against the Teutonic invasions, has reversed her traditional policy of opposition to England ; while as a counter-move in the game of politics the Kaiser turns his sympathetic gaze towards his suffering brother of Russia. The Dual Empires, too, have had unpleasant experiences. Norway and Sweden mutually agreed to part company ; Austria and Hungary would have been better had they followed the example thus set, and, who knows, but before another year has passed for us, a still more interesting separation may not have been decreed ?

In Catholic circles, too, the year just passed has not been an altogether uneventful one. The life of the Church, like that of the individual, is to be a life of warfare. She has had her crosses and defeats, but she has also had her consolations. Under the present illustrious Pontiff, whose motto is, the renewal of all things in Christ, she has freed herself more and more from the nets of diplomatic entanglements, to the strengthening of her own innate powers of defence. We are not of those who think that in the days of the Middle Ages the Church reached her prime, and that the remainder of her course must be marked by signs of senility and decay. New developments in social and educational circles, though at first apparently antagonistic, but open new spheres for her activity and new fields for her conquest, and it only requires a man and a policy to ensure success. Never before did the Church stand in a higher or better position. Old abuses, which for centuries crippled her power, have been eradicated ; the doles of State assistance with their consequences of slavery and silence have disappeared, or are rapidly disappearing, and in the present conditions of the world may they never return ; the union of the different parts with one another and with Rome is closer and more sympathetic than it had ever been ; new activities have been developed, new weapons of defence have been pressed into the service, new policies more in conformity with modern developments have been initiated, and with courage, patience, and withal prudence, the ultimate triumph is, we are convinced, assured.

Pius X has himself set the example of activity. With the keen eye of a general marshalling his forces for the fray he has seen the weak spots, and he has had the courage to point them out. The Commissions for the reforming of Canon Law, for the improvement of Church Music, for the unravelling of the Biblical problem, have engaged his sympathetic attention ; the multiplication of congregations and of offices, and of dignities, has not escaped his eagle scrutiny ; his desire to give all parts of the Church due representation in the College of Cardinals has been ex-

emplified by the appointment of a South American Prelate ; new life has been infused into the Roman Universities ; Apostolic Visitors have been appointed for Italy ; the initiation of Provincial instead of Diocesan Seminaries is, we believe, under consideration. His Encyclicals, too, on the Social Question in Italy, on the Teaching of Christian Doctrine throughout the world, his letter to the Austrian Prelates on the ' Los von Rom ' movement in the Dual Empire, his many consistorial references to the present policy of the French Republic, have aroused universal interest. What is best for the present circumstances, not what is most in conformity with traditions is his aim ; and friends and foes alike admit that Pius X is not to be debarred by difficulties from carrying his view into practice.

Politically, too, the power of the Holy See has been sufficiently demonstrated. The representative of the Pope undertook, and successfully carried out, to the satisfaction of the contending parties, an arbitration between Brazil and Bolivia, and later between Brazil and Peru ; the Emperor of Russia has expressed his anxiety to have a regularly accredited Ambassador of Rome at St. Petersburg ; the Sultan of Turkey and the ruler of China were anxious for a Papal representative at Constantinople and Peking ; the Mikado received, in his island kingdom, with every mark of honour, the Extraordinary Envoy of the Pope ; the Kaiser is well known to be playing at Rome for the place vacated by France ; the new King of Norway officially notified his accession to the throne to the Holy See—the first official communication between Rome and Norway since the Reformation ; while in the forthcoming assembly of the Powers at the Hague, it is not improbable that the Holy See will secure the representation in their councils that had been previously refused.

In Italy the relations between Church and State, though remaining essentially the same, have been considerably modified. A spirit of mutual forbearance and conciliation has taken the place of the bitter opposition consequent upon the events of 1870. The utter rout of the forces of anarchy and disorder brought about by the union of Italian

conservatives has not been without its lesson to the Vatican and the Quirinal. Italy has refused to follow in the wake of the anti-Catholic party in France, but she intends to profit by it, in securing for herself, in part at least, the French Protectorate over the Catholic missions. On the other hand, in his Whitsuntide Encyclical, Pius X urged the Catholics to throw themselves into the social work, to form associations on the model of the German Catholic Associations, to dispute the ground with the anti-Catholic socialists, and, eventually, to form a Catholic party to defend Catholic interests in Italy, as the Centre defends them in Germany. It was an appeal for the union of the conservative and radical elements into which the Catholic ranks in Italy had been long divided. Three men, distinguished in economic circles, were appointed to draft the constitution of the new organization, and have since then given the fruits of their labour to the world. But, unfortunately, for the present, the Christian Democrats, or Autonomists, as they are called, have not ceased in their campaign of opposition. We are not, however, without hope that under the stress of circumstances the present bitterness will pass away, and all Italian Catholics will be found united in their allegiance to the policy sketched by Pius X.

There has been a marked revival of Catholic life throughout Italy. In the municipal elections the Catholics, either alone or in alliance with some friendly party, achieved some notable successes; the Holy Father's discourses to the children and the grown-up people of Rome have excited the greatest interest; the efforts of the Catholic bishops to help the poor Italian emigrants have won the marked recognition of the Government and of the King; the jubilee of Bishop Bonnomelli of Cremona, who had done so much for the Italians in the East, was a national festival for Italy, while the death of Mgr. Scalabrini of Piacenza, the friend of the Italian emigrants of the West, was lamented as a national loss. The attitude of the leaders in the literary world has been considerably modified towards the Church. Giovanni Pascoli sang the golden jubilee of

Mgr. Bonnomelli. Fogazzaro organized the celebrations in honour of Cardinal Capecaltro, and Graf has recently announced his conversion to the Catholic faith. The social works initiated by the clergy and by the people, of which the diocese of Bergamo is a standing example, continue to spread rapidly; and on the whole, despite the divisions in Catholic ranks, the Church has no reason to regret her progress in Italy during the year just passed.

In France the policy initiated by M. Waldeck-Rousseau, and in greater part carried out by M. Combes has, at last, under M. Rouvier, been brought to a successful issue. The Church and State are finally divorced. The decree that went forth so often from the Masonic lodges has in the end received the approval of the Chamber and the Senate, and the signature of the President of the French Republic. France as an official Catholic nation has ceased to exist. For Catholics throughout the world, but more especially for Irish Catholics, the news has been a cruel blow, but, it was one for which they were prepared. They may indeed have hoped that the Church would have made a better struggle, they may have counted too much upon the traditional devotion and generosity of the French nation, they may have thought that even in the last moment a man would arise capable of repairing the blunders of the past, and welding together the friends of religion and of liberty, but still they knew that, sooner or later, the divorce must come.

The important question must now be faced, what is to be done under the new conditions? According to the new law the Republic will no longer recognize officially any religion, and will give no aid to its support. The Budget of Worship and all departmental and communal estimates for religious expenses will be suppressed. The ministers of religion who are over sixty years of age, and who have given, at least, thirty years service, are to receive as a pension two-thirds of their present salary, those over forty-five, and who have given over twenty years work, receive one-half, and all others will receive their full salary for the first year after the separation, two-thirds for the

second, one-half for the third, one-third for the fourth, and henceforth the State will recognize no obligations towards them.

The property of the Church in France—cathedrals, churches, seminaries, presbyteries, with all their belongings—will be transferred to the Associations of Worship which will take the place, in a certain sense, of the present *fabriques*. These associations, whose sole object is to be religious, are to consist of seven persons in a parish of one thousand people, of fifteen if the parish has over a thousand and under 20,000, and of twenty-five if the population be greater. These parochial associations can unite together with a central direction and administration, and thus the religious associations in a diocese may be joined together for diocesan interests. They will be recognized by the Government as legal corporations, and will enjoy all the privileges of such. They are to give an account of their work to the people once a year, and their financial status is to be examined by governmental departments.

On this point there are two restrictions to be noted, one of which is injurious to the Church and the other distinctly favourable. These associations can build up a reserve fund, but the extent of that reserve is strictly limited. For associations with 5,000 francs of revenue they can accumulate only a sum equal to three times their annual expense, and for the others the reserve fund must not exceed six times their annual outlay. The reserve must be securely invested; but in addition they may also accumulate a special fund, to be placed in certain investments, for the buying, construction, repair or decoration of property suitable for the objects of the association. On the other hand, it is understood, though the final decision rests with the Council of State, that no association will be recognized unless its priest is in a position to perform the usual duties of a Catholic priest, that is to say, that he is in subjection to his bishop who is himself in communion with Rome. If this interpretation be given to the law, the danger of schism will be, to a great extent, removed.

To these associations of worship will be handed over most of the Church property, the cathedrals, churches, seminaries, presbyteries, etc., with this difference that in case of the churches they are to be handed over gratuitously, but in the case of archiepiscopal and episcopal houses, they are given for only two years, and the seminaries and presbyteries for five years. On the expiration of these terms they become the property of the State or department or commune. But beside this movable and immovable property, the associations can obtain funds by gifts, by collections, by fees for religious ceremonies, by foundations, by hiring out the seats and places in the church, and in many other ways, the only restriction being that they can receive no help from the State under any title whatsoever.

Regulations for securing public order are also introduced. Religious gatherings are under the surveillance of the police; with the mayor lies the regulating of processions and of ringing the bells; heavy fines are levelled against anyone forcing another to join a religious function or to contribute to its expenses, against ministers of religion defaming by sermon or public notice any citizen of France, against any minister of religion who would encourage resistance to the laws, or whose sermons would tend to rouse one party against another. These are the principal clauses of the Bill of Separation.

Now, there are two lines of opinion in France regarding the action that should be taken in the present circumstances. One party would have nothing to do with the new law. They would not organize these associations of worship nor give any countenance to their organization; they maintain that such associations introduce democratic elements into the Church, essentially at variance with her Divine constitution. Besides, they argue, the present law is but the beginning of the persecution. The anti-religious elements are not content, and, as a result, the very earliest opportunity will be utilized to place on the statute-book still more stringent measures. But another, and we think a wiser, party stoutly maintain that Catholics should be up and doing, that they should begin at once the work

of organization, that the principle of lay control of the finances, though not the usual system, is, still, not in opposition to the constitution of the Church, that the fear of future robbery should not prevent the householder from fortifying his house against attack. They point out, too, that what the Church has lost in funds she has gained in freedom; that the appointment of bishops, which hitherto rested with the Government, will now be vested in the Holy See, which will appoint men, not for their political services or their readiness to meet the wishes of the secular power, but for their ability and readiness to defend the interests of the Church; that the fourteen Sees now lying vacant on account of the action of the present Ministry can at once be filled, and that with good bishops to guide the fortunes of the Church, the present crisis will soon pass away, and in the end Catholicity will progress as it has progressed in the English-speaking countries.

The opinions of these latter will, we trust, prevail, but until the regulations of the Council of State for the enforcement of the law are seen, and especially until the Holy Father has spoken, it is not safe to give a very definite opinion. Pius X has followed the course of events in France with anxious attention. He has heard the views of all parties expounded by their ablest exponents; he has around him many devoted counsellors who are in close touch with the state of affairs in France; he has no interests to seek except the welfare of the Church, and, therefore, he is in a position to pronounce an impartial verdict on the new law, and to give an authoritative declaration on the policy which should be adopted by French Catholics. We are confident that he will soon publish his views, and we trust that they will be loyally accepted by all.

But, if Catholics have reason to regret the state of affairs in France, they have still better grounds to rejoice at the position of the Church in the German Empire. What a change since the days of the Kulturkampf under the Iron Chancellor? The Kulturkampf and its authors are gone, but the fruit of their work remains, and is repre-

sented by the Centre party in the Reichstag, which party in itself is typical of the perfectly organized forces of German Catholicism. It is now the most powerful section of the German representatives, counting one hundred pledged members, and, in union with the Alsatians, Poles, Guelfs, etc., can command over one hundred and thirty votes on any religious question. The Emperor perfectly recognizes that the Centre is the only real bulwark against the advancing tide of Socialism, and hence his readiness to comply with the demands of the party. Nor are there any signs of weakness or decay to be found in the Centre. The recent elections in Bavaria were a sweeping triumph for the Catholics over the Liberals, and in Baden, too, they have achieved some notable successes. The Catholic Congress held this year in Strasburg, was even more imposing than before, and the utmost unanimity marked the proceedings. Persecution was advantageous to Germany. It welded together the Catholic forces, and we are not without hope that it may produce the same effect in France.

Perhaps the most interesting development in the Empire during the past year was the attacks made upon the Catholic student societies at the German universities. For over sixty years the Catholic societies have existed at the universities. The necessity for such separate foundations will be evident, if it be remembered that most of the student bodies are organized on a duelling basis, or recognize the lawfulness of such forms of 'satisfaction.' The motto of the Catholic societies, on the contrary, is religion, science and good-fellowship. In recent years many new societies were formed, the work of organization was perfected, and the Catholics had secured a position at the German universities that they could have never hoped for without such union. The result was noticeable, both in the tone of the universities themselves, and in the public life of the country.

The extreme Protestant parties took alarm at the spread and success of the movement. The Evangelische Bund, corresponding more or less with 'The Protestant Alliance' of these countries, passed resolutions condemning the

Catholic student societies, and calling upon the Government to suppress them. Their cry was the freedom of university life. Young men, they said, going to the universities should begin life without guiding strings, they should be at liberty to select for themselves in religion and politics, and the Catholic societies were a menace to the intellectual and political life of the Empire. The agitation soon spread. Jena was the first place to adopt their resolutions and the technical schools of Hanover were not slow to follow the example, and in the February Re-union at Eisenach the decree of dissolution against the Catholic societies was pronounced. The matter was brought before the Reichstag. The Catholic students were ably defended by Dr. Porsch, himself a member of a Catholic student society—and the Chamber was practically unanimous in condemning the agitation.

In May, the Minister of Education summoned the Rectors of the universities to a conference, and the student societies were one of the items for discussion. The Minister insisted that the students were free to do as they pleased—to join any or no society—and he called upon the rectors to allow no intimidation or persecution of the free corporations. His instructions did not put an end to the controversy, a campaign of boycott was initiated, but the Catholic students were not to be easily crushed. Their answer to the agitation was the foundation of many new societies, and nobody who saw them march through the streets of Freiburg to High Mass, last summer, or through Strasburg at the Catholic Re-union of Germany, could have any fear that they mean to barter one iota of their freedom or their principles, even at the bidding of the Evangelische Bund.

For Catholics throughout the Russian Empire the recent disasters have not been without good fruit. Religious as well as political liberty has been granted by the recent Imperial decrees. But in no other part of the Empire has the Church benefited more than in Poland. There the freedom of religion was hedged round by many restrictions. The priests were at best only ticket-of-leave men; they

could not go outside their parish without special permission, and re-unions were almost an impossibility. Religious instruction in Polish was forbidden, and in the schools Polish was ruthlessly pursued. But the recent war disasters put an end to such autocratic rule. The Russian popular assembly is certain to be favourable to Poland, as is shown in the resolutions of the Zemstovs in Moscow.

The first result of the Imperial decrees may be seen in the territory of the 'Uniate' Ruthenians. These unfortunate people were betrayed by their Metropolitan. They had been in communion with Rome, but their Primate joined the 'orthodox' Church years ago, and they suddenly found themselves registered as orthodox. They were commanded to conform to the orthodox religion, their priests were banished, their churches sequestered. Persecution followed persecution, in spite of the protests of the Holy See, but the poor unfortunate people refused to accept the orthodox faith. The result was that they were left without the Sacraments of the Church, except Baptism, which they administered themselves; they assembled in the woods or private houses for their devotions. They remained devoted to Rome in spirit, though separated from it by force, and, as soon as the Imperial ukase appeared they hastened to put themselves into communication with Rome. The result is that the Church has gained an immense number of recruits in the last six months; by many it is estimated that over half a million have declared themselves Catholics, anxious to remain in submission to Rome. Whole villages have turned over at the same time. These are only the first fruits of the new awakening in Russia, and still more important developments may be expected in the near future.

The state of Catholicity in the Dual Empire (Austria and Hungary) is not entirely satisfactory. We fear that there, too, the evils of State control are only too visible and that an effort must be made if the Church is to maintain her position. But it is pleasing to know that there is new life and energy in the Catholic ranks. After the

Papal Letter to the Austrian Bishops on the 'Los von Rom' movement—a proselytizing movement adopted by the Pan-Germanic party—serious steps are being taken to combat the evils. Societies are being formed, churches are being built, collections are being organized to send priests into the districts hitherto neglected. The religious character of the schools is engaging serious attention, and an effort is being made to found a new Catholic University at Salzbourg. How far such a step is prudent in Austria at present, we leave it to the organizers to determine. Unfortunately, the Catholic parties are not unanimous in regard to the line of action to be pursued, and the present political troubles between Austria and Hungary have tended to throw the religious programme into the background. But the recent re-union of the Austrian Catholics may help to put an end to their dissensions, and if they were only united, the new energy in the Catholic ranks would give us hope for the future of Austria.

We can merely glance at the remaining Continental countries. In Belgium the Catholic party still controls the Government, and bids fair to control it for a long time to come, though we are still uncertain whether it is wise to identify the interests of the Church with the fortunes of a political party so closely as has been done; in Holland the Catholics form about one-third of the population, and the Catholic representatives hold the balance of power between the Evangelicals and the Socialists; in Switzerland the position of the Catholics could hardly be more encouraging; in Sweden there is a Catholic population of two thousand, with a Vicar-Apostolic and sixteen priests; in Norway the number is a little higher; in Denmark the figure reaches about seven thousand. Spain, if anything, has improved under its excellent young Catholic king, and Portugal is no worse than it has been for years.

Before passing to other countries it might be well to call attention to the serious struggle which the Church is forced to sustain throughout the world in defence of religious education. In Ireland and England our readers

are perfectly familiar with the difficulties of the situation ; in France religion has been banished from the schools, but we hope the scholars are still not neglected ; in Italy religious instruction used to be given unless the parents object—now, unfortunately, the parents must demand it ; in Austria and Belgium there is danger brewing ; in America separate schools still keep their flag flying, as is shown by the Sheedy Report in the recent blue book on education ; in Canada the Laurier compromise has secured Catholic teachers for Catholic children in the north-western territories ; in Australia the bishops have reasons for protesting against the system ; and in New Zealand the united Hierarchy have registered their objection against wholesale Bible reading in the public schools. The cause of religious education is a sacred one and an important one, and from this brief epitome of the state of affairs throughout the world, it will be evident that the enemies of the Church are sparing no pains to secure the ultimate triumph of secularism. It behoves Catholics to note the turn which affairs are taking, and to determine upon the line of defence best suited to modern requirements.

In the United States Catholics have no reason to regret the work that has been done in recent years. According to the *Willzius Directory* (1905) there are now under the United States jurisdiction, 22,127,354 Catholics—that is to say, about twelve millions on the mainland, over one million in Porto Rico, and seven millions in the Philippine Islands. Great sacrifices are being made to maintain the separate Catholic schools. New York alone has paid out 4,839,000 dollars for its sixty schools, frequented by 40,000 pupils, and their annual cost exceeds 320,000 dollars. By the recent decision of the President we understand that the Indian Catholic schools can receive an endowment from the funds annually devoted to the Indians in lieu of regular government withdrawn since 1899. New dioceses have been formed, and new activity is evidenced by the Federation of Catholic Workmen's Societies, and, in the literary world, by the project of publishing a scholarly and scientific Catholic encyclopædia.

The need of such a publication has long been felt. Encyclopædias, indeed, there are in sufficient numbers in the English language, but a glance at a few of the articles will be sufficient to prove how little the writers understood or appreciated Catholic beliefs and sentiments. It is to such books that Catholics must at present have recourse, if they want to procure the information they require; and the influence for evil upon their readers is sufficiently evident from the work the Encyclopædists did in undermining the faith of the French nation. Hence it is, that a number of Catholic scholars in America have determined to do for the English language what has been already done for the French and the German. The names of the committee, embracing, as it does, the foremost Catholic scholars in America, some of them Professors at the Catholic University, are a sufficient guarantee that the work will be done in a scholarly style. Writers have been secured throughout the English-speaking Catholic world, and the publishers are prepared to spare no expense to make the encyclopædia not unworthy of the Catholic faith. We wish the project every success.

There is, too, another institution on American soil to which Irish Catholics turn with sympathy and confidence—the Catholic University at Washington. They look to it as the crowning and completion of the great work of education done by Catholics in the States; they recognize its necessity, they know its capabilities, and they are confident that under its present management it will satisfy all their expectations. Difficulties it has met with, we admit, friends have not rallied round it as they might have done; its financial reverses would have broken the courage of less devoted labourers; but, as Cardinal Gibbons put it in his memorable letter, the honour of Catholic America is pledged for its success, and Catholic America seldom knows failure. The Pope has blessed the work, the bishops are at present unanimous in its support; an annual collection taken up through the States about the beginning of Advent has been inaugurated; the present financial status, though far from perfect, is reassuring;

and with its excellent staff we are confident the number of its students will equal that of the leading American universities. It requires time, no doubt, before the necessity of such an institution is recognized in certain circles, but nowadays we would fain believe that the recognition is universal.

In Australia and New Zealand the progress of the Church has been completely satisfactory. In 1904 a great Catholic Congress was held at Melbourne, attended by representatives from all parts of Australia, and the report of the proceedings prove beyond doubt the vitality and the advance of the Church in Australia. During the present year the Australian Hierarchy met together at Sydney, under the presidency of Cardinal Moran, and in their joint pastoral issued to the Australian people the progress in the Church is sufficiently indicated :—

The period [they say] has been one of quiet growth and consolidation rather than of that pioneer missionary expansion which was distinctive of earlier periods of our history. Our Catholic population in Australia has grown to something over a million (1,011,550). The clergy number over thirteen hundred ; the teaching brothers over six hundred ; the nuns over five thousand five hundred. We maintain thirty-three colleges for boys, and one hundred and sixty-nine boarding schools for girls ; two hundred and fifteen superior day-schools, ten hundred and eighty-seven primary schools, ninety-four charitable institutions, and the children in Catholic schools number over one hundred and twenty-seven thousand. From these figures it can be seen that although ours is a land which has developed and grown with the rapidity of adolescence, the Church has progressed also, even so as to keep well to the front among the most progressive institutions of the country.

The news of the progress of Catholicity in Australia was welcome to Catholics throughout the world but especially did it send a thrill of pleasure through Irish hearts. Under the Southern Cross many of our exiled countrymen have found a home, and the interests of the Church there are in the hands of Irish ecclesiastics. Their devotion to their Mother Church and country was appropriately expressed in their address to the Hierarchy of Ireland, and in the name of Catholic Australia Cardinal Moran, a few days ago,

sent his touching message of sympathy to the representatives of the Irish nation.

For the Catholic Missions, too, the year 1905 has not been an unfavourable one. It was feared that the religious disturbances in France would have had a disastrous effect in places far remote from France, for, as everyone knows, French Catholics have been the mainstays of missionary efforts during the last one hundred years. French men and French money were freely placed at the disposal of the Church, and we are confident, even in these dark days, that God will not desert a nation which has done so much to spread the Gospel light. It is true, no doubt, that the banishment or suppression of the religious Orders and the diplomatic rupture with the Vatican have had injurious effects on the Catholic missions; and nowadays with the separation of Church and State, when the people will be obliged to contribute to the support of their pastors and of the Church, it will be impossible to expect that there will not be a diminution in the amount of French contributions to the Propagation of the Faith and other kindred societies.

But the Providence of God is watching over the Church. If one race or nation fail, another arises to take its place. Germany, which till recent years did comparatively little in the missionary field, is rapidly coming to the front. Numerous societies have been established throughout Austria and Germany for the spread of the Gospel, for collecting funds and for training missionaries. The Emperor, too, is not unconscious of the advantage such efforts might bring to the State in developing the sphere of German influence in distant lands. He recognizes to the full, what France has gained by its protectorate over the Christian missions of the East, and in the present crisis he hopes that Germany might occupy the place vacated by its rival. America, too, bids fair to excel in its contributions towards the funds of the Catholic missions. It was only in 1897 that the Council of American Bishops officially took up the work of the Propagation of the Faith, and warmly recommended it to the generosity of American Catholics. Nor has their appeal been long without a

gratifying response. According to the most recent reports the diocese of Boston has actually contributed more money than the great diocese of Lyons, which is the home of the organization, and which for eighty-two years has headed the list ; and many other American dioceses have been almost equally generous in their subscriptions. There is, then, no fear that the Catholic missionary forces will be crippled for want of funds, and, despite the few reverses which even this year they have met with, the progress of the missions has been steady and re-assuring.

In England, during the year that is passed, the question of education has been most prominent in Catholic quarters. The Bill of 1902, though good, in so far as it recognizes the rights of parents to the religious education of their children, has not been working so smoothly as many of its supporters anticipated. When the local authorities are unfriendly, difficulties of all kinds have been put in the way of the Catholic schools. The premises were condemned, or the teachers were underpaid, as in London, or the necessity for separate schools was disregarded. With patience and determination perhaps the difficulties will pass away : but, without professing to possess an intimate acquaintance with all its workings, we must admit that we have for the future the gravest fears.

The limit of compromise has at least been reached, and, we think, Catholics can surrender nothing more without surrendering principles for which the Catholic Church has maintained many a severe struggle. Hence it is that friends were shocked and alarmed at one incident in the history of the school question last year, namely, what was known as the Bradford Concordat. There, the Catholic authorities seemed to have agreed to hand over a Catholic secondary school to the management of a committee, two-thirds of whom were to be elected by the City Council and only one-third by the trustees. Teachers were to be appointed without any reference to their religious beliefs, and no religious education was to be given in school hours, or to be paid for from the public rates. The principle of Catholic teachers for Catholic children is, we think, the main

contention of the Catholics, and no compromise surrendering such a principle could be tolerated. Fortunately, the Catholic Education Council promptly condemned the Concordat, the Bishops expressed their approval of the form and substance of the condemnation, and, as a result, the Catholics who had signed the agreement withdrew from the understanding. Such weakness, though in the most difficult circumstances, does much to injure the Catholic position.

What fortune the present year may have in store for the Catholic schools of England we do not profess to know. The policy of the Liberal Government depends upon so many factors, at present uncertain, that no man, short of a prophet, could hope to foretell what the next few months may bring to light. That the Education Act of 1902 will be modified we have very little doubt ; but that the Catholic schools of England will suffer by the modifications we have not the slightest fear. The separate treatment of Catholic schools may, indeed, be the solution, and though the separate treatment has been time and again severely criticised, we are not yet convinced that it involves any certain risk of future ruin. It would, indeed, be a privilege, but it would be a privilege for which Catholics have made a sacrifice never made, and never likely to be made, by any other Christian denomination. It would be a privilege, too, guaranteed by a Liberal Government, and Tory Administrations, are not, from their principles, opposed to such privileges. But whatever be the plan proposed, of one thing we are confident, and that is, that the interests of the Catholic schools of England are safe in the hands of the Irish party. However much the party may have reason to resent the attitude of some of the leaders and organs of English Catholic Toryism, they have pledged themselves to maintain the cause of Catholic education, and they are not accustomed to shirk their pledges. But if they are prepared to do the work, if they are prepared to undertake the responsibility, and in their present position the responsibility is a serious one, surely they should be allowed to measure the ground for themselves, and to select the spot best suited for manœuvring.

In Ireland, too, the Education question, primary, secondary, and University, has been the main topic of discussion in Catholic circles during the year 1905. The Commissioners of National Education by their amalgamation tendencies, and their withdrawal of fees for the teaching of the Irish language, have aroused popular feeling against them as it has hardly ever before been aroused. How long they can continue under present circumstances in setting at defiance the protests of managers, teachers, and people yet remains to be seen. Thinking men are at last waking up to recognize the anomalous position which Trinity College holds in the educational advance of the Irish nation. If indeed it were an Irish University, progressive with the progress of the times, anxious for the development of the mental and material resources of Ireland, proud of the Irish literary and historical treasures left to it to unfold—we could well understand why Dublin University should exercise a predominant influence over secondary and primary education in Ireland. But, there it stands on Irish soil indeed, but almost the only English institution which has remained for centuries uninfluenced by its Irish surroundings. With its immense revenues, drawn for the most part from Irish sources, it has persistently refused to suit its teaching to Irish requirements or Irish sentiments, with the result that foreigners have had to be summoned to superintend the industrial development, and foreign scholars—French and German and Italian and Danish—have had to undertake the publication of Irish manuscripts, many of which are safely lodged in the Library of Trinity College. Unfitted by its constitution to advance with the progress of the times, it has either stood still or gone back when similar institutions were advancing, and now it stands an object of contempt for any one who understands the work a national university should accomplish. Yet, it is such an establishment as this, itself above all examination or supervision, outside the sphere of every commission or report, that manages to control, to a great extent, the secondary and primary education of the country. We trust that the recognition of such an anomaly will soon be

universal, and that the recognition may bring the country relief from such a reactionary influence.

The University grievance was well kept before public attention during the year. This is in itself a distinct gain, for one of the great difficulties in the way of some settlement is, the fact that the mass of the people have never realized the importance and necessity of such an institution. In the early part of the year the Trinity College Scholarships—consisting partly of College foundations and partly from funds supplied by Sir John Nutting—opened the eyes of the people that Trinity College, with its falling numbers and its shattered reputation, was willing to stoop to any methods that might fill its vacant halls. The proposers of such a plan must surely have lived all their lives inside the walls of Trinity College, else they would have better realized the feelings which such a bribe was likely to evoke amongst the Irish people. The Bishops promptly expressed their condemnation of such a scheme, and strengthened their condemnation by establishing a number of Scholarships themselves for the most promising Intermediate students. The scheme of Scholarships has been taken up by some representative bodies throughout the country, and it is possible that in this direction some little might be done, not indeed to solve the question, but to relieve the most glaring wants of the present intolerable position. But as things stand at present, where there is no guarantee of permanency, representation, or effective control, the people will never rally whole-heartedly to such a scheme. Still the number of new forces and elements in the field give us hope for the future of the question. The Gaelic League, the Graduates' Association, the Maynooth Union—not to speak of a host of individuals—have each in turn submitted their views on the situation, and suggested the remedies which they thought best. It may be that with the advent of the new Government the prospect of a settlement will be brighter, but at the worst they cannot be darker than under the last Administration.

JAMES MACCAFFREY.

RELIGION AS A CREDIBLE DOCTRINE

AS no satisfactory answer has yet been given, from a Catholic standpoint, to Mr. Mallock's work on the *Credibility of Religion*, we have thought that it should not be allowed to pass out of sight without some notice from us. Immortality, Free-will, and the Existence of God—Mr. Mallock understands by Religion, assent to the existence of these three things as objective facts—have ever been absorbing themes of philosophical speculation. But other and more personal motives have led us to the study of Mr. Mallock's book. *Religion as a Credible Doctrine* is of particular interest to students of Neo-Scholastic philosophy, for this reason, that it purposes to be a reasoned denial of the possibility of Neo-Scholasticism. Neo-Scholasticism professes to base on the findings of modern science an intellectualistic thesis affirming the existence of God, Free-will, and Immortality as objective certainties. Mr. Mallock concludes 200 pages of detailed argument thus:—

If we fix our minds on the great primary doctrines . . . and if we compare them honestly with the actual facts of the universe, as science, by research and experiment, is day after day revealing them, we find that these doctrines thus tested are reduced to dreams and impossibilities—that in the universe of law and reason there is nowhere a place left for them.

There is more. Mr. Mallock proceeds to build up what he has thrown down. How? As Kant in the eighteenth century, by proving that Practical Reason—or, as Mr. Mallock calls it, 'the subjective value of things which make up the practical life of all men'—postulates Free-will, Immortality, and God. This conclusion opened up a new problem. Kant, living in the eighteenth century, might write a 'Critic of Pure Reason' and a 'Critic of Practical Reason,' and bestow on posterity the legacy of their re-

conciliation, but Mr. Mallock, writing in the twentieth century, was bound to face frankly the problem of the reconciliation of two contradictory conclusions. Honesty is at times inconvenient, whatever the makers of proverbs may say. While loudly disclaiming any intentions of emulating Hegel, Mr. Mallock closes his book as follows :—

Here, then, we find ourselves standing between two worlds—the cosmic world, with all that is implied in it, on the one hand ; and the moral world, with all that is implied in it, on the other. Such being the case, when we consider either of these two worlds separately, we assert, as reasonable men, that each is no less real than the other ; in experience, moreover, both these worlds are united ; and yet, when the intellect compares them, we find that the two are contradictory. As reasonable beings we can unite these two incompatible worlds in a single reasonable synthesis by one means only ; . . . we must learn, in short, that with regard to the deep things of life, that the fact of our adopting a creed which involves an assent to contradictories is not a sign that our creed is useless or absurd. . . .

In reviewing *Religion as a Credible Doctrine* we are bound therefore to enter on a treatment of such interesting problems as the possibility of Neo-Scholasticism, the value of the Kantian Basis of Metaphysics, and the value of Neo-Hegelianism.

A word about method. Mr. Mallock singles out Father

reader the decision of the worth of our own efforts, we are confident that we have loyally set forth every argument and fact of importance adduced by Mr. Mallock in favour of his theories.

I.—MR. MALLOCK ON IMMORTALITY

The first argument generally advanced by religious apologists runs thus: Intellect is a faculty specifically distinct from sense as is proved by the fact that it acts, and particularly that act known as self-consciousness, display aptitudes fundamentally opposed to the known properties of matter. Such absolute contrariety, which, be it noted, is admitted by atheistic scientists, proves that the intellect, or the rational soul of man, is essentially distinct from the body, and is therefore capable of surviving it. A belated, and self-contradictory, and yet most popular fallacy—is Mr. Mallock's comment on this argument.

Everyone assents to the unimaginable nature of the connexion between consciousness and organized matter; but everyone, including our religious apologists, admits that this connexion is a fact. Now, asks Mr. Mallock, is not the alleged fact of necessary separability just as difficult to imagine, and just as contrary to analogy, as the admitted fact of connexion? The argument is an assumption that the unimaginable cannot exist; whereas, the very phenomenon of the admitted connexion is unimaginable, and one alternative explanation of it is just as unimaginable as the other. Again, the religious apologist admits the unimaginable in admitting that spatial pressure can excite non-spatial pain. And if non-spatial pain cannot exist, as the religious apologist holds it cannot, without the spatial pressure that excites it, how can it be self-evident that non-spatial intellect is essentially independent of the operations of the spatial brain?

Finally, there is the same apparent contrariety between the consciousness of the brute and matter as there is between matter and the consciousness of man, and therefore this first argument of the religious apologist shows that pigs have immortal souls, or does nothing to show that men have.

The second argument of the religious apologist is an attempt to demonstrate, by the ordinary methods of observation, that man and man only possesses the various faculties that comprise Intellect—attention, judgment, reflection, self-consciousness, the formation of concepts, and the processes of reasoning. Let us take these faculties *seriatim*, observes Mr. Mallock, and see if observation and experience warrant us in maintaining that in all living creatures, with the sole exception of man, all trace of every one of these faculties is wanting.

Let us begin with attention, judgment, and reflection.

Does the elephant when he feels a bridge, before he will trust his weight to it, not judge and reflect in an obvious and appreciable manner? Does not a dog judge and reflect when he moves aside just in time to avoid a stone thrown at him, the speed of which he must have accurately gauged, discriminating between swift and slow? And yet again, do animals never show attention? Does a horse, a dog, or a deer, hearing some sound, never start, then stand motionless, and then bound away?

Next, let us take self-consciousness. The question is not—as the religious apologist puts it—whether there is not an obvious difference between the operations of the mind of a Descartes speculating on the Ego, and any operation we can assign to the mind of a dog, an ape, or an elephant, but whether the highest mental operations of dog, ape, or elephant are inferior in a greater degree to those of a new-born baby, than those of the new-born baby, speechless, and so wanting in reason, that it does not know that its own leg is its own, are inferior to the mental operations of the poet, the mathematician, and the philosopher. We are inquiring whether the animal nature has really an unbroken connection with human nature, or no; and, therefore, we must take on the one hand the faculties of the higher animals, and on the other those of the new-born babe.

Is there, then, the smallest warrant for saying that the highest animal at the highest stage of its development recognizes itself as an Ego in a manner demonstrably different from that in which the human being recognizes

itself at its lowest stage. Baby, for a considerable, time does not know it has a self; and even when its mental development has begun to be clearly perceptible—when it first cries for its pap-bottle, or for a piece of rubber to bite upon—who can say that its consciousness of its own self is clearer than that of a dog fighting for a bone with another dog? If there is no break—and we know there is none—between the consciousness of the full-grown man and the baby's, how can we pretend that, as an actual and demonstrable fact, an impassable gulf yawns between the baby's consciousness and the dog's?

But now, observes Mr. Mallock, we approach the apologist's citadel—the formation of concepts. The essence of a concept is this: it is a general idea of a thing as distinct from any particular specimen of it—for instance, a general idea of milk as distinct from the milk in this jug or in that jug. The apologist maintains that the philosophy of the cradle abounds in such concepts—for instance, 'milk nice,' or the infant naturalist's classification of the first horse as a 'big bow-wow.' The animal, on the other hand, is conscious of nothing but a multitude of individual things. But, rejoins Mr. Mallock, does not a cat realize as a fact, which is true generally, that milk is nice, just as clearly as a child does? It knows by the look and smell of it without tasting it that the milk in this particular saucer is a specimen of a fluid whose niceness it has learnt already. Does not the dog recognize other dogs as creatures belonging to the same species as its own? Do not cows and horses, who have been at first frightened by trains, reach, when they have ceased to be frightened by them, to some such conclusion as, 'trains not dangerous'? The animal's judgments are at all events more clear than the baby's, and certainly do not show signs of so great a distance from the child's, as the child's show from those of the mature philosopher.

Having thus satisfied himself of the insufficiency of these two main contentions of the religious apologist, Mr. Mallock passes on to the examination of some less important arguments.

Firstly, it is asserted that men alone are capable of disinterested and reasonable affection. Is this true? How is it evident that the dog who watches by his dead master's body is animated by a feeling of a kind radically different from the feelings of a human mother who watches by her dead child?

Secondly, it is maintained that animals, unlike men, make no progress. This statement, according to Mr. Mallock, is the very reverse of the truth, if we apply it to mankind at large. Tribes of savages exist to-day, who are still in the condition of the men of the Stone Age. While in itself the Stone Age reduces, in point of duration, the age of historical progress to less than a bustling yesterday in the life of a man of sixty. On the other hand, the progress of man in the arts is admittedly due, in a very great degree to a purely physical superiority—the adaptable human hand. If men, then, with human hands have remained stationary for countless thousands of years, why need the fact that animals have remained stationary also prove that, besides lacking the hand, they must have been lacking in every faculty that can be called intellectual likewise?

Thirdly, the apologists tell us that Physiology cannot locate the higher mental faculties. It seems, therefore, that the higher mental faculties can employ, within limits, any portion of the brain indifferently; and it is concluded that these higher faculties are demonstrably separable from matter. This alleged fact, observes Mr. Mallock, is one no physiologist will admit. Some religious apologists base the fact on Goltz's experiments. Unfortunately for them, Goltz's experiments were made on dogs!

Fourthly, Science, according to these apologists, cannot point any difference between the animal brain and the human brain sufficient to account for the admitted superiority of man's powers; therefore, man's superior powers are demonstrably independent of the brain. What is the fact? Flechsig, a distinguished physiologist, and one cited frequently by apologists, declares that in the thought-centres of the brain, which are distinguished by their

structure from the sense-centres, man does possess precisely that degree of peculiarity which analogy might lead us to expect as an explanation of his mental pre-eminence.

Finally, all these apologetic arguments are based on the supposition that by observation, inference, or otherwise, we can learn, with approximate accuracy, what the mental life of the animals is. Yet these same apologists admit that 'our assurance with regard to their (the animals) subjective states can never be more than a remote conjectural opinion.' What, then, becomes of the whole argument in favour of man's immortality?

At this point, Mr. Mallock passes on to consider the case of the other side. 'We have listened to religious dualism attacking scientific monism. Let us now listen to scientific monism as stating its own case : it attacks religious dualism.'

To enable his readers to grasp the full strength of the scientific, Mr. Mallock insists on the fact, and cites names thereto, that modern apologists recognize the claim put forward by science to interpret the universe so far as the universe is accessible to it, and recognize also the substantial truth of the conclusions which thus far it has reached. That evolution, for instance, explains a vast number of phenomena which were formerly regarded as due to separate acts of God, that it explains, in particular, the variety of living species as a result of a continuous and single process rather than as a result of a number of isolated and arbitrary interferences—this all educated apologists are in these days eager to declare that they accept as fully, and with as little fear, as their opponents. Yet, they are ever nervously on the watch to discover limitations and flaws. They fail to understand that whilst, on the one hand, lacunæ have been discovered in the class of evidence with which, in a special manner, the name of Darwin is associated, other evidences of the doctrine for which Darwin contended—namely, the essential unity of man with the other animals—have accumulated in overwhelming strength and have done more to make the doctrine a demonstrable indeed a visible, fact, than any of the detected lacunæ

have done, or can do, to cast doubt upon it. Thus, within the last quarter of the nineteenth century, it has been demonstrated, firstly, that the evolution of the individual man is identical with the evolution of the animals most closely allied to him; and, secondly, that the organic evolution of the individual—human and animal equally—is in each case an epitome of the long evolution of the species. We will deal with these two facts separately.

And, first, for the comparison of the embryonic evolution of man and the allied animals. The first act of the great drama of conception is common to man and to the animals most nearly allied to him—one of those minute, ciliated cells, known as spermatozoa, is admitted within the female ovum, and the egg-cell, barren of itself, becomes the source of life. As the drama proceeds, the identity of its incidents, in all these cases, continues; not only that, but the mode of origin in the parent body of these two protagonists, the male cell and the female cell, is the same. 'The embryo of the man and of the anthropoid ape retain their resemblance much later—at an advanced stage of development—when their distinction from the embryos of other animals may be seen at a glance.' It is impossible to elucidate such facts as these, except by the assumption that these animals have a common parentage.

But, pursues Mr. Mallock, more important embryological discoveries remain. Ontogenesis is the brief and rapid recapitulation of phylogenesis: that is to say,—alike in the case of man, and of the animal species generally, that gradual and slow development of the species from lower forms to higher may be seen taking place with the rapidity of a brief epitome in the embryo of each individual living creature from the moment of its conception till the final moment of its birth. Of this truth it will be enough to give two illustrations.

One is the fact that in the embryo of man and of the allied animals, the gill-clefts of our far-off aquatic ancestors emerge and subsequently disappear. Thus, the supposition of aquatic ancestry, treated with such injudicious scorn by the theologians, is attested afresh by the evidence of a

living document every time a child is conceived and grows to maturity within the womb.

A second, and more familiar fact, gives us a daily miniature reproduction of the great process of evolution, in virtue of which we are men, and not frog-like things ourselves—it is the transformation of the tadpole, an animal that swims in the water, into a frog, an animal that hops on land. We have here the ancient development of the land animals from the fishes re-enacted for us in the open light of day.

And there is more to add. As the embryo of the baby recapitulates the evolution of man as an organism, so does the progress of the baby from an unthinking to a thinking being recapitulate the evolution of the specifically human intellect; and each mother who has watched with pride, as something peculiar and original, the growth of her child's mind, from the days of the cradle to the days of the first lesson book, has really been watching, compressed into a few brief years, the stupendous process which began in the darkest abyss of time, and connects our thoughts, like our bodies, with the primary living substance—whether that be wholly identical with matter or no.

What are the existing lacunæ in that mass of circumstantial evidence collected by evolutionists compared to the overwhelming unanimity with which all this cloud of witnesses declare that all life is, in kind and origin, the same? The history of religious apologists of recent years has been that of a long series of failures. Time after time, scientific conclusions were pronounced false, because positive proof was wanting for this or that detail; and lo! in the midst of the theological jubilation the missing proof has often been found. Such occurrences should be a warning to these apologists who favour the gaps-in-existing-evidence arguments.

Before quitting the question of man's immortality, Mr. Mallock employs an *argumentum ad hominem*, and from the satisfaction he takes in exposing and developing it, he clearly thinks that he is giving the *coup de grâce*. When, asks Mr. Mallock, is this imperishable soul introduced into

its perishable envelope ? At the moment when the male spermatozoon and the female ovum coalesced. Now, argues Mr. Mallock, since the entire animal life, vegetative and sentient, is one ; and since the animal life is derived entirely from the parents, and the indivisible human life is not—it follows, that whilst the animal ovum and the animal spermatozoon contain in themselves necessarily the principle of life from the first, the human ovum and the human spermatozoon are, before their coalescence, so much below the animal that they do not contain in themselves any principle of life at all. Animal life arises from organic matter that is living. Human life from organic matter that is dead !

If we look back, says Mr. Mallock, over this aggregate of facts and arguments, one conclusion and only one, leaps into light, that whilst life endures, the individual lives, dies—dies as the rose dies, never to bloom again ; and that the mystery of the man's life and the mystery of the pig's are one.

Here we have only been able to present a summary of Mr. Mallock's arguments on one particular phase of the great question he discusses. Editorial tyranny compels us to reserve our criticism of these arguments till next month.

JOHN O'NEILL, Ph.D.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND HUMAN LIBERTY—V

IN my last article I described the position of the Catholic Church in relation to science and scientific liberty ; and in the present article I purpose to deal with the doctrine and discipline of the Catholic Church in relation to educational liberty, as it affects the Family, the State, the Founder of a private school, the Teacher. Are Catholic parents free to choose the school, the college, the university they think best, for the education of their children ? Is the Catholic State free to adopt the system of education it considers the most perfect and the most suitable to the circumstances of the time, to establish a neutral or purely secular system of education, to oblige by law all children to attend the State schools and forbid the opening of private schools ? Are the laity of the Catholic Church free to open schools and to teach, or are they excluded from the teaching profession ? What is the measure of freedom accorded to Catholic teachers in the course of instruction which they deliver to their pupils ?

I will begin with a brief exposition of the rights and duties of parents in regard to the education of their children ; then I will pass on to describe how schools and colleges and universities should be constituted, according to the laws of the Church, in Catholic countries ; and from this we can infer what the attitude of the Church is, and whether it is reasonable or unreasonable, towards freedom of education, whether of the primary, intermediate or university order.

I.

Rationalist socialists advocate the theory that the child is born not into the family but into the State, and that it is the State and not the parents that has the right and is directly charged with the duty of determining the manner of the rearing and education of the infant citizen. But here the Church intervenes to define and vindicate the rights

and liberties of parents against this theory of the absolutism of the State. According to the Catholic theory the child is born into the family, and only through the family into the State. If a family lived apart, isolated and separated from all those aggregations of human families that we call States, the parents surely would have the right and the duty of determining and supplying the means of physical subsistence and of mental and moral training to their children, and these rights are not surrendered or sacrificed by entrance into the corporate civic life of the State. Citizenship does not carry with it the loss of parental rights, but offers to parents facilities for the discharge of their parental duties through the ministry of others, for example in schools, which would not exist if they lived isolated and external to the social life of the State. It is not the province nor indeed the practice of the Civil Authority to interfere in the internal affairs of the family, in the domestic arrangements, in the relations between father and son, in the system of education which a mother adopts in teaching her infant children, whether it be wholly secular or wholly religious or a combination of religious and secular instruction, but only to correct excesses and to supplement the efforts or supply for the deficiency or inability of parents by establishing schools for the education of the young.

In the miniature kingdom of the home the parents reign supreme, the father and the mother are the king and queen, and the children are at once a part of the parental being and the subjects or citizens of the kingdom of the household. And how are the parents to govern the household, what are their duties towards their youthful subjects? After Baptism their duties are of a material order, to provide for the life and physical development of the infant; but with the opening and expansion of reason new duties succeed one another, to minister to the mind suitable religious and secular instruction and to the will education or moral formation, to develop a sense of duty towards God, towards parents, towards the different orders of superiors, towards mankind generally, towards oneself, to sow the seeds of good habits, to cultivate a great admiration for Christian and civic virtue

and a feeling of disapproval and reprobation of vice and particularly of national vices. They are bound to govern the household so as to present to the State, when their children come to have independent and responsible relations with their fellow-citizens and enter into the life of direct personal responsibility to the civil authority, strong, earnest, industrious, trained, educated, morally-disciplined, devoted subjects ; and to the spiritual kingdom of the Church men of faith and of hope and of charity and of obedience, who will combine in their lives the virtues of good citizens and good Christians.

II.

I pass on to consider what should be the scope and constitution of primary schools according to the Catholic ideal. Canonists¹ distinguish State and municipal schools, schools established by private persons or associations but open to the general public, and what may be called the family school, where the children of the family receive instruction from tutors or governesses.

To begin with the last : Has the Church the right to define the kind of education that should be given in the family school ? Is it not the inalienable right of parents to determine the education of their children ? Whence then comes the jurisdiction of the Church to take cognizance of the programme of instruction in the school of the home ? The parents have, no doubt, the right to determine the education of their children. But even apart from the hypothesis of supernatural religion it would be the duty of parents to provide for their children, together with secular instruction, moral and religious instruction and education. If God had made no revelation to the world parents would naturally be guided in choosing a course of moral instruction for their children, by their own innate or reasoned conception of the duties imposed by the natural law. But the Christian moral code is founded on supernatural religion, and Catholics, besides their subjection to the natural law, are members of the visible divine society

¹ Cf. Cavagnis, *Institutiones Juris Publici Ecclesiastici* (ed. tertia), vol. iii¹ l. iv, c. 1, a. iii, from whom the following exposition is taken.

of the Church to which they owe obedience, and they recognize the right and duty of their religious pastors to define the obligations of parents towards their children as they recognize their right and duty to define the obligations of masters towards their servants, of rulers towards their subjects, and of mankind generally towards God and the neighbour. But it is not alone indirectly or through the jurisdiction it exercises over the parents that the Church acquires authority to interfere in the Christian education of the young. The children themselves, who are inducted by birth into the family, are born again by Baptism into the spiritual kingdom of the Church and so become the subjects of the Church and the objects of the combined care and solicitude of their parents and ecclesiastical pastors.

But, it will be asked, what is the extent and what are the limits of the Church's authority to take cognizance of the family course of education? The Church claims no authority over the family except in matters of faith and morals. With the course of secular instruction given in the household she does not interfere, except, as canonists say, in a negative way, that nothing be taught which is contrary to faith or morals. But she commands, in the exercise of her positive jurisdiction, that the education of the home shall include the teaching of Christian doctrine, she claims the right of determining a programme of religious instruction suitable to the different ages of children, and while not claiming the right of approval of the teacher at his appointment she claims the right of vigilance over the teacher charged with religious instruction and of remonstrating and ordering his removal should he be found to be teaching doctrines at variance with the formularies and moral principles of the Catholic Church. The Church does not command that every school exercise in the family commence and end with prayer, or that the catechism be taught concurrently with every secular subject, or that it be taught every day, or that it be taught by the teacher who is employed to give secular instruction; the teachers employed in the family are regarded as *assistants* to the parents and not as their *substitutes*, the parents may prefer

to teach the catechism themselves or get it taught by priests or religious, but they satisfy the discipline of the Church if in the home system of education religion constitute an obligatory subject in the programme of instruction.

Practical Catholics, who get their children taught by tutors or governesses at home, fulfil these parental duties spontaneously from a sense of religious duty and without the need of admonition from their ecclesiastical pastors ; and I only refer to the home school because it is the model of what the system of education in the State schools should be to satisfy the religious convictions and obligations of Catholic parents.

III.

The Church the State and the Parent meet in the State school and demand the recognition of their respective rights and the equitable adjustment of their respective claims. Let me observe again that I contemplate at present only a Catholic country where the Government, the Church, the parents the teachers and children are Catholics, where the rights of the Church and State are duly defined and respected, where there is no encroachment of the Civil Power on the rights of the Church nor of the Church on the rights of the State. What then are the rights and duties of the Church and State and Parent in respect to the education given in primary State or municipal schools ?

The State, in the fulfilment of her mission to promote the natural well-being of her subjects, establishes primary schools to supplement the efforts or supply for the inability of parents to give a reasonable education to their children. In this her authority and power are undisputed, and the Church makes no claim of a right to interfere at the erection of State schools or in their maintenance or their hygienic condition or their equipment or the programme of secular instruction or the system and nature of the secular education given, whether it be literary or technical, national or neutral, or the hours of school or the duration of the course of primary education. Individual churchmen may be appointed by the State to administer the laws relating to

the State schools, or in their capacity of citizens may interest themselves in the extension and improvement of primary secular education ; but the Church as a divine institution, with a spiritual mission to create and develop and foster the supernatural life of the soul, claims no other authority over the sovereign independence of the State in respect to secular government and secular education in State schools than the negative authority that requires that nothing shall be enacted by law or taught in schools that is contrary to faith or morals. But can the Church forbid the establishment of a purely secular system of education ? Can she command that religion be taught in the State primary schools ? Does she claim the right of appointing or approving the teachers to be appointed ?

It might be argued on behalf of the State that her jurisdiction is confined to protecting the life and property and promoting the natural and secular well-being of her subjects, that she may relieve parents of a part of their duty towards their children though not of the whole and that consequently, while providing secular instruction, she may leave to the Church or to private benevolent religious enterprise ; or to the care of the parents the duty of instructing the children in the supernatural truths of the Catholic religion. And it might be argued that this is a legitimate theory at least in regard to day schools ; because in the case of the public day schools as in the case of the home school the teachers are regarded by canonists not as *substitutes* for but as *assistants* to the parents, the school and the home constitute one moral educational establishment, and though the school course be confined to secular instruction and religion be taught at home the whole system of education may be called one integral system of combined secular and religious instruction.

But the Church requires, in the first place, that the system of education in primary boarding schools, where the teachers are substitutes for the parents and are charged with the parental obligations, shall combine religion with secular instruction. She argues and insists from her experience of two thousand years that, though in

individual cases no injury may be sustained from a divided education, when secular instruction is commanded by the public authority of the State and received in the public schools and religious instruction is left to private initiative and enterprise, religion is in danger of being unappreciated, undervalued, regarded as unimportant and indifferently taught if not altogether neglected. And she argues, from the intrinsic nature of the case, that mental instruction does not complete the formation of youth, that schools are established not alone to store the mind with the rules of grammar and arithmetic and similar subjects, and teach the art of reading and writing and keeping accounts, but to inculcate a sense of moral duty, to educate the will, to teach the importance of good habits, to direct the orderly evolution of the whole man. .

Moral training of some sort is therefore at all times and in every possible condition of mankind an essential part of any complete system of primary civic education ; and surely it would be most prejudicial to the State and unnatural to establish a system of education which should occupy itself solely with the duty of filling the infant mind with the rules of arithmetic, grammar and the like, and exclude from its programme or neglect the moral formation of the future citizen. The conception of moral duty would presuppose, even in a purely natural state of society, certain doctrinal beliefs, such as the existence and supreme sovereignty of God and the responsibility of man, but obviously natural ethics would not presuppose supernatural religion. In a purely natural order the State would of course instruct children only in the principles of natural ethics and in natural religion. But in the hypothesis of supernatural revelation the revealed moral code supplements and takes the place of natural ethics ; and hence we see the Christian nations conform their laws and their worship and their day of rest to their conception of the principles of Christian morality. And as the Catholic State conforms to the rule of Christian morality in its laws and public worship so, the Church teaches, the moral training given in the schools should be Christian moral

training, and as a foundation for this moral training the children should be carefully instructed in the truths of the Christian religion.

And though it is true that, in the case of day schools, canonists speak of the teachers in the schools as *assistants* to the parents, the Church requires that the programme of education in these schools as well as in boarding schools should include the teaching of Christian doctrine. For, again, her long experience teaches her that when, in the school system, secular subjects alone are taught by the authority of the State, religion is in danger of being undervalued and treated as relatively unimportant ; and though the teachers in day schools are considered *assistants* to the parents and the education of the children is supposed to be completed at home, the State schools are understood to supply a complete specific course of primary civic education, and should therefore include the teaching of the moral system and religion by which the State itself and its citizens are supposed to be guided even in their public political life and actions ; the school course includes all the subjects of secular instruction though these subjects be also taught by the parents, and why therefore should it not include moral training though the catechism be also taught at home by the parents ?

Christian morality therefore and the doctrines of the Christian religion enter into the programme of primary education because the State, the parents, the teachers and the children are Catholics ; and thus by reason of the obligation of teaching Christian morality and Christian doctrine the Church has positive jurisdiction to take cognizance of the religious teaching in State schools. This, again, does not necessarily imply that the different school exercises should begin and end with prayer, or that the catechism should be taught at every class or every day, or that it should be taught in the school or by the teacher who is employed to give secular instruction. It supposes only the fundamental principle that the system of education should combine religious and secular instruction, that the school authorities should include catechism in

the programme of obligatory work in the school and that the Church has the right of defining how much catechism should be taught. It may be taught by the teacher charged with secular teaching or by a special catechist or by the priests of the parish : it may be taught in the school or in the church, if convenient : but it should constitute a part of the obligatory school programme, and at the inspections made or examinations held in the school the teaching of religion ought be a subject of inspection and examination like the secular subjects on the programme.

Finally it follows from the positive jurisdiction of the Church in respect to supernatural religion that, though the State has the right of appointing the teachers, the Church has the right of exercising vigilance over or giving approbation to teachers charged with religious instruction, the right of demanding the dismissal of teachers dangerous to the faith or morals of the children, and the right of exercising vigilance over the schools to see that the prescribed programme of religious instruction is taught ; ‘ *hinc legislatores christiani solent parochis, qui repraesentant auctoritatem ecclesiasticam in suo gradu magis immediato cum populo, jus concedere scholas has visitandi et interrogandi pueros de re religiosa ; dicimus christianas, quia et apud acatholicos id solet adhuc obtinere, quia principium de schola laica satis recens est.*’ Ecclesiastical approbation may be given to teachers by including religion among the subjects at the examination for the teacher’s diploma, by committing this portion of the examination to an examiner sanctioned by the Church. and by the examiner’s report that the candidates are qualified to teach Christian doctrine. When a special catechist is appointed with the exclusive duty of teaching the catechism in school the Church can claim the right of designating the catechist.

IV.

What is the position of religion in intermediate schools and universities ? Does the Church command that Christian doctrine shall constitute a part of the obligatory scholastic

programme of the teachers and students? The Church's authority is co-extensive with the needs of souls, and she can command for the schools and for the non-scholar world the course and mode of religious instruction which she considers necessary or useful for the spiritual protection and improvement of her children. The Church does not command that religion be a part of the obligatory programme in schools, whether primary or superior, where only a particular subject is taught as, for example, in medical and veterinary and technical schools. The local pastors may make special provision for the religious instruction and protection of the students of such schools, but religion does not constitute, by the general law, an obligatory part of their scholastic programme. Still the same religious education is not sufficient for all, and the Church can command that in schools where a full course of secondary education is given a higher course of moral and religious formation and education form a part of the obligatory programme of instruction. This should include a suitable course of apologetics, as men scientifically educated experience more difficulty than others in accepting truths on authority and require to be instructed in the motives of credibility to understand that the assent of faith, though resting on authority, is perfectly reasonable.

The scholastic religious education of the laity is then complete. Though the Church naturally establishes a theological faculty in her own universities, outside the theological faculty religion does not constitute in universities an obligatory part of the scholastic programme of lectures and examinations. Neither does the Church claim the right of appointing or approving the professors outside the faculty of theology, but the right of exercising vigilance and remonstrating and commanding that a particular person reasonably suspected or proved to be dangerous to the faith or morals of the students be not appointed or be deprived of his appointment. The professors should be imbued with the Catholic spirit and teach nothing contrary to religion. But the students are supposed to have completed their scholastic religious education and, like men

in the world, are required only to attend the university or parochial sermons and instructions ; but it is desirable that they should have their own chapel with instructions and conferences suitable to the peculiar and varying wants of university students.

v.

I come now to the questions asked at the beginning of this article : Are Catholic parents free to choose the school, the college, the university they wish for the education of their children ? Is the Catholic State free to establish a purely secular system of education ? Are Catholic laymen excluded from the teaching profession ? What is the measure of freedom allowed to the teachers themselves ?

I. I would recall a distinction frequently made during the course of these articles between physical and moral liberty. Our modern non-Catholic critics generally deny the existence of physical liberty or physical power of self-determination, and should hold that parents, when they send their children to a particular school or college or university, are mechanically determined thereto by the physical laws of nature, or if they act spontaneously that they are necessarily determined in each case by the force of character, disposition, advantages to be gained and the like, whereas the Catholic Church teaches as an article of faith that parents have the power of determining, by the self-determination of the will, where they shall send their children to school. But about moral liberty ? Determinists, having reduced man to the nature of a piece of physical or ideal mechanism, are rather inconsistent in their denunciations of the Catholic Church for her denial of moral liberty ; but what does the Church say ? She says that the question cannot be decided on its own immediate merits and without reference to more fundamental principles. If there were no God, she says, morality would not enter into the programme of education : if deism were true, natural religion alone would constitute the subject of religious education : if a non-dogmatic Christianity had been established, then an

undenominational indeterminate Christian instruction should be given in the schools : and in the hypothesis of the divine institution of a definite confession of faith, of the Catholic religion, Catholic parents are bound to send their children to Catholic schools and colleges where they are instructed definitely in the moral system and doctrines of the Catholic Church ; but among the approved schools to which their children have access parents have the right of determining and choosing the school to which they wish to send their children. Parents are bound absolutely to be diligent in the moral formation of their children : in the hypothesis of a supernatural revelation and religion they are bound by divine law to instruct their children in the principles of supernatural religion : and in the hypothesis of a divine Church to which they own allegiance they are responsible to her for their observance of divine law, they are subject to her jurisdiction and to the laws that relate to the religious education of their children.

II. Similarly, the Church would say, Catholic governments have the physical power of establishing purely secular schools, of compelling children to frequent them, of forbidding the opening of private schools ; but they cannot lawfully establish a purely secular system of education, nor forbid the family school or private schools, nor compel all children to frequent the State schools, even if they be constituted according to Catholic principles.

III. Catholic laymen are not excluded from the teaching profession. They may establish schools, primary or intermediate, but subject to the general rules already described for combining religion with secular education.

IV. There are no restrictions on the teaching liberty of Catholics except those imposed by the creed which they profess and believe to be true. And if we examine carefully the Catholic creed and the demonstrated conclusions of science we shall find that the truths of religion harmonize admirably with the conclusions of science, that there is no opposition between them, that the truths of the creed are a most effective protection against the spurious and

unworthy theories that are not unfrequently advanced in the name of science.

I have dealt with Catholic education in this paper only in relation to liberty, and as it should be conceived and established in Catholic countries. I hope at some future time to offer a study of the principles that guide the Church in regulating education in what she considers abnormal conditions, in mixed communities where the State system of national education is neutral or undenominational.

DANIEL COGHLAN.

THE VATICAN EDITION OF PLAIN CHANT

THE first part of the Vatican edition of Plain Chant, namely, the 'Kyriale,' that is, the part containing the chants for the *Kyrie, Gloria, Sanctus, Agnus*, and *Credo*, as well as for the *Ite, Missa est*, and *Benedicamus Domino* and for the *Asperges* and *Vidi aquam*, has appeared at last. It had been waited for anxiously and with some uneasiness. It was an open secret that the cause of the delay lay in some dissensions amongst the members of the Pontifical Commission. When this difficulty had been overcome—we shall see presently in what manner—disconcerting rumours as to the nature of the forthcoming edition got abroad. We are now in a position to formulate an opinion, and let me say it at once, the result before us is sorely disappointing. I make this statement with the utmost pain. For I know that the opponents of the attempted return to the tradition will rejoice, and many friends of the old chants will be disheartened. But the truth must come out sooner or later, and it is best, therefore, to let it be known at once.

Let us recall what has happened. In his *Motu Proprio* on Church Music, of 22nd November, 1903, Pope Pius X ordained the return to the traditional chant of the Church. Accordingly, in a Decree of 8th January, 1904, the Congregation of Rites, withdrawing the former decrees in favour of the Ratisbon (Medicean) edition, commanded that the traditional form of Plain Chant should be introduced into all the churches as soon as possible. Soon afterwards his Holiness, in order to avoid anything like a monopoly in the chant books, conceived the idea of publishing a Vatican edition of Plain Chant, which all publishers, capable of doing it in a satisfactory manner, should be free to reprint. The Benedictines of Solesmes having, with extraordinary generosity, placed at the disposal of the Holy See the result of their long continued and expensive studies in the field of Plain Chant, Pius X published, under

25th April, 1904, the *Motu Proprio* concerning the 'Edizione Vaticana dei libri liturgici continenti le melodie gregoriane,' from which I must quote a few extracts. The document opens thus :—

Col Nostro *Motu Proprio* del 22 Novembre 1903 e col susseguente Decreto, pubblicato per Nostro ordine dalla Congregazione dei Sacri Riti l'8 Gennaio 1904, abbiamo restituito alla Chiesa Romana l'antico suo canto gregoriano, quel canto che esse ha ereditata dai padri, che ha custodito gelosamente nei suoi codici liturgici e che gli studi più recenti hanno assai felicemente ricondotto alla sua primitiva purezza.

His Holiness then proceeds to state that he has determined on a Vatican edition of the chant, and lays down a number of directions :—

(a) Le melodie della Chiesa, così dette gregoriane, saranno restabilite nella loro integrità e purezza secondo la fede dei codici più antichi, così però che si tenga particolare conto eziandio della legittima tradizione, contenuta nei codici lungo i secoli, e dell'uso pratico della odierna liturgia.

(b) Per la speciale Nostra predilezione verso l'Ordine di S. Benedetto, riconoscendo l'opera prestata dai monaci benedettini nella restaurazione delle genuine melodie della Chiesa Romana, particolarmente poi da quelli della Congregazione di Francia e del Monastero di Solesmes, vogliamo che per questa edizione, la redazione delle parti che contengono il canto, sia affidata in modo particolare ai monaci della Congregazione di Francia ed al Monastero di Solesmes.

(c) I lavori così preparati saranno sottomessi all'esame ed alla revisione della speciale Commissione romana, da Noi recentemente a questo fine istituita. . . . Dovrà inoltre procedere nel suo esame con la massima diligenza, non permettendo che nulla sia pubblicato, di cui non si possa dare ragione conveniente e sufficiente. . . . Che se nella revisione delle melodie occorressero difficoltà per ragione del testo liturgico, la Commissione dovrà consultare l'altra Commissione storico-liturgica, già precedentemente istituita presso la Nostra Congregazione dei Sacri Riti. . . .

(d) L'approvazione da darsi da Noi e dalla Nostra Congregazione dei Sacri Riti ai libri di canto così composti e pubblicati sarà di tal natura che a niuno sarà più lecito di approvare libri liturgici, se questi, eziandio nelle parti che contengono il canto, o non siano del tutto conformi all'edizione pubblicata dalla Tipografia Vaticana sotto i Nostri auspicj, o per lo meno, a giudizio della Commissione, non siano per tal modo conformi, che le varianti introdotte si dimostrino provenire dall'autorità di altre buoni codici gregoriani.

There can be no reasonable doubt about the meaning of this document. Mark how, in the opening, his Holiness speaks of the chant as having been guarded by the Church jealously in her codices, and as having been restored to its primitive purity. Then, under (a) the work of the Commission is clearly defined. The melodies are to be re-established in their integrity and purity. As criterion for this is to be taken, in the first instance, the reading of the oldest codices. In the second place, however, account is to be taken of the legitimate tradition contained in the codices of later centuries. This is necessary, particularly as some melodies are not contained in the oldest codices. Such is the case, for instance, with a large number of melodies of the 'Kyriale,' which are not of Gregorian origin, but were composed centuries afterwards, some of them even later than the eleventh century, the date of our earliest staff notation MSS. Moreover, it is conceivable that in some particular point the oldest MSS. may be wrong, as each of them represents the tradition of merely one place. It would be the business of scientific criticism in such an instance to determine the original version from later evidence. Finally, the practical use of the present Liturgy is to be taken into account. This is necessary, because in some cases the wording of the liturgical text has been slightly altered in our modern liturgical books. In such cases the original melodies must be adapted to the new wording, unless, indeed, the Congregation of Rites can be induced to restore the original wording, for which the Pope makes provision under (c).

Again, under (c) the Commission is directed to see that nothing should be published which could not be properly accounted for. The meaning of this is plain. It would be absurd to suppose that the President of the Commission could 'account' for a passage by saying: 'This seems to me beautiful; therefore, I have put it in.'

Altogether the document is most wise and statesman-like, and we had reason to expect something very perfect as the outcome of it. But then something unexpected happened, as the novelist says. By a letter of his Eminence

Cardinal Merry del Val, dated 24th June, 1905, Dom Pothier, the President of the Commission, was made the sole judge of the version of the new edition, and the other members were reduced to the position of his helpers. What led up to this decision is not public history, and I have no desire to lift the curtain. Let it suffice to judge the proceedings by their result.

Ostensibly the cry got up against the redactors, the Solesmes monks, was that of 'archaism.' I need not go into the question of archaism at length. Dom Cagin has dealt with it admirably in the *Rassegna Gregoriana*, of July-August, 1905. I will make only one remark. I could understand a modern musician objecting to Plain Chant altogether, because it is archaic. But if we accept at all the chant of thirteen centuries ago, what difference does it make whether a phrase here and there is a little more or less 'archaic'?

It seems that Dom Pothier himself not long ago differed very much from those who now talk of 'archaism,' for, speaking of the variants of the Plain Chant melodies that crept in in the course of time, he said :—

Toutes ces variantes s'expliquent et, à certains points de vue, peuvent plus ou moins se justifier, mais aucune d'elles ne constitue un progrès. La manière plus simple et plus dégagée de la mélodie primitive est aussi la plus douce et la plus distinguée, celle qui a pour elle, avec le mérite de l'antiquité, celui de l'art et du bon goût.¹

And Father Lhoumeau, his pupil, and but the echo of his master, says :—

Cet examen d'une simple mélodie nous amène à des conclusions qui ressortent de l'état général du chant grégorien, car ce que nous voyons ici se retrouve partout. Si l'on veut restaurer l'art grégorien il faut toujours revenir aux sources, et ce qu'il y a de plus ancien, c'est ce qu'il y a de plus pur, de plus artistique, et non pas seulement de plus archaïque, comme peuvent le croire certaines gens.²

¹ *Revue du chant grégorien*, 15th December, 1896, p. 70.

² *Ibid.*, 15th June, 1895, p. 169.

In the Preface, too, of his *Liber Gradualis* of 1895, Dom Pothier claims that he always has followed the authority of the *oldest* codices.


But we need not delay over this, for, as we shall see, the question of 'archaism' has not really much to do with the changes from the original made in the Vatican edition.

Dom Pothier, as soon as he had got a free hand, set to work vigorously, and at the Gregorian Congress in Strasburg last August, it was announced that the last sheet of the 'Kyriale' had got the final *Imprimatur*. At the same time the Commission, that is to say, the majority of the members present in Strasburg, declared that the 'Kyriale' represented the fruit of the long and enlightened labour of the monks of Solesmes. We shall see how much truth there is in this. For, as generally known, the Solesmes Benedictines make the reading of the MSS. their supreme law.

To get any definite information on the relation of the 'Kyriale' to the MSS., my only way was to go to Appuldurcombe, the present home of the Solesmes Benedictines, and study the MSS. They have there over four hundred of the best codices in photographic reproduction—the material on which the Vatican edition is based—and with that same generosity with which they offered the result of their studies to the Holy See, they place their library at the disposal of students. Accordingly I went there, and I now publish the result of my investigations. Within the time at my disposal it was not possible for me to go into all the cases where the Vatican edition seems to deviate from the authentic version. Giulio Bas, one of the consultants of the Commission, in a letter to the *Giornale d'Italia*, states that they number 130. Accordingly I left aside, of set purpose, all the cases that presented difficulty, that would require anything like a careful weighing of the evidence, to get at the true version, and confined myself to those where the Vatican edition is glaringly at variance with the reading of the MSS. And, alas! as the patient reader will soon see, they are only too many.

Before I take up the pieces contained in the 'Kyrie' one by one, I have to make a couple of general reflections. The first concerns the German tradition of the chant, for which Dom Pothier shows a strange predilection. One of the chief peculiarities of this German tradition is the frequent substitution of the minor third $a-c$ for the second $a-bb$ or $a-b$. Is this tradition a 'legitimate tradition'? I should think not. It detaches itself at one point from the general current of tradition which flows from the time that we first can trace it, down to our own days, and remains in opposition to it ever afterwards. It may have a certain title to continued separate existence, but it has no claim to general acceptance. But there is more. I do not for a moment believe that Dom Pothier is going to accept this German tradition in its entirety.

Surely he is not going to make us sing (1)



Stá-tu- it

instead of (2)




Stá-tu- it

There is a question, therefore, of making a selection. On what principle, then, is this selection to be made? The æsthetic taste of an individual? Dom H. Gaisser, one of the most prominent members of the Commission, in an interview recently published in the *Katholische Kirchenzeitung*, and again in the *Giornale di Roma*, of 3rd December, 1905, points out the danger and instability of such a criterion. He reminds us that not only is taste an individual thing, varying greatly in different people, but it is also dependent, to a very great extent, on what one has been accustomed to. Those, therefore, that have been accustomed to the 'Kyrie' of Dom Pothier's *Liber Gradualis*, including Dom Pothier himself, will be prejudiced in favour of the readings which, for some reason or

other, got into that publication. To give an example, the Vatican 'Kyriale,' in accordance with the *Liber Gra-*


dualis, has the 'Paschal' *Kyrie* thus: (3)



Ký-ri- e

All the MSS., except the German ones, have :

(4)




Ký- ri- e

To me it seems that the double *ac* of the Vatican version is decidedly tautological, and that the older version with its gradual rise first to *b* and then to *c* is immensely superior. Dom Pothier evidently thinks differently. But I believe he has stated that in some cases he made too much concession to the modern taste in the 'Kyriale' of his *Liber Gradualis*, and accordingly those pieces have been changed in the Vatican edition. What guarantee have we that after a few years he will not find that he made too much concession to the German tradition?

My next remark is about the reciting note of the 8th mode. It often happens that in the course of a melody a number of syllables are recited on one note. For such recitation the Gregorian melodies had, in the 8th mode, the note *b*, while the reciting note of the psalmody in that mode seems always to have been *c*, as at present. Thus we find in the Antiphon *Vidi aquam* this passage :


(5)



et omnes, ad quos pervé-nit a- qua i-sta


In the course of centuries this reciting note, owing probably to causes similar to those that brought about the German

tradition mentioned above, was almost universally changed into *c*. Thus, the *Liber Gradualis* has



et omnes, ad quos pervé-nit


It seems to me that in many cases this change has been to the detriment of the melody. Thus in the example (5), the gradual rise of the melody, which rests first on *b*, then on *c*, and finally rises, on *ista*, to *d*, constitutes a great beauty, which is lost in the version at (6). Still, as the change was almost universal, I could understand the position of those who claim that it should be maintained. But what does the Vatican edition do? It evidently goes on the principle of 'pleasing both parties,' and gives half the recitation to *c*, half to *b*, thus:



et omnes, ad quos pervé-nit

Three syllables on *c*, three on *b*, nothing could be fairer, and nobody has any right to complain! The procedure is a great testimony to Dom Pothier's amiability, but what about his critical judgment?

In this same *Vidi aquam* we find the following:—




tém- plo

The MSS. are divided as to the figure on the first syllable

of *templo*, some have (9a) others (9b)

the best have (9c)



The version of the Vatican edition is *not found in any single one!*

At *dextro* and the *alleluja* immediately following, all the oldest MSS. except the German have *a b g a* and *g a b a b*. The Vatican edition follows the German tradition in substituting *c* for *b*.

I have already referred to the *Kyrie* of the Mass I (*Tempore Paschali*). I have now only to call attention to the difference in the final figure of examples (3) and (4). All older MSS., neumatic and in staff notation, of all countries have the Pressus as at (4), only German MSS. of later origin have the reading (3) adopted by the *Vaticana*.

A very striking fact is met with in the *Gloria* of this Mass. All MSS. and printed editions down to the nineteenth century ascribe this *Gloria* to the 7th mode, ending it on *g*. The edition of Reims-Cambrai (1851), was the first to change the ending to *b* and thus make the *Gloria* a 4th tone melody. The Vatican edition sides with Reims-Cambrai! In this *Gloria* also the German substitution of *c* for *b* has been accepted at *excelsis*, *hominibus*, and the corresponding places.

In the *Agnus Dei* nine MSS. of France, England, Spain, and Metz have on *Dei* the figure *a b d*; one German, one Italian, and one French have *g b d*. The *Vaticana* follows the minority.


The *Kyrie* of Mass II (*Kyrie Fons bonitatis*) has been dealt with, in a masterly fashion, by Dom Beyssac in the *Rassegna Gregoriana*, November-December, 1904, where the MS: evidence is subjected to a thorough examination. I can confine myself, therefore, to giving some extracts showing the difference between the version of the MSS. (10)¹



¹ The last note of this example ought to be *g* instead of *a*.

and that of the *Vaticana*

(11)




Ký-rie Chri-ste

Ký-ri-e

Detailed description: This block contains three lines of musical notation on four-line staves. The first line is labeled (11) and shows a melody for 'Ký-rie Chri-ste'. The second line shows a continuation of the melody for 'Ký-ri-e'. The notes are square black symbols, and the melody is written in a style typical of plain chant notation.

In the *Gloria* of this Mass *all* the MSS. have at *propter*


magnam gloriam tuam: (12)



gló- ri- am tu-am

Detailed description: This block contains two lines of musical notation. The first line is labeled (12) and shows a melody for 'magnam gloriam tuam'. The second line shows a continuation of the melody. The notes are square black symbols, and the melody is written in a style typical of plain chant notation.

Dom Pothier writes: (13)



gló- ri- am tu-am

Detailed description: This block contains two lines of musical notation. The first line is labeled (13) and shows a melody for 'gló- ri- am tu-am'. The second line shows a continuation of the melody. The notes are square black symbols, and the melody is written in a style typical of plain chant notation.

The second *Agnus* of this Mass is an adaptation of a trope. All the MSS. without tropes repeat the melody of the first *Agnus*.

In the first *Christe* of Mass III, all the MSS. have *e g g a*. Dom Pothier changes this into *e f g a*.

In the *Gloria* all the MSS. have a Podatus on the final syllables of *Domine Deus* and *Domine Fili*. The *Vaticana* has single notes.

The intonation of the *Sanctus* is thus in the *Vaticana*:

(14)



San- ctus

Detailed description: This block contains two lines of musical notation. The first line is labeled (14) and shows a melody for 'San- ctus'. The second line shows a continuation of the melody. The notes are square black symbols, and the melody is written in a style typical of plain chant notation.

This piece is found in eight MSS. Seven of these have *g a b*, one has *g a c c b a; g f*. Dom Pothier takes the latter

version, but omits the *b* after *c c*. The reason for this change is easy to guess. It is to avoid that *diabolus in musica* of the medieval theorists, the tritone. I admit that the tritone sometimes causes a little difficulty to modern ears. But if we are to eliminate all the tritones from the Gregorian melodies, what is to become of them? And if we are to make this concession to the modern taste, why not change other things as well, why not, for instance, sharpen the leading note? I think that the full tone under the tonic causes far more difficulty to the modern musician than a few tritones. As a matter of fact, in one case, as we shall see below (*Gloria* of No. VII), Dom Pothier has sharpened the leading note. So we cannot know what may happen before the Vatican edition is completed. But why not go a step farther and do away with the antiquated modes altogether, and present all pieces of Plain Chant either in the major or the minor mode? And, finally, why retain that puzzling rhythm of Plain Chant? Why not re-write it nicely with bars in $\frac{4}{4}$, $\frac{3}{4}$, and $\frac{2}{4}$ time? I must confess I see no satisfactory answer to these questions. Once we leave the firm ground of the tradition, we get into shifting sands, and there is no stopping anywhere.

In the *Agnus* of this Mass all MSS. are agreed in having a single note on the first syllable of *Dei*. The *Vaticana* has three. All MSS. are agreed in having a Quilisma on *tollis*. The *Vaticana* has a simple Podatus. All MSS. are

agreed
in
reading
(15)



peccá- ta

The
Vaticana
reads :
(16)



peccá- ta

All MSS. are agreed in placing *e* on the accented syllable of *miserere*. The *Vaticana* has *f*. The melody of the second *Agnus* in the *Vaticana* is not to be found in any MS.

In the *Gloria* of Mass IV, the vast majority of the MSS. have the last figure on, *Glorificamus te* as *g f e*. The *Vaticana* has *g g e*.

The *Agnus* of Mass V is found in two MSS. At *tollis*

and *miserere* the one has *b*, the other *bb*. The *Vaticana* has *c*.

In Mass VI, in the second last *Kyrie*, nearly all the oldest MSS. have two notes on the second syllable, and nearly all MSS. mark a *bb*. The *Vaticana* has one note on *ri* and has *bb*.

In the *Gloria* the vast majority of MSS. have two notes on the final syllable of *excelsis*. The *Vaticana* has one. At the first *peccata* all the MSS. that have substantially the reading of the *Vaticana*, have the figure *a b c*. No MS. whatever has *a c* as the *Vaticana*. Of the *Amen* several variants are found, but not amongst them the version of the *Vaticana*.

In the *Kyrie* of Mass VII, the vast majority of the MSS. and all the best, place the Clivis *a f* on the second syllable of *eleison*. The *Vaticana* places it on the first.

The *Gloria* is found only in some English MSS. They all write it in *c* and have a flat at the cadence of *Deus Pater omnipotens*. The *Vaticana* writes it in *f* and omits the flat, thus sharpening the leading note, as mentioned above. At *Cum sancto Spiritu* the MSS. read


(17)		the <i>Vaticana</i>	(18)	
	Spi- ri-tu			Spi- ri-tu

The *Agnus* of Mass VIII is found only in one MS. (Paris Bibl. Nat. Lat., 905 fol. A.). On *tollis* it has the notes *f e d c*, Dom Pothier changes this into *f d d c*. At *mundi* the MS. has *f g g f*, Dom Pothier writes *f g f*. On the second syllable of *miserere* the MS. has *g*, Dom Pothier writes *g a*. On the second *Dei*, the MS. has *c a b c*, Dom Pothier writes *c a g c*. At the second *tollis* the MS. has *a g a g*, Dom Pothier writes *a g a*. It is hard to suppress one's indignation at this. But we have a long way to travel yet. So I hurry on with the bare enumeration of facts.

In the *Gloria* of Mass IX all old MSS. have *c* on the first syllable of *deprecationem*, Dom Pothier has *d*. At

Cum (sancto Sp.) thirty-nine MSS. have *e*, three have *d e*, Dom Pothier follows the minority.

In the *Sanctus* the MSS. write X (19)




Dom Pothier (20)



Similarly at *Domini*. The figure at *Deus* is found in no MS. At *tua* most MSS. have *bb a g a*. No MS. has the reading of the *Vaticana*, *bb a g*.

In the *Agnus* the *Vaticana* writes (21)



Of eighteen
MSS. sixteen
have (22)




Two have
(23)




The version of the *Vaticana* finds, therefore, no authority at all in the MSS. Similarly the note on *qui* in the second *Agnus* is not found in any MS.

The *Kyrie* of Mass X, which is the older form of that in No. IX, is found in three MSS. All three have double notes on the accented syllable of *eleison*. The *Vaticana* has single notes.

The *Gloria* is found only in one MS., the one published with the Sarum Gradual by the Plainsong and Mediæval Music Society. The *Amen* runs thus in this MS.




Dom Pothier changes this into: (25)



The *Sanctus* of this Mass is not found anywhere. It seems to be Dom Pothier's own composition. The same holds of the *Sanctus* No. III, and the *Agnus* No. II, of the *Cantus ad libitum*. Now there is not, of course, any objection to Dom Pothier or anybody else composing new pieces of Church music, and if they select to write in the style of the Gregorian music, they are at perfect liberty to do so. But I certainly think that such compositions ought to have no place in the Vatican edition, which purports to be a collection of medieval music. There might be some excuse in the case of new texts, for which no melody exists, though I should consider it better to arrange some existing melody to them, as was the general usage from the seventh to the fifteenth century. In the Ordinary of the Mass, however, for which we have such a large number of medieval pieces, such a procedure is altogether unwarranted.

In the *Kyrie* of Mass XI the vast majority of MSS. have on *Christe* the figure *d c b a* and suppress, in the second *eleison*, the *f g a b* of the first. Dom Pothier skips the *b* on *Christe*, and writes the second *eleison* like the first. For the second *Kyrie* the vast majority of MSS. have either



In the *Gloria* eight MSS., and these not very good ones,

write
(29)



Qui se-des

Some sixty have
(30)



Qui se- des

The *Vaticana* sides with the minority.

In the *Gloria* of Mass XII at *Filius Patris* two Treves MSS. end *e e*, twenty-five others have *e f*. The *Vaticana* has *e e*, though in the corresponding place at *tu solus sanctus* it has *e f*.


For the *Gloria* of Mass XIII there is only one MS. It

has the intonation thus
(31)



Gló-ri- a in excélsis De- o

Dom Pothier cuts out the *f* on *in*. Later on the MS. has




Dómi-ne De-us, Agnus De- i, Fí-li- us Patris

Dom Pothier changes the *c* on *Agnus* into *f*, thereby losing the pretty effect of the varied middle phrase! Could anything be more discreditable to an editor?

The *Sanctus* is found in two MSS., Worcester and Sarum.

Worcester has
(33)




Dómi-ni. Ho-sáнна

Sarum has (34)



Dó-mi-ni. Ho-sáнна

Dom Pothier
writes (35)



Dómi-ni. Ho-sáнна

In the *Kyrie* of Mass XIV all the MSS. have a *b* in the second *Kyrie* melody. The *Vaticana* omits it. In the *Gloria*, on the last syllable of *miserere*, practically all MSS. have a four-note Climacus; the *Vaticana* has three notes. In the *Amen* the German codices are followed against all the others.

In the *Kyrie* of Mass XV the second *eleison* takes the reading of one MS. against forty. In the *Gloria*, at *Tu solus Dominus*, most MSS. have the intonation *e g a* or *g a a*. No MS. has the reading of the *Vaticana*.

In the *Agnus* of Mass XVI, on the last syllable of the first *miserere*, one MS. has a Clivis, thirty-seven have a Podatus. The *Vaticana* has a Clivis.

For the second *Kyrie* of Mass XVII the sources are one MS. and one printed book, both of the sixteenth century. Both divide the figure on *eleison* after *a* (*c bb a g a | f e g*) as the Ratisbon Edition and the Missal (*Benedicamus* for Advent and Lent) do. The *Vaticana* writes the notes *a f e* as a Climacus.

For the figure on the second syllable of *Hosanna* in the *Sanctus* the MS. evidence is: one for, thirty-four against.

In the *Kyrie* of Mass XVIII all the MSS. that have that melody give three notes to the first syllable of the second *eleison*. The *Vaticana* has two.

In the first *Credo*, at *visibillum* and in all the corresponding phrases, two MSS. of the late fifteenth century have *a*, all the others *g*. The *Vaticana* has *a*. At *Genitum* one MS. of the fifteenth century is followed against all others.

At *de Spiritu* only the Cistercians and Dominicans share the reading of the *Vaticana*. At *venturi* the vast majority of the MSS. and all the old ones end on *d*, not on *e*, as the *Vaticana* does.

We come now to the *Cantus ad libitum*. In passing I may note that the *Kyrie* II has only two *Christe*, evidently an oversight. The *Kyrie* VI is a later form of the Paschal *Kyrie* dealt with above. I may remark that here we meet the Pressus *c b b g*, that is simplified in the other

version. Another trifle is that in the first *Christe* the *eleison* has a different melody from the former version. The MSS. have both melodies, but each MS. gives the same form for both the older and the later version.


Kyrie X is the older form of No. XI in the body of the book. Here we find for the second *Kyrie* the melody given above as No. 27. The last *Kyrie*, however, is not found in any MS. as given in the *Vaticana*.

In the *Gloria* I we are met by an interesting psychological problem. We have seen that in many cases Dom Pothier showed a curious leaning towards the German tradition. Now this *Gloria*, attributed to Pope Leo IX., belongs mainly to the German tradition. Accordingly we find very frequently the third *a c*. Thus, the *miserere nobis* runs in the MSS. as follows :



What does Dom Pothier do? He changes the first *c* into *b*! *Qui potest capere, capiat*.

For the *Gloria* II we have three MSS. They are agreed



At *deprecationem nostram* the MSS. have *e e* for *nostram*. Dom Pothier writes *d d*, although in the corresponding place, at *unigenite*, he has *e*.

For *Gloria* III there are nine MSS. They have a Pressus at *excelsis* (*g f f e*) and double *d* at *te* (*Laudamus te*, etc.) Dom Pothier has a simple Climacus and a single *d*. At *Domine Deus, Rex cælestis* six MSS. have

(39)		Dom Pothier's version (40)	
	Dó- mi- ne		Dómi- ne

is not found in any MS. Similarly, the melody of the final *Patris* is not found in any MS.

We have come to the end of our weary journey. It would be difficult to see any definite principle in all the cases where Dom Pothier has defied the evidence of the MSS. In some cases, as we have seen, he followed a special current of tradition against the general tradition; in others a morbid fear of the tritone made him introduce changes. But for most cases the only actuating principle that could be assigned is his 'æsthetic taste,' or shall we say, his whim? In any case it is clear that he has given up his role as restorer of the ancient melodies, and has joined the rank of the 'reformers.'

It is a melancholy sight, this procession of the 'reformers' as they pass through the centuries, although they are headed by a St. Bernard. He at least, or rather his musical adviser, Guido, the Abbot of Cherlieu, had some show of reason for his changes. For it was on the Scriptural authority of the *In psalterio decachordo psallam tibi* that he cut down all the melodies exceeding the ten-note compass. The Cistercians were followed in a mild way by the Dominicans, who looked upon the repetition of melodic phrases, and upon the melisma at the end of the Alleluja verses as redundant. There is a gap then until we come to the end of the sixteenth century, when the cry of 'Barbarisms' was got up, and eventually, in 1614 and 1615, the *Medicæa* resulted. And now they come in regular succession through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, each subsequent editor improving on his predecessor, and according to his own peculiar 'æsthetic taste' mutilating the poor Gregorian melodies, until at last they richly deserved the general contempt into which they had fallen. In the nineteenth century the need of a return was felt. But still editors

could not resist the temptation to reform to some extent. Thus, to mention only a couple, we have the edition of Reims-Cambrai still yielding to the fear of 'barbarisms,' and the edition of Cologne reducing all Gregorian rhythm to duple time. All these editions have come and gone, and now in their wake we find the *Vaticana*, really the saddest spectacle of all, because none of the others were the direct outcome of an act of the central authority of the Church.

What next? One thing is certain to me. The *Vaticana* cannot last. Dom Pothier has, indeed, already got a considerable number of authoritative pronouncements in favour of his edition. There was first a letter from Cardinal Merry del Val, of 3rd April, 1905, of which Professor Wagner gives some extracts in a paper published for the Gregorian Congress at Strasburg. Then the other letter of 24th June, quoted above, and finally two decrees of the S.R.C., dated 11th August and 14th August, which, to some extent, annul the wise and liberal regulations as to other editions, laid down in the *Motu Proprio* of 25th April, 1904, *sub* (d) quoted above. But what is this compared with the formidable array of decrees that backed up the *Medicea*? And yet, with one stroke of the pen, an enlightened and determined Pope cancelled them all. No, this question cannot be settled by decrees. If the *Vaticana* cannot stand on the strength of its intrinsic excellence, no artificial propping up by decrees will prevent it from tumbling down.

But what are we to do? The best thing, in my opinion, would be, if the Solesmes Benedictines would publish the MS. version of the 'Kyriale.' It seems to me that the whole world, as far as it is interested in Plain Chant, is anxious to know the MS. version of it, and the monks of Solesmes would satisfy a general demand by publishing that. But if for some reason or other they should choose not to do so, or if Dom Pothier, through the power of the Congregation of Rites, should succeed in preventing the original form of the melodies of the Church from being published, then we shall have to be satisfied with the

Vatican edition for a time. We may console ourselves by the thought that of all existing editions the Vatican edition is decidedly the best. If we compare it with the 'Kyriale' of the *Liber Gradualis* or *Liber Usualis*, we find not only many of their melodies much improved, but also a considerable number of new ones added, some of them of great beauty, particularly the older and simpler forms of the *Asperges* and of the *Kyrie de Beata* and *in Dominicis per annum*. The labours of the Solesmes monks have not all been in vain. But I hope still that before long the unconditioned return to the tradition, so happily inaugurated by the early acts of our reigning Pontiff, will be fully accomplished.

H. BEWERUNGE.

GENERAL NOTES

THE PHILOSOPHY OF IMMANENCE

THE scene changes rapidly in France. The French mind is ever active and restless. Some few years ago the question which mainly occupied the thoughts of ecclesiastics in that country was whether Father Hecker was a saint or not, whether there are passive as well as active virtues, virtues which the Holy Ghost allows to lie dormant for years, perhaps for centuries, and stirs to life and action when He pleases, according to His own will and the requirements of the age. Pope Leo XIII settled that controversy.

Then the Abbé Loisy startled the ecclesiastical world with his book *L'Evangile et L'Eglise*, soon to be followed by a reply to his critics in another small volume, *Autour d'un Petit Livre*. In both these works, which were intended as his reply to *Das Wesen des Christentums*, of Professor Adolph Harnack of Berlin, the Abbé whittled down the essence of Christianity to very small proportions indeed. He discarded with little ceremony the Gospel of St. John, and indeed everything in the other Gospels that stood in the way of his theories. He attributed motives to the sacred writers and proceeded to reject what he thought might be ascribed to these motives. One got up from the perusal of his book without knowing whether he still clung on to the Divinity of our Lord. He held a theory utterly incompatible with the teaching of theologians as to the knowledge of Christ. Our Lord, according to him, did not realise for a long time that He was the Messiah, and when at last he became conscious of the fact, He had no complete conception of its significance. The coming of the Kingdom of God in a vague way, was all that He anticipated. The Abbé indeed protested that he judged only from the evidence of the Gospel taken as a human document, and did not presume to set aside anything that was essential in the teaching of the Church. But his works speak for him, and their disturbing tendency could not be denied. They were condemned, and the author disappeared both from his chair in the Sorbonne and from the public view.

No sooner, however, had the Abbé Loisy gone under tem-

porary eclipse than a new band of apologists came to the front. They are partisans of what they call the 'Philosophy of Immanence.' Some of them are laymen, like M. Blondel, a University Professor, M. Edouard Le Roy, a distinguished mathematician, and M. Fonsegrive, editor of the *Quinzaine*; others are priests, amongst whom the most prominent are the Oratorian Abbé Laberthonniere, the Abbé Jules Martin, and the Abbé Charles Denis. Most of the articles expository of the new system have appeared in the *Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne*. But as that review does not circulate very widely amongst the general public, the principal articles have been published in book form by their authors,¹ and a résumé of the system was recently contributed to the *Quinzaine* by M. Edouard Le Roy.

It was this last article that brought matters to a crisis. For doctrines that had hitherto been expressed in very obscure prolixity were now formulated in fairly intelligible language. The article was severely condemned by the Bishop of Nancy, Mgr. Turinaz, who wrote a pamphlet against it. Cardinals Perraud and Coullié lost no time in congratulating the author of the pamphlet, and denouncing the new apologetics as foolish and absurd.

In the course of the controversy the new system was opposed chiefly by the Abbé Fontaine in his *Infiltrations Kantiennes et Protestantes*, by Père Le Bachelet, S. J., in *De l'Apologétique Traditionnelle et l'Apologétique Moderne*, by the Abbé de Sertillanges, the Abbé de Grandmaison, and others in various reviews.

But what is this new doctrine? In the first place Scholastic Philosophy is put aside as a phase of Christian thought, good in its day, admirable as a synthesis, interesting as the apparatus of former ages, but no longer capable of establishing harmony between reason and faith, between revelation and science, between dogma and philosophy. Its arguments are valid only for those who have the faith already. It presupposes faith. It is of no value when addressed to the unbelievers of our time. If we wish to influence our contemporaries we must enter into their difficulties, see how far we can adopt their point of view and their methods, and lead them gently to the fold of salvation by a path that they are willing to tread. Miracles and prophecies have no longer any demonstrative value for those who

¹ *L'Action*, by M. Blondel; *La Demonstration Philosophique*, by the Abbé Martin.

are versed in the philosophy most widely received in our day. They are, like all other external things, merely phenomena. What matters to us is internal, permanent, *immanent*. There is no equation whatever between what we feel and see and what we think. Thought itself is an act, and the abstraction which expresses it is merely a symbol, and as such incapable of expressing it completely. What we know, even of ourselves, is not the full measure of what we are. But the important thing is what we do know, not what we express, and still less what is outside us. It is in that interior consciousness that we must seek both light and guidance. It is there we must settle with ourselves the sense and form in which we can accept the dogmas, formularies, and teaching of the Church. And as this consciousness is never at rest but always *in fieri*, we are bound to follow its guidance whithersoever it may lead us. It is there that reason has its seat and its autonomy; but it is there also that the existence of a supernatural order is most fully realized, that the Holy Ghost directly exercises His power, that the Christian religion in all its beauty and grandeur wins our allegiance and faith. Doctrinal and religious convictions are acquired by a process as mysterious as faith itself, and have but little to do with metaphysics or science. We feel within us that both are true in their domain and that is enough. The link between them is in ourselves, *immanent* and permanent. There is no reciprocal dependence of one on the other. Intellectual and speculative knowledge is entirely independent of knowledge of the exterior world. And what is recognized within us as right and true the intensity of the trained will must communicate to others. Faith is not acquired by any process of reasoning. It comes from above; and he who receives the gift is convinced of its truth with a more solid and all pervading conviction than any human knowledge can beget. The Author of our nature has implanted in us the need of the supernatural, without which we are incomplete and unsatisfied. In that inmost fortress of our conscious being we recognize that need and all that results from it—the Redemption, the Gospel, the Church. The authority of the Church is a moral necessity: but its definitions and decrees tell us what is wrong rather than the metaphysical sense of what is right and true. That is for ourselves, each one according to his own light and conscious condition.

Such are the fundamental outlines of this new system. It is

phenomenalist, subjectivist, idealist, with Kant; voluntarist with Schopenhauer; monist and evolutionist with Hegel. It has in addition to other serious disadvantages as an apologetic system of Christian and Catholic philosophy this one, that in some of its main proposals it comes into direct collision with the Dogmatic Constitution of the Vatican Council, which says:—

‘ Ut nihilominus fidei nostrae obsequium rationi consentaneum esset voluit Deus cum internis Spiritus Sancti auxiliis externa jungi revelationis suae argumenta, facta scilicet divina, atque imprimis miracula et prophetias, quae cum Dei omnipotentiam et infinitam scientiam luculenter commonstrent, divinae revelationis signa sunt certissima et omnium intelligentiae accomodata. ’

It is undoubtedly a good and wholesome sign of the times to see both clergy and laity in France so much alive to the necessity of meeting their contemporaries as far as possible on their own ground; but it is also an object lesson in the danger of laymen and priests who have not a true grasp of the principles of Theology, setting themselves up as founders of new systems and as renovators of the great bulwarks of tradition. If it be possible for the Church in any sense to come to terms with the philosophy most in vogue at the present day in the non-Catholic and scientific world, it must be done by thoroughly trained theologians and equally experienced philosophers. The worst of it is, that the best trained theologians and philosophers are, to a great extent, leaving the field open to men whose good intentions nobody will question, but whose equipment for the task is neither singly nor collectively what it should be. Perhaps there are better days in store for us.
Faxit Deus!

AUGUSTINE BIRRELL ON UNIVERSITIES

MR. AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, who now controls the ‘ Board of Education ’ in England, has written a very interesting essay on ‘ The Ideal University. ’ It is published in a volume of *Miscellanies* (Elliot & Stock, 1902). In discussing the question of the patronage and general management of a University, he says that the nation at large should be interested in it.

‘ The history of Oxford and Cambridge during the last century, ’ he writes, ‘ proves the result of national indifference, ’

and in support of that opinion he quotes the author of *Terrae Filius*, who says :—

‘ I have known a profligate debauchee chosen Professor of Moral Philosophy, and a fellow who never looked upon the stars soberly in his life, Professor of Astronomy. We have had History Professors who never read anything to qualify them for it but *Tom Thumb*, *Jack the Giant Killer*, *Don Belianis of Greece*, and such like valuable records. We have had numberless Professors of Greek, Hebrew, and Arabic, who scarce understood their mother tongue, and not long ago a famous gamester and stock-jobber was elected Margaret Professor of Divinity.’

And, farther on :—

‘ An ideal patron is, perhaps, a contradiction in terms, but if it is to be found anywhere it will be, I believe, in a small combination of men of high character, reputation, and general learning, who may be trusted to act independently and judiciously. The head of a political department, a town, or county council ! *Retro me Sathanas*. These are persons that stand self-condemned. They have not the time, the temper, the disposition, or indeed any single one of the necessary qualifications. The existing professors of the University, though they might well be represented on the Board of Selection, should not have, in an ideal University, a predominant influence upon it ; and especially should the Board be confined to one University of whose exclusive interests they should be fiery partisans, and with whose fortunes and reputation they should be as closely as possible allied.’

Finally on the question of a site he writes :—

‘ I will end where a more dexterous orator probably would have begun, with the site of my ideal University. Much has been written, much can still be written, on this golden theme. Had one the eye of an old Benedictine or Cistercian monk, seeking where to establish a religious house of his Order to the glory of God and the comfort of the brethren, one might enlarge upon soils and prospects, on water-meadows and trout streams ; dreams of Tintern and of Fountains, of Wye and Tweed might cross the inward eye—that is, the “ bliss of solitude ”—but standing where I do, in

“ Streaming London’s central roar,”

amid the huge population of the mightiest and richest, though not the most beautiful or the most beauty-loving city the world has ever known, I have already found the object of my

search. When all is said and done, what is more stimulating to the mind of man than the vast tide of population as it pours through the arteries of a great city? Where else in the wide world is there so powerful a magnet as London? Not a day passes but hundreds are drawn within her grasp. Where else are there, can there be, so many young creatures richly endowed with natural gifts capable of cultivation, astir with the uneasiness of youth, seeing the vision of the world, feeling the "wild pulsation," hearing their days before them and the tumult of their lives, and yearning for the large excitement that the coming years may yield? If ever there was a theatre for academical actors, it is London. If ever there was a people and an age that needed the higher Education, we are that people, and we live in that age."

THE MINERVA FOR 1905-1906

THE *Minerva*, which is a 'Directory' for the Universities of the world, published annually by Trübner of Strasburg, gives, amongst other things, the statistics of students, together with the names of the authorities and staffs of the various universities. In last year's issue we noticed that the Rector of the University of Vienna, with 6,205 students, was a Catholic priest, the Rev. Franz Schindler, Professor of Theology. This year the post is occupied by Dr. von Philippsberg, a professor of law. In the German and Austrian Universities the rector is changed every year, and is usually selected in turn from the different faculties. Last year the Rector of the University of Bonn, with 3,217 students, was the Rev. Johann Heinrich Schrörs, Professor of Theology in the Catholic Faculty. This year the Rectorship is occupied by Professor Jacobi, of the Philosophical Faculty. Last year the Rector of Würzburg, with 1,321 students, was the Rev. Sebastian Merkle, a Catholic priest and Professor of Church History. This year the post is occupied by Professor Theodore Boveri, from the Philosophical Faculty (Science and Mathematics section).

On the other hand, the Rector of the Czech University at Prague, with 3,487 students, is this year a Catholic priest, the Rev. Antonin Vrestal, Professor of Theology; whilst in the same city a Catholic priest has been replaced as Rector of the German University, with 1,335 students, by Dr. Josef Ulbrich, Professor

of Law. In the year 1895 the number of students at these two universities was, respectively :—

German University	.	.	. 1,192
Czech University	.	.	. 2,519

In the year 1905, the figures are,

German University	.	.	. 1,335
Czech University	.	.	. 3,487

Thus it will be seen, whilst the Czech University is forging ahead, the German establishment is almost stationary.

The University of Munich, with 4,766 students, has also this year a Catholic priest at its head, Dr. Otto Bardenhewer, author of various works on Scripture and Patrology.

The University of Louvain in 1895 had 1,475 students ; this year it has 2,148. The Catholic University of Freiburg in Switzerland had 308 students in 1895. It has now 558. The Catholic University of America, which had 60 students in 1895, has now 123.

The number of students attending the Universities in Great Britain and Ireland in the years 1895 and 1905, is as follows :—

ENGLAND.

	1895.	1905.
Oxford	3,256	3,572
Cambridge	2,895	2,879
London (Univ. Colls.)	1,500	2,631
Manchester	928	1,097
Liverpool	Not given	900
Leeds	1,116	1,278
Durham ¹	400	2,135
Birmingham	623	Not given
Bristol	584	1,164
Aberystwyth	360	453
Bangor	Not given	329
Cardiff	170	651

SCOTLAND.

Edinburgh	2,924	3,140
Glasgow	2,080	2,272
Aberdeen	812	1,100
St. Andrews	199	287
Dundee	71	217

¹ Durham now includes the Medical School and College of Science in Newcastle-on-Tyne.

IRELAND.

	1895.	1905.
Dublin University (Trin. Coll.)	1,124	950
Belfast	Not given	395
Cork	245	210
Galway	Not given	106

Amongst the largest Foreign Universities, are :—

Paris	11,010	12,980
Vienna	6,714	6,205
Madrid	5,829	5,196
Berlin	4,807	6,279
Naples	4,881	4,918
Munich	3,754	4,766
Harvard	3,290	4,136
St. Petersburg	2,804	4,562
Yale	2,350	3,138
Chicago	1,587	4,580

STATISTICS OF THE WORLD

THE following statistics of population, according to the most recent census, are taken from *Kuerschner's Jahrbuch für* 1906 :—

GERMAN EMPIRE, 56,367,178.

Protestants, 35,231,104 ; Catholics, 20,321,441 ; Other Christians 210,265 ; Jews, 586,833.

The chief States of the Empire are represented as follows :—

Prussia, 34,472,509.

Protestants, 21,817,577 ; Catholics, 12,110,229 ; Other Christians, 142,498 ; Jews, 392,322.

Bavaria, 6,176,057.

Catholics, 4,362,563 ; Protestants, 1,749,206 ; Jews, 54,928.

Baden, 1,867,944.

Catholics, 1,131,413 ; Protestants, 704,058 ; Jews, 26,132.

Wurtemberg, 2,169,480.

Protestants, 1,497,299 ; Catholics, 650,311 ; Jews, 11,916.

Kingdom of Saxony, 4,202,216.

Protestants, 3,972,063 ; Catholics, 197,005 ; Jews, 12,416.

Alsace-Lorraine, 1,719,470.

Catholics, 1,310,391 ; Protestants, 37,278 ; Jews, 32,264.

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE, 45,405,257.

Catholics, 35,570,870 ; Protestants, 4,224,095 ; Greek Orthodox or Oriental Church, 3,423,175 ; Jews, 2,076,277.

Austria, 26,150,708.

Catholics, Latin Rite, 20,660,279 ; Catholics of Greek, Ruthenian and Armenian Rites, 3,136,535—total Catholics, 23,796,814 ; Protestants, 494,011 ; Greek Oriental Church, 607,462 ; Jews, 1,224,899.

Hungary, 19,254,559.

Catholics, Latin Rite, 9,919,913 ; Catholics of Greek, Armenian and Ruthenian Rites, 1,854,143—total Catholics, 11,774,056 ; Protestants, 3,730,084 ; Greek, Orthodox or Oriental, Church, 2,815,713 ; Jews, 851,378.

RUSSIA, 128,797,534.

They are divided as follows, Russia in Europe, 105,843,997 ; Russia in Asia, 22,953,537. The religious statistics are :—
Greek Orthodox, 89,606,106 ; Roman Catholics, 11,420,227 ;
~~the~~ Protestants, 6,213,237 ; Other Christians, 1,224,032 ; Jews, 5,189,401 ; Mahomedans, 13,889,421.

FRANCE, 38,961,945.

In every thousand of the population 980 are Catholics, 16 Protestants, 1 Jew, other denominations, 3.

France has upwards of 50,000,000 subjects in her colonies ; but the proportion of Catholics amongst them is not given.

ITALY, 33,218,223.

The *Directory* says that Italy is almost exclusively Catholic, there being in the country only 65,596 Protestants, and 35,617 Jews.

SPAIN, 18,618,086.

All Catholics, except 8,000 Protestants and about 1,000 Jews.

PORTUGAL, 12,693,132.

All Catholics, except 500 Protestants and 200 Jews.

BELGIUM, 6,985,219.

All Catholics, except 20,000 Protestants and 4,000 Jew

HOLLAND, 5,430,973.

Protestants, 3,068,129 ; Catholics, 1,798,915 ; Jews, 103,988.

TURKEY, 24,028,900.

In every hundred, 50 are Mohammedans, 40 Greek Orthodox, 4 Catholics, and 1 Jew.

GREECE, 2,433,806.

Greek Orthodox, except 24,000 Mahommedans and 600 Jews.

DENMARK, 2,464,770.

All Lutherans, except 5,373 Catholics, 5,501 Baptists, 3,476 Jews.

SWEDEN, 5,221,291.

All Protestants, except 37,000 Baptists, 1,390 Catholics, 3,402 Jews.

NORWAY, 2,240,032.

All Protestants, except 10,286 Methodists, 5,674 Baptists, 1,969 Catholics.

SWITZERLAND, 3,315,443.

Protestants, 1,916,157 ; Catholics, 1,379,664 ; Jews, 12,264.

GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND, 42,940,000.

In every thousand of the population, 131 are Catholics, 575 Anglicans, 46 Scotch Established Church, 246 Dissenters, and 2 Jews. The total population of the British Colonies and Possessions Beyond the Seas is given at 355,372,000.

CHINA, 330,130,000.

This includes Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet, and Turkestan, All Confucians and Buddhists, except 20,000,000 Mahommedans about 1,000,000 Catholics, and 1,000,000 Protestants.

JAPAN, 48,351,764

Nearly all Shinto and Buddhists.

UNITED STATES, 76,303,387.

Of these 66,990,802 are whites ; 8,840,789 negro and mulatto ; 266,760 Indians ; 119,050 Chinese ; 85,986 Japanese. The effort to classify them according to religious persuasion has been given up in despair. We are simply told that they are divided into a hundred different sects.

CANADA, 5,372,000

Statistics of religion not given.

SOUTH AMERICA, 63,147,271.

All Catholics :—

Argentine Republic	5,160,983	Haiti . . .	1,294,400
Bolivia . . .	1,734,000	Honduras . . .	543,741
Brazil . . .	14,400,000	Mexico . . .	13,605,929
Chili . . .	3,173,783	Nicaragua . . .	429,310
Columbia . . .	3,917,000	Panama . . .	400,000
Costa Rica . . .	322,618	Paraguay . . .	635,571
Cuba . . .	1,572,797	Peru . . .	4,559,550
Dominica . . .	4,160,000	Salvador . . .	1,050,912
Ecuador . . .	1,272,000	Uruguay . . .	978,048
Guatemala . . .	1,364,678	Venezuela . . .	2,590,981

AUSTRALIA, 4,086,933.

In every thousand of the population 699 are Protestants, 238 Catholics, 4 Jews, 12 heathens, and 47 unregistered.

TOTAL POPULATION OF THE WORLD.

Europe, 401,542,000 ; Asia, 822,718,000 ; Africa, 142,567,000 ; America, 148,012,000 ; Oceania, 4,086,933.—Total, 1,518,925,933.

J. F. HOGAN, D.D.

Notes and Queries

THEOLOGY

WHO IS THE 'PROPRIUS PAROCHUS' OF 'VAGI'?

REV. DEAR SIR,—The parish priest of parish A assists at the marriage of *vagi* in parish B, without the license of the local pastor. Is the marriage valid? I always thought that the parish priest of the place where the marriage is contracted is the *proprius parochus* of *vagi*, but some doubt has arisen in my mind, owing to teaching of Genicot, vol. ii., page 551, who says that according to St. Alphonsus any parish priest can anywhere validly assist at the marriage of *vagi*.

SUBSCRIBER.

The question raised by our correspondent has been often discussed by theologians,¹ some of whom hold, principally on the authority of Sanchez and St. Alphonsus, that any parish priest in the world can validly assist at the marriage of *vagi* even outside his own parish, and others²—the vast majority—maintain that only the parish priest of the place where the marriage is contracted, or another priest, by his permission, can so act. We accept the latter opinion for the following reasons.

The general principle which governs the reception of the Sacraments by *vagi*, subjects them to the parish priest in whose territory they happen to be. No law of the Church, decision of a Roman Congregation, or reason derived from the nature of the case, makes an exception of the Sacrament of Matrimony.

Again, there is a twofold connexion—the one local and the other personal—by which anybody can be subject to a parish priest in regard of marriage, since the decree *Tametsi* is local and personal in its binding force. It is evident that *vagi* have a local connexion only with the parish priest

¹ Genicot, vol. ii., n. 551.

² Lehmkuhl, vol. ii., n. 776; Wernz, n. 178; Feije, n. 238; Rosset, n. 2178.

in whose parish they are at the time ; nor have they a personal connexion with any parish priest of whom they are not subjects by reason of a domicile or quasi-domicile in his parish. Hence the local parish priest, and he alone, can validly assist, and delegate other priests to assist, at the marriage of *vagi*.

The argument put forward on the other side—that there is no reason why *vagi* should apply to one parish priest rather than to another—is quite invalid, because by their presence in the parish *vagi* have a local connection with the pastor of that place ; all the argument proves is that *vagi* can submit themselves to any parish priest by going into his parish.

Moreover, in an authoritative document¹ Benedict XIV, expressly states that the parish priest of the place where *vagi* are is their *proprius parochus* in the sense of Trent :— ‘ Ipsorum (vagorum) parochus is dicitur in quorum (cujus ?) ditione versantur ; quod pariter asserendum est, licet alter solum ex illis, qui conjugium petunt, vagantium numero adscribantur.’ This plain official statement leaves little room for doubt about the true doctrine.

Hence we hold that the opinion of Lehmkuhl, etc., is the only one which has speculative probability in its favour ; nor can we admit that the other view is probable in practice on account of extrinsic authority, because there are few who hold it, and because it is wrongly attributed to Sanchez and St. Alphonsus. Sanchez² says of *vagi* :—

Hinc infertur, si quis pristinum domicilium omnino deserens, iter agat, aut naviget animo acquirendi novum domicilium dum nondum acquisivit, incipiens habitare, posse eum coram quocunque parochus contrahere matrimonium. Quia est vagus, et nulli subditus : ut probavi n. 2. Item quia potest cuicumque iateri, tanquam vagus, ut diximus n. 5 et 6. Ergo et coram quocunque parochus contrahere matrimonium.

In this passage Sanchez says that a *vagus* can be married before any parish priest, but he does not say that any parish priest can assist at the marriage outside his own parish ; on

¹ Instr. 33, n. 10.

² *De Matrimonio*, 1. 3, disp. xxv., n. 13.

the contrary, his argument shows that he speaks of a parish priest who is in his parish, because he bases his teaching on a parity between Matrimony and Penance. But only the local parish priest, or another priest having delegated jurisdiction for the parish, can absolve a *vagus*, a doctrine which Sanchez held as is clear from a previous paragraph, n. 5, in which he proves that any parish priest can absolve *vagi*: 'Ubique (*vagi*) sortiuntur forum, possuntque pro delictis alibi commissis puniri,' an axiom which holds only so long as the delinquent is in the territory of the ecclesiastical authority concerned.

St. Liguori is also credited with the same view because he said:—'Commune est, quod vagi possunt contrahere coram quovis paroco, ita Sanchez,' etc.¹ Now St. Alphonsus asserts that any parish priest can assist at these marriages, but he does not say that he can do so outside his own parish, which is an entirely different thing.

We agree, therefore, with those theologians who hold that the only safe doctrine is contained in the clear authoritative statement of Benedict XIV, who declares that the parish priest of *vagi* is he in whose parish they happen to be at the time of marriage.

TRANSFERENCE OF MASSES TO THE BISHOP.

REV. DEAR SIR,—I get intentions for Masses from day to day, and have always on hands just about the number I can say in one month. But special occasions occur, corpse-house Masses, nuptial Masses, etc. Now I find on several occasions that although I have only as many Masses as I can easily say in a month from any fixed date, still owing to the unforeseen circumstances I have mentioned, some of these are on hands five or six days more than a month from the date I received them. Can I keep these intentions, seeing that I have more than I can easily discharge within a month from the present date, or must I forward them to the Bishop?

SACERDOS.

In the case stated by our correspondent there is no

¹ Vol. ii. n. 1089.

obligation to transfer the honoraria to the Bishop, although there is one to celebrate the Masses at once.

The time available for the lawful celebration of Masses must be reckoned according to moral estimation and not on strict mathematical lines. Hence, when a month is allowed, any term within five weeks would, probably, be included therein ; and consequently a priest who can celebrate the remaining Masses within that period is not bound to transfer them to the Ordinary.

Moreover, the decree *Ut debita* allows any delay in celebrating Masses, and in transferring them to the Bishop, which is in accordance with the reasonably presumed consent of the donor ; such consent seems to exist in the present case for a delay of a few days, since the priest can celebrate the Masses in a shorter time than the Bishop can hope to have them said ; and since the Bishop could, in conformity with the decree, hand back these Masses to the same priest who is without superfluous honoraria. Hence the Masses can be lawfully retained in the circumstances.

What has been said so far is independent of a further question which arises in connexion with the article that commands the transference of unfulfilled obligations to the Ordinary. Having indicated the time available for the celebration of manual Masses the decree gives, in its fourth article, an authentic interpretation of that part of the decree *Vigilanti* which ordered that Masses be given to the Bishop after a year :—

Ad tollendas ambiguitates, Emi. Patres declarant ac statuunt tempus his verbis praeinitum ita esse accipiendum, ut pro missis fundatis aut alicui beneficio adnexis obligatio eas deponendi decurrat a fine illius anni intra quem onera impleri debuissent ; pro missis vero manualibus obligatio eas deponendi incipiat post annum a die suscepti oneris, si agatur de magno missarum numero ; *salvis praescriptionibus praecedentis articuli pro minore missarum numero aut, diversa voluntate offerentium.*

Do the words referring to a small number of Masses imply that these must be given to the Bishop as soon as the available time for celebrating them has elapsed ; or do they mean

that, although the decree *Vigilanti* continues to rule them they must nevertheless be celebrated under pain of sin within the times specified in a previous article ; or do they state that the decree *Vigilanti* has no reference to them, the provisions of a previous article in regard to the lawful time of their celebration being considered sufficient ? If the first interpretation is correct they must be given to the Bishop as soon as the time for celebrating them has elapsed, unless the donor wishes them to be retained ; if one of the other interpretations is accurate they need not be transferred at least till the end of the year.

The first is urged by the fact that the article expresses the intention of removing difficulties concerning the meaning of the decree *Vigilanti*, and, unless the time when the decree insists on the transference of a small number of Masses is indicated in the words *salvis praescriptionibus*, etc., the principal difficulty of the case remains to be solved. It might also be fairly said that, in the context, the natural meaning of the phrase *salvis praescriptionibus*, etc., is, that in the matter of giving honoraria to the Bishop, the time mentioned in a previous article is obligatory.

The second is favoured by the absence of any definite reference in a previous article which the fourth commands to be observed, to this obligation of transferring honoraria ; and also by the fact that when there is question of a large number of Masses to be personally celebrated, some of them must be said before the end of the year, and yet there is no obligation of giving them to the Bishop till the year has expired.

The third seems to be entirely excluded by the universality of the obligation imposed by the decree *Vigilanti* which says :—‘*Omnes . . . utcumque ad missarum onera implenda obligati*, sive ecclesiastici, sive laici in fine cujuslibet anni missarum onera quae reliqua sunt, et quibus nondum satisfecerint, propriis Ordinariis tradant juxta modum ab iis definiendum’; nor is there any sign of a revocation of this provision, which would now free a small number of Masses from the rule laid down for them by the decree *Vigilanti*.

Although the first interpretation seems the most probable, still the decree *Ut debita* is hardly so clear as to exclude the second as improbable, which can in consequence be adopted in practice till an authentic decision shall be given. Hence there is an additional reason for not transferring to the Ordinary the few remaining Masses which a priest can celebrate personally or by another within five or six days.

J. M. HARTY.

LITURGY

EXEQUIAL MASS

REV. DEAR SIR,—In the Diocese to which I belong, though there is no Diocesan law, there is a long standing custom that the *least* number of priests necessary for a *Missa Cantata de requie* should be five, and for a *Missa Solemnis de requie*, thirteen.

I would like to know—(1) What is the least number required by the general law of the Church for a *Missa Cantata de requie*? (2) If, notwithstanding the Diocesan custom referred to, any justification can be alleged for a priest who holds a *Missa Cantata de requie*, without having invited the minimum (five) where this attendance could be easily procured? (3) Is it justifiable to substitute the *Missa Cantata de requie* for the ordinary parochial low Mass, considering many business people, who wished to assist at a low Mass only, are unduly delayed?

A reply in an early number of the I. E. RECORD would oblige, yours faithfully,

IGNOTUS.

The Exequial Mass contemplated by the Rubrics, and referred to by the Roman Ritual¹ as desirable on the death of a member of the faithful, is a Solemn Mass *de requie* celebrated with deacon and sub-deacon, or at least a *Missa Cantata*. It is only to these that the privileges apply that have been so generously granted by the Church. Evidently, then, the Exequial Mass is entitled to a certain degree of solemnity, without which it cannot take place. As far as

¹Tit. vi., c. i. n. 4.

we can ascertain there is no general law laying down the *minimum* number of priests that should be present to render legitimate either the solemn *Requiem Mass* or the *Missa Cantata*. All that is required seems to be that there should be a sufficient number of sacred ministers about the altar and of singers in the choir to ensure that the function will be carried out with due decorum. From this point of view numbers do not count, for one priest in the choir who can sing will lend more religious *éclat* to the ceremony than half-a-dozen who cannot sing. If the Office is recited before the Mass, as it ought to be, then there should be enough of priests or clerics present to recite it properly. Diocesan legislation can, however, step in and declare the conditions under which the Exequial Office is likely to be carried out properly, and where there is a ruling on the matter it must, of course, be adhered to. We think that where such a regulation exists there can be no justification for disregarding it, where compliance with it entails no difficulty or inconvenience.

The Roman Ritual¹ says: 'Si quis die festo sit sepeliendus Missa propria pro Defunctis praesente cadavere celebrari poterit: dum tamen Conventualis Missa et Officia divina non impediuntur, et magna diei celebritas non obstat.' Now the parochial Mass is one of the things that cannot be neglected, and hence, *per se*, the Exequial Mass cannot be substituted for it.² Moreover, the Parish priest is bound to apply the Mass *pro populo*, and the Exequial Mass is not allowed unless it is said *pro defuncto*. Hence, where there is only one Mass in a parish church the case is clear. Supposing there are two Masses in a church on a Sunday, may the Exequial Mass be substituted for one of them? We think it may, at least according to the general law of the Church, which contemplates only one parochial Mass properly so called, unless there is some diocesan regulation, or some other inconvenience that would forbid it. We assume, of course, that the *Missa de requie* can be properly carried out,

¹Tit. vi., c. i. n. 5.

²S.C.R. Decr. n. 4024.

that there is a sufficient number of priests available for this purpose, and that it does not prevent the performance of any necessary parochial functions. The Exequial Mass should supersede that one of the two Masses said on a Sunday, which is the less important, and with which the sermon or devotions are not connected.

PREFACE OF MASS DURING THE QUARANT' ONE.

REV. DEAR SIR,—Will you kindly answer in the I. E. RECORD the following question :—What Preface should be said in the Mass of the Forty Hours' Exposition, when it takes place (1) on the First Sunday of Advent, and (2) when it takes place on the Second Sunday of Advent, when that Sunday falls within the Octave of the Feast of the Immaculate Conception ?

In the first case the Mass to be said is the Mass of the Sunday, with a commemoration of the Blessed Sacrament, but I am doubtful whether the Preface should be of the Sunday, *De Trinitate*—or of the Blessed Sacrament, *De Nativitate*.

In the second case, the Second Sunday of Advent, when that Sunday falls within the Octave of the Immaculate Conception, the Mass should also, I believe, be of the Sunday, with a commemoration of the Blessed Sacrament only, but as three Prefaces occur—that of the Sunday, the Blessed Sacrament, and the Blessed Virgin—I do not know which should be said.

DUBIUS.

In the first instance the Preface to be said is that of the Sunday, *De Trinitate*. There is no change to be introduced into the Mass of the day on account of the Exposition except the commemoration of the Blessed Sacrament, under the same conclusion as the prayer of the Mass. In the second case the Preface should be *De B.V.M.* Here again the Exposition makes no change in the Mass of the day except the Commemoration, and the Preface of the Octave takes precedence over that of the Sunday.

MEANING OF 'RUBEUS' AS LITURGICAL COLOUR
LIGHTS IN CHURCH DURING BENEDICTION

REV. DEAR SIR,—May I trouble you to let me know through the I. E. RECORD—(1) What is meant by the colour 'Rubeus,' which is prescribed by the Rubrics for the Masses of certain feasts? Will any one of the manifold varieties of 'Red' suffice? (2) Is it rubrical to have candles lighted in a church during Mass or Benediction?—I am, yours faithfully,

G. D.

1. Red is one of the primary colours, and has various shades or hues from the bright scarlet to the sombre purple. We would say that any of these tints, so long as it can popularly be designated 'Rubeus,' fulfils the liturgical requirement. As the symbol of fire and blood, red testifies burning charity and consuming self-sacrifice. It is appropriately used, therefore, on the Feasts of the Sacred Passion of our Saviour, of the Holy Ghost, and of the Martyrs. The Spouse in the Canticles is 'candidus et *rubicundus*.'

2. We presume that there is question of the lights that burn before statues, and that our correspondent wishes to know if these lights may be retained during Mass or Benediction. In a previous issue of the I. E. RECORD¹ we discussed the propriety of these lights, and concluded that they are not forbidden by any ecclesiastical enactment, provided that they do not give rise to the danger of detracting from the worship and adoration due to the Blessed Sacrament or of confounding the *cultus duliae* of the images of the saints with the *cultus latriae* which is to be rendered absolutely to God Himself and relatively to the material things which represent Him. The question was asked whether images and statues in the locality of the High Altar on which the Blessed Sacrament is exposed should be covered during the Exposition of the Forty Hours, and the reply was, '*Negative : et solum legenda est imago quae extat in Altari in quo fit expositio.*'²

In 1874 another question was asked :—'Permittitur ne vel saltem toleratur antiqua consuetudo tenendi sacras

¹ Sept. 1904, pp. 256-8.

² S. R. C. Decr., n. 3241.

magines detectas in Capella vel Altari, stante Expositione Quadraginta Horarum?' In the reply the matter was referred to the discretion and prudence of the Ordinary. If, then, images, except in accordance with the first Decree given—those on the High Altar—may remain uncovered and exposed during the Forty Hours' Adoration, there is no reason why lights should not be used before them. But on this occasion, lest they should attract too much attention to the detriment of what is due to the Blessed Sacrament, the lights should be used very sparingly.

THE CONFRATERNITY OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE—(continued)

FORMALITIES OF CANONICAL ERECTION

THE Bull *Quascunque*, issued by Clement VIII in 1604, lays down in detail all the things that are to be observed in the establishment of Confraternities. According to this constitution, supplemented by subsequent decisions and regulations of the Pope and the various Congregations, the following must be carefully attended to.

A parish priest about to set up any Confraternity in his parish should, as a first preliminary, seek the counsel and authorization of his Ordinary. As a general rule Bishops have *jure ordinario*, the power of erecting confraternities within the limits of their dioceses. This faculty does not belong to the Vicar-General without express mention. In regard to confraternities that are associated with certain religious Orders, the powers of canonical erection are vested in the Generals of these Orders exclusively, and may not be exercised by Bishops independently of special delegation by the Holy See. The *erection* of a Confraternity is one thing, however, and the aggregation or affiliation, by which the *confrerie* becomes a participator in the privileges and indulgences enjoyed by the Arch-confraternity of the same name in Rome, is quite another, and power to erect did not always presuppose the faculty of affiliating. The erection was often a condition on the fulfilment of which affiliation was obtained from the Arch-confraternity. As far as our

country is concerned this distinction is of no practical importance, for by an Instruction issued by the Propaganda in June, 1889, Bishops subject to it have full powers for establishing all Confraternities and Sodalities approved by the Holy See, and for granting to them all the privileges and favours which affiliation could confer. To be able, however, to endow the Confraternity of the Rosary with the very special privileges that are peculiar to it, recourse must be had to the General of the Dominicans. Bishops, then, have the plenitude of power, as regards the Confraternity of Christian Doctrine. The authorization of the Bishop should be in writing, and should be deposited in the archives of the parish or Confraternity, so that if the canonicity of the erection were ever called into question, this documentary evidence might silence all doubts. When the requisite permission is being sought for the erection of the Society, the statutes or rules by which it is to be controlled should be submitted for episcopal approval. These rules should be simple and modelled upon what is demanded by the end of the Confraternity and the means and practical method of giving it effect. What has been said in the last number of the I. E. RECORD about the regulations for working the Confraternity in Rome will supply suggestions for drawing up a code of rules that will be suitable to the needs of each place, for it must be remembered that Bishops can modify the statutes of the Arch-confraternity so as to make them practical and workable in their dioceses. The appointment of a Director must be also made by the Bishop, and it would be of advantage if the priest so nominated were also to receive the power of delegating another priest to act in his stead, in case he ever found it impossible or inconvenient to discharge the duties in person. Mention of this fact should be made in the statutes. In nominating the Director the Bishop will give him all requisite faculties for blessing badges and medals and imparting all the Indulgences of the Society. Since 1861 Bishops have the power of appointing the *parochi pro tempore* as Rectors and Directors of the various Confraternities. The next thing is the reception

of associates or members. In all Confraternities the actual entry of the names is essential. If there is a canonically erected branch in the parish, it is enough to enter the names on the register of this branch. If there is no canonically erected branch, then the names must be sent on from time to time to some place where such a branch exists. The Director himself, or some one duly authorized by him, makes entry of the names. If the Director should not happen to write the list, it would be well if he initialled it to give it the sanction of his authority. This enrolment comprises the essentials of reception. For most Confraternities there is a special formula, but there seems to be no special one for the Confraternity of Christian Doctrine. The general form will be quite sufficient. As we have not found it in the Roman Ritual we give it here :—

Auctoritate mihi concessa Ego vos (te) recipio et adscribo Confraternitatis Doctrinae Christianae vosque participes facio omnium gratiarum, Indulgentiarum, privilegiorum, bonorumque spiritualium ejusdem Confraternitatis in nomine Patris, etc.

On the occasion of inaugurating, or re-establishing the Confraternity of Christian Doctrine, it would be advisable to surround the simple reception of members with more or less solemnity. The nature of the Confraternity being explained to the people beforehand and the advantages of membership being put before them, a convenient hour might be selected for the enrolment of members when it would be possible to have Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament.

RULES OF THE CONFRATERNITY

We have come across a copy of the Provincial Statutes of the Archdiocese of Dublin, published in 1831, which contains in the Appendix the rules for the Confraternity of the Christian Doctrine. As some of our readers have been anxious to know where they might procure a copy of these rules, we gladly publish them. They may not be altogether suitable to the conditions of modern times, or to the circumstances of particular places, but they will afford a

basis to go upon, and may be modified, with the authority of the Bishop, wherever necessary:—

1. The object of this Society is to promote, amongst all classes of the faithful, the knowledge of the Christian Doctrine, and is to be in all things under the special care and superintendence of the parochial clergy.

2. The President, Vice-President, and Treasurer are to be elected by ballot, on the first Sunday of January in each year, and a Secretary is to be appointed by the President. The election of these officers must be confirmed by the Parish Priest (Director).

3. The members are also to be chosen by ballot; but no person can be proposed until he shall have obtained a written certificate from some one of the parochial clergy, and he cannot be voted into the Society, until he shall have been employed for two months in discharging the duty of a member.

4. A meeting of all the members shall be held on the first Sunday of each month, at which anything regarding the welfare of the Society shall be discussed and determined. If possible, one of the clergy (Director) shall attend this meeting.

5. A Committee of five shall be chosen on the first Sunday of each quarter, and these, with the President, Vice-President, and clergy shall arrange the classes, appoint the teachers, award the premiums, and transact all the other business of the Society.

6. The teachers of each class should, as far as possible, be charged with the instruction of the children in their own neighbourhood, and are, *at all times*, to watch over the conduct of their pupils.

7. There shall be a public examination held the first week of May in each year, and the premiums shall be distributed on the third Sunday of the same month, by the Priests in the church.

8. Each member, when enrolled in the Society, is to pay One Shilling, and One Penny a month afterwards. The Treasurer shall pay no money unless he receives a written order signed by the President.

9. Any member absent from Catechism for three successive Sundays without some very good reason, or who shall allow his subscription to be three months in arrear, shall first be admonished by the President to discharge his duty more regularly, and, if he neglect such admonition, he shall no longer be considered a member of the Society, and must be re-elected if he wish to return.

10. Any member who shall frequent public-houses, or give bad example in the parish, must be expelled from the Society. Members are exhorted to approach Holy Communion the first Sunday of each month, in order to gain the Plenary Indulgence.

Rule 5 is the most important. It should provide for (a) the attendance and classification of the pupils ; (b) programme of instruction suitable to each grade ; (c) books to be used ; (d) appointment of teachers, notaries to, record names of absentees, prefects to arrange pupils in their proper places and grades, and be generally helpful during the classes ; (e) time at which instructions are given and their duration ; (f) officers to look up the absentees and bring them in.

Rule 9. Persons may become members of the Society, even though they do not participate actively in the Sunday classes, provided they undertake to promote the welfare of the Society in any of the ways indicated in last issue.

P. MORRISROE.

DOCUMENTS

HIS HOLINESS POPE PIUS X AND THE POLES

EX ACTIS SUMMI PONTIFICIS ET E SECRETAR BREVIVM
 ALLOCUTIO SSMI. AD JUVENES CATHOLICOS STUDENTES POLONIAE,
 DIE 24 APRIL. 1905.

Maximae sint tibi grates, Venerabilis Frater,¹ qui diserta allocutione dilectos filios coram Nobis ostendens iucunditatem ac solatium animo Nostro attulisti. Si enim semper et praecipue cordi Nobis est iuventus, verbis satis significare non possumus, quantum gaudii Nobis afferat conspectus uvenum Gentis Poloniae, cuius et praeclara spirat memoria gestarum rerum et magnam erga hanc Sanctam Sedem coniunctam cum fiducia pietatem agnovimus.

Hi enim fratres sunt illorum, qui sicut perbelle meministi, ineunte saeculo XIII, ferventi religionis ardore incensi innumeri in Syriam et Palaestinam dimicantes convenerunt, ut loca sanctissimis Redemptionis nostrae mysteriis consecrata recuperarent et christiani nominis hostes ad catholicam veritatem converterent. Hi filii sunt illorum patrum, qui tremefacta Europa ad impetus hostium praepotentium, pectorum suorum praesidia inter primos insignibus proeliis opposuerunt: iidem religionis et civilis cultus vindices acerimi, fidissimique custodes. Hi sunt iuvenes, qui macte virtute saeculi fallacias et malorum exempla caventes, ad omnem christianam laudem animose contendunt, nec postrema cura ea est aliis prodesse exemplo, scilicet ut multi numerentur, qui cum illis rerum omnium, quae honestae sint communione iungantur.

Dum porro vos, dilecti Filii, non degeneres virtutis patrum gaudenter perspicimus, praeclaras voluntates vestras omni, ut par est, commendatione prosequimur, atque animos etiam vobis ultro addimus, ut studiis vestris eam gloriam sectemini quae in probanda Deo et Ecclesiae fide vestra continetur. Quod si in hac via fideliter institeritis, minime dubitamus lucem exempli vestri plurimum valituram, ut plures ea excitati, ac tristi eorum conditione permoti, qui saeculi erroribus anguntur,

¹ Illmo. ac Revmo. Archiep. Leopoliensi.

sesse vobis socios, adsciscant et ad certandum bonum certamen alacritatem vestram studeant aemulari.

Haec autem omnia pro ingenii vestri docilitate feliciter consecuturos confidimus, praesertim cum noverimus vestrum moderatores et magistros, quorum multos praesentes laetanter conspiciamus, collatis in unum viribus et consiliis, cuncta quae in illis sunt adhibere, ut vestrum omnium animi in catholicae professionis officiis roborata virtute et subsidiis auctis confirmantur et praestent.

Vobis propterea, electi iuvenes, eximii magistri, et tibi in primis, Venerabilis Frater, qui omnes singulari charitate permoti ad Nos adiistis, gratum animum Nostrum nominatim profiteamur, pariterque petimus, ut civibus vestris quos ut amantissimos filios habemus maxime caros, paternam benevolentiam Nostram reduces testari velitis: quibus vobisque cunctis vestrisque familiis et universae Polonae Genti caelestium auspicem munus Apostolicam benedictionem ex intimo cordis affectu in Domino impertimus.

PIUS PP. X.

HIS HOLINESS POPE PIUS X AND THE MARONITES

**EX ACTIS SUMMI PONTIFICIS ET E SECRETAR. BREVIUM
PIUS X GENTI MARONITAE DE PIETATIS OBSERVANTIAEQUE TESTI-
MONIIS GRATULATUR
PIUS PP. X.**

Venerabilis Frater,¹ salutem et Apostolicam benedictionem.

Maronitarum cum Apostolica Sede coniunctionem necessitudinis, ab avis et maioribus singularem, egregie proximis diebus testata sunt officia, quae tu, Venerabilis Frater, et nonnulli tecum Episcopi nobilesque, de Clero et populo viri complures, totius gentis vestrae nomine, praesentes Nobis praestitistis. Equidem pergrata perque iucunda haec Nobis accidisse ostendimus: iterum vero profiteamur libenter, Nos pietatis observantiaeque vestrae testimoniis suaviter affectos esse, gratiamque vobis agimus de Petriana stipe caeterisque muneribus, quibus istam ipsam pietatem pro facultate probastis. Praesertim laudare satis non possumus eam, quam perspeximus in vobis, tuendae promovendaeque catholicae fidei constantiam: quam

¹ Illmo. ac Revmo. Domino Eliae Petro Huayek, Patriarchae Maronitarum, Antiochiae.

quidem Orientalibus, qui ab Ecclesia Romana dissident, salutari et exemplo et incitamento esse intelligimus.—Haec, quamquam significavimus coram, tamen his etiam litteris significata volumus; eam nempe ob causam, ut paternus Noster in omnes dilectos filios Maronitas animus constaret luculentius. Neque enim commissuri unquam sumus, ut minus a Nobis diligi quam a Decessoribus Nostris videamini.—Vos interea vestraque omnia enixe divinae benignitati commendamus, atque auspicem caelestium bonorum, testemque praecipuae benevolentiae Nostrae tibi Venerabilis Frater, et reliquis Venerabilibus Episcopis universaeque genti Maronitarum Apostolicam benedictionem peramanter in Domino impertimus.

Datum Romae apud S. Petrum, die XXIX Iunii, festo Apostolorum Principum, anno MDCCCCV, Pontificatus Nostri secundo.

Pius PP. X.

THE CONFRATERNITY OF MOUNT CARMEL

E SACRA CONGREGATIONE INDULGENTIARUM

SANANTUR RECEPTIONES AD CONFRATERNITATEM B.M.V. DE MONTE CARMELO USQUE NUNC INVALIDE PERACTAE

Bme. Pater,

P. Praepositus Generalis Carmelitarum Discalceatorum ad Sacrorum Pedum osculum provolutus, exponit S.V. non raro contingere ut christifideles, qui ad Confitem. B.M.V. de Monte Carmelo admitti postulant, invalide recipiantur, tum ob omissam nominum inscriptionem, tum ob aliam causam. Ne itaque praefati christifideles gratiis et privilegiis memoratae confi. concessis inculpatim priventur, Orator S.V. humiliter exorat, quatenus receptiones ad eandem confitem. quacumque ex causa usque ad hanc diem invalide peractas, benigne sanare dignetur.

Et Deus, etc.

S. C. Indulgentiis Sacrisque Reliquiis praeposita, utendo facultatibus a SS. D. N. Pio Pp. X, sibi specialiter tributis, petitam sanationem benigne concessit. Contrariis quibuscumque non obstantibus. Datum Romae ex Secria. eiusdem S.C., die 28 Iunii 1905.

A. Card. TRIPEPI, *Praef.*

Pro Secrio. : IOSEPHUS M. Cancus. COSELLI, *Subtus.*

NOTICES OF BOOKS

THE SACRIFICE OF THE MASS : An Historical and Doctrinal Inquiry into the Nature of the Eucharistic Sacrifice.
By the Very Rev. Alex. MacDonald, D.D., V.G.
New York : Christian Press Association Publishing Company.

IN an age when Protestants no longer cling to the extreme principle of the one rule of faith, founded on each one's individual reading of the sense of Scripture, but appeal to the early centuries of Christianity as witnesses to dogmatic truth, works such as that under notice are very much in season. For Catholics, too, both those who view Dogma from the standpoint of the professed critic, and those who humbly submit to take teaching from others, the historical method of dealing with Theology is increasingly important.

The present work is a historico-theological examination of the central idea in the Eucharistic Sacrifice. In the early portion of his volume the author discusses the subject of sacrifice in general, and both from appeals to the voice of Tradition, and from a detailed examination of the history of sacrifice, he shows conclusively that the destruction of the Victim was in all cases the essential notion in this particular sort of worship. He proves, consequently, that the view held by some of the older theologians, and revived in later days, which would see in sacrifice merely a common meal, a sacred banquet, eaten by the worshippers in communion with the Deity, has no historical or traditional evidence to support it, besides being in direct conflict with the teaching of Scripture.

He next considers the Mass itself, and seeks for the formal constituent of the sacrifice therein. In doing so, he proposes to himself to show that the Scholastic explanations, which so generally obtain in the schools of to-day, are founded on principles unknown to the Fathers as well as to the earlier schoolmen ; nay, are quite at variance with the pure Patristic idea. The Fathers are quoted, and in our opinion, quoted justly, to prove that they held the Mass to be the same sacrifice as that offered

at the Last Supper and on Calvary. Modern theologians, no doubt, say the same ; but since they explain the immolation of our Lord in the Mass as consisting in His being reduced to the state of food and drink, Dr. MacDonald would have it that this is to set up a new sacrificial action in place of that insisted on by the Fathers, according to whom there is not merely specific but even numerical identity between (what are called) the two sacrifices, and an identity not only as to Priest and Victim, but also as to the sacrificial action in both. Much better to keep to the old view : in the Supper-room, Christ offered up the first Eucharistic sacrifice, and as this oblation virtually contained the bloody oblation of Himself some hours later, He may be regarded as judicially slain, even before the Jews laid hands on Him in the Garden. The Last Supper, then, with the subsequent Crucifixion, is in reality the first Christian Passover, and in the Mass the moment of the Supper and the moment of the Crucifixion—two moments, which, by reason of the connexion between them, are really one—are repeated, or rather are continued, for evermore.

The author sets forth his views in language that is always clear and telling, and strong by its moderation. From what we have said, it will be inferred that the point of view taken up is an interesting, and, in some degree, a novel one ; but there is abundance of quotation, as well as theological reasoning, to show that it is but the old, and in the author's mind, the true and consistent view revived.

J. S.

RECOLLECTIONS OF WILLIAM O'BRIEN, M.P. London :
Macmillan & Co. 1905. 8vo. 14s. net.

WHATEVER our opinion may be of Mr. O'Brien's politics, we must recognize that he has written a fascinating book. It is indeed the best thing in the way of literature that we have yet seen from him. Not that it is entirely free from his peculiar defects of excessive emphasis, exaggerated statement and harrowing, almost agonizing sentiment ; but it is more self-possessed, calm, and controlled than anything that has yet come from the same author.

Mr. O'Brien seems to have constantly before him the object of converting Englishmen to sounder views on Irish

politics. The same we remarked in his early novel *When we were Boys*. It is a laudable object, and we believe that this last volume will be a powerful instrument in the task of securing it. It will, in our opinion, be impossible for any Englishman to read some of the chapters in this book, particularly those on the Forster régime, without feeling ashamed of the folly that is there revealed to all the world. Possibly in furtherance of his main purpose, Mr. O'Brien goes farther in the way of concession to British prejudices than the majority of Irishmen would be prepared to go. Thus, for instance, we come across passages which cast a vivid sidelight on Mr. O'Brien's views on education. Writing about the mixed school in Mallow—the polite establishment of the Misses Babington, in which his mother was educated—Mr. O'Brien says :—

'In the Misses Babington's polite establishment, the girls gentle and simple, Protestant and Catholic, seemed to have mingled together with an amenity which, I am afraid, is wanting in the more recent relations of classes and creeds in Ireland, and which served in a surprising degree to mitigate the brutality of the strict letter of the law in pre-emancipation days. Quite half the families with whom my earliest recollections of small dances and games of forfeits are associated, belonging to one or other of the half-dozen Protestant sects which had their conventicles in Mallow—to which of them, or for what reasons, it never struck us to inquire, no more than it struck the occupants of the old graveyard, where Protestant and Catholic reposed side by side.'

After having graduated in two elementary schools in Mallow, Mr. O'Brien was sent for his classical education to the Protestant 'Diocesan College' of Cloyne. Here he tells us :—

'Three-fourths of the pupils were Protestants. Here again my experience of the commingling of classes and creeds was of the same happy character as all my early recollections in Mallow.'

Those who wish to have proof of the influence of the classics on a man's life will read the following with interest :—

'I knew all about Virgil before I could ever read a page of Shakespeare. I could construct trashy Greek verses at a

time when my hand-writing in English was little above the dignity of pot-hooks. I could tell nearly every battle of the Peloponnesian wars, as Grote told them, years before I had heard of Crecy or Agincourt. . . . At twelve years of age profoundly ignorant of all that was modern, I could rattle through all the common school classics—even Livy's gnarled sentences and Herodotus' Egyptian adventures—with a facility, and even joy, that sometimes made "Old Edward's" eyes beam at me over his spectacles.'

And yet it can hardly be said that all this has had a very classical result. Intellectually and in all other respects Mr. O'Brien seems to be more of the Gothic than of the Classic build.

In his references to education, however, it is only fair to say that he roundly condemns the Queen's Colleges, and says that he could never look on the college in Cork as an *Alma Mater*, although he had carried off some of its highest prizes.

In his conclusions on the policy of the Fenians, to whom he at one time belonged, he says :—'The moral influence of the Secret Society is wholly bad. A life of conflict with the Church demoralises all except the most stoical.'

Another feature of the book, and one which has pleased us more than any other, is the author's memorial of Dr. Croke. Mr. O'Brien says he has only contributed one stone to the monument which he hopes will be one day erected to the memory of that great Archbishop. We re-echo the hope, and we note, with satisfaction, that Mr. O'Brien's contribution is a precious one. We should like to give some extracts from Mr. O'Brien's references to the Archbishop; but no extracts will give a satisfactory impression of this book. It must be read and judged as a whole.

J. F. H.

THE LIFE OF COUNT ARTHUR MOORE. By Rev. Albert Barry, C.S.S.R. Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son. 1905. 3s. 6d. net.


WE are glad that the life of Count Arthur Moore has not been allowed to pass away without a suitable memorial, and we congratulate Father Barry on the handsome volume in which he has perpetuated it for us. Count Moore was a thoroughly good man, a sterling patriot, according to his own conception of the

word, and a Catholic of whom Ireland had reason to be proud. Of his devotion to the Church he gave the most generous and life-long proofs, and of his desire to benefit the Irish people and to improve their condition, there is ample testimony in this volume. The Archbishop of Tuam, in his admirable Preface, sums up the various activities of the late Count in language which could not be excelled by us, and we commend it to the attention of our readers. For our part we have only to say, that there was nothing in the life of the Church and of the country that appealed to all that is best and noblest in Irishmen and Catholics that did not appeal to Count Moore. The holy places in Palestine which he visited so often, the holy places of Rome in which he was almost as much at home as his friend Marrucchi, the holy places of Ireland which he did so much to perpetuate, were always in his heart. The poor and the suffering had no more practical benefactor. Catholic education in all its grades had no more staunch supporter. 'The Catholic Truth Society of Ireland' counted him as one of its Vice-Presidents, and one of its most active members. Catholic soldiers and sailors looked up to him as one of their most devoted friends.

All this is made clear and patent in the pages of Father Barry. But behind it all there was the refined and polished gentleman who never obtruded his generosity or zeal, and who won the hearts of those who approached him by his kind and gentle manners.

He may have been sometimes a little rash and impulsive ; but if that is a defect it is one which Irishmen readily overlook. It was, in any case, outbalanced by so many virtues that it scarcely deserves to be reckoned. With great pleasure we recommend this biography, which we should be glad to see in every reading-room and every private library in the country. Its influence will be for good wherever it is read, and the words of Scripture will be verified that 'A good life hath its measure of days, but a good name shall live for ever.'

J. F. H.



FATHER DENIFLE, O.P.

IN the death of Father Denifle, which occurred unexpectedly at Munich on the 10th of last June, the Dominican Order has lost one of its most celebrated members, and the Catholic Church one of her staunchest defenders. He was on his way to Cambridge to receive the degree of Doctor of Letters, which the University had decided to confer upon him for his distinguished merits in historical research, when the hand of death struck him down.

Joseph Denifle was born in the Austrian Tyrol, at the village of Imst, in Ober-in-Thal, in 1844. His father, who was schoolmaster and organist of the village, taught him music, for which the lad showed considerable talent. He made his elementary studies at the cathedral school for choristers in Brixen, and at the age of seventeen entered the Dominican novitiate at Gratz in Styria. It was the study of the *Conférences* of Père Lacordaire that decided young Denifle to take this step. He was professed on the 5th of October, 1862, and exchanged his name of Joseph for Henry Suso, of whose life and writings he was afterwards to make a special study. After his philosophical and theological studies which he made at Gratz, at Rome, and at St. Maximin, in France, he was ordained priest in 1866. In 1870, when he took his degrees in theology, he was appointed professor at Gratz, and taught for ten years.

During the years of his professorship, Denifle preached in the cathedral at Gratz, and in the principal cities of Austria. The subject-matter of his sermons was published in a volume of exceptional merit, *Die Katholische Kirche und das Ziel der Menschheit* (The Catholic Church and the End of Humanity).¹ He relieved the monotony of a professor's life by a close study of German mysticism in the fourteenth century. The place occupied by the Dominicans in the mystic movement of that period had for him a special attraction, and in 1873 he gave to the world the charming volume, *Das geistliche Leben, Blumenlese aus den Deutschen Mystikern und Gottesfreunden des 14 Jahrhunderts*.² The author in this work, which contains 2,500 passages, has co-ordinated the most striking texts of the principal mystics, in accordance with the three degrees of Christian perfection—the purgative, the illuminative, and the unitive—and he shows such a marvellous grasp of his subject that those who knew his methods and his almost phenomenal powers of application were led to expect works of higher and still greater critical value. A series of studies on 'The Friends of God,'³ and his efforts to restore to the 'Friend of God in Oberland' his true identity, instead of confounding him, as had been hitherto done, with Nicholas of Basle, were partially crowned with success, and drew the attention of the learned to his novel methods of criticism.⁴ Five years subsequently he proved that the 'Friend of God' never existed, and that the works which were published under this name were written by

¹ We wish to express our indebtedness for many of these biographical facts, to the article of Mgr. Kirsch, a distinguished friend of Father Denifle, in the *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique*, also to the article by M. Pelzer in the *Revue Néo-Scholastique*, and to an article by Père Conlon, O.P., in the *Annales Dominicaines*.

² 'The Spiritual Life, an Anthology of German Mystics and Friends of God in the fourteenth century.' A French translation and adaptation of this work has been published by the Countess of Flavigny, under the direction of the author—*La Vie spirituelle d'après les Mystiques allemands au xiv. siècle*.

³ Cf., Alzog, *Universal Church History*, vol. iii., p. 128.

⁴ These studies were published in the *Historisch-politische Blätter*, vol. lxxv., 1875, pp. 17, 93, 245, 340.

Rulman Merswin.¹ Denifle was recognized, in a very short time after the publication of these studies, as a specialist in German mysticism, and his splendid powers and sound criticism proved that he had no equal on this subject. In 1874, Preger published the *History of German Mysticism* (*Die Geschichte der deutschen Mystik*), which contained many inaccuracies, and was wanting in the critical value which such a work demanded. In a series of articles, published in a leading review,² Denifle handled the work with great severity, and fearlessly pointed out to the author that he did not possess the qualifications for the due accomplishment of the work he had set himself to perform. About this time he announced the publication of a work on German mysticism which should treat of Tauler and Suso, but with the exception of some articles which appeared later the work was never completed.

His controversy with Preger prepared the way for a critical edition of the works of Henry Suso, but as he was called to Rome, only the first volume of the work was published.³ Denifle devoted a considerable time to the study of Tauler and published his book on spiritual poverty,⁴ and two years later he published a critical study on the conversion of Tauler.⁵

These studies on Suso and Tauler brought about a controversy with Jundt, who published about the same time a work on the 'Friends of God' in the fourteenth century, and in an appendix criticized some of Denifle's conclusions. In two articles published in the *Historisch-politisch Blätter*,⁶

¹ These studies appeared in the *Zeitschrift für deutsches Alterthum und deutsche Litteratur* (vol. xxiv., 1880, and vol. xxv., 1881). Under the general heading, 'Die Dichtungen des Gottesfreundes im Oberland,' Denifle examines in turn; (1) 'Das Meisterbuch' (vol. xxiv. p. 200); (2) 'Die Proteusnatur des Gottesfreundes' (p. 280); (3) 'Die Romreise des Gottesfreundes' (p. 301); (4) 'Die Dichtungen Rulman Merswins' (p. 463); and in an Epilogue, vol. xxv., p. 101, he draws his conclusions.

² 'Eine Geschichte der deutschen Mystik,' *Historisch-politische Blätter*, vol. lxxv., 1875, pp. 679, 771, 903.

³ *Die Schriften des sel. Heinrich Seuse*, t. i., *Deutsche Schriften*, Munich, 1880.

⁴ *Das Buch von der geistlicher Armuth, bekannt als Johann Taulers Nachfolgung des armen Lebens Christi*, Munich, 1877.

⁵ *Taulers Bekehrung kritisch untersucht*, Strasburg, 1879.

⁶ Vol. lxxxiv., 1879, pp. 797, 878, 'Taulers Bekehrung Antikritik gegen A. Jundt.'

Denifle defended himself against the criticisms of Jundt and pointed out many defects in the work, which seems to have escaped its author. Father Denifle was an intimate friend of Mgr. Greith, Bishop of St. Gall, who was also an interested student of the works of Dominican mystics. The bishop induced him to write the life of Margaret of Kentzingen, which appeared with notes in the *Zeitschrift für deutsches Alterthum*.¹

The German mystics always possessed a peculiar charm for him, and we find him returning to them again and again in several articles which he subsequently published. His sympathies were drawn to Master Eckhart, and several articles appeared, in different reviews, on the acts of the process against Eckhart in 1327, on his doctrine, on his Latin writings, and on his birth-place.² These studies on the famous mystic constitute an epoch in the literature of German mysticism, and place Master Eckhart in a new light. He was not born at Strasburg, as it was hitherto generally believed, but at Hochheim, a district of Thuringia, about two leagues north of Gotha. His German sermons and writings represent but a very small portion of his work, the greater part being written in Latin. He is not the pantheist that history represents him, as he does not identify God and the creature inasmuch as the creature is but a manifestation of God, but inasmuch as the being of God so fills and permeates all creation that God is the formal being of all creatures. Denifle arrived at this conclusion from a minute and exhaustive study of the *Opus Tripartitum*, the manuscript of which he found in the library of Erfurt, and of which, at the time, he publi-

¹ T. xix., 1876, p. 478; *Das Leben der Margaretha von Kentzingen. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Gottesfreundes im Oberland*. This work, says Père Conlon, placed Denifle in the first rank of writers on mysticism. It received unbounded praise in the leading German reviews, and proved its author to be a man of vast learning and phenomenal powers of research. *Annales Dominicaines*, September, 1905.

² 'Aktenstücke zu Meister Eckharts Prozess' (*Zeitschrift für deutsches Alterthum*, vol. xxix., p. 259); 'Meister Eckharts lateinische Schriften und die Grundanschung seiner Lehre' (*Arch. für Literatur und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters*, t. ii., pp. 417, 652); 'Das Causanische Exemplar lateinischer Schriften Eckharts in Cues' (*Ibid.*, p. 673); 'Die Heimath Meister Eckharts' (*Ibid.*, t. v., p. 349).

shed the most important passages. Before this manuscript appeared in print, he came upon a second, more accurate and more complete in detail, in the library of the hospital of Cuse-sur-Moselle, written in 1444 at the instance of Cardinal Nicholas de Cues, which confirmed the conclusions he had already arrived at from the study of the first.

Eckhart was no enemy of scholasticism, as some writers on mysticism assert¹:—

Their judgments upon the philosophical talents of Eckhart [says Denifle] should bring joy to all scholastics. They claim him (Eckhart) as the herald of the philosophy and theology of the future, as the father of Christian philosophy, as one of the most original thinkers of the Middle Ages. But they were not aware that the admiration they expressed for the philosophy of Eckhart, was simply addressed, in its due and lawful measure, to the mother from whose bosom Eckhart had been nourished, namely, scholasticism, whose doctrines we meet, for the first time, though not in the measure to be desired, in his German writings.²

In his controversies with Preger, Denifle always insisted that without a profound knowledge of scholastic philosophy and theology a proper understanding of the mystics is impossible:—

The historian of German mysticism [he writes] should be profoundly versed in scholasticism, especially in the writings of St. Thomas; otherwise he displaces the mystics from the historical surroundings to which they belong. He will deny that they themselves are but the term of an evolution which is a fact, and he will never understand their terminology still less their doctrines.³

In an able article that appeared in 1888, Denifle unmasked the plagiarist Nicholas of Strasburg, who had copied almost entirely the writings of John of Paris, and circulated them as his own.⁴ Thus the mystical life of the fourteenth century, personified in Henry Suso, Margaret of Kentzingen, Tauler, and Eckhart, occupied the hours

¹ Preger, Ch. Schmidt, etc.

² *Archiv. für Litteratur und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters*, vol. ii., p. 424.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 532.

⁴ 'Der Plagiator Nicolaus von Strassburg,' *ibid.*, vol. iv., 1888, p. 312.

that he was able to spare from his duties as professor. His labours on German mysticism earned for him a reputation that was not confined to Austria and Germany. The excellence of his work did not escape the Master-General, who determined to call him to Rome, and open up a wider field for his investigations. He left Gratz for Rome in 1880, as the *socius* of the General for German-speaking countries, and he was destined to spend the remainder of his life in the Eternal City.

In Rome he found a new sphere for his activity, but for want of documents he had to defer his studies on the mystics. In the Roman archives and libraries, however, he found material to resolve questions that had long occupied his thoughts. In 1878, Leo XIII addressed his Encyclical letter—*Aeterni Patris*—to the Catholic world on the revival of the study of scholasticism, and especially the study of St. Thomas, the prince of scholastics. He determined to bring out a new and critical edition of the works of the Angelic Doctor, and Denifle, who even then occupied the first rank among paleographers, was selected as one of the editors. The work was not congenial to his spirit, which required a wider and more comprehensive field for the exercise of its powers than textual criticism would allow, and consequently, after a few months, he begged to be relieved of the task.¹

In the course of his studies on German mysticism, Denifle was struck by the number of existing prophecies which announced impending calamities on the Church and society. In Rome he had an opportunity of examining them still more closely, with a result that he himself could hardly have foreseen. Leo XIII had thrown open the archives of the Vatican, and at the instance of Cardinal Hergenröther, the archivist, Denifle was, to his own great delight, appointed sub-archivist. He first intended, says M. Pelzer, to give an exact account of the prophecies

¹ During the winter of 1882-1883, Denifle was sent to Spain to collect and collate manuscripts for the Leonine edition, but as one of his colleagues told the writer of this article, he was much more occupied in collecting matter on the theologians and mystics of the Middle Ages than in collating the manuscripts of St. Thomas.

of the fourteenth century, which announced impending calamities, and this further led him to the study of similar prophecies of the twelfth and thirteenth. In studying the Abbot Joachim and the Eternal Gospel, and its vicissitudes at the University of Paris, he found that the knowledge then possessed on these subjects was absolutely inadequate, and that comparatively little was known of the dispute between the University of Paris and the Mendicant Orders. Denifle forthwith conceived the project of publishing a work on the University of Paris and the Mendicant Orders, in which the Eternal Gospel should be studied in an appendix.¹ While preparing this work, having discovered that nearly all the authors who had written on the University of Paris, and notably Du Boulay, in his *Historia Universitatis Parisiensis*, had been deceived on the origin of the University, Denifle took up the work from the beginning, and determined to study the schools of the University of Paris from its foundation till the end of the fourteenth century. He undertook, at the same time, to write a history of the other universities of Europe. The first volume appeared at Berlin in 1885, under the general title, *Die Universitäten des Mittelalters bis 1400*. He had designed to complete the work in five volumes. The first volume (*Entstehung und Gründungsgeschichte der mittelalterlichen Universitäten bis 1400*) opens (pp. 1-40) with a study on the designation of the universities of the Middle Ages (*universitas, studium generale, academia, gynasium*); next the author treats of the rise of Paris and Bologna (pp. 40-218); then the other universities of Europe up to 1400 (pp. 219-652). The universities are then studied in their relation to the schools that had preceded them (pp. 652-742); in the causes that led to their establishment (pp. 743-791); and the volume closes with conclusions which the author has drawn from the text, and some additions and appendices (pp. 800-814).

The appearance of this volume determined the General Council of the Faculties of Paris to ask Denifle to undertake

¹ He afterwards published some articles on the Eternal Gospel; 'Das Evangelium aeternum und die Commission zu Anagni,' *Archiv.*, i., pp. 49-98; 'Protokoll der Commission zu Anagni,' *ibid.*, pp. 99-142.

a work much more vast in extent. Under its patronage, and with the assistance of M. Emile Chatelain, professor of paleography at the Sorbonne, Denifle began to collect and edit, with notes, all the documents relating to the University of Paris from the end of the twelfth century till the end of the fifteenth. The first volume¹ appeared in 1889, and was published at the expense of the Minister of Public Instruction. It was awarded a prize of 10,000 francs, and Denifle was decorated with the badge of the Legion of Honour. The four volumes already published appeared at intervals during the next ten years. The first treats of the period from 1200, when Philippe Auguste guaranteed by privilege the personal safety of the students of Paris to the reign of Philippe le Bel in 1285;² the second to the reign of Jean le Bon;³ the third to the death of Clement VII in 1394;⁴ the fourth to the reform of the University in 1454.⁵ For the fifth volume, which is yet unpublished, Denifle had reserved the schism, the pontificate of Benedict XIII, the general and provincial Councils, the errors of Wickliffe, and the controversies of the Council of Constance. He decided to publish apart—under the general title, *Actuarium Chartularii Universitatis Parisiensis*—documents relating to the study of arts in the four great national Universities. Only two volumes were published in 1894 and 1897. They contain the ‘Liber procuratorum nationis Anglicanae (Alemanniae)’—the first for the years 1333-1406; the second for the years 1406-1466.⁶

¹ ‘*Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* sub auspiciis consilii generalis facultatum Parisiensium ex diversis bibliothecis tabularisque collegit et cum authenticis cartis contulit Henricus Denifle, O.P., in archivio Sedis Apostolicae vicarius, auxiliante Aemilio Chatelain, bibliotheca Universitatis in Sorbona conservatore adjuncto.’

² Paris, Delalain Frères, 1889, pp. xxxvi., 714.

³ Published 1891, pp. xxiii., 808.

⁴ Published 1894, pp. xxxvii., 777.

⁵ Published 1897, pp. xxxvi., 835.

⁶ M. Marcel Fournier, in his work *Les statuts et privilèges des Universités Françaises*, criticized the author of the *Chartularium*, but he had no conception of the manner of man with whom he had to deal. Denifle published a brochure, *Les Universités Françaises au moyen âge*—Avis à M. Marcel Fournier (Paris, 1892), in which he gave M. Fournier what he did not in the least expect, and in another article which appeared in the *Revue des Bibliothèques* (1892), ‘Les délégués des Universités Françaises au concile de Constance,’ he criticized Fournier’s work with great severity, and brought discredit on many of his conclusions.

These masterpieces of historical erudition earned for Denifle a world-wide fame and placed him in the front rank of writers on the Middle Ages. His researches in the publication of the *Chartularium* brought prominently before him the disastrous effects of the Hundred Years' War on the churches and monasteries of France. This important factor in ecclesiastical history was too valuable to be dismissed, and Denifle, with characteristic impetuosity, which in his case was justified by the marvellous grasp of his comprehensive mind, which was always occupied with two or three collateral subjects at once, interrupted his work to study the 300 volumes in folio of petitions addressed to the Holy See, and relating to the material and moral calamities that the Hundred Years' War had brought upon the Church in France. The work appeared in two volumes,¹ and is one of the most valuable additions that has ever been made to the history of the Church in France.

In studying the vast field which his researches on the University of Paris covered, he gathered together an incomparable collection of documents, which he published from time to time in a series of studies relating to the history of the Universities,² and which in all probability he intended to embody in the work which his labours for the French Government had interrupted.

The works of Denifle on the University of Paris, and other collateral subjects connected with it, which his researches have enabled him to give to the world, will prove of immense value to all future historians of the Middle Ages. It may with justice be said that he has revived and clothed

¹ Vol. i., *La désolation des églises, monastères et hôpitaux en France pendant la guerre de Cent ans* (Paris, 1897); Vol. ii., *La guerre de Cent ans et la désolation des églises, monastères et hôpitaux en France* (Paris, 1899).

² 'Die Sentenzen Abaelards und die Bearbeitungen seiner Theologie vor Mitte des 12 Jahrhunderts,' *Arch.*, vol. i., pp. 402-469, 584-624; 'Die Sentenzen Rolands, nachmals Papstes Alexander III' (Freiburg, 1891); 'Quellen zur Gelehrten-geschichte des Predigerordens im 13 und 14 Jahrhunderts,' *Arch.*, vol. ii., pp. 165-248; 'Die Handschriften der Bibelcorrektorien des 13 Jahrhunderts,' *Arch.*, vol. iv., pp. 263-311, 471-601. Denifle has published several other studies of the highest importance for the study of scholasticism, cf., Pelzer, *Revue Néo-Scholastique*, August, 1905.

with a new interest all the subjects he has treated in his work ; and if we may not give him the place of a pioneer in the history of university education in the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries, we are absolutely safe in asserting that no one has treated this period with such profound science and judgment, with such unerring criticism and wealth of erudition, as he. He has eliminated errors and legends in which the history of the Middle Ages abounded ; he has settled for ever, as historical facts, a number of points that were hitherto doubtful, and brought to light others that were completely unknown ; and he has furnished materials that will be indispensable for future writers on the Middle Ages.

He will remain [says M. Pelzer] the indispensable guide for those who undertake the historical study of medieval civilization, of the Catholic Church, of Luther and Lutheranism, of France and England, of Germany and Italy in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, of the teaching of universities, of Papal diplomacy, of philosophy, of law, of mysticism and of exegesis.

His history of the universities of the Middle Ages outclasses the work of Du Boulay, who was hitherto the great authority on the subject. His conclusions are always safe, because they are drawn, wherever possible, from manuscript sources, and he has opened up, in his edition of the *Chartularium*, one of the richest mines of historical learning that has ever been given to the world.

The University of Paris was, for a long time, the first school in Europe, and students of every nation flocked to it in large numbers. Its scientific importance began to diminish in the fifteenth century, and it became rather a national institution than a cosmopolitan seat of learning. Thus about the end of the fourteenth century every political event in France was discussed in the University, which, at the time, was regarded as on equal footing with the Bishop of Paris, the King and Parliament.¹

Father Denifle [says M. Pelzer] does not confine himself to

¹ Cf., Mgr. Kirsch in a study which he consecrated to the work of Denifle in the *Revue Thomiste*—'L'Université de Paris au moyen âge'—vol. ii., pp. 661-685.

the mere collecting and publishing of the original documents relating to the University, numbers of which exist not only in Paris, but in several other archives and libraries. He has added to a critical text numerous notes on persons mentioned in the documents, on events and on the existing manuscripts of the works which he uses in the compilation of the *Chartularium* itself. He has made the reading of it easy for the student by the annexation of a double table: one chronological, which reproduces the regests of documents published; the other onomastic, which gives the required information on the names cited, and their titles, etc. Thus the second and fourth volumes contain respectively 3,000 and 4,500 proper names. The edition is prefaced by long introductions in which Denifle studies, on broad lines, some results of his researches, on the institutions, the persons, and the events to which the documents refer. He corrects opinions that had hitherto been erroneously received, and gives his own conclusions, based on a wealth of evidence, on which future historians may confidently rely.

It would be impossible to do justice in the space allowed us, to the work Denifle has accomplished for the history of scholastic philosophy and theology. We can but refer the reader to a noble article that M. Pelzer of Louvain has written on Denifle, in the *Revue Néo-Scholastique*, the official organ of the first school of scholastic philosophy in Europe. Denifle's studies on Abelard and his disciples, on the Abbot Joachim and the Eternal Gospel, bring to light facts that had been long unknown, clear up doubts that had existed for centuries, and dispel legends that had supplanted truth for generations.

In the midst of his labours on the University of Paris, and the calamities of the churches and monasteries during the Hundred Years' War, Denifle was struck by the extraordinary decadence among the secular and regular clergy during the fifteenth century. In studying the sources of this decadence, and pursuing its evolution, he was brought face to face, in the third decade of the sixteenth century, with numbers of priests and religious who lived in open violation of their sacred vows, and who, to the indifference which was characteristic of the period, added the denial of religious beliefs that had hitherto been held sacred. He found Luther at their head, and he determined

to devote his energies to unmasking the hypocrisy and wickedness of the apostate.

Having found Luther at their head [says M. Pelzer], he undertook the regressive study of the reformer to the beginning of his teaching. To check the results of his researches, he retraced his steps and followed, in an inverse direction, the evolution of Luther year by year. He wished to determine, in the life of Luther, the psychological moment that would enable him to understand the personality of the apostate and to explain his rôle as the leader of a sect.

In 1903, the first volume of his monumental work on Luther appeared.¹ The first edition was exhausted in a month, and a second was urgently demanded. Denifle recast the first volume and divided it into three volumes, the first of which appeared in 1904, and the second a few days before his death. The second volume is composed of a large number of texts on justification. Each of these texts has an introduction, and is borrowed from Patristic and medieval theologians and exegetes, as the title of the volume indicates.² The end the author had in view in this volume was the complete refutation of the fundamental doctrine of Lutheranism,—justification by faith without works. He wished to test the affirmation of Luther, that, with the exception of St. Augustine, all the interpreters of Scripture, in the Western Church, understood the text of St. Paul³ relating to justification as he had expounded it. In this volume the doctrines of Luther are confronted by the teaching of the Fathers, and of medieval exegetes and theologians. He proves that Luther had a most imperfect knowledge of the golden age of scholasticism, and even that was acquired through the school of Occam, and he also shows how this ignorance has been perpetuated, and is characteristic of the best treatises of contemporary Protestant theology. He criticises severely numerous citations taken from St. Augustine, Venerable

¹ *Luther und Lutherum in der ersten Entwicklung: quellenmässig dargestellt*, vol. i. (Mainz, 1903).

² *Luther und Lutherum, Die abendländischen Schriftausleger bis Luther über Justitia Dei (Rom. i. 17) und Justificatio* (Mainz, 1905).

³ Rom. i. 17.

Bede, St. Bernard, and the scholastics, in the great edition of the works of Luther, which the editors were not able to identify. Two of them, however, have had the generosity to do justice to the learning of Denifle. Professor Köhler says: 'His knowledge of medieval literature is astonishing,' and Kawerau speaks of 'his incomparable knowledge of ancient ecclesiastical literature, and his marvellous grasp of the literature of the Middle Ages.' The appearance of Denifle's book on Luther raised a storm among the Protestants of Germany, and created what may, with justice, be called a panic. Harnack and Seeberg, and a number of others, entered the lists against Denifle to defend their idol whom he had damaged beyond hope of repair, but their literary reputation suffered seriously in the attempt, and they soon discovered that they had to deal with a giant, sure of his own strength as he was certain of the justice of his cause. He demolished their arguments in a pamphlet which he published in 1904,¹ and Luther shall remain, for all time to come, the discredited hypocrite that the German Dominican has proved him to have been. The publication of the third volume was announced for the end of 1905, and the second volume, which Denifle had time to prepare before his death, is to be published this year.

To the works to which we have already referred, and which represent but a part of the immense labours of the learned Dominican, we must add another which was published at Rome in 1888,—*Specimina paleographica Regestorum Romanorum Pontificum*. The life of Denifle was a life of intense activity, and from 1880 till 1905 not a single year passed without some volume from the pen of this literary giant. Articles on a vast variety of subjects appeared in the leading periodicals of Germany and France,² and from 1885, in conjunction with his friend Father Ehrle, S.J., the *Archives für Literatur und Kirchen-*

¹ *Luther in rationalistischer und Christlicher Beleuchtung Prinzipielle Auseinandersetzung mit A. Harnack und R. Seeberg*, (Mainz, 1904).

² Cf. *Deutsche Literaturzeitung*; *Mémoires de la Société de l'histoire de Paris et de l'Île de France*; *Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie*; *Historisches Jahrbuch*; *Revue des Bibliothèques*; *Revue Thomiste*

geschichte des Mittelalters appeared regularly till his death, and its pages contain many of his best and most original works.

In his preface to the *History of the Universities of the Middle Ages*,¹ he explains the method he rigidly adhered to in all his historical studies :—

The analytic method [he says] is the only one that guides us to the discovery of truth ; it saves us from an error into which we often fall, and which results in the seeking of proofs in support of preconceived ideas and assertions, to the complete obscuring of the common adage—*qui nimis probat nihil probat*. I am convinced that in using the synthetic method we cannot arrive at solid conclusions, in a field of research where much has yet to be done, and where we must first of all establish particular facts. We run the risk of taking as general what is, in reality, particular ; of basing conclusions on defective inductions, regarding as particular incidents, universal facts, and of confounding different epochs. I do not like such conclusions as the following : It has been thus in this place, and in that century ; therefore it has been the same elsewhere, and in antecedent and subsequent centuries. We do much more for historical science by confining ourselves to the domain of facts and mastering them one by one.

It was characteristic of Denifle to go to original sources even when published matter was available. His numerous researches had familiarized him with the contents of the principal archives and libraries of Europe, to an extent that he knew exactly what they contained relating to the life and works of any scholastic. When engaged on any work he was never satisfied till he had collated every manuscript that he could find of the work itself, and arranged and classified every document he could discover bearing upon it. In an interesting study on Denifle's personality,² Mgr. Ehses says that there was nothing mechanical about his work. He examined every document that passed through his hands minutely, though he might not have been able, at the time, to make immediate use of it. It was due to his analytic method and to his passion for original research that the historical works of Denifle

¹ Cf., pp. xxiii. et sq.

² *Kölnische Volkszeitung*, July 15, 1905.

are so accurate and trustworthy, and that future writers will be able to rely upon them with complete confidence.

This article would be incomplete if, having noticed the life-work of Denifle, we omitted to say something of his original personality. In appearance he was tall and slight with piercing blue eyes, and dark auburn hair which he generally wore long; he was extremely abrupt in manner, and his intense application to whatever work he had in hand made him, at times, totally unconscious of his surroundings. He was frank, sometimes to the verge of rudeness, in conversation, and in his writings he expressed his views of men and things with almost brutal severity. He speaks of the 'lies' of Preger, and the 'romancing' of Reuter, two opponents whom he had to castigate in some of his controversies. He warns all who may be inclined to trifle with truth of this side of his character:—

Since my childhood [he wrote in 1903], I have regarded frankness and probity as the basis of intercourse with my fellow-man. For thirty years I have fought many a hard fight, but there is one thing that my opponents will always grant me. They know how they stand with me; they know that my methods are open and straightforward, and that I neither involve nor conceal my thoughts. If I discover a lie, I call it a lie; and if I detect a trick, a duplicity, or a forgery, I designate it by these words.¹

As he tells us, in his preface to *Luther und Luthertum*, he wishes to strike the reformer to the heart. He knew the unpopularity his work would bring upon himself, and the storm of hate that should burst upon him, but as he says—

Someone had at last to do it, and to submit willingly to all the ignominy that the world reserves for him who conscientiously announces the truth such as it appears to him, and gives things their proper names; who relates not only facts—even the most unpalatable—but who draws from them their logical conclusions, because he knows from experience that Protestant readers do not do so, when this subject is in question.²

With all the cares and preoccupations which his literary

¹ *Luther in rationalistischer und Christlicher Beleuchtung*, p. 5.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 6.

labours entailed, he was always prepared to look after the spiritual interests of those who sought his guidance. Whole families of the highest rank and greatest distinction were under his spiritual direction. In his private life he was the simplest of men. During the hours of mental relaxation he was amused by the simplest jest, and he took great delight in challenging the lay-brothers to a game of draughts. He had the spiritual charge of them for years, and he seldom failed to turn up at their recreations, and enter with great zest into their simple amusements.

Father Denifle was a member of the most illustrious academies of Europe—of Vienna, Prague, Gottingen, and of the Academy of Inscriptions and Belles Lettres of Paris. He had several decorations from the Emperor of Austria which are only given to those who are distinguished in science and art, and besides these he received the order of the Iron Crown. He was decorated by the Emperor of Germany, and, as we have seen, France enrolled him in her Legion of Honour. A few years ago he received the Doctorate from the Academy of Munster in Westphalia, and the University of Cracow placed him among the doctors in her roll of honour. A tardy recognition, but none the less appreciated, came from the Protestant University of Cambridge, but on his way to receive it God called the labourer to his reward, and, we trust, gave him a more glorious decoration than any man has to bestow.

MICHAEL M. O'KANE, O.P.

RELIGION AS A CREDIBLE DOCTRINE

II.—CRITICISM

MR. MALLOCK'S reasons for rejecting the spirituality of the soul, as proved from self-consciousness, may be briefly put thus : Everyone admits that we cannot imagine how the thing called matter and the thing called mind are connected in man ; yet everyone admits that they are united in point of fact. Is it not, therefore, just as reasonable to hold that they are one indivisible thing, as to hold that they are two distinct things ? Their connection is unimaginable, yet it is a fact, why should the unimaginability of their oneness necessarily prove their duality ? Because, we venture to assert, that Mr. Mallock has not grasped the precise point of the argument. We admit freely that we cannot explain how mind and matter are united in man, but we deny that this forces us to accept their oneness. If the act of self-consciousness is proven independent of matter, then the soul, the entire principle of that action, must be independent of matter. *Operari sequitur esse*. Now, 'the act of self-consciousness implies absolute identity between myself thinking about something, and myself thinking on that thinking self : ' it is an instance of the complete or perfect reflection of an agent back upon itself. An action of this kind is in open and direct conflict with all the fundamental characteristics of matter as known to physical science. Atom A may act on atom B, but atom A could not turn back on atom A without assuming a character absolutely contradictory to the essential nature of matter. Therefore, this act of self-consciousness is not the act of anything intrinsically dependent on matter. I may not know, I do not know, how matter and mind are connected, but I am absolutely certain that the thing within me, which is the source of self-consciousness, and which all agree to call mind, must be intrinsically independent of my material organism, of

matter. Unity is essentially repugnant, duality must be accepted. Imaginability has nothing to say with the question.

Mr. Mallock confounds two different things carefully distinguished by me, the simplicity and the spirituality of mental activities. He then represents me as proving the spirituality of the soul by the non-spatial character of its activities. . . . My answer is to refer the reader to page 469, where I explicitly point out the difference between the spirituality and the simplicity or non-spatial character of a mental activity. I there state formally at the beginning of the thesis concerning the spirituality of the soul that the principle of conscious life in the lower animals though non-spatial is yet not spiritual. I then prove, not from consciousness—which the animals possess—but from self-consciousness, from thought and from free volition, of which animals are devoid, that the human soul is spiritual. Nowhere in this proof do I appeal to the non-spatial quality of consciousness. My argument is not, it is unimaginable how non-spatial consciousness can be dependent on an extended organism, but that it is absolutely unthinkable that self-consciousness, thought, or free volition can be acts of a bodily organ.¹

Let us see if Mr. Mallock presents a stronger case against the second main contention of the apologist. The first thing that strikes Mr. Mallock's readers is that he does not devote a single line to that proof which the apologist is bound to furnish in favour of this part of his thesis. Mr. Mallock contents himself with stating the conclusion without a word of explanation of the terms involved, and then proceeds to marshal against that conclusion an array of facts. We intend to supply the lacunæ. We intend—to use Mr. Mallock's words—to ask our readers 'to accept the statement that men possess certain faculties of which, in other living creatures, there is not even a trace, on grounds similar to those on which all of us do accept the statement that men can boil tea-kettles, and other living creatures cannot,' namely, on the grounds of the ordinary methods of observation. And, then, we shall discuss Mr. Mallock's objections in detail.

¹ Maher's *Psychology*, p. 606. Many able Neo-Scholastics deny that the principle of life in irrational animals is simple, and deny that sensations are simple. Mercier, *Psychologie*, p. 351, sixth edition; Fontaine, *La Sensation et La Pensée*, pp. 29-32; Nys, *Cosmologie*, pp. 202-206.

The thesis of the apologist is : Science proves that man, and man alone, is capable of certain manifestations which indubitably demand spirituality of intellect, namely, rational language, morality, religion, and that progress which results from individuality. We shall first prove this thesis, and then apply it.

Rational language is, according to Mr. Mivart,¹ 'the external manifestation by sound or gesture, of general conceptions :—not emotional expressions, or the manifestations of sensible impressions, but enunciations of distinct judgments as to "the what," "the how," "the wherefore."' And, in 1889, Max Muller,² as President of the Anthropological Section of the British Association, said :—

If all true science is based on facts, the fact remains that no animal has even found what we mean by a language ; and we are fully justified, therefore, in holding with Bunsen and Humbolt, as against Darwin and Romanes, that there is a specific difference between the human animal and all other animals, and that the difference consists in language as the outward manifestation of what the Greeks mean by Logos.

Morality does not here mean that feeling inspired by fear of chastisement, but that shame inspired by the violation of inflexible laws made known to each man through the voice of conscience. Now, every nation has its own laws, and every state of civilization has had, and has, its own peculiar practices on such essential matters as chastity, property, and human life. Still the untiring efforts of ethnographers and naturalists have brought to light this fact, that there was, or is, no known race, however barbarous and degraded, that had not, or has not, adopted customs and established sanctions which prove the existence of, and assure respect for, the moral notions. Who has ever seriously maintained, with any show of proof, that the animals respect or recognize the moral notions ?

Religion, in so far as it implies belief in a superior Being, or beings, capable of influencing our destiny, and also the persuasion that some part of our being will survive

¹ *The Old Riddle and the Newest Answer*, p. 75.

² M. Duilhé de Saint-Projet, *Apologie*, p. 397.

death is also found among every race of men. Some years ago, evolutionists made great capital out of the fact that certain races of savages were atheistic. Scientists, with no apologetic leanings, have proved the falseness of this view. 'J'ai cherché l'athéisme avec le plus grand soin. Je ne l'ai rencontré nulle part, si ce n'est à l'état erratique, chez quelques sectes philosophiques des nations les plus anciennement civilisées.'¹ Who has ever spoken of the religion of the brute?

Progress is another characteristic of man. What a change from the world of the pre-historic man of the quaternary period to the world of to-day. The rude arms and utensils of the pre-historic races are jealously treasured in our museums, and rightly so, for they are our legacy from our earliest discovered ancestors. Yet, how primitive are these instruments, and how far on are we not gone, from the cradle days of our race. How many sciences, how many industries, how many religions, how many styles of architecture, how many arts, how many inventions for the comfort and pleasure of men, how many different fashions in dress and clothing have not come and gone through the various centuries? And to-day, the rush of progress is faster than ever. But the dumb creatures about us! Truly, they seem not of us: they do not even appear to realise that things are changing around them. The throb of human progress awakes no responsive chord within them: they are heedless of the feverish rush of humanity towards the goal of happiness. It has ever been so with them. Never through the roll of the centuries have they shown any trace of personal initiative. From the first they have shivered as men did when the bitter blasts blew, and when the frost and snow encircled them; from the first, they have had certain tasks to fulfil, and when the sun set and darkness came down, they, too, like men, betook themselves to rest. They must have then felt the same need of physical comforts as men did; yet, they never lit a fire against the winter's cold, never donned a garment to keep

¹ Quatrefages, *Introduction à l'études des races humaines*, p. 278.

out the sleet, never built a shelter for the night, never made a tool to help them at their toil. They have lived as long, and longer, than man on the earth. Yet, at all times and in all places, uniformity and stability have marked the conduct of the individuals within each species. No progress, no change.

Here, then, are facts as palpable as the boiling of tea-kettles : man is capable of rational speech, man is religious man is moral, man is capable of personal progress, and of profiting of the progress of others—and man alone is capable of these things. Within these sacred precincts no animal has ever entered. And the question arises, why is man capable of such things ? A moment's introspection gives us the answer. Each man discovers within himself acts of two kinds : the eyes see, the ears hear, the imagination imagines objects of such and such size, of such and such colour, of such and such proportions.

But there are acts of another kind. Each human being can convince himself by personal observation that his inner faculties can grasp ideas and principles which have no connection with matter or with sense—abstract and universal ideas, which ignore or prescind from all individualizing conditions. For instance, my concept of man represents the nature or essence of man, and is applicable to each one of hundreds of millions of human beings scattered everywhere throughout the globe. It represents only the essential attributes of man, and prescinds from colour, shape, size, or any other individualizing factor. I turn over the leaves of my Shakespeare—Hamlet, Macbeth, Romeo, Cæsar, etc., loom up before my mind, with oh ! so many masterly-tinted individualizing traits. Yet, my concept never varies, it is one, and it is found beneath the peculiar characteristics of these creations of genius, everywhere the same, everywhere man, everywhere the one human nature. Now, a concept of this kind cannot come from a faculty intrinsically dependent on sense. Sensations, however reproduced, aggregated, blended, or refined, are material phenomena, and include a set of individualizing conditions, and are applicable only to

objects that are characterized by these conditions. A sensation, therefore, is not abstract, not universal. Now, the existence of universal ideas and concepts, altogether removed from sense and matter, alone accounts for these four distinguishing facts, and alone accounts for their absence in the animals.

Thus, rational language implies the transference of thought, and since the sensible image varies from moment to moment, and from individual to individual, this transference would be impossible if there were not behind the image a universal and abstract concept, independent of all fleeting influences, and conveying to my neighbours exactly that which I wish to convey. Again, in every proposition, the predicate is abstract, and Max Muller tells us that all names were originally terms conveying some general attribute of the subject. On the other hand, given an intellect capable of knowing the abstract and the universal, the possessors cannot fail to establish a medium of intercourse. 'The reflective activity of the intellect, combined with the social instinct, would inevitably lead these beings to manifest their ideas to each other, were such ideas in existence.'

Morality presupposes necessary and universal principles of conduct, be they few or many. The notions of good and evil binding at all times and in all circumstances—notions and principles that can be grasped only by an intellect capable of universal and abstract ideas. Therefore, it is that man is moral, and the brute not.

Religion, even restricted to the narrow limits of our definition, implies that man has seen his own littleness, and has sought out the author of himself and of all those fleeting things about him—effort that involves the principle of causality. And, then, observing his own superiority to all about him, he thought on the future, and felt somehow that all did not end as his body stiffened out in death. Every step here demands an intellect not shut up within the narrow barriers of sense and matter, an intellect capable of the universal and the abstract. And, therefore, man has got his temples, and the brute his lair.

Progress—why are animals condemned to psychical fixity, why ever the slaves of nature, and why is man master of all about him, and capable of every form of progress? Again, because man grasps the universal and the abstract, and because the animal does not. The first human being looked out on the vast world, conceived the plan of such and such an action, chose the means thereto, and accomplished it in his own way. His successor felt the same needs, but conceived another way of satisfying them, and so reached the same goal by another path. Thus, as each man faced the problems of life for himself, the human intellect, in virtue of its universal and abstractive potentiality, pointed out ever new means to old ends; and progress grew from generation to generation, from century to century. Why did the brute creation remain outside all this? Why did it not even learn the lesson by force of example? Because nature denied brutes the power: it fixed one mode of action for them, varied it from species to species, but within the same species never so much as suggested another to them. Brutes lacked that faculty, which presents an ideal, capable of being embodied in diverse forms according to the end in view: in a word, a faculty capable of conceiving the abstract and the universal. Invention and progress are due to the application of universal concepts to matter and material phenomena. The brute has never made the slightest progress, never invented anything. He had ever as much need of invention and of progress, as much incitement thereto as man. What can have been wanting save the universal idea? Is it for a moment tenable that the brute conceived the same ideas as man, felt the same needs, and yet stood still, stands still to-day, and will stand still for ever?

Man, therefore, to sum up, is proven possessed of universal and abstract ideas, and the animals are proven wanting in such ideas. Now, a faculty is judged by its acts, and the nature of the principle of any faculty by the nature of the faculty itself. Therefore we conclude that the human faculty of intellect is intrinsically independent

of sense ; and therefore, further, that the human soul, principle of the intellect, is intrinsically independent of sense, that is, spiritual. The same argument proves that the animal soul is not spiritual. Here, then, with all the evidence of the 'tea-kettle' methods, we reach the conclusion that there is a difference, not of degree, but of nature, between the soul of man and the soul of the brute. Let us see if Mr. Mallock's facts invalidate our thesis.

Does Mr. Mallock's elephant judge and reflect ? No one can pretend to know the elephant's mind, and, therefore, his claims to intellect must be weighed by his actions. Elephants, since their appearance on the earth, have never invented a single tool, never given a sign of progress. With such proof to their complete want of judgment and reflection, are we to accept Mr. Mallock's example as proof of the possession of these faculties ? Is it not infinitely more rational to explain this act by means of those faculties which elephants have ever given proof of—by the faculties of sense-perception and by the association of sense-perceptions. May not the sight of the rapid, flowing water have suggested to the elephant that act of caution ? Or, it may be, that Jumbo has just come away from his fountain, and the sense-association of the non-resisting power of water revives in his brain at the sight of the colourless liquid. A hundred means of explaining the elephant's action through the sole means of sense, and sense-co-ordination are possible, while to introduce into his brain the act of human judgment and of human reflection is wholly unnecessary, and so opposed to past elephantine history as to be wholly inadmissible.

The dog, by sad experience, knows that he is not impenetrable, sees the missile coming, and dodges it. Sight and touch and sensitive memory of co-ordinated sensations account for all. But, insists Mr. Mallock, the dog gauges the speed ? Why suppose that he does ? Does a man, when avoiding a similar missile, make a mathematical calculation ?

The attention of the horse, the dog, the deer ? Yes, we admit that the horse, the dog, the deer are capable of

attention, so far as attention means mere intensification of sensuous consciousness. But the attention which marks off man from the brute is of quite another order : it is the special application of intellectual energy to any object ; it is, therefore, a wholly internal act, known only to our own consciousness and presupposes an intellectual faculty. And so, too, with the judgment and the reflection proper to human nature. Human judgment is an act of intellect, by which the mind combines or separates two attributes by affirmation or denial. Human reflection is intellectual attention to our own states. Attention, reflection, and judgment, as proper to man, are internal acts, which imply the possession of intellect, and which can be proved only by external manifestation of a very specific kind. Animals have in all their history positively proved that they do not possess an intellect such as man possesses. They cannot, therefore, be capable of acts of supersensuous attention, judgment, or reflection. All their acts are explicable by purely sensuous faculties and sense-co-ordination.

In his opening remarks on the facts against self-consciousness, Mr. Mallock wastes to no purpose an extraordinary amount of eloquence. No apologist of note holds that baby crying for the pap-bottle has a consciousness of self clearer than that of the dog who fights for a bone with another dog. What every apologist does hold is, that the newly-born babe possesses that faculty called intellect. That faculty, however, depends on certain material images that it may enter into exercise, and students of infant physiology have shown that the infant organism is not sufficiently developed to permit the proper and complete action of the intellect. The infant senses must be trained, the infant brain must be developed along certain lines, and its various parts be properly differentiated—all this demands time, and so far as science can say at present, two years or even less in very favourable circumstances, and in other less favourable circumstances five or even six years. But this development being completed, the infant gives proof of intelligence. The intelligence of the infant is proved by signs of intelligence, when

prompted thereto. That the highest animal at the highest stage does not possess an intellect is shown by the fact that no amount of training, no amount of careful education, will bring him to the point of giving even one unmistakable proof of the possession of that faculty. The infant is not then in the animal stage of evolution, it is merely a being following the laws of development proper to that quite specific nature, called human nature. Every organism demands a certain time that it may reach mature development, so does the human organism. The human intellect is extrinsically dependent on that human organism, it is natural, therefore, that it cannot evidence its presence until that organism reaches a certain stage of perfection. In the case of the other animals, even where their organism has reached its full perfection, the signs of intellect are wanting. Use up all the means that human ingenuity can suggest, and still the remotest sign of intelligence is not forthcoming. Why? Because the principle of that intellect is wanting—the spiritual soul.¹

Before we pass on to the facts on universal ideas, we may remark, that though Mr. Mallock speaks of self-consciousness in this part of his essay, his objection has not touched that point at all. Self-consciousness is the knowledge which the mind has of its acts as being its own. It demands a spiritual faculty, and since the animal proves positively that he has got no such faculty, it follows that the animal cannot be self-conscious. That man is self-conscious is verifiable for each one for himself: at what precise moment the infant acquires this power is another question, and a delicate one, but a question that does not touch our thesis.

General concepts represent the essence of some subject in an abstract fashion, ignoring or prescinding from all accidental individualizing conditions. To establish their existence, the psychologist describes the marks which distinguish them, and then appeals to each man's internal experience; or, again, he may deduce their existence from

¹ See Mivart's *Origin of Human Reason*.

the nature of the acts placed by man or animal. We have proved that the animals give positive proof of the absence of such concepts. The cat's recognition of milk, the dog's recognition of his fellow-dog, the growing familiarity of horse and cow with the passing train—all these are explicable on the grounds of association of sensuous images and of sensuous memory. The cat has seen and tasted milk, and the memory of the sweet, white liquid remains with him—no need of a universal concept to enable him to recognise milk when he sees it again. Like grouping of sensuous and concrete associations explains the dog's knowledge of his fellow-dog. The cow and the horse have oft-times run away, and have seen that the train did not follow, but passed them by—why should their ceasing to run one day mean that they had grasped a universal idea : this big, black, puffing something has never done them any harm, has never done other than pass them by with snorts and smoke. Perception of concrete facts explain their growing ease in its presence.

The sorrowing animal beside his master's bier is incapable of exactly the same feelings as those of the desolate mother for this reason, that his actions through life prove him devoid of intellect. That does not prevent him from feeling intense sorrow. No one dreams of denying,—and the most orthodox apologist has not the slightest interest in denying,—that animals are capable of intense affection.

As to the objection on progress, we have discussed its value, and found it to be null. Two further points remain. The Stone Age, writes Mr. Mallock, makes our historical age a bustling yesterday in the life of a man of sixty, and men made no progress during that age ; further, even to-day, tribes of savages exist who are still in the condition of the men of the Stone Age.

We do not contest that the Stone Age is immeasurably longer than that of historical progress. How much longer it was, no one can tell us. The documents that enable us to retrace and re-picture that age are few, but they are very precious, for they prove to demonstration the existence of an intellect capable of the universal and the abstract.

These primitive men have left us the indubitable signs of intelligence in their weapons, their instruments, their works of art, their funeral pyres. Euclid gave no proof of genius in his deductions from his fundamental theorems : he did give such proof in inventing the fundamental theorems. And so these men of the Stone Age gave signal proof of genius, even in the invention of their rude arrows and hatchets. They led a wandering life : their forms of industry were elementary ; yet they progressed, they multiplied gradually their conquests over nature. At the neolithic epoch, they show signs of fairly advanced civilization, though they did not yet employ the metals : at the paleolithic epoch, the men of the Madeleine were capable workmen and capable artists. Mr. Mallock seems to ask : Why did not these primitive men progress as quickly as we to-day ? The question is puerile. To what is our progress of to-day due to, if not to the labours of so many preceding generations ? If we started as the men of the Stone Age started, how far on would we have got ? Again, these men had not at all the same cravings and motives for progress as we have. Few in numbers, they led a simple life, sustained by the superabundant products of the yet untrodden earth. Their numbers multiplied, and then the race for life began. But however simple that primitive life, the remains prove it to have been lived by beings at once intelligent and progressive.

The savages of to-day ? First, it is perfectly evident that those modern savages are intelligent beings. Visit them in their huts, speak to them, follow them in their hunts, and you find in them that faculty of intellect which you recognize to be your own. Rational language, religion, morality, and the capability of individual progress—these are inalienably theirs, the signs of their manhood and of their intellectuality. Under the influences of education, these modern savages reveal all the capability of the ordinary civilized man. No doubt, therefore, of the community of nature between the two. Now, to the precise point of Mr. Mallock's objection—the want of progress.

That objection rests on the false assumption that the modern savage is a retrograde. Modern scientific research proves that the modern savage is a degraded specimen of humanity, a man fallen and falling from his high estate. Facts prove that the ancestors of these savages were more educated, more civilized, more comfortable than their present-day progeny. The hall-marks of an extinct and more elevated civilization hang about them still. The richness and complexity of their language, the treasured remains of better days in painting and sculpture, their religious traditions point to a state of civilization and of culture much superior to that which obtains to-day. This thesis has the confirmation of other historical evidence. Tribes of modern savages are known to have lost more and more that civilization, which they possessed when their existence first became known to Europeans. And yet, these tribes have never lost the signs of intelligence. Banished by his white brother to inhospitable climes, where his utmost efforts can barely eke out a miserable existence, the bitter struggle for life robs the poor savage of his ancient dignity and culture; yet, when a cruel destiny has overcome him and his, and has left but one living specimen to pine away in loneliness and in misery, that derelict of an extinct race retains to the last those spiritual faculties that are the glory and the mark of his manhood.

But, insists Mr. Mallock, human progress is due to the human hand! Has not the modern savage had all through the centuries as perfect a hand as the European? The cause of progress must, therefore, lie outside the hand. And how many instances have been known of men from whom nature or accident have taken away the hand, who have acquired perfect skill in writing and in the mechanical arts. Surely the human foot is not as adaptable as the fore-paw of the gorilla for such purposes; and in the face of such facts as we have noted, who can maintain that handless men would have remained stationary, or that gorillas have remained stationary merely because their fore-paw was not as perfectly formed as the human hand?

To the first of Mr. Mallock's objections as regards

physiology, and the localization of cerebral functions, we may reply, *transeat*. No apologist employs such an argument. What apologists do say is, that the scientific opponents of localization at least prove 'that the principle which dominates the living organism,' whether of man or animal, 'has within certain limits the power of adapting to its needs, and employing as its instruments, other than the normal portions of the cerebrum.'

With regard to Flechsig's thought-centres, or to employ Flechsig's own terminology, 'association- or coagitation-centres,' they certainly do not account for man's superiority. Flechsig describes these higher centres as 'apparatus, which combine the activities of the various special senses, inner and outer, into higher unities. They are association-centres of sense-impressions of different qualities, visual, auditory, etc.' After what has been said in proving the spirituality of the soul, and according to the teachings of that host of scientists who style themselves parallelists, it is obvious that such a theory as Flechsig's does nothing to show the superiority of man over the brute. Scholastic apologists maintain the extrinsic dependence of intellect on the brain, and, therefore, if Flechsig's theory of association-centres stands the tests of experience and verification, they welcome it as one more contribution to philosophy. The higher intellectual activity of man postulates a more perfect cerebrum as a condition of action, but no mass of cerebral matter, however associated, can account for the phenomenon known as thought.

But, after all, asks Mr. Mallock, what does the religious apologist know of the subjective states of the brute? Nothing directly, something indirectly. Our arguments to distinguish man from the brute have been based on external facts—speech, religion, morality, progress. Spiritual faculties alone explained these facts, and, as we saw, the presence of these spiritual faculties, plus the absence of these external facts throughout so many centuries, and in such circumstances as those in which the animals found themselves, is admissible. Therefore, we concluded, man

is spiritual and immortal, and the brute is not. Is this argument rendered valueless, is it even touched, by the admission that we know nothing directly of the subjective states of the brute ?

Confident of the hopeless discomfiture of the apologist at this stage, Mr. Mallock proceeds cruelly to pile on the agony by stating the case of scientific monism against dualism.

Mr. Mallock begins by declaring that modern educated apologists admit evolution. Yes, but of a very specific kind. The apologist postulates an absolute break between organic and inorganic matter,¹ between the vegetable and the animal kingdoms, between man—that is, at least, as a whole,—and the other animals ; and he maintains that such evolution as has taken place resulted from a law imposed and executed by the Creator. We do not insinuate that all apologists admit evolution, nor that apologists ought to admit evolution ; we merely state how far any apologist can admit evolution. And now let us examine those proofs which Mr. Mallock declares to have done more to make the 'doctrine for which Darwin contended—namely, the essential unity of man with the other animals—a demonstrable, indeed a visible, fact than any of the detected lacunæ have done, or can do, to cast doubt on it.'

We admit the three facts : that is, that the conceptional and embryonic stages are alike in man and in the higher animals up to an advanced stage of development, that gill-clefts emerge and subsequently disappear in the human embryo, that the tadpole changes daily into a frog. The conclusion read into these facts, namely, the essential unity of man with the other animals, we reject.

In the first place, even if evolution is admissible for man's body, it cannot account for his soul. We hope to have proved indisputably that the human soul is transcendently different in nature from the soul of the brute, and no evolutionist holds that evolution can create

¹ i.e., Science has not yet proved the physical possibility of the passage. Professor Burke's experiments demand further investigation before they can be accepted as final.

anything. Evolution modifies things already existing. The human soul is something wholly new, wholly different from all other things. It was not, therefore, evolved.

Secondly, we deny that the three facts mentioned *prove* the evolution of the human body. Because the human act of conception resembles the animal act of conception, are we to conclude to a common, primitive parentage? Is it not at least an equally probable hypothesis that God—if He exists, a point to be discussed later on—was pleased to have it so?

Again, ontogenesis is the brief and rapid recapitulation of phylogenesis. Father Gerard, S.J., asks somewhere: 'Is it a proof of a theory to translate its terms into Greek?' And with regard to this so-called law, Carl Vogt is cited by Quatrefages, and with approval, as saying¹:—

This law, which I have long held as well founded, is absolutely and radically false. Attentive study of embryology shows us, in fact, that embryos have their own conditions suitable to themselves, very different from those of adults.

In other words, the human being as well as the other animals, pass through certain embryonic phases, wholly and solely because these forms are the best suited for the purposes of existence at each respective stage. Again, embryology tells other tales that Mr. Mallock has conveniently forgotten. Some frogs are never tadpoles, and some newts breed as tadpoles! Are these latter climbing down their genealogical trees? Plants, too, do not climb their genealogical trees; and yet they, too, are subject to evolution, if evolution be a fact. Is there not, therefore, some other reason for the fact that animals do climb their genealogical trees? Further, as 'each cell or embryo is determined to be one sort of animal and no other, and can live at all only on condition of developing towards the prescribed form,' it follows that even if 'the development of the individual is an epitome of that of the species, the latter must, like the former, be due to the action of definite innate laws unconsciously carrying out definite preordained

¹ *The Old Riddle and the Newest Answer*, p. 194.

ends and purposes. Thus whatever evidence the embryonic forms may be supposed to afford in support of Evolution, 'they are one evident disproof of the possibility of evolutionary monistic theories.'

Let us follow Quatrefages in his development of the chief argument against the evolution of man's body—its revelations will bring to light some of those lacunæ, which, for Mr. Mallock, are wholly minimised by the three facts just discussed. The distinguished naturalist accepts for the moment the evolutionistic data, and proves that on evolutionistic principles the human organism cannot have come from the animal.¹

Evolution is based on two principles: (1) Ontogenesis is the brief and rapid recapitulation of phylogenesis; (2) the law of permanent Characterization, which means that if an organism is once modified in a definite direction, it retains the mark of this modification during further stages.

Now, the human embryo follows the development of the other animals up to the point where the marsupials enter on the scene: afterwards, the human embryo follows a mode of development peculiar to itself. According, therefore, to the first principle, man is sprung not from the monkey, but from the marsupials.

According to the second principle, two distinct organic types can spring from a common ancestor, but one cannot come from the other. Man and monkey are two such distinct organic types. They possess the same organs, but they have these organs arranged after plans completely different. Man is a walker, monkey a climber. And this principle leads us to connect man with the didelphys of the kangaroo family.

Haeckel does not accept these logical conclusions; he holds that the actual man is sprung from the pithecoïd man, and that the pithecoïd man, as well as the catarrhiniens sans queue, is sprung from the group of catarrhieniens à queue. Thus, while Quatrefages postulates at

¹ De Quatrefages, *L'Espece Humaine*, c. xi.

least four intermediary types between man and the known animals, Haeckel postulates only one.

Where are these intermediary types—these missing links—be they one or many, to be found? Why have they disappeared in the struggle for existence, whereas the ancestors of the anthropomorphic apes have survived? Were our ancestors less fitted to survive than those of the monkey family? Haeckel can only reply that though pithecoïd man exists no longer, he must have existed sometime. If he did exist, and if, though our ancestor, he was less worthy of existence than the ancestor of the dumb apes about us, and therefore went down in the struggle for existence, surely we must find some traces of him in the geological records. If our ancestor, he was not made of salt, and must, therefore, have left some traces of himself in the earth like all other animals. The transformation of a species is admittedly a slow process, and therefore the missing links must have lived a long time on the earth, and must have been exceedingly numerous. Yet, all efforts to discover the missing links of this particular chain have been fruitless. The bowels of the earth have been torn open, and many wondrous things of the past brought to light. Not a trace, however, of our so-called ancestor or ancestors! We have men and monkeys, the ancestors and the posterity of monkeys, men and marsupials, and the ancestors and posterity of marsupials—in a word, all the data that can be desired to form a judgment, but the links that ought to hold together this evolutionistic chain are not to be found! Why? Common sense, and fair interpretation of the scientific facts, warrant us in replying: Because these particular links of the evolutionistic chain were never forged.¹

As to Mr. Mallock's paragraph about the evolution of the human intellect from the primary substance, it does not contain a word of proof, and it is evident at this point that it is a delicious bit of monistic poesy deserving as much credence as Dante's Vision of Hell.

¹ Though this argument shows that the arguments in favour of the evolution of the human body are less complete than Mr Mallock contends, it does not disprove all probability of that evolution.

The danger of arguments from gaps-in-evidence is as evident to the apologists as to their opponents. And certainly a science which has had its Bathythius and its Colorado Beetle cannot afford to throw stones.

With regard to the time of origin of the human soul, there are two opinions. St. Thomas maintained that 'during the early history of its existence the human foetus passes through a series of transitional stages in which it is successively informed by the vegetative, the sentient, and finally by the rational soul.' Others maintain that the rational soul 'is created and infused into the new being in the originating of life in conception.' Clearly, Mr. Mallock's objection cannot be formulated against St. Thomas's view. Nor for the same reason is it valid against the second view: no one holds that the human ovum and human spermatozoon, principles of conception, are dead. They are living when—in the second view—God, at the moment of conception, creates and infuses the human soul into the organism formed by the coalescence of the human ovum and the human spermatozoon: at the same moment the other vital principal disappears, and the rational soul exercises its functions. Not an instant intervenes between the disappearance of the one and the appearance of the other. All is simultaneous.

To repeat Mr. Mallock's words, if we look back over this aggregate of facts and arguments, one conclusion and only one leaps into light, that whilst man endures, the animal dies—dies as the roses die, never to bloom again; and that the mystery of man's life, and the mystery of the pig's are—*not* one.

JOHN O'NEILL.

THE BLOOD OF ST. JANUARIUS

IN one of the numerous references to miracles contained in the works of Cardinal Newman, he mentions the liquefaction of the blood of St. Januarius as one of the ecclesiastical, as distinguished from Gospel, miracles, in which he personally believed on account of the strong evidence adduced in its behalf.

It has occurred to us that it would serve a useful and edifying purpose if we laid before the readers of the I. E. RECORD, however briefly and imperfectly, some account of the miracle and the circumstances by which it is attended. We shall preface our remarks with a brief notice of the saint. He was Bishop of Benevento, and flourished towards the close of the third century after Christ. On the outbreak of the persecution by Diocletian and Maximian, he was taken to Nola, and brought before Timotheus, the Governor of Campania, on account of his profession of the Christian religion. After he had withstood various assaults on his constancy, he was at last sentenced to be cast into the fiery furnace, through which he passed wholly unharmed. On the following day, along with a number of fellow-martyrs, he was exposed to the fury of wild beasts, which, however, contrary to their nature, laid themselves down in tame submission at his feet. Timotheus, again pronouncing sentence of death, was struck with blindness, but immediately healed by the powerful intercession of the saint, a miracle which converted nearly five thousand men on the spot. The ungrateful judge, only roused to further fury by these occurrences, caused the execution of Januarius by the sword to be forthwith carried out. The body was ultimately removed by the inhabitants of Naples to that city, where the relic became very famous for its miracles, especially in counteracting the more dangerous eruptions of Vesuvius. His clotted blood, preserved in a glass phial,

even to this day is wont to liquefy and bubble up as if but recently shed whensoever it is placed within sight of the martyr's head. It is thus solemnly placed, May 1st, and September 19th, each year, and the recurrence of the miracle is observed by the Neapolitans with various festivities.

What a strange age we live in ! How full of inconsistencies ! On the one hand men are so credulous that any impostor who with loud and confident voice proclaims his pretensions to the public, however ridiculous and blasphemous they may be, never fails to find ready dupes to follow him and implicitly believe in him. Dowie in America is a striking instance. On the other hand, how obstinately incredulous men are ; miracles are asserted to take place, and yet they are so confident beforehand that miracles do not take place, or cannot take place that they will not be even at the pains to examine calmly and dispassionately into the evidence.

Here is a constantly recurring miracle which any one of common sense, and common observation can verify for himself. The blood liquefies. Of this there can be no possible doubt. A tradition which goes back very many centuries bears witness to it, and the illiterate and the learned, the man of the much maligned Middle Ages, and the most up-to-date man of science, are equally competent to ascertain the fact of liquefaction. The blood becomes liquid ; it is not a mere matter of more or less solid, but a perfect solid and a perfect liquid. When it is in the solid state, if you shake the phial, you can hear the solid matter beating against the glass, and thus both eyes and ears bear witness to its solidity. While at other times it is quite evident to any one who examines the phial that it is a pure liquid it contains. Formerly the phials were not kept in a safe (*custodia*) as at present, and history relates that when Charles VIII came to venerate the relics he was allowed to touch the hard substance with a small rod, and after liquefaction, touch it with the same rod, and withdraw it wet with blood. There are two phials ; but in the one there are only a few drops,

while in the other there is a considerable quantity ; the latter, of course, can be more easily observed, and, consequently, to it we shall confine our remarks.

The condition of the blood in its liquid state is not uniform ; it varies in its colour from dark brown to red and likewise in its density, at times being what we may call a thin liquid, at other times thick, so as to adhere lightly to the glass.

The liquefaction takes place ; the next question is, how it takes place. Needless to say, impiety and infidelity have devised various hypotheses to explain it away. These attempts serve one good purpose : they bear incontestable testimony to the reality of the fact. No one nowadays suggests the possibility of fraud, unless indeed some self-confident person, who has merely heard of the miracle, and gives expression to his own prejudices.

In the splendid chapel of the saint, behind the altar and under the bronze statue, are two niches or recesses of metal, in the one is the silver bust in which is preserved the saint's head ; in the other the monstrance with the reliquary containing the two phials. There are four keys for the doors of these recesses ; two in the hands of the Archbishop, and two in the hands of the municipal authorities. For the past four centuries a committee has existed, formed of twelve members chosen by election from the different wards of the city, whose duty and privilege it was to safeguard the relic and make all arrangements necessary and becoming for its *cultus*. Even at the present day, the chairman of this committee is the Mayor of Naples. It is utterly impossible to open the recess and remove the relics, or interfere with them in any way, unless both parties, ecclesiastical and civil, are present and use their keys.

Many solid bodies become liquid under the influence of heat. It is obvious, therefore, that heat should be adduced as an explanation of the phenomenon. But not all substances are thus affected by heat ; for instance, the contents of an egg are not dissolved but solidified by heat ; and this happens likewise in the case of blood. Once it is removed from its natural place in the veins and arteries of the human body, it solidifies more and more in pro-

portion to the intensity of the heat applied to it. Therefore, if it be really the martyr's blood that is in the phial, heat is not the explanation.

But is it really blood? Some sceptics have denied it; but is it reasonable, merely in order to support our opinions and without any serious grounds, to deny a fact supported by the tradition of ages. Let us, however, grant for a moment that it is not blood, and see if that will get us out of the difficulty. Let it be some other substance. Surely it is an elementary law of physics that the melting point of any given substance is fixed and invariable at a given pressure, and that its temperature will remain unaltered until the whole mass has melted. If phosphorus melts at 44° centigrade, then a substance that melts under the same pressure at 43° is not phosphorus, or at least is adulterated. If, then, the contents of the phial, whatever it be, be subject to the laws of nature, there will be a certain degree of heat at which it will uniformly liquefy. Now, on examination we find the exact opposite. Professor Fergola, of the University of Naples, has left on record that at the time of liquefaction, May 2nd, 1795, the thermometer placed beside the relics stood at $24^{\circ}4$; May 4th, at $26^{\circ}4$; 5th, $23^{\circ}8$; 7th, 25° ; 9th, $19^{\circ}4$. In the observations taken by Professors Govi and De Luca, September, 1879, and published by Professor Punzo, on the 19th, the thermometer registered 30° ; 22nd, 27° ; 26th, 25° . In May, 1901, as verified by Signor Spirindeo, the temperature was $18^{\circ}8$. Anyone who takes the trouble to go to Naples and assist at the miracle at different times will be enabled, by his own experience, to confirm these statements.

Surely it is incomprehensible that a substance remaining in a sealed phial should liquefy one day at 20° , and yet remain solid the next day at 29° . Let it be observed, moreover, that it passes from the solid to the fluid state not by a slow process but quite rapidly. For hours it may show no sign whatever of softening, and then in a minute or two it is a perfect liquid. Not less mysterious is the difference of time before liquefaction takes place. Consulting, again, the records of Professor Fergola, we find it happened May 2nd, temp. $24^{\circ}4$, after a delay of 12 m.;

May 2nd, at precisely the same temperature, after 2 m.; while May 3rd, temp. 25°, it delayed 41 m.; on the 8th, temp. 26°6, it delayed 23 m.; while on the 9th, temp. 19°4, it only took a quarter of an hour. Similar facts can be verified every year; they are borne witness to by Humphrey Davy, Lavoisier, Waterton, Dumas, Kotzebue, and a thousand others: and we need not take up the time of our intelligent readers in showing how contrary they are to the known laws of nature. To deny, therefore, that the substance is really blood does not tend to make the question more easy of solution.

But, is it really blood? Well, in the first place we have the evidence of our eyes. Let anyone take blood recently shed, attentively examine its colour and appearance, and he will be convinced it is really blood that is in the phial. Naturally, the guardians of the relic, out of reverence, will not suffer it to be subjected to chemical analysis; but, fortunately, the progress of science has provided us with a method which we can employ without being wanting in reverence. On the evening of September 26th, 1902, Professor Raffaele Januario, of the Neapolitan University, accompanied by other professors and friends, was allowed to examine the relic by spectrum analysis. The experiment clearly proved it was blood, and the Professor exclaimed, 'The liquid undoubtedly is blood; and its liquefaction, under such extraordinary and varied circumstances, is mysterious, so mysterious that I do not hesitate to assert it is supernatural.'

The liquefaction, then, is mysterious enough; but it is attended by another circumstance which is perhaps still more mysterious. The blood increases and diminishes in volume during the various solemn expositions of the relic that take place in the course of the year, and this circumstance has been noticed from time immemorial. In fact, so full at times is the phial, that it is impossible to determine whether the blood is in a liquid or solid state, while on ordinary occasions the phial is but two-thirds full, or even less. Even if it were not blood, but some liquid which heat increased in volume, heat would not be an adequate explanation. If, while the exposition is going

on, the concourse of people raise the surrounding temperature a few degrees, this would not occasion so considerable an augmentation of volume ; besides, how then would it come to pass that if it happens to increase in May, yet in September, when the heat is more intense, it frequently diminishes. The same agent, under the same conditions, cannot produce diametrically opposite results.

The increase, moreover, is not merely in the apparent volume, but in the mass of blood itself. This results clearly from experiments conducted, since 1901, by Professor Spirindeo. He weighed the blood at various times, using a most delicate balance, and adopting every scientific precaution ; and he found that when the phial was full, it weighed, together with the reliquary in which it is enclosed, 1.015 chilogr. ; when half-full .987 chilogr. ; thus showing a difference of 28 grms., which would be about the weight of 24 or 25 cubic centimetres of blood, the amount which would about half fill the phial. The experiments have been repeated with similar results by others. September 19th, 1904, weight 1.015 chilogr. ; at 6 o'clock, p.m., 21st, 1.004 chilogr. ; the same hour, 22nd, 1.008 chilogr.

Considering all these facts, surely the reader will agree with us that if ever there was a miracle this is one. Facts are facts, however unacceptable the inferences may be to an incredulous mind. But those who believe in a God Who takes an intimate interest in all that happens here below, Who loves His children, the work of His hands, will not be surprised that He is pleased to make use of miracles to raise their minds and hearts to Him ; nay, they will be on the look-out for such manifestations, and will humbly and fervently thank Him for continuing this wondrous miracle in this so-called enlightened age, when infidelity is so rampant, and for affording this sensible and striking confirmation of the teaching of Holy Church with regard to the respect and veneration due to the relics of those who, we hold, are now, by their merits, exalted to a high place in the Kingdom of God.

RICHARD FLEMING, C.C.

A SCHOLASTIC DISCUSSION

I PURPOSE, in these pages, to discuss a question to which a comparatively meagre space is allotted in our ordinary theological manuals: the Nature of Divine Hope. The scope of the inquiry is not, how are we to make an act of hope? but, rather, what it is that we do when we make an act of hope?—for neither the theologians nor the faithful, nor the teachers nor the taught, experience doubt or difficulty in the actual practice of the virtue. The subject, therefore, can scarcely be regarded as one of direct practical bearing upon the Christian life; but to every student of the sacred sciences who has sedulously endeavoured to acquaint himself with expert opinion upon it, and has tried to solve the problem for himself, it presents many serious difficulties. The effort to overcome such difficulties will always have attractions for the lover of theology, and this must be my apology for venturing to tread upon ground already strewn with conflicting theories and unlooked-for aspects of familiar truths.

At the outset of the discussion, it will be well to recall some preliminary truths bearing thereon: 1. Hope is a theological virtue having God for its primary material object and its formal object as well, but differing from faith and charity by reason of the precise aspect under which it regards Him; 2. The material object embraces everything for which we can hope,—hence God and His grace, our own good works, and even temporal blessings, in so far as they conduce to heaven; 3. The formal object or distinguishing motive—*actus enim et virtutes ex motivis specificantur*—is variously assigned by the different authorities. St. Thomas and his school arguing that it consists in nothing other than the right hand of God going out to help His creatures (*virtutis Dei auxiliatrix*); Suarez, and not a few besides, contending that in it lies the goodness of God to us, and St. Alphonsus combining the two theories into one.

The first thought that arises in our minds in connection with this subject is, what is the common-sense view of hope in general? What is the meaning given to the word in ordinary language and speech? Does it coincide with the desire of an absent good?

It will be evident, I think, on consideration, that hope is not synonymous with desire. It is at once the witness of experience and the verdict of sound philosophy that absence makes the heart grow fonder, even when there is very little prospect of satisfying our desire, and accordingly very little hope. We might yearn, for instance, with an insatiable longing for an absent friend, of whose return we had come to despair. Who has not known the tireless constancy with which a mother prays for the return of an exiled son,—even when her hope has all but vanished? Or, to put the matter in another light, who could fail to observe the depth of our country's desire for the redress of her grievances even in those very crises in her history when dissension was making her chances dwindle to vanishing point? A drowning man will grasp at a straw in his last extremity, showing that his desire of safety is greatest when his hope is faintest. Indeed it is a well-known fact that we long all the more for the desired object when we see it receding from our grasp.

From all this it is lawful to conclude that desire and hope must be specifically distinct. The same precise reason cannot make a man at once weak and strong in his love for a certain object. If his craving for it, as in the examples adduced, be so engrossing as to dominate all other wishes, and his hope at the same time but slight, it seems evident that the two emotions must be of different kinds, and accounted for by proportionately different motives. When the same object exercises altogether opposite though simultaneous influences on the will, it is clear that the explanation of the opposition must be sought in the diverse aspects towards which the will is drawn, or, to put it in scientific terms, in the different formal objects of its volitions.

Having endeavoured thus far to state what hope is

not, we must now proceed to state what it *is*. And here again we may take our stand on the commonly-accepted meaning of the word. If a man tells us that he has a strong hope of succeeding in a difficult enterprize, we take him to mean that he is *confident* of success. When we hear people say that all their hopes are centred in a great leader, a great general, a great hero, their language conveys but one meaning,—their *confidence* of victory is in their chosen standard-bearer. When a nation rightly struggling for freedom, declares that its hopes are placed in a great tribune for the realization of its aspirations, it indicates that it *trusts* in him for the accomplishment of its wishes. When we say that a ray of hope lights up a dark and difficult situation where there was nought but despair before, we intend to convey that faintheartedness has given way to *buoyancy* of *spirit* in the presence of a possible or probable solution of the difficulty. When relatives who had been in fear and trembling for the fate of their friends on the battle-field, are informed that the fortunes of war are becoming propitious, they avow that they hope more strongly than they had hitherto dared. Do they mean that they had grown more eager for their loved ones' return? No. Their desire remains the same, but their spirits are *cheered* and their hearts *elated* by the brightened prospects. Hope, then, in its varying degrees, is 'good heart,' trust, confidence.

This everyday use of the term is in perfect harmony with the explanation of St. Thomas. Here are the words of the Angelic Doctor :—

The object of hope must have four conditions: In the first place it must be good; for hope, properly speaking, can only have to do with good, differing in this form from fear, which only has to do with evil. Secondly, it must be future, for we do not hope with regard to a thing already possessed, and herein it differs from joy, which relates to a present good. Thirdly, it must be something difficult of attainment; for nobody is said to hope for what is easily obtained, wherein it differs from desire or cupidity, which regard the absent, absolutely speaking. Fourthly, it must be possible of attainment; no one hopes for what he cannot reach, and in this it differs from despair.

A few pages further on he again points out that it is the contrary of despair, and shows that although an object be difficult of attainment, it can draw the appetite in so far as it is possible to reach it. That feature, he remarks, has an attracting force which draws us towards it. These and other passages of St. Thomas show that he places the essential element of hope, not in the love of an absent good, but rather in that special outgoing of the heart to the happy prospect of attaining that good. And as it is precisely because of this feature in the desired object that we are trustful, elated, confident, it is clear that the angel of the schools is at one with the ordinary man in his idea of hope.

‘A thing can be possible for us in two ways,’ St. Thomas continues, ‘by means of our own powers or by the help of others. In so far as we hope for what is made possible for us by the divine assistance, our hope touches God, on whose assistance it rests.’ Accordingly he places the essential element of divine hope in the fact that it springs from the motive of God’s unfailing help. The theological virtues, he goes on to declare, do not, as far as their proper objects are concerned, admit of that golden mean which is the test of virtue in general. Just as there is no limit to our assent of faith, resting on the divine authority, neither is there a limit to our hope, resting on the divine assistance. But, he reminds us, as in the case of faith there are many truths besides the primary—God Himself—to be believed in, so in hope there are many things to be expected besides the beatific vision, and with regard to these secondary material objects there is a mean to be observed. Having laid it down that the principal material object of the theological virtues is God, he distinguishes their formal objects thus: ‘By charity we adhere to God for His own sake; by faith inasmuch as He is for us the principle of, or the means of arriving at, truth; by hope inasmuch as He is the means by which we attain to good—our eternal happiness.’ All through his works, in fact, wherever he touches on the matter, he either expresses or implies that the ground-work, the ultimate reason, the

formal object of our hope is the right hand of Omnipotence stretched out to help us. At times, it is true, he speaks of the possession of God, the beatific vision, our last end, our eternal happiness, as the object of our hope. Not, however, without having over and over again pointed out that it is in the same way as the truths believed by faith are the object of that virtue.

Suarez maintains that the view which he himself holds,—the view, namely, to which I referred at the commencement of the paper—is the one which St. Thomas held, ‘whatever some may say.’ This very same expression, oddly enough, is made use of by Mazzella in quoting St. Thomas in favour of a different opinion. With all due respect for these great names, we cannot but wonder how any reader of St. Thomas’s writings,—especially of his *Disputed Questions*, one of which deals with hope—could depart from the interpretations which the theologians of his own Order have placed upon his word. To place the matter beyond doubt, let us quote another passage from his works :

The supreme good, which is eternal life, man cannot reach unless with the help of God, according to the text of Romans vi. 23 : ‘By the grace of God life eternal ;’ and therefore the hope of attaining eternal life has two objects, eternal life, namely, which one hopes for, and the divine assistance from which he hopes for it ; just as faith likewise has two objects, the truth, namely, which one believes, and the first truth, to which it corresponds. For faith is not a virtue unless in so far as it rests on the testimony of the First Truth, so as to believe what is manifested thereby according to the text of Genesis xv. 6 : ‘Abraham believed in God, and it was reputed to him unto justice.’ Hence hope also is a virtue from the very fact that one rests on the help of the divine power for the attainment of eternal life. . . . Just, therefore, as the formal object of faith is the first truth, by which, as by a kind of means, he assents to the things which are believed, which are the material object of faith ; so also the formal object of hope is the help of the divine power and piety on account of which the motive of hope tends towards the things hoped for, which are the material object of hope.

It may be useful to draw out somewhat further this

idea of virtue. Let us compare hope with faith. In the latter we have an (a) assent to a truth on the (b) authority of (c) God revealing. It agrees with all affirmative judgments on the first score. On the second head it differs from science, and agrees with every judgment formed on the authority of another. And it gets its ultimate specific determination from the fact that the testimony relied on is the testimony of God. Hope is a (a) gladness of heart, at the (b) prospect of reaching some desirable end by (c) means of God's assistance. Hence like faith it has something in common with the remaining acts of the general class to which it belongs,—it is an act of love. But it differs from ordinary love as being directed towards the possibility or likelihood of attaining the good desired. And finally, as faith is divine when the authority whose word we accept is divine, so hope is divine when the helper on whose assistance we rely is divine. An ignorant man who had never heard of the Supreme Being might believe in His existence on the mere word of a scientist, but his belief would be human faith, not divine. Similarly a Pelagian, as long as he remained in error, could never elicit an act of divine hope. He might long for heaven, as an absent, arduous, and yet realizable good; but as the source of his confidence to attain it would be his own natural powers, his reliance was not on God, and not divine. 'Accursed be the man who trusteth in man' (Jeremiah xvii.) His confidence, as St. Thomas points out, would be an inordinate human hope, directly opposed to the virtue of magnanimity. It would be what some theologians call Pelagian presumption.

It is pretty plain from this example that we cannot describe the formal object of theological hope as the Infinite Good, our reward, *absent*, *arduous*, yet *possible* of attainment. All these notes are to be found in the vicious human hope of a Pelagian. We must assign, in addition to these notes, the efficient cause that renders the attainment possible. To omit the efficient cause in treating of divine hope would leave as truncated a definition of the virtue as the omission of the source of the authority in the

case of faith. And it makes all the difference in our assent to know the worth of the authority that solicitates it. It may be of very little value and may therefore beget a very feeble faith; or it may be of infinite value, and thereby beget the highest certitude. So, too, the efficient cause that renders a desired object reachable may be of very limited powers, and incapable, on that account, of stirring up a strong vigorous hope (*erectio animi*); or it may be Omnipotence itself, and thus lift up the soul to an unbounded trust. The *possibility* of reaching the goal of one's ambition is the feature which marks off one's hope from mere desire and from despair, and thus far may be said to constitute the *differentia ultima* of hope. But if our hope is to be divine, and distinguished as such from all other kinds, it must be so in its distinctive elements. Hence no definition of this divine virtue can be adequate which does not mark it off by reason of the divine power which generates and sustains it.

This brings me to the theory of Suarez. He contends that the formal object of divine hope is God, as our supreme good. He excludes altogether from the motive the *virtus Dei auxiliatrix*, the unfailing help of God. He is driven by the exigencies of his theory to relegate the other notes mentioned in the last paragraph to the back-ground of pre-requisite conditions. Hope, he says truly, must be love. And therefore, he continues, the only element than can enter into the formal object is the goodness of the thing hoped for.

If one were to reply, 'Faith is an assent, and therefore the only thing that can enter into its formal object is the truth of the doctrine believed in,' it would be interesting to know how Suarez would endeavour to meet the difficulty. A transference of his reasoning to this parallel case would exclude the authority of God from the formal object of faith. Undoubtedly, faith is an assent to the truth of some proposition, but it does not follow that the only determinant of the nature of the intellectual act is the truth believed in. Might we not assent to the very same truth,—the existence of God, let us say—because of the

scientific evidence in its favour, or because of merely human testimony, or finally, on account of the authority of God revealing it? And will not any one of the three acts be specifically distinct from the others? Manifestly the way in which the truth is presented has to do with the nature of the resultant act. It gives it its ultimate differentiating characteristic, its formal object. (The doctrine assented to is only the generic or material object.) Hope, we agree with Suarez, is an act of love; but the only determinant of its formal object is not the goodness of the object hoped for. Otherwise it would not differ from despair, nor from mere desire. For both of these emotions centre round the goodness of an absent thing. I desire a thing because I consider it good for me; but that alone is not sufficient to make me hope for it. It underlies my hope, and may lead up to it. But the reason why I hope is the chance of success which I see before me. The force which moves the will in this case, as St. Thomas points out, is the possibility of reaching what we long for; and that it is which causes the different kind of act, and the need for a specifically distinct virtue. In fact, if one were to regard this feature as a mere condition of divine hope, the authority of God should be regarded as a mere condition of divine faith.

Underlying the theory we have advanced under the shadow of the great name of St. Thomas, is the supposition that the *ultima differentia*, and not the *genus*, constitutes the formal object. It may possibly be objected that the *genus* should not be excluded. But the answer is on the surface: the latter constitutes the *material* object, and cannot be otherwise regarded. When we look for the distinguishing features of acts or virtues, we do not look for those in which they agree with others, but rather those in which they differ. The theological virtues differ from one another in their formal objects, or *differentiae ultimae*. They agree with one another in regard to their primary material object or *genus*. And they differ from all other virtues in both respects,—both in *species* and *genus*.

The whole terminology was taken originally from the

Scholastic doctrine of matter and form. Seeing that the form, as Father Maher points out in his *Psychology*, is the last ^{the} compliment of reality, the final determination, it came to be considered analogous to the *ultima differentia*, while the germs and the matter were regarded as similarly related :—

Germes [says Father Clarke, in his work on *Logic*] expresses the *pars determinabilis essentialis*, or, as it is sometimes called, the material part, inasmuch as the matter of which anything is made has to have its shape or essential characteristic given to it by something that forms or informs it. It represents the wider class, but has somehow to be limited in order to reach the species or class, which is said to contain the whole essence. *Differentia* represents the *pars determinans essentialis*, or, as it is sometimes called, the formal part, inasmuch as it informs or gives the form to the matter, and gives to what may be regarded as an informed mass its distinguishing form or shape. It represents the limiting characteristic which has to be added to the wider class in order to limit the wider class as aforesaid.

Acts and virtues are classified as well as all other objects of knowledge, and the principle of classification is that laid down by Father Clarke. But as it is the elements in the object embraced that enable us to determine the intrinsic nature of the acts, the latter are said to be specified by their objects. To the *genus* and *differentia* of the intrinsic constituents correspond the generic or *material* and specific or *formal* objects.¹

To return once more to the theory of Suarez. Besides the reasons which we have already dwelt upon, there is another very striking difficulty against it. If this theory be true, we must enumerate at least four theological virtues,—contrary to the universally accepted teaching. If we hold that the goodness of God to us enters, wholly or partially, into the constitution of the formal object of hope, this awkward consequence follows logically from the line of argument we pursued a few pages back. We laid it down as certain, that mere desire and hope are different *kinds* of love. Therefore, if the mere desire,

¹ Mazzella, in his *Grace Tract* (pp. 30 and 31) quotes Maurus and Cajetan in illustration of this usage of the terminology.

apart from the hope, of our supreme good, be possible, there must be another theological virtue to elicit it.

This difficulty against the views of Suarez might be met in either of two ways. First, by denying the possibility of mere desire of heaven, apart from hope of the same. This solution of the difficulty was evidently not the one chosen by the great Jesuit himself, for he admitted the possibility of an inefficacious desire of heaven, which is not hope. Such an inefficacious desire would be really an act of the same virtue as an efficacious desire, just as inefficacious love of God is still an act of divine charity. But apart from Suarez' admission on the point, we cannot see how the possibility of such a longing can be denied. It is surely not necessary that we should always have the possibility of reaching heaven before our minds? We can abstract from many thoughts in our meditations on a subject, and why not from this? If one might be allowed to appeal to experience in this matter, do not people, in moments of worry and exhaustion, often wish for heaven without actually hoping for it? The other solution of the difficulty would make hope and desire belong to the same virtue. It is a consistent view of the case, and hence it commended itself to Suarez. He decided that the possibility of satisfying our desire was a mere condition necessary to be known before we could have hope. Then he concluded, as he was bound to do, that the two acts were the offspring of one and the same virtue. Perhaps it did not strike him that the very same reasoning should lead him to infer that hope and despair are also the offspring of the same virtue—the desire of heaven! Nor could he have remembered that St. Thomas, whose exponent and follower Suarez professed to be in this matter, emphatically declared hope and desire *specifically* distinct.¹

Another consideration that should weigh with us in

¹ Laymann and others, who felt the force of the objections to this portion of Suarez' teaching, contemplated the possibility of different *kinds* of acts emanating from the same virtue. This view is so utterly inconsistent with a scientific treatment of the question, and so opposed to all our conceptions of the virtues, that I think it does not merit serious attention.

estimating the value of Suarez' theory, is the fact that if the goodness of God to us were the distinguishing motive of hope, there would be no valid reason why this virtue should not remain in heaven. Faith, we know, will be swallowed up in vision; charity will remain substantially the same as on earth; hope, too,—if Suarez be correct in his view,—should remain substantially the same. It is easy to see how the authority of God will no longer be a motive of assent when all things will be seen by a light from whose presence we cannot abstract. It is easy to see that we shall no longer hope in God's omnipotence to bring us to Himself, seeing that we enjoy ensured fruition. But God will always be our supreme good, and as such must be loved. It avails not, against this conclusion, to point out that He will no longer be loved as possible of attainment, for the theory in question makes that note a mere condition. When the material object of a virtue and the formal object, are present, and the latter actually affects or clothes the former, all the requisites of the virtue are at hand, and no condition has any further function to discharge. God shall always be before our eyes in heaven, and His goodness to us can never be shut out from our sight. We shall, therefore, always love Him as the source of our happiness. Hence it follows that if we depart from the teaching of the Angelic Doctor, which lays down the future prospect of eternal life as the source of our hope here below, we are driven to admit that we shall carry that earthly virtue into the bliss of the heavenly court.

It might possibly be urged against the opinion we have advocated, that *trust* or *confidence* is an act of the intellect, rather than of the will. But against any such assumption we are met by the full force of theological authority. St. Thomas, for instance, more than once refers trust to the will. St. Bonaventure ascribes to hope a confidence in the person on whom we rely, and an expectation of the object hoped for. Suarez, in distinguishing faith from hope, ascribes trust and confidence to the latter, and points out that faith and despair can co-exist. Mazzella refutes the Reformation notion of faith by proving that trust is an

act of the will. And for that matter all our theologians who have written since the sixteenth century use this very same argument against the so-called faith of the Protestants.

The question naturally arises, if St. Thomas's view of hope be the correct one, to what virtue are we to ascribe the love of concupiscence, the desire for God because He is good to us? Both reason and authority unite in ascribing it to love of self in the laudable sense. 'Hope,' says the angel of the schools, 'presupposes the love of that which we hope to attain, which is the love of concupiscence, by which love he who desires a good loves himself more than anything else.' With him, then, this kind of love is charity towards oneself. It makes us love ourselves for our own sake, and others because of ourselves. Just as by divine charity I love God in myself, by this I love myself in God. The same high authority deals further with this subject when commenting on the Lord's Prayer. He states that we desire God, our last end, by a twofold tendency—the longing for His glory, and the longing to enjoy that glory. The former he calls the love of God in Himself, the latter the love of ourselves in God. Cajetan, when expounding the teaching of his angelic master, says, that in one sense every love is friendship,—towards others, if things are loved for their own sake; towards ourselves, if the things be loved as *our* good. Mazzella calls concupiscence a love of God which does not rest in Him, but wishes good to ourselves from Him. St. Francis de Sales describes it as tending to our own utility, pleasure, or satisfaction, as returning to ourselves. St. Bernard distinguishes charity from inferior love of God, by the fact that the former is an affection for Him, not as good to us, but as good in Himself,—for His own sake, not for ours. Even Suarez explicitly calls concupiscence self-love. And when Bolgeni, towards the close of the eighteenth century, started the theory that concupiscence and charity were identical, Muzzarelli, by quotations from the Fathers and Doctors of the Church, showed beyond the shadow of a doubt that the traditional view identified concupiscence and self-love.

In this connexion it is interesting to recall that Luther, Calvin, Baius, and their followers condemned the love of concupiscence as sinful self-love that sought one's own benefit not God's, and opposed the apostle's teaching, 'charity seeketh not her own.' And to this objection Ripalda replied in language that has been adopted by all our theologians :—

In this love of concupiscence, by which a man loves himself, turpitude has no place ; both because it is not identical with every love of self (*non fertur in seipsum utcumque*), but it is a love of oneself as blessed and just. To love oneself, however, as blessed and just, is not forbidden but rather commanded, and because the love is not the source of evil-doing of any kind but of every kind of good. But love which is the source of every kind of well-doing is not bad, for the good tree bringeth forth good fruit, but the bad tree evil fruit. Therefore there can be a love of self which is good and not bad.

Here, then, is a decisive argument against the theory of Suarez. His view of divine hope would put it outside the list of the theological virtues altogether. It would identify hope and concupiscence, and therefore make our own selves, and not God, the ultimate term and formal object of that virtue.¹ The love of God as our good would be not merely a necessary antecedent, underlying and, as it were, leading up to hope, but it would be the very essence of the virtue. The moving power which makes the will rejoice and be glad would not be the thought of God's strengthening assistance, but one's own use and benefit.

A careful perusal of the Sacred Scripture will wonderfully bear out the teaching of St. Thomas :—

Have mercy on me, O God, have mercy on me, for my soul *trusteth* in Thee ; and in the shadow of Thy wings will I *hope* (Ps. lxvi.) My God is my Helper, and in Him will I put my *trust* (Ps. xvii.) In this will I be confident ; be thou my Helper (Ps. xxvi.) In Thee, O Lord have I hoped. . . . I have hoped in the Lord. . . . I have put my *trust* in the Lord (Ps. xxx.) None of them that *trust* in Him will offend (Ps. xxxiii.) In God have I put my trust . . . in God

¹ The love of concupiscence is sometimes called the love of hope, but the meaning is that the former must always underlie the latter.

have I hoped (Ps. lv.) Thou shalt have confidence, hope being set before thee (Job xi.) Macchabaeus ever trusted with all hope that God would help him (2 Mach. vii.) We should not trust in ourselves but in God (1 Corinthians i. 8)

We might quote at far greater length from the sacred volume, but we hasten to deal with a theory which has found credence with rather a large number of latter-day theologians. St. Alphonsus, Laymann, and Mazzella contend that as hope is love it must include in its formal object the love of God to us; but that as it is more than mere ordinary love we must also admit the mercy, omnipotence, and fidelity of God. They agree with Suarez in regard to the first element, and largely because of the reasons he assigns, they agree with St. Thomas regarding the omnipotence of God, for the reasons which he put forward. And just as Suarez is very dogmatic in claiming the authority of St. Thomas for his view, these are likewise positive in asserting that their view may be gleaned from the writings of the Angelic Doctor. We may quote the words of Mazzella in elucidation of their view:—

That must be the formal object of hope into which the act of hope is resolved in its ultimate analysis. To the question, why do you desire God? we reply, because He is good to us; to the question, why do you hope to attain to God? we reply, because God, who is omnipotent, merciful, and faithful, promised it.

Hence they admit that hope implies in its very conception, the reliance on the person whose assistance makes the desired object possible. Nevertheless it cannot be accepted any more than the theory of Suarez. It leaves the door open for the admission of a fourth theological virtue, divine concupiscence. Again, it is altogether unscientific: in the whole range of moral science, no such combination of motives is set down as the formal object of any one virtue, as each motive is of itself sufficient to constitute a virtue. It mixes up the act of desire and the act of hope, the material and the formal objects. Hence it cannot be admitted as the true solution of the difficulty.

A few theologians have taken the mercy of God alone

as the distinguishing motive of hope, others again, such as Juenin, took the fidelity of God to His promises. We have throughout understood St. Thomas to include but one attribute of God in the phrase which he uses to designate his opinion, and that attribute is the divine omnipotence. The exercise of the latter attribute presupposes an act of mercy on the part of God, and likewise a fidelity to His promises ; but we regard this exercise of clemency and faithfulness as preliminaries to the bestowal of help and grace. And in like manner we are led by the consideration of His boundless mercy and unfailing adherence to His word to place all our hope and reliance on the limitless resources of His power. Hence I conclude this weary paper by holding that the sole constituent of the formal object of hope is the omnipotence of God.

EDWARD NAGLE,



LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL

HIS many friends and admirers will be consoled to know that the late Lord Randolph Churchill has left behind him a son who has already proved himself worthy of his father. Mr. Winston Churchill had impressed the public imagination with his pluck and daring before he took to literature—his latest work, the life of his father, is an acknowledged masterpiece in the department of letters, his election honours are now thick upon him, and all the indications go to foretell for him a career more complete and not less brilliant than that of his father. It was one of the soft traits of this father's character that he revered his own father, the seventh Duke of Marlborough, and it will not be his gifted son's least glory that he spent three and a half years in compiling the present work, than which no more fitting or enduring monument could be erected to the memory of Lord Randolph Churchill.

It is a book that appeals to all classes of readers. A consistent, graphic, and at times thrilling narrative of a chequered and tragic life; it is at the same time a lucid summary of ten years' political history (1880-90) told for the most part in original documents, many of these the private letters of one cabinet minister to another, and written at times when burning questions and sharp controversies agitated all classes of society in the United Kingdom. Lord Randolph, it appears, had a habit of keeping all his letters, and the writer had access to all his father's papers which filled 'eleven considerable tin boxes.' Where memoranda and chatty letters do not speak, the story loses nothing in the hands of the author who had mastered his subject, who has inherited his father's courage and sympathies, and who has the power, in a high degree, of translating his thoughts and impressions into flowing, musical, and unencumbered prose. One

¹ *Lord Randolph Churchill.* By Winston Spencer Churchill, M.P. *

impression, above all others, which the reader will carry away from the perusal of these two volumes is that with all his waywardness, and all his violence, Lord Randolph Churchill possessed qualities of character which should protect his name from oblivion, viz., sympathy with the oppressed, courage to trample on the prejudices of his class, courage to speak his mind, political sagacity and steadfastness in unselfish friendships. He was the exact opposite of the prudent politician. He could on an occasion look out for an 'ace of trumps' in the game of politics, but the reader of these volumes cannot fail to be convinced that ill-starred as was his political career, his politics were, on the whole, consistent and sincere, and deserved a better fate.

I.

In English political history, Lord Randolph Churchill will be associated more than any other of his contemporaries with the conception and propaganda of Tory democracy. How a 'proud sprig of the nobility' came to sympathise with the masses may, to some extent, be explained by the following passage :—

But in the year 1876, an event happened which altered, darkened, and strengthened his whole life and character. Engaging in his brother's quarrels, with fierce and reckless partisanship, Lord Randolph incurred the deep displeasure of a great personage. The fashionable world no longer smiled. Powerful enemies were anxious to humiliate him. His own sensitiveness and pride magnified every coldness into an affront. London became odious to him. The breach was not repaired for more than eight years, and in the interval, a nature originally genial and gay, contracted a stern and bitter quality, a harsh contempt for what is called 'society,' and an abiding antagonism to rank and authority. If this misfortune produced in Lord Randolph characteristics which afterwards hindered or injured his public work, it was also his spur. Without it he might have wasted a dozen years in the frivolous and expensive pursuits of the silly world of fashion; without it he would probably never have developed popular sympathies or the courage to champion democratic causes.¹

¹ Vol. i., p. 74.

When this event happened he was twenty-seven years of age. He had passed through Eton without distinction, had got his degree in Oxford in 1870 with second class honours, was M.P. for Woodstock since 1874, which was also the year of his marriage. 'But for the recurring ailments to which his delicate constitution was subject, and the want of money which so often teases a young married couple, his horizon had been without a cloud, his career without a care,' until the event of 1876. His residence in Ireland during the next four years, where his father was Lord Lieutenant, was, perhaps, the next factor in nurturing his democratic sympathies.

Before Lord Randolph had been many months in Ireland, he began to form strong opinions of his own on Irish questions, and to take a keen interest in politics . . . At Howth, and in Fitzgibbon's company, he met all that was best in the Dublin world. . . . He became very friendly with Mr. Butt, who, with Father Healy, often dined at the little lodge, and laboured genially to convert Lady Randolph to Home Rule. Indeed he saw a great deal more of Nationalist politicians than his elders thought prudent or proper.¹

He was [writes Fitzgibbon] always on the move. He had the reputation of an *Enfant terrible*. Before long he had been in Donegal, in Connemara, and all over the place, 'Hail fellow, well met' with everybody, except the aristocrats and the old Tories; for he showed symptoms of independence of view, and of likings for the company of 'the boys,' which led to some friction with the staunch Conservatives and strong Protestants who regarded themselves as the salt of the earth.²

The popular trend of his sympathies was expressed for the first time at Woodstock in 1877, in a speech which gave great scandal to the Tories, and for which his father could allege no excuse except that Randolph 'must either be mad or have been singularly affected with local champagne or claret.'

I have no hesitation [he said on that occasion] in saying that it is inattention to Irish legislation that has produced obstruction. . . . England had years of wrong, years of crime, years of tyranny, years of oppression, years of general misgovernment to make amends for in Ireland. The Act of

¹ Vol. i., p. 82.

² Vol. i., p. 79.

Union was passed, and in the passing of it all the arsenal of political corruption and chicanery was exhausted, to inaugurate a series of remedial and healing measures ; and if that Act had not been productive of these effects, it would be entitled to be unequivocally condemned by history, and would, perhaps, be repealed by posterity.¹

The man who held these and kindred views, and had the courage to express them, was bound to come into collision with the old school of Toryism. And except this man had rare power of character, he would simply be brushed aside or driven into the opposite camp. Well, Lord Randolph Churchill was not the man to be brushed aside or to be driven to anything. With magnificent courage he stuck to his views. He was as free from reverence for his elders as he was from fear of their frowns. Around him grew the famous Fourth Party, making four in all who sat below the gangway in Parliament in the early Eighties, and were as much a source of irritation to the opposition as they were to the Government. The man 'with the fierce moustache and note of interrogation head' soon became a power in Parliament and in the country. He developed the faculty of speech—direct, cutting, clear, epigrammatic speech. He spared no man in his political wrath. Age, reputation, position, blood had no glamour for him. He became so popular with the masses that his party were obliged to come to terms with him, and in 1885 he entered Lord Salisbury's Cabinet as Secretary for India. His one bond with the Conservative party, besides the tie of sentiment, was his opposition to Home Rule. It is hard to understand how a man who sympathized with Arabi Pasha, with the Boers, and with the Hellenic nationalities, could refuse political independence to one of the oldest nationalities in Europe ; but with this exception, and in particular, that of his Ulster campaign against Home Rule, there are few things in his political career which do not hang together as a logical, consistent, and enlightened course of action. By his fearless advocacy of liberal doctrines—local govern-

¹ Vol. i., p. 91.

ment, parliamentary reform, peace and economy—he won for the Conservative Party that democratic support without which it was bound to drift out of existence. His programme was to rally the masses (under the banner of Tory democracy) around the Throne, the Church, and the Conservative Party. Time has justified the wisdom of his policy. It is not, I think, too much to say, that his untimely disappearance from the arena of English politics was a national disaster, for had he remained there since, it is likely that England would have been spared the humiliation of the Boer War, and that the Conservative Party would have added to the Statute Book a more liberal English Education Act, and also a satisfactory measure dealing with the Irish University question.

II.

His political career, however, was in sad contrast with the amplitude and consistency of his political programme:—

How men may for a time prosper continually, whatever they do, and then for a time fail continually whatever they do, is a theme in support of which history and romance supply innumerable examples. This chapter marks such a change in the character of the story I have to tell. Hitherto the life of Lord Randolph Churchill has been attended by almost unvarying success. His most powerful enemies had become his friends. His instinct when to strike and when to stay was unerring. Fortune seemed to shape circumstances to his moods. The forces which should have controlled him became obedient to his service. The frames of age and authority melted at his advance, and rebuke and envy pursued him idly. All this was now to be changed. During the rest of his public life, he encountered nothing but disappointment and failure. First, while his health lasted, the political situation was so unfavourable, that, although his talents shone all the brighter, he could effect nothing. Then when circumstances offered again a promising aspect, the physical apparatus broke down. When he had the strength, he had not the opportunity. When opportunity returned, strength had fled. So that at first, by sensible gradations, his political influence steadily diminished; and afterwards, by a more rapid progress, he declined to disease and death.¹

This passage traces graphically the comet-like pall

¹ Vol. ii., p. 296.

of his political fortune. He entered Parliament in '74. He made the Woodstock speech in '77. In 1881 the *Times* and the *Morning Post* were reporting his speeches verbatim, while Ministers and ex-Ministers had to be content with reading mutilated outlines of their utterances. In 1882, he had become the most popular speaker on the Opposition side of the House of Commons. When Lord Salisbury formed 'the Ministry of Caretakers' in 1885, he entered the Cabinet as Secretary for India, and when the same Prime Minister returned to power in 1886, Lord Randolph Churchill became Chancellor of the Exchequer and Leader of the House of Commons. Now begins the backward course. 'He was a Chancellor of the Exchequer without a budget, a Leader of the House of Commons but for a single session, a victor without the spoils.' It would seem that they were the same forces which directed his forward and backward course. 'He contained in his nature and in his policy all the elements necessary to ruin and success.' Lord Randolph was possessed of a 'stormy and rebellious nature.' When Secretary for India he tendered his resignation because the Queen communicated privately with the Viceroy of India on a matter in which he thought he should have been consulted; but the affair about which the communication was made was settled to his satisfaction, and there the matter ended. Feeling his obligation now as Chancellor of the Exchequer to be true to the programme of policy enunciated in his published speeches, he set about insisting in the Cabinet on a reduction in the proposed estimates for the Army and Navy. The Cabinet, however, held out against him, and on the morning of 23rd December, 1886, the public were 'startled to read in the *Times* the announcement that Lord Randolph Churchill had resigned the offices of Chancellor of the Exchequer and Leader of the House of Commons, and had retired altogether from the Government.'

A fraction of the common-stock political prudence would have induced Lord Randolph to give way on what was in itself a small point. In that case he might long continue

to exercise a potent influence in the chief council of the empire, and would, perhaps, trace out for himself an orbit as wide and symmetrical as that of Gladstone ; but prudence was no part of his composition. He was in the habit of calling one of his prudent colleagues 'old tutissimus.' It was by what the world would call imprudence that he attained one of the most coveted prizes that can fall to the lot of a politician, and now by what the same world would acclaim an act of imprudence, he allowed it to slip from his fingers. Was it not merely a question of reducing millions by some thousands? But it was not, it seems, altogether an inability on his part to be accommodating. Behind the small issue in which he refused to yield, there was, we are told, radical divergence of view from his chief in matters of general policy.

The action of Lord Randolph in resigning the office he held in such a manner, and on such an occasion, has two aspects—a smaller and a larger. Both are partly true : neither by itself is comprehensive. The smaller aspect is that of a proud, sincere, over-strained man, conceiving himself bound to fight certain issues, at whatever cost to himself—believing at each moment that victory would be won, and drawn by every movement further into a position from which he could not or would not retreat. The larger aspect deserves somewhat longer consideration. The differences between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and his colleagues were matters of detail.

The difference between the Leader of the House of Commons and the Prime Minister was fundamental. . . . It was a difference of belief of character, of aspiration—and by nothing could it ever have been adjusted. There were many considerations and influences which worked powerfully for their agreement. . . . But the gulf which separated the fiery leader of Tory democracy—with his bold plans of reform and dreams of change . . . from the old-fashioned conservative statesman, the head of a High Church and high Tory family, versed in diplomacy . . . was a gulf, no mutual needs, no common interests, no personal likings could permanently bridge. They represented schools of political philosophy. . . . Sooner or later the breach must here come.¹

Whether he was wise or not in resigning it is anyhow

¹ Vol., p. ii. 240.

his son's view, that having resigned he did the wrong thing in not fighting 'on the large ground of the unsatisfied aspirations of Tory democracy':—

Two courses therefore presented themselves at the outset : either to fight on the large ground of the unsatisfied aspirations of Tory democracy . . . or on the smaller ground of the Estimates. The first involved a downright assault upon the Conservative Government, an irreparable breach with its leaders. . . . The second whittled the difference down to a question of not very important figures. . . . The one promised a chance of successful strife, the other offered a prospect of reconciliation. . . . But in all respects save one, the first was the path of courage, of consistency and perhaps of prudence also. It suited his nature. It freed his hands. It justified and explained his action in a manner which the people could easily understand. 'I fondly hoped to make the Conservative party the instrument of Tory democracy. It was a idle, an idle schoolboy's dream. I must look elsewhere.' No doubt that was the road to tread. It might have ended in Liberalism ; but from that he would not at a later date have shrunk.¹

Had he joined the Liberals he would only have done what Gladstone before him did, and clearly in this direction lay the star of his political hope. Had he done so, and had he been blessed with the usual span of life, it is not difficult to imagine what might now be his place in public life. But remaining as he did a Conservative, he could not but feel keenly the loss of place and influence which were the co-natural term of his hitherto brilliant career. Such a sacrifice without a compensating reward was more than even his strangely rugged nature could well bear, and though he worked on, and worked effectively within the party when he was not travelling abroad, the opportunity of asserting his natural position did not return until his health was completely shattered. He died on January 24th, 1894, at the early age of forty-five, only too well illustrating the motto of his house, *Fiel pero Desdichado*.

III.

Irishmen will find very much to interest them in these two volumes. Reference has already been made to Lord

¹ Vol. ii., p. 279.

Randolph's attitude towards Home Rule. It would seem that at least one of the grounds of his objection to repeal of the Union was the loss the House of Commons would sustain by the absence of the Irish members :—

He could not vote for Home Rule [he said in the Woodstock speech of '77] because without the Irish members more than one-third of the life and soul of the House of Commons would be lost. 'Who is it but the Irish whose eloquence so often commands our admiration, whose irresistible humour compels our laughter, whose fiery outbursts provoke our passions. Banish them and the House of Commons composed only of Englishmen and Scotchmen would sink to the condition of a vestry.'¹

If he remained in a Coercion Cabinet, Coercion was certainly not agreeable to him, and if he played what he calls the 'ace of trumps' in exciting Ulster to fight against Home Rule, he did much otherwise to atone for what was certainly a grave fault. When the Reform Bill was going through Committee in 1884, Mr. Brodrick moved to omit Ireland from the scope of the new franchise, and in supporting this motion, recourse was had to an argument first advanced by Mr. W. H. Smith, member for Westminster, who had asked if Irish peasants who lived in mud cabins should be entrusted with a vote. Lord Randolph begged Mr. Brodrick to withdraw his amendment, and in the course of his speech replied to the 'mud-cabin' argument so effectively, that it was never heard of afterwards. He was friendly towards Irish members when it was the fashion to scowl at them as rebels. It was through his active co-operation with Lord Justice Fitzgibbon, Mr. Sexton, and Mr. Healy that the Irish Educational Endowments Bill was rushed through Parliament in the last week of its term in 1885.

He was a consistent, generous, and zealous advocate of the claims of Ireland to a Catholic University, not altogether it appears from love of Ireland, but also because it was good English policy. Here is a plan of 'University

¹ Vol. i., p. 90.

(Ireland) Education ' which he submitted to Lord Salisbury as part of the Tory programme for the Parliament '86 :—

1. The transference of Cork College to a Catholic Board of Management.

2. The endowment of the Catholic University College in Dublin.

3. The establishment of a Catholic College in Armagh.

4. The transference of the Belfast College to a Presbyterian Board of Management.

On November 21st, 1887, he wrote to Lord Justice Fitzgibbon: ' I will assent to and assume parliamentary responsibility for any scheme which you and the Archbishop can agree upon,' and on July 14th, 1888, he writes to him again: ' I wish very much we could meet the Archbishop's views.' Had he remained in the Cabinet he might have been instrumental in remedying a crying and calamitous grievance which still remains unredressed. but as it was, his views and sympathies were without tangible issue. He must be also credited with a desire to do justice to the Christian Brothers. As late as November, 1892, he wrote to Lord Justice Fitzgibbon :—

I hope John Morley will make a final adjustment of the grievances of those poor Christian Brothers. If I can usefully make any representations to him, instruct me. We have always been very good friends.

His speech during the debate in the House of Commons in March, 1890, on the report of the Parnell Commission, was one of the many sensations of the time. It is graphically described here even to the incident of the glass of water :—

At length he began to speak louder. ' The procedure which we are called upon to stamp to night is a procedure which would undoubtedly have been gladly resorted to by the Tudors and their judges. It is a procedure of an arbitrary and tyrannical character, used against individuals who are political opponents of the Government of the day, procedure such as Parliament has for generations struggled against and resisted. . . . It is a procedure such as would have startled even Lord Eldon ; it is a procedure such as Lords Lyndhurst and Brougham would have protested against. . . . But a Nemesis awaits a Government that adopts unconstitutional methods. What,'

he asked, 'has been the result of this uprootal of constitutional practice? What has been the one result?' Then in a fierce whisper, hissing through the House, 'Pigott!'—then in an outburst of uncontrollable passion and disgust—'a man, a thing, a reptile, a monster—Pigott!'—then again, with a pause at which the house shuddered, 'Pigott! Pigott! Pigott!'

No wonder that after this passionate outburst he was denounced by the Conservative Press once more—perhaps now for the twentieth time—as a traitor; so that the contention of the author may be admitted, that notwithstanding his attitude towards Gladstonian Home Rule, 'Ireland was a loser by his downfall.'

IV.

Great as is the political interest attaching to this brilliant work, the portraiture of the man is perhaps its most fascinating feature. Lord Randolph was a unique and picturesque character. Reserved and haughty with strangers, particularly with snobs, he was 'merry, frank, and cheerful' with his friends. If he called eminent personages hard names in political warfare, he could atone for this fault by the 'old-fashioned courtliness of his manners' in society.

'He was the most courtly man I ever met,' observed Mr. Gladstone in later years to Mr. Morley. At one dinner at Brook House, Mr. Gladstone had talked with great vivacity and freedom, and held everyone breathless. 'And that,' said Lord Randolph to a Liberal Unionist friend as they walked out of the room together, 'that is the man you have left? How could you have done it?'

A wit himself and brilliant conversationalist, he was most at home in the society of clever unconventional people. When exhausted one time from his labours, he wrote to his friend Lord Justice Fitzgibbon: 'Many thanks for your letter and telegram. My complete physical restoration depends on an evening with Father James Healy.' He was capable of forming sudden, strong, and enduring friendships. One of these was with Viscount Landaff, then Mr. Mathews, a Catholic barrister whom he got appointed

¹ Vol. ii., p. 416.

² Vol. ii., p. 433.

Home Secretary in 1886. Such an unusual appointment called forth a strong protest 'against the elevation of Roman Catholics to positions of power,' on the grounds of danger to the State, from the Scottish Protestant Alliance. This was the Chancellor of the Exchequer's immediate reply to the Secretary of the Association :—

TREASURY CHAMBERS,
WHITEHALL, *September 9.*

SIR,

I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter enclosing a copy of a resolution passed by the Directors of the Scottish Protestant Alliance, and, in reply, to remark that I observe with astonishment and regret, that in this age of enlightenment and general toleration, persons professing to be educated and intelligent can arrive at conclusions so senseless and irrational as these which are set forth in the aforesaid resolution.

I am, Sir,
Yours faithfully,
RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.

He was unaffected, reckless, and brilliant in his private letters as he was in his conversation. In fact his freedom and piquancy of speech were nowhere so unrestrained, so much so, that the author found himself obliged to make a selection for the present publication.

His letters from abroad contain graphic and humorous descriptions of his experiences and impressions. He travelled in India, Egypt, South Africa, Russia, Germany, France, Norway, and descriptions of his interviews and feastings with such men as the Czar of Russia and Bismarck are written in the same free off-hand way as are his accounts of tiger hunts in India, and lion hunts in South Africa. But his private life was not all enjoyment. Nervous irritability, fits of despondency, disgust with politics, above all the shadow of approaching death supply the sombre tints. Altogether he was a man whom his enemies must forgive for his noble qualities, and whose claim to a cherished place in the memory of his generation no one will dispute.

T. P. GILMARTIN.

GENERAL NOTES

'THE DUBLIN REVIEW'

THE *Dublin Review* has got a new editor, and put on a new suit. I do not very much admire the cut and make up of the latter ; but I do admire the work of the editor. Mr. Wilfrid Ward is one of the ablest and most judicious of Catholic apologists at the present day, and his accession to the editorship of the *Dublin Review* will be warmly welcomed in all English-speaking countries. Conservative without being reactionary, progressive without being disloyal, he is a man in whom Catholics can have the fullest confidence, and readily acknowledge as one of their spokesmen. Of course the Church gives *carte blanche* to nobody, lay or cleric ; but in anything that Mr. Ward has written, even in those directions in which he has gone farthest in concession, there is a singular absence of that disposition to indulge in fads, novelties, harsh criticism, and proofs of independence which make much of the work, otherwise in many respects valuable, of some of his Catholic countrymen, so disagreeable.

In the present number I suppose the unsigned articles on 'St. Thomas Aquinas,' on 'The Destroyed Letters,' and on 'The Functions of Prejudice,' may be attributed to the editor. They are all valuable. The opening article is a good commentary on Father Rickaby's recent translation, and is an implied declaration of policy to which anyone might subscribe. The article on the 'Destroyed Letters' contains a very welcome announcement, and vindicates Cardinal Manning from some of the ugliest aspersions cast upon him by Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Purcell. Lord Llandaff describes his election for Dungarvan in 1868, and shows a much more kindly feeling towards Ireland and Irishmen than his attitude towards them when he was in power in the Tory Government would lead one to suspect.

I should not fail to welcome the valuable contribution of Professor Phillimore on 'Leonidas of Tarentum.' I trust the Editor will cultivate this contributor and others like him. One such article is worth a dozen treatises on generalities. Most attractive and readable also is Dom Gasquet's paper on his

'Impressions of America.' Father Thurston's archæological paper on the 'Praetorium' is valuable for Scriptural students; whilst the article on 'The Letters of St. Catherine of Siena' cannot fail to stimulate interest in a subject of which more is sure to be heard. Altogether I can congratulate the readers of the *Dublin Review*, as well as its new Editor.

STATISTICS OF MARRIAGE

Kurschner's Jahrbuch for 1906 gives an interesting table showing the proportion of married men and women per 1,000 of the population, in various European countries. Only those above fifteen years of age are reckoned.

	MEN				WOMEN
Germany	547	519
Austria	535	510
Italy	548	548
France	551	537
Belgium	507	494
Holland	516	493
Switzerland	487	459
England and Wales	536	496
Scotland	477	442
Ireland	382	370

Ireland has the lowest proportion per thousand of married men and women, of all the countries given, and although she has a fair proportion of widows and widowers (58 men and 132 women) still she has by far the highest proportion of *unmarried* adults, viz., 559.3 men and 496.6 women.

THE CLERGY IN PARLIAMENT

IN the same German Official Directory, I find that in the Imperial Parliament of the German Empire—the Reichstag—which is composed of 397 members, there are no less than twenty-one Catholic priests, the most prominent of whom are Dr. Hitze, Professor at the University of Münster; Father Dasbach, of Treves; Provost von Jadsveski, of Schroda in Prussian Poland; Archpriest Frank, of Ratibor; Father Delsor, of Alsace; Dean Schaedler, of Bamberg; Canon Pischler, of Passau; Mgr. Lender of Baden; Father Leser, of Ravensburg, etc., etc.

In the Upper Chamber of the Kingdom of Prussia there are

two Bishops, Cardinal Kopp and Mgr. Jacobi, Bishop of Hildesheim; and in the Lower Chamber there are twelve priests. In the Grand Duchy of Baden the Archbishop of Freiburg is *ex officio* member of the Upper Chamber. In the Grand Duchy of Hesse the Bishop of Mayence and in the Kingdom of Saxony the Vicar Apostolic of Dresden enjoy a similar privilege. In Bavaria, the Archbishops of Munich and Bamberg and the Bishop of Passau have seats in the Upper House, and nine priests are members of the Lower House.

In Wurtemberg there is a peculiar constitution. The Upper House consisting of 31 territorial magnates. The Lower House is made up of 93 members, 63 of whom are elected, and 20 nominated by the Crown, or hold their position *ex officio*. Amongst the latter the Bishop of Rotenburg and two other dignitaries of the Catholic Church are always included; but there are other priests elected in Wurtemberg.

In Austria, there are in the Upper Chamber, 'Herrnhaus,' at Vienna, six Cardinals, six Archbishops, six Prince-Bishops, and several Abbots. In the Upper House of Hungary, the 'House of Magnates,' as it is called, there are ten or twelve Bishops, and several abbots and prelates.

In Ireland, a priest, bishop, or even Cardinal, could not be a member of a District Council. Quite recently a great demonstration took place at Armagh, because the local clergy were allowed to vote at municipal and parliamentary elections. And yet Ireland is a priest-ridden country, and we live under the most liberal and well-disposed government in the world! And when anything has to be done to improve the condition of the people, the question is asked, 'Why don't the priests do it?'

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE VATICAN

MR. HERBERT PAUL, who has recently been returned again to Parliament, describes in the first volume of his *History of Modern England* the efforts made by Lord Palmerston, in 1848, to establish diplomatic relations with the Vatican:—

'On the 17th of February, 1848, nine months earlier than the flight of the Pope, Lord Lansdowne moved in the House of Lords the second reading of a Bill for authorizing diplomatic relations with the Court of Rome. This was really Palmerston's Bill, and indeed the whole of his foreign policy was played, as

he himself put it, off his own bat. The Bill was the direct result of Lord Minto's singular mission to Italy in 1847, and on principle it was difficult to oppose. The Pope was a temporal sovereign, and five-sixths of the Irish people owned him as their spiritual head. Some lawyers thought that the Queen might, without statutory authority, appoint an envoy to Rome, and receive an ambassador from the Pope. But the balance of opinion was the other way, and it was considered safer to proceed by legislation. The principle of the measure was supported by Lord Stanley, the Duke of Wellington, and Bishop Thirlwall. Its only prominent antagonist was Bishop Philpotts of Exeter, a militant churchman of the fiercest type, who inspired awe without inspiring esteem. No worse charge was ever made against "Harry of Exeter" than that he had supported Catholic Emancipation to get a bishopric from the Duke. But in controversy he did not always display a Christian temper, and he seemed to be rather orthodox than pious. Bishop Thirlwall's philosophic intellect almost always took a statesmanlike view of political questions, and Lord Stanley, having been Chief Secretary for Ireland, knew the value of a good understanding with the Vatican. Although the Bill was read a second time by the Peers without a division, a curious mishap befell it in committee, which ultimately rendered it useless for all practical purposes. Lord Eglinton, whose name is known in fields more attractive than politics, carried by a majority of three votes an amendment providing that the Papal representative at the Court of St. James should not be a priest. The Bill was read a second time in the House of Commons, on the 17th, by a majority of 79, and Mr. Gladstone spoke in support of it. But the Pope declined to send a layman to represent him, and it became a dead letter. Mr. Disraeli, who was perhaps the best Leader of the Opposition the House of Commons has ever seen, took the opportunity of commenting on Lord Minto's roving errand "to teach politics in the country in which Machiavelli was born" (Vol. i., pp. 102-103).

Lord Edmund Fitzmaurice, in his *Life of Lord Granville* (Vol. ii., pp. 281-282), gives the following historical account of the same project :—

'The attempt to enter into diplomatic relations with Rome has had a chequered history. The memories associated with the Earl of Castlemaine's embassy to Rome in 1687 were still profoundly cherished by every Irish Protestant—the mission which Bishop Burnet had denounced as "high treason by law" and had even made Lord Chancellor Jeffreys "uneasy." It had ended in the Earl of Castlemaine being tried on the capital

charge "for going as an ambassador to Rome," and he was sent to the Tower, although he pleaded that "he did not go to Rome for any religious purpose, but only to show courtesy to a temporal prince and for a secular purpose." From that time nothing more was heard of embassies to Rome till 1848, when it was thought that a more open procedure might be safest to follow after all.

'In that year a Bill was introduced in the House of Lords to enable Her Majesty to open and carry on diplomatic relations 'with the Court of Rome,' and this Bill ultimately became law, but subject to an alteration which, curiously enough, eventually proved fatal to it. On the motion of the Bishop of Winchester, in the House of Lords, the words "Sovereign of the Roman States" were substituted in the Bill for the words just quoted, and in consequence when, in October, 1870, the Bishop of Rome ceased to be "Sovereign of the Roman States," the Statute Law Revision Committee considered themselves justified in proposing the repeal of the Act as obsolete, and succeeded in the attempt.

'The Act was enabling only, and while it was on the Statute Book from which it was so soon to disappear, no public appointment was made under its terms; but the practice grew up of allowing a Secretary of Legation, nominally appointed to the Grand Ducal Court of Tuscany, to reside at Rome, where he was regarded as *de facto* Minister to the Vatican, but was always prepared to assert that, like the Earl of Castlemaine, he was there for secular purposes only; and even this arrangement came to an end when Mr. Jervoise was withdrawn from Rome by Lord Derby, and no other appointment made.'

MONSIGNOR CAPEL.

SOME months ago I received the following post card:—

' ARNO, CALIFORNIA,
' July 15th.

' REV. AND DEAR FATHER,

' I take the liberty to send you a copy of Father Wyman's *Certainty in Religion*. You may deem it worthy of being called to the attention of the readers of the IRISH ECCLESIASTICAL RECORD

' Very respectfully yours,
' T. J. CAPEL.'

This is the well-known Mgr. Capel, whom Disraeli introduced as Mgr. Catesby into his famous novel *Lothair*. In the same work, Cardinal Manning appeared as Cardinal Grandison. Both were indefatigable, according to the old politician, in their

efforts to propagate Catholicism in society as well as in the intellectual world. Irish priests will be glad to hear that Mgr. Capel is still flourishing under the favourable sky of California.

The author of the little volume about which Mgr. Capel writes, is a convert; and that indicates that the zeal of the 'Apostle of the genteel,' as he used to be called, is not yet dead. Father Wyman is a Paulist and, like all the members of the New York Community, a learned and zealous man. There is nothing new in his book (New York: Columbus Press), but old arguments are presented in a new and fascinating style. This is particularly the case in the part of the book that deals with the theory of knowledge, and with the prophecies and their fulfilment.

'THE IRISH THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY'

THE great awakening in the intellectual life of Ireland finds its latest expression in the *Irish Theological Quarterly*, the success of which has already surpassed the most sanguine expectations of its promoters. For many years I have found it difficult to accommodate as speedily and as fully as I could wish the numerous contributors who sought a share of the space at my disposal, and I am heartily glad that they have found another and most valuable outlet for their activity; the more so, as I have every reason to believe that the I. E. RECORD will not in any way be deprived of the co-operation of those who have undertaken this new enterprise.

The principle underlying Dr. McDonald's opening article is one with which I have always had much sympathy, that men must be taken as they are, in their concrete, and the truths of religion brought home to them in such form as is most likely to reach them and influence them. This by no means implies a rejection of the old arguments, or an admission of their invalidity. It is, in many respects, rather an application of old arguments and of what is older and better than all arguments, reason itself, to the difficulties and troubles of those who are seeking to solve the riddle of their lives. If Mr. Mallock, and people who think with him, refuse to find any help in the origin of life, or in the moral argument, or in the dissipation of energy, it is no harm at least to try the effect upon them of a closer study of the origin of Free Will and of Universal Ideas. Whether the result will be more satisfactory who can tell?

In his paper on 'Socialism' there seems to me to be great force in what he says about the 'accumulated stores' that are the common heritage of all men, and for which all men have a perfect right to exact the fair and full value. On the other hand it is a source of satisfaction to see him remind his readers of democratic sympathies that, as it is 'unwise to put limits to the march of a nation,' it is equally impolitic to put chains on individual endeavour and weight it down with impossible impediments.

Wealth confers benefits second only to those of labour itself.

'If it offends some [says M. Thiers¹], it excites others, encourages, animates, sustains them; and society finds in it so many advantages for the generality of its members that it ignores the grumbling and discontent of the few. After all, manual labour is not the only kind of labour. You must also have men to apply the compass to paper, to study the movements of the stars, to teach us how to cross the seas. You must have men to study the annals and the efforts of other nations, to discover the cause of the prosperity and decay of empires, and to teach us how to rule. It is not the man who from day to day remains bent over his machine, or over the soil, who will have leisure for such pursuits. You may indeed find a peasant who will one day turn out to be the great Sforza, or a compositor in a printing-house to become Benjamin Franklin. But these exceptions are rare. It is rather the sons of the toiler, raised above their condition by a laborious father, who will mount the steps of the social ladder and reach the sublime heights of thought.

'The father was a peasant, a workman, a sailor. The son will be a farmer, a manufacturer, the captain of a ship. The grandson will be a banker, a surgeon, a barrister, perhaps one day head of the State. . . . Thus the human vegetation operates, and little by little is formed the wealthy class of society, which is called idle but is not so; for the work of the mind is value for that of the hands, and must ever succeed it if society is not to return to barbarism. I recognize that amongst these rich people there will be some, unworthy sons of wise fathers, who will spend their days at the gaming-table and their nights at pleasure, who will become stupid with drink, dissipating in idleness and debauchery their youth, their health, and their fortune. That is all true. But they will soon enough be punished. Their career blighted before its time, their fortune lost, they will wander sad, disfigured, and poor, before those palaces which their fathers had built and which now must pass into

¹ *La Propriété*, p. 66.

the possession of wiser and better men. In a generation you see labour rewarded in the father and idleness punished in the son. O Envy, implacable envy, art thou not satisfied?

'But are all the children of the rich of this description? It is true that they do not dig, nor spin, nor wield the hammer in the forge. But, do they not read, study, teach, discover, govern? If it is not the rich man who always makes the discoveries that contribute to our welfare, it is he sometimes. It is he who encourages them. It is he who contributes to form the learned public for whom the modest *savant* labours. It is he who has large libraries, who reads Sophocles, Virgil, Dante, Galileo, Descartes, Bossuet, Molière, Racine, Montesquieu. If it is not he, it is at his house, around him, near him, that they are read, criticized, appreciated, and that you find that enlightened, polished society, with fine taste and trained judgment, for which genius writes, sings, and paints. Sometimes he will not be satisfied with admiring the works of eminent minds; he will produce some of his own. He will be the rich Sallust, the rich Seneca, the rich Montaigne, the rich Buffon, the rich Lavoisier, the rich De Medici, founders of that republic which was most fruitful in riches and in art, which gave to the world Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio, Machiavelli, Galileo, Ghiberti, Brunelleschi, Donatello, Poggio, Politiano, Leonardo da Vinci, and Michelangelo.'

These are certainly considerations which must not be left out of calculation in endeavouring to fix the boundaries of social rights. If the natural incentive to work is removed, the work is sure to fail.

The most important part of Dr. MacRory's paper is that in which he deals with the theory of the 'crude scientific notions of the age,' and 'loose historical methods' which have been supported by such a large number of writers on Biblical subjects in recent times. This is a question which we hope will be dealt with more fully; for just as our curiosity was keenly aroused we saw that space limits would compel us to restrain it for three months more.

Dr. Harty contributes an article on 'Fetal Life,' which is useful both from the theoretical and practical point of view. Father MacCaffrey is laying the foundation of a most valuable work in his paper on 'Rome and Ireland.' It is critical and argumentative from beginning to end. His introduction on 'Pre-Patrician Christianity,' and his discussion of Zimmer's theory about Palladius and St. Patrick, are the most hopeful things of their kind that have appeared in our time. Some

people may prefer fine writing and a florid style, but Father MacCaffrey has adopted the style which is most effective in these days of facts and analysis. It is the style which has been adopted by the most successful of German ecclesiastical historians, amongst others Rettberg, Hauck, Friederich, Bellesheim.

I welcome, with particular pleasure, Dr. Toner's paper on the 'Kenotic Theory' of Dr. Gore, or 'Depotentialization of the Logos.' This opens up a vast field of utility for a young professor, already learned and well trained, who may be trusted to give a good account of himself in anything that he undertakes. It is only natural that in the Anglican Church there should be 'variations' now as there have always been. This latest 'variation' in doctrine is clearly explained and put to the test of the 'Rule of Faith,' and will be put to a further test in the next number.

The size, form, and production of the *Quarterly* excite my envy as well as my admiration. The new ship has been launched under an able captain. It has made its first voyage safely and pleasantly. May it have many others equally safe and pleasant.

J. F. HOGAN, D.D

Notes and Queries

LITURGY

DECREE CONCERNING CONFRATERNITY OF MOUNT CARMEL

WE would call the attention of our readers to an important Decree of the Congregation of Indulgences which was published in the last issue of the I. E. RECORD. The Decree has been issued at the instance of the General of the Discalced Carmelites (who have this Confraternity under their special protection and patronage), and has for its purpose the *reinvalidation* of all the receptions into the Society which might possibly happen to be invalid from non-compliance with any of the essential conditions for securing membership. Priests, therefore, who may have reason to be scrupulous lest, owing to the omission of any of the necessary formalities for a valid reception—such as the inscription of names, etc.—persons so received might be deprived of the advantages, privileges, and favours attached to the Confraternity, will be pleased to know that possible defects of the kind have been made good up to 28th June, 1905, the date of the Decree, and that all persons received up to this date will not be deprived of their Indulgences owing to the non-fulfilment of any technical requirement.

MASS TO BE SAID IN CERTAIN CHURCH

REV. DEAR SIR,—An answer to the two following dubia will much oblige :—

A pastor has charge of two churches in the united parishes of B. Michael and St. Colman. He lives beside the church of B. Michael ; but as St. Colman's feast (29th October) has been kept from time immemorial as a parish holiday in the church and parish bearing his name, the pastor, rightly, as he hopes,

considers St. Colman the *titularis ecclesia*, and recites his Office Ut duplex 1 cl. cum Oct.

Now, the doubt occurred in connection with the celebration of Mass on the octave day of St. Colman, during the past year, in the church of B. Michael. The pastor had to say Mass on the occasion not in St. Colman's church, but in B. Michael's; and as this church and parish had no connection with St. Colman he felt doubtful as to whether he should say the Mass of the Oct. of St. Colman or the Mass in the general Ordo for the day—that is, the Mass of the Maternity of the B.V.M. Please say which Mass ought to have been said in the circumstances.

The pastor in question does his duty correctly in celebrating the feast of the Titular, St. Colman. He is bound to celebrate the feasts of the Titulars of the two churches which are committed to his charge, for all the necessary conditions, making their celebration obligatory, appear to be present. The due celebration includes, of course, the saying of the office and Mass on the feast-day, and on all the days *inf. oct.* on which they may be said in accordance with the Rubrics. On the octave day of St. Colman's Feast, the pastor, we assume, recites the office of the octave. If he were saying Mass in the church of the Saint, he should also say it in conformity with his office. He has to celebrate, however, for some reason, not in the church of St. Colman, but in that of Blessed Michael, and he hesitates about the Mass he should select. What is the right thing for him to do? In other words, is he to arrange the Mass in harmony with the office he recites, or, rather, in harmony with that of the church in which he celebrates, that is, with the office of the General Calendar? The principle governing the solution of the case has been laid down by the general Decree of the Congregation of Rites, *Urbis et orbis*, dated 9th July, 1895, which directs that the selection of the Mass *in aliena Ecclesia* is to be determined not by the Calendar of the celebrant, but by that of the church in which the Mass is said. In the contingency contemplated, therefore, he should celebrate the Mass of the Maternity of the B.V.M.

We need not add that the making provision for these particular offices, such as the Titulars of churches and Patrons of places will introduce a certain dislocation in the offices of the general Calendar, but, at the same time, it is a most laudable, as well as an obligatory, work to carry out these celebrations in the spirit of the Liturgy. In some cases the Titulars or Patrons will be Divine Persons or Mysteries, whose feasts enjoy all the rank and dignity that the Church can bestow on them; in others they may be the same as the cathedral, or diocesan patrons, whose offices are fully provided for in the diocese: and in all instances the titular or patron will be at least a Saint of such eminent standing that his feast-day will be assigned a place on the General, or, at least, on the Diocesan Calendar, so that the only thing necessary will be to celebrate it as a double of the first class within an octave. This will involve more than making suitable provision for the *octave* day.

‘BENEDICTIO MENSÆ’

REV. DEAR SIR,—In some religious communities, which have no special rite, the custom prevails of omitting the *Benedicite* at the beginning of the grace before meals on certain feasts, for which a change of Versicle is prescribed in the Breviary, as e.g., Christmas, Epiphany, and Easter. It seems to me that there is no authority for this in the rubrics of the Breviary. Can the omission be justified *aliunde*?—I am, yours faithfully,
SACERDOS.

¶ We quite agree with our correspondent that there is no justification for omitting the *Benedicite* at the beginning of the form of blessing before meals. So far from sanctioning the omission the Rubric in the Roman Breviary implies that this appropriate preamble should always be said. For, having given the *formulae* suitable to the various meals—before each of which the *Benedicite* is distinctly introduced—it states in an explicit Rubric that the changes to be made on special occasions affect only the Versicle and Psalms. ‘Praedictus modus benedicendi mensam

et agendi gratias servatur omni tempore . . . praeterquam diebus infrascriptis quibus V.V. et Psalmi *tantum variantur*.' The Rubricists who notice the *Benedictio Mensae*, similarly insinuate that the initial *Benedicite* is always to be retained, and that the changes rendered necessary by special feasts and at certain seasons of the year occur only in the places already mentioned. Thus Appeltern: 'Adsunt nonnulla tempora in quibus benedictio et gratiarum actio sunt quidem ut in communi formula, sed variantur Versiculi et Psalmi.'¹

P. MORRISBOE.

¹ *Manuale Liturgicum*, vol. ii., p. 250.

DOCUMENTS

THE USE OF MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS AT SACRED
FUNCTIONSE SACRA CONGREGATIONE RITUUM
COMPOSTELLANACIRCA USUM MUSICORUM INSTRUMENTORUM IN SACRIS
FUNCTIONIBUS

Emus. et Rmus. Dnus. Cardinalis Iosephus M. de Herrera y de la Iglesia, Archiepiscopus Compostellanus, ad Sacram Rituum Congregationem mittens elenchum tum festorum, quae in sua ecclesia Cathedrali solemniter celebrantur cum musica vocali et instrumentali, vulgo *orquesta*; tum instrumentorum, quibus musici utuntur in iisdem solemnitatibus: atque insuper interpretationem authenticam habere desiderans super iis, quae Sanctissimus Dominus Noster Pius Papa X in *Motu proprio* super musica sacra statuit, nempe: "Aliquoties, servatis servandis, admitti possunt alia musica instrumenta, sed annuente Episcopo, ut Caeremoniale Episcoporum praecipit," eidem Sacrae Congregationi sequentia dubia enodanda reverenter proposuit, videlicet:

I. An, et in quibus festis permitti possit usus instrumentorum quae (vulgo *violines, violas, violoncello, contrabajo, flauta, clarinetes, fagots, trompas*) in elencho recensentur?

II. An permitti possit usus instrumentorum in Officio et Missa defunctorum?

III. An proscribendus sit in ecclesiis parochialibus et conventualibus usus organi dicti *harmonium* in Officio et Missa defunctorum?

Sacra porro rituum Congregatio ad relationem subscripti Secretarii, exquisito voto Commissionis super Musica et Cantu sarcro rescribendum censuit:

Ad I. Ad primam partem *Affirmative*; an secundam partem, in illis functionibus et temporibus, in quibus sonus organi aliorumque instrumentorum non prohibetur a Caeremoniali Episcoporum, a praedicto *Motu proprio* et a Deretis S.R.C. uti in *Pisana* 20 Martii 1903, et in *Compostellana* 8 Ianuarii 1904, super Triduo Maioris Hebdomadae; verum iuxta prudens Ordinarii arbitrium in singulis casibus cum dispensations a lege

et praxi communi adhibendi in sacris functionibus cantum gregorianum vel musicam polyphonicam aut aliam probatam.

Ad II. In Officio *Negative*; in Missa et Absolutione post Missam, prouti in responso ad I et servatis servandis, ita ut sonus organi aliorumque instrumentorum tantum ad sustinendas voces adhibeatur, et sileant instrumenta cum silet cantus, iuxta Caeremoniale Episcoporum, lib. I, cap. 28, n. 13.

Ad III. Provisum in praecedenti.

Atque ita rescripsit, die 15 Aprilis 1905.

A. Card. TRIPEPI, *Pro-Praef.*

L. ✠ S.

D. PANICI, Archiep. Laodicen., *Secretarius.*

INDULGENCES FOR SATURDAY DEVOTION TO THE IMMACULATE VIRGIN

E SACRA CONGREGATIONE INDULGENTIARUM

DECRETUM URBIS ET ORBIS

INDULG. CONCEDUNTUR PRO PIO EXERCITIO IN OBSEQUIUM DEIPARAE IMMACULATAE PRIMIS CUIUSQUE MENSIS SABBATIS

Rmus. P. Dominicus Reuter, Minister Generalis Ordinis FF. Min. Conventualium, nuper exposuit, se anno quinquagesimo mox expleto, ex quo dogma de Immaculato Bmae. Virginis Conceptu proclamatum est, veterem praxim, fere oblivioni datam, revocasse, exhibendi nimirum peculiarem cultum Virgini Deiparae singulis primis cuiusque mensis sabbatis, in obsequium tam singularis privilegii intuitu meritorum Christi eidem Virgini collati; quam piam praxim f. r. Clemens XIV litteris aplicis d. d. 10 Iunii 1774 indulgentia biscentum dierum iam ditavit, acquirenda a christifidelibus, qui memoratis sabbatis praefati Ordinis ecclesias adivissent.

Porro quum tam laudabile exercitium, nunc denuo propositum, vehementissimo cordis affectu christifideles sint prosequuti, ne huiusmodi tepescat pietas, sed imo ferventior in posterum evadat, idem Minister Generalis humillimas preces SSmo. Dno. Nro. Pio PP. X. admovit, ut christifidelibus, qui singulis primis sabbatis, vel etiam dominicis, haud interruptis, infra spatium duodecim mensium sacramentali poenitentia rite expiati sacraque mensa refecti, sive precibus, sive quoque meditationibus ad honorem Virginis absque originali macula concepta aliquamdiu vacaverint, simulque ad mentum Sancti-

tatis Suae oraverint, plenariam indulgentiam, defunctis quoque applicabilem, memoratis sabbatis vel dominicis lucranda, tribuere dignaretur.

Sanctitas vero Sua, votis Rmi. P. Ministri Generalis obsecundare exoptans, ut erga Dei Matrem magis foveatur fidelium religio, in omnibus pro gratia iuxta preces benigne annuere dignata est. Praesenti in perpetuum valituro. Contrariis quibuscumque non obstantibus.

Datum Romae e Secretaria Sacra Congregationis Indulgentiis Sacrisque Reliquiis praepositae, die 1 Julii 1905.

A. Card. TRIPEPI, *Praef.*

L. ✠ S.

✠ D. PANICI, Archiep. Laodicen., *Secret.*

PRIVILEGE OF THE WAY OF THE CROSS IN NEWLY-
ERECTED CHURCHES

E SACRA CONGREGATIONE INDULGENTIARUM
IN CASU ECCLESIAE REAEDIFICATAE FERE IN EODEM LOCO ET
SUB EODEM TITULO, PRIVILEGIUM VIAE CRUCIS TRANSFERTUR
SINE NOVA ERECTIONE

Fr. Bonaventura Marrani, Ordinis FF. Minorum Procurator Generalis, ab hac S. Congregatione Indulgentiarum sequentis dubii solutionem humiliter expostulat :

Ex Decreto huius S.C. in una *Leodien*, d. d. 9 Augusti 1843 indulgentiae non cessant, si, destructa veteri Ecclesia, nova aedificetur fere in eo loco, ubi vetus existebat, et sub eodem titulo. Quaeritur :

Utrum praefata resolutio applicetur etiam Stationibus S. Viae Crucis legitime erectis, ita ut in casu Ecclesiae ex toto reaedificatae fere in eodem loco et sub eodem titulo praeeexistens privilegium S. Viae Crucis non cesset, si S. Via Crucis, quae in veteri Ecclesia destructa legitime erecta extabat, salva substantia, ast sine nova erectione in Ecclesiam reaedificatam, prout dictum est, transferatur ?

S. Congregatio Indulgentiis Sacrisque Reliquiis praeposita, audito Consultorum voto, proposito dubio respondendum mandavit : *Affirmative.*

Datum Romae ex Secretaria eiusdem S.C., die 7 Iunii 1905.

A. Card. TRIPEPI, *Praef.*

L. ✠ S.

✠ DIOMEDES PANICI, Archiep. Laodicen., *Secret.*
IOSEPHUS M. Cancus. COSELLI, *Subst.*

REMOVAL OF A PARISH PRIEST

E SACRA CONGREGATIONE EPISCOPORUM ET REGULARIUM

PONENTE EMO. AC RMO

CARDINALI ANDREA STEINHUBER

DIE 13 MAII 1904

BAMBERGEN—TRANSLATIONIS

Confirmatur remotio oeconomica cuiusdam parochi inamovibilis, ob illius gravissima dissidia cum magistratibus civilibus, necnon et populi scandalum, illiusque translatio ad aliud beneficium simplex.

In dioecesi Herbipolensi, Ioannes N.... a. 1897 renuntiatus est parochus cuiusdam loci, sed anno insequenti cum auctoritatis civilibus gravia habere coepit dissidia, quae in dies magis excreverunt hac etiam de causa, quod, iuxta eges Bavariae, parochiali muneri officium est adnexum regendi et inspiciendi publicas scholas Gubernii nomine et mandato. Res itaque eo processerunt ut Ordinarius dioecesanus postquam pluries parochum graviter admonuerit, tandem decreto praesertim 29 Febr. 1901 renuntiationem paroeciae et optionem ad simplex beneficium imposuit. Sed quum parochus parum curaret de episcopali decreto, gravioresque dissensiones cum civili potestate imprudenter foveret, Episcopus iterum decreto 15 Martii 1901 praescriptam translationem illi intra tres dies sub poena remotionis a paroecia implendam iussit; addita insuper prima monitione canonica ob neglectum praeceptum petendi aliud beneficium simplex.

Parochus Ioannes N.... ad Archiepiscopum Bambergensem ab hoc decreto appellavit, qui tamen die 31 Octobris 1901 sententiam Episcopi Herbipolensis plene confirmavit. Tunc parochus, posthabito iure provocandi in tertia instantia apud tertium Bavariae Episcopum a Nuntio Apostolico eligendum vigore privilegii a Pio IX per Breve *Nemo ignorat* concessi, maluit supremo Sedis Apostolicae iudicio sistere.

Ad sustinenda iura sua, praedictus parochus Ioannes N. contendit iniuste canonicam monitionem ab Ordinario sibi fuisse inflictam. In decreto enim 29 Febr. 1901 nullum praeceptum continebatur, sed merum Episcopi desiderium quoad paroeciae renuntiationem. Hinc, quum nemo teneatur propriis iuribus valedicere ad votum superioris implendum, parochiali beneficio non valedixit; eo vel magis quod in Episcopi decreto nulla suae

decisionis ratio afferebatur. Insuper addit contra canonicas sanctiones et praecipue contra Conc. Trid. (*Sess. 21, c. 6 de Reform.*) militare impositam sibi a paroecia amotionem; utpote quod Episcopus veram rerum cognitionem nec habuit, nec habere voluit, quum et testes audire et inquisitionem peragere neglexisset. De caetero dissidium cum laica auctoritate, de quo ipsa tantum est iudex competens, non est ratio sufficiens ut Episcopus parochum inamovibilem destituere possit.

At ex adverso, Archiepiscopus Bambergensis animadvertit Episcopum Herbiapolensem, nec in procedendo, nec in iudicando minime errasse. Non erravit in procedendo: tum quia Episcopus est incompetens in iudicandis dissidiis exortis parochum tamquamInspectorem scholasticum inter et civiles magistratus, quod ad Gubernium pertinet; tum quia accusationes adversus parochum prolatae et per ipsius rei confessionem et per publicam notorietatem satis in propatulo erant, quin opus esset testes audiendi atque inquisitionem instituendi canonicam. Sed neque Episcopus erravit in iudicando: tum quia parochus in morali impossibilitate versabatur absque gravi fidelium scandalo, fungendi munere parochiali ob notissima dissidia, tum quia in potestate Ordinarii est ut decreta vim rei iudicatae habentia monitione canonica urgeat, et tandem executioni tradat. Hinc ad

DUBIUM

An et quomodo sit confirmandum decretum Rmi. Archiepiscopi Bambergen. in casu?

Responsum fuit: *Decretum esse confirmandum.*

**INDULT GRANTING PERMISSION TO SECLAR PRIESTS OF
THE THIRD ORDER OF ST. FRANCIS TO SAY A VOTIVE
MASS OF THE IMMACULATE CONCEPTION ON SATURDAYS**

ET SACRA CONGREGATIONE RITUUM

**INDULTUM PRO SACERDOTIBUS SAECULARIBUS III, ORD. S. FR.
DICENDI MISSAM VOTIVAM DE IMM. SINGULIS SABBATIS**

Cupiens Reverendissimus Pater Frater Bonaventura Marrani, Procurator Generalis Ordinis Minorum, ut cultus erga Imm. Deiparae Virginis Conceptionem magis magisque augeatur, atque omnis controversia tollatur circa Missam votivam de eadem Imm. Conc. ex Apostolicae Sedis Indulto concessam Franciscalibus Familiis, a Sanctissimo Domino Nostro Pio Papa X humillimis precibus flagitavit:

I. Ut Sacerdotes etiam saeculares, Tertio Ordini Sancti Francisci adscripti, qui Kalendario Romano-Seraphico utuntur, quoties vel in privato Oratorio vel in Ecclesiis trium Ordinum Sancti Francisci Sacrum faciant, singulis per annum Sabbatis Missam votivam de Immaculata Beatae Mariae Virginis Conceptione legere valeant, prouti Alumnis vel Cappellanis trium Ordinum Regularium permittitur; quemadmodum nempe Sacerdotibus Tertii Ordinis Praedicatorum conceditur FERIA IV et Sabbato per annum, etiam Festo duplici minori ac maiori impeditis, Missam Sanctissimi Rosarii '*Salve radix*' iisdem in casibus celebrare.¹

II. Ut Sacerdotes e primo ac Tertio Ordine Regulari Sancti Francisci Sacrum facturi in Oratoriis privatis extra Coenobium positis, sicuti Kalendarium Romano-Seraphicum possunt ac debent adhibere, ita valeant Missam votivam de Immaculata Beatae Mariae Virginis Conceptione celebrare, prouti in Ecclesiis ipsius Ordinis conceditur; ne secus, ac praesertim Religiosi extra Coenobium rem divinam oblaturi eodem uti privilegio impediantur, ipsis admodum salutari.

Sanctitas porro Sua, referente infrascripto Cardinali Sacrorum Rituum Congregationi Pro-Praefecto, benigne annuere dignata est pro gratia iuxta preces: servatis Rubricis. Contrariis non obstantibus quibuscumque.

Die 22 Martii 1905.

A. Card. TRIPEPI, *Pro-Praef.*

L. * S.

* D. PANICI, Archiep. Laodicen., *Secret.*

APPOINTMENT OF CONFESSORS OF NUNS

DE SACRA CONGREGATIONE EPISCOPORUM ET REGULARIUM CIRCA DESIGNATIONEM CONFESSARII PRO MONASTERIIS MONIALIUM ET SORORUM

Petrus Gonzales et Estrada Episcopus S. Christophori de Habana, omne illicitum vitare cupiens, a Sacra Episcoporum et Regularium Congregatione sequentium dubiorum solutionem humillime postulat; nimirum:

I. An Episcopus licite valeat confessarium ordinarium monia-

¹ Indultum praesens valet etiam de Ecclesiis ad Tertium Ordinem *saecularem* Sancti Patris Nostri Francisci reapse pertinentibus, si in eis Kalendarium Romano-Seraphicum observetur, etiamque vim habet pro Vigilia proque integra Octava Immaculae Conceptionis.

lium unius Monasterii pro alius Monasterii monialium ordinario confessario designare?—Et quatenus *negative*,

II. An Episcopus confessarium ordinarium monialium unius Monasterii ad munus ordinarii confessarii sororum votorum simplicium eligere queat?—Et quatenus *negative*,

III. Utrum Episcopus unum confessarium ordinarium pro duabus Communitatibus Sororum possit licite deputare?

IV. An prohibitum sit Regularibus confessarios ordinarios sororum votorum simplicium esse, sicut pro monialibus eis vetitum est?

Et Sacra Congregatio Eorum. ac Rrum. S. R. E. Cardinalium Negotiis et Consultationibus Episcoporum et Regularium praepositae, omnibus sedulo perpensis, respondendum esse censuit, prout respondet:

Ad I. *Affirmative*.

Ad II et III. Provisum in primo.

Ad IV. *Affirmative*.

Romae, die 1 Septembris 1905.

D. Card. FERRATA, *Praef.*

L. ✠ S.

PHILIPPUS GIUSTINI, *Secretarius*.

POPE PIUS X AND THE GERMAN CATHOLICS

EX ACTIS SUMMI PONTIFICIS ET E SECRETAR. BREVIUM
PIUS X CEMMENDAT CATHOLICORUM GERMANORUM LII CONVENTUM,
MOX ARGENTORATI COGENDUM

*Dilecto Filio Burguburn, ac Praesidi coetus Conventui LII
Catholicorum Germaniae apparando, Argentoratum.*

Dilecte Fili, salutem et Apostolicam benedictionem.

Habiti quotannis coetus catholicorum Germaniae in eam Nos opinionem adduci quotidie magis iusserunt, congressiones easdem, quo plures numero de successione recensentur, eo etiam digniores et prae se ferre apparatus et edere fructus. Huius sane solatium rei communes nunc confirmavere litterae, Nobis a te datae atque a praesidibus caeteris, quum proximo adorando coetui studeretis: vestrarum enim curarum ea potissima fuit, aperire ex ordine omnia quaecumque erunt disceptanda congressui, sensusque declarare simul, quorum ductu convenietis. Neque modica ista est Nobis gaudendi, et gratulandi opportunitas: quid enim quam fecundam Germanorum alacritatem expetere possimus amplius ad inserendam propagandamque

religionem ? Causae equidem in disputatione versabuntur graves salubresque, atque eadem admultiplicem christianae vitae necessitatem peridoneae. Nam quibus maxime, pro conditione temporum expediat viis fidei nostrae et Apostolicae Sedis cultum provehere, proximorum sententias, catholica praelucente doctrina, humane ac rite vereri, expeditiones adiuvaré sacras, integritati morum prospicere, tenuium fortunam sublevare, locupletum alere inopumque amicam conspirationem, sacri denique civilisque principatus concordiae consulere, in hisce, quemadmodum nunciasti, maximi momenti rebus vestra debet se prudentia probare. Quod autem decretum vobis sit accedere ad disserendum eo animo, ut hinc Nostra Decessorisque Nostri Leonis XIII fel. rec. prae oculis documenta habeatis, inde hortamenta Pauli deducatis ad usum, qui spiritu actus ac repletus Dei, *omnia* nostra iussit *in charitate* fieri, vehementis haec Nobis origo voluptatis est ; compertum namque et exploratum habemus quam multum emolumenti consueverint qui haec sequi lumina et praecepta studeant, e collatis consiliis percipere. Nec minus oblecta coire vos in civitatem nobilem, antiquam et *piam* ; cui gloriae est in Episcopatu Romano Pontificem dedisse insignem, et coelo Sanctissimam peperisse sobolem, et artibus monumenta illustria suppeditasse. Spem ideo firmam fovemus, auspiciis Praesulis Argentinensis vestraeque diligentia prosperam apparando felicemque celebrando coetui debere operam impendi. Quoniam vero a summae clementiae Deo, quippe ipse est consilii boni largitor, implorandam censetis in primis opem, eius in vos atque in labores vestros devocamus ardentes gratiam, testemque votorum animi Nostri Apostolicam benedictionem tum vobis praesidibus, tum singulis e conventu sodalibus peramanter in Domino impertimus.

Datum Romae, die 14 Augusti 1905.

PIUS PP. X.

NOTICES OF BOOKS

THE LIFE OF GRANVILLE GEORGE LEVESON GOWER. Second Earl of Granville, K.G. 1815-1891. By Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice. Longmans, Green & Co. 1905. 2 vols. 8vo. 30s. net.

THE *Life of Lord Granville* has been pronounced by English reviewers one of the most important that has appeared in recent times on account of the letters and *memoranda* of Queen Victoria which it makes public for the first time. It is, no doubt, very interesting to notice the vigorous style in which her late Majesty knocked some of her Ministers on the knuckles, and the almost unmeasured language in which she denounced others, expressing a hope that some means would be found of letting them know what she thought of them.

But for Irish readers there are chapters of this work, that have nothing to do with the Queen, still more interesting and important. The most prominent is the chapter on 'Ireland' in the second volume, and the chapter on 'Home Rule.'

In the former of these we get the whole story of the Errington mission to Rome in 1882, and a great insight into the intrigues and manœuvres by which it was surrounded. Letters from Lord Granville to Lord Emly, from Sir William Harcourt to Lord Granville, from Lord Granville to Lord Spencer, etc., throw a flood of light on the whole affair. The part played by Lord O'Hagan, Lady Herbert, Sir Augustus Paget, and others is referred to. The informal credentials given by Lord Granville to Mr. Errington are set forth. The following passage in a letter from Lord Granville to Mr. Gladstone will give an idea of the interest of the chapter:—

'I have received a letter from Errington complaining that his nose was out of joint in consequence of the attitude Manning was taking, strongly criticising the Pope's Irish policy, which the Cardinal said was alienating the Catholic population, and advising the Pope to send a letter of thanks to Archbishop Croke.'

Anyone who wishes to present to the public a faithful account

of the events of those days, or to learn them accurately for himself, must read this book. It cannot be done without. Lord Granville was the Minister of Foreign Affairs during that time. He had his hand at the helm, and in all foreign negotiations it was he who set the machinery going.

History is now being made on all this period. The biographies of Mr. W. H. Forster, of Mr. Gladstone, Lord Granville, Lord Randolph Churchill, on the one hand, and the recently published works of Mr. Davitt¹ and Mr. O'Brien² on the other, are forming public opinion on these events. Several of them make opposite charges against the clergy of Ireland. The English writers accuse them of complicity in revolution and injustice, Mr. Davitt of subservient and slavish cowardice and incompetence. The clergy require a champion. *Exoriare aliquis !*

The chapter on 'Home Rule' is sad reading for Irishmen ; for when the idea of self-government first began to be entertained, the interests of Ireland were like a game of chance in the hands of British statesmen. It was a toss up with many of them, as we clearly see from the evidence of this biography, as to whether Ireland was to have Home Rule or Coercion or, nothing at all.

Altogether we commend the perusal of this work to our readers. It will help them to form a juster estimate of past events, and to shape their future conduct by enlightened experience.

J. F. H.

A SHORT GRAMMAR OF CLASSICAL GREEK. By Adolf Kaegi. Translated from the German by Rev. J. A. Kleist, S.J. St. Louis, Mo.: B. Herder, 17 South Broadway.

ACCORDING to the prevailing English standard, proficiency in the classics is measured by one's ability to solve what may be termed the equation of idiom. A piece of English prose, thoroughly reflective, in all its finer shades, of the English mind, is selected as a test of scholarship for translation into Greek or Latin. Each sentence is carefully examined and is found, as a rule, to draw its strength mainly from its use of

¹ *The Fall of Feudalism in Ireland*, by Michael Davitt.

² *Recollections of William O'Brien*, M.P.

prepositions, its beauty from the epithet or the literary reference or the half-formed metre, so often hidden from the author himself. The essence of the passage must be represented in the classical language, and an equivalent for each accident must be sought out, so that the version may produce upon its readers all the effects of the original. Such a version is accepted as a proof of a thorough understanding of the classical and the modern mind.

In Germany, less time is devoted to composition and more to reading, with the result that the German boy in an advanced class reads Homer or Thucydides with much greater ease than an English-trained boy of the same age and ability. Composition is not looked on as an end, but as a means. This explains at once the scope and object of Kaegi's Short Greek Grammar. It contains the essentials of grammar for school purposes. All else is suppressed or relegated to small print. Thus, within the compass of two hundred pages, the young scholar finds all the forms and laws which he should know before attempting an author.

The book is well printed and thoroughly up to date. In the latter respect, it is more reliable than Goodwin. This, however, may not be regarded by some teachers as an advantage. It seems strange that many, through a spirit of conservatism, adhere jealously to forms and derivations which often enough have been rejected by the very men on whose authority they depend. The chief defect in the book is the use of spaced instead of large leaded type in the declensions. The price is not stated.

The translator refers in his preface to the Exercises which accompany Kaegi's Grammar. We should be glad of an opportunity of noticing them. If he has translated them as carefully as he has translated the Grammar, they should be very useful.

M. S.

A HISTORY OF MODERN ENGLAND. By Herbert Paul.
Vol. iv. 8vo. 8s. 6d. London: Macmillan & Co.

THE fourth volume of Mr. Herbert Paul's history brings us from 1875 to 1885. The most interesting chapters in it for Irish readers are those on 'The Irish Revolution' and 'Lord Spencer's Task.' Mr. Paul is, in many respects, friendly to Ireland; but his superior and absurdly arrogant method

of pronouncing dogmatic judgments is trying to the patience. With the substance of his homilies we have but little fault to find. It is the form that is irritating. Apart from this uniform defect, this volume is marked by the same brilliant qualities as the proceeding ones. When the fifth and last volume appears Mr. Herbert Paul will have accomplished a great work, and will deserve to rank amongst the first historians of his time.

J. F. H.

KYRIALE SEU ORDINARIUM MISSAE cum Cantu Gregoriano ad exemplar editionis Vaticanae concinnatum et rhythmicis signis a Solesmensibus Monachis diligenter ornatum. No. 636. Rome et Tournai: Desclée, Lefebvre et Cie.

KYRIALE SEU ORDINARIUM MISSAE juxta editionem Vaticanam SS. PP. Pio X., evulgatam. Ratisbon: Pustet.

KYRIALE SIVE ORDINARIUM MISSAE conforme editioni Vaticanae a SS. D. N. Pio PP. X., evulgatae. Editio Schwann. A. Duesseldorf: L. Schwann.

THERE are quite a number of publications containing the reprint of the Vatican *Kyriale*. It seems that the publishers have come to an agreement as to the price, for what may be called their normal edition costs in each case, bound, one shilling. We have before us three of these editions, Pustet's, Schwann's, and Desclée's. Desclée's, however, is not their normal edition, but a smaller one—in the size of the *Liber Usualis*. Moreover, it has the rhythmical signs employed in the last-named book, namely, the prolongation dot and the Episema. In addition, we find a new sign for the Strophicus, imitating the comma-like shape of the sign in the earlier MSS. We think this is a decided improvement, as evidently the Strophicus has a special significance in the neumatic notation. For the rest, this new edition has the same pleasing and quiet forms as the earlier editions of Messrs. Desclée.

Pustet has notes of a different shape. They are slightly convex both above and below, which makes the angles very sharp, and gives a very lively appearance to the page. The print shows the usual clearness of Pustet's publications. Schwann seems to have the largest type of all. In shape it is like

Desclée's, but the curvature is a little more pronounced. The page looks rather black, and would probably be improved, if the margin was left a little wider. His paper is very good, and the ornaments are in excellent style.

H. B.

THE LIFE OF SIR JOHN T. GILBERT. By his Wife, Rosa Mulholland Gilbert. Longmans, Green & Co., 1905.

FEW men of the last generation have deserved better of the Irish people than the subject of this volume—Sir John Gilbert. By his researches on the Irish Records he led the way in a work that up to his time had been almost entirely neglected and his publications gave a new impulse to the investigation of Irish History. A glance at the bibliography of his works in Appendix XV of the present volume will serve to give some idea of the work which he accomplished, but only a thorough study of the volumes themselves can lead to an understanding of the amount of labour which their publication must have involved.

His *History of the City of Dublin*, *A Contemporary History of Affairs in Ireland from 1641-1652*, *The History of the Irish Confederates*, are already well known to the general reader, but these represent only a small portion of his notable contributions to the history of Ireland.

The gifted authoress has done her work well. She gives a fine sketch of the life of her late husband ; and, what is better

Sévestre is very opportune. Chapters I and II deal with the negotiation and ratification of the Concordat in Rome and in Paris. Chapters III and IV give a detailed account of its application under the different governments from the year 1802 to the fall of the Second Empire, 1870. The sixth chapter deals with the Third Republic and the Concordat. The seventh chapter gives a good account of the actual debates on the denunciation of the Concordat from 1900 to 1905.

The second part of the volume deals with the text of the Concordat, and is one of the best commentaries on this famous document with which we are acquainted. It compares the French Concordat with similar agreements between Rome and other countries; and also with the Organic articles, showing how these latter restricted the guaranteed liberty of the Church. The third part deals with the relations which should exist between the Church and the State, and gives a splendid account of the opinions of those opposed to the Concordat. In an Appendix all the documents upon which the author relies are given in full.

At the present time, when the Church in France is the subject of such discussions, we know of no book which we could more heartily recommend.

J. MACC.

DIRECTOIRE CANONIQUE A L'USAGE DES CONGREGATIONS A VŒUX SIMPLES. Dom Pierre Bastien, O.S.B. Maredsous 1904.

THERE has been in recent times a wonderful multiplication and development of these Congregations. A century ago only a few were in existence, now they are remarkably numerous. But more impressive even than the sight of so many religious institutions is the magnitude and the variety of the works which these Congregations perform. The result is, that their respective vocations have created the need of large additions to Canon Law. Year after year important decrees regarding religious with simple vows have been issued. People behold the Congregations spreading in all directions and doing good everywhere, while all the time Rome has been indicating the ways and means by which this success has been attained. To anyone, however, who is not a specialist in ecclesiastical legislation, it would have been almost impossible to know all those

decrees and constitutions. The work of Dom Bastien explains them in a most satisfactory manner. Of course particular attention has been paid to the far-reaching Constitution of Leo XIII, *Conditae a Christo*, and to the *Normae*, published by the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars. The decree *Quemadmodum* regarding frequent Communion, etc., and the commentary written on the decree by Cardinal Gennari, one of the ablest canonists in Rome, will also be of great use to confessors of religious communities. Priests and nuns that desire to get reliable information about the laws regarding novitiates, the nature and obligation of vows, the power of superiors, the authority of bishops, etc., will find it in this admirable *Directoire Canonique*, which has been honoured with a letter of approval by the Cardinal Prefect of the Congregation of Bishops and Regulars.

J. C.

CATHOLIC TRUTH SOCIETY PUBLICATIONS

THE English 'Catholic Truth Society' continues its good work with unabated zeal. We congratulate Mr. Britten and his colleagues on the recent additions to their valuable store of books. Amongst these the more important are two volumes, entitled *Paying the Price and other Stories*, by Father David Bearne, S.J.; *The Education Question*, by His Grace the Archbishop of Westminster, Dr. Windle, and others; *Thoughts for Creedless Women*, by Emily Hickey; *St. Hildegard the Prophetess*; *St. Ethelburga*; *Catholic Answers to Protestant Charges*, by G. Elliot Anstruther; *To Have and to Hold*, by M. S. Dalton; *Spiritual Counsels from the Letters of Fénelon*, by Lady Amabel Ker; *Simple Meditations on the Life of Our Lord*, by Rt. Rev. Joseph Oswald Smith, Abbot of Ampleforth, etc.



THOUGHTS ON PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION¹

PHILOSOPHY is, I fear, not quite a popular study in our Colleges and Universities in recent years. The Physical Sciences, with their wonderful discoveries and captivating theories, hold out greater attractions to the youthful mind, while the traditional method of teaching Philosophy has rendered it anything but attractive to the unfortunate beginner. Its real attractions have been hidden away under a hard and repulsive-looking crust of half-Latin, half-English terminology, beyond which few have the perseverance to penetrate, and which none appear to have the courage to modify, or, mayhap, to demolish.

Perhaps as a consequence of this, Philosophy has been very much misunderstood and very much discredited, even by those who, in other circumstances, would have been the first to appreciate it. No other science has suffered from so many misconceptions; and that in the minds of Catholics no less than in the minds of non-Catholics. Many a smile is still provoked at the mention of the word 'Metaphysics'; and those smiles are directed at the thing that the word is popularly supposed to mean, namely: 'a wild dance of unintelligible speculations in the air.'² A Scotchman is said to have

¹ Being in substance a Paper read before the Students' Literary Society, Maynooth College.

² Rickaby's *General Metaphysics* (Stonyhurst Series), preface, p. iv.

defined Metaphysics in the following way : 'When the lad that's listnin' doesn't understand what the lad that's talkin' is sayin', and the lad that's talkin' doesn't understand what he's sayin' himself : that's Metaphysics.' The rebuke, with its grim humour, is not wholly undeserved. Something like that is what certainly does often pass for Metaphysics. Only the rebuke falls not upon Philosophy itself, but upon the heads of those, in all ages, who have claimed to be its guardians and exponents.

In English-speaking countries the cultivation of that vague department of human speculation called 'Modern Philosophy' is the pursuit of the comparative few : to the vast majority it is practically unmeaning, if not indeed positively distasteful. The speculative philosophers are a class apart,—select if you will, but dilettante,—without any apparent point of contact with the lives and hopes of the people, without any message of joy, or any voice of sympathy for the sufferings of the masses. I speak now of non-Catholic Modern Philosophy ; and what I have just said applies to Continental, and especially to German, as well as to English Modern Philosophy.

Now, why has all this Modern Philosophy gone so much adrift, escaping the grasp of 'the people' ? Why has it become the monopoly of 'the few' and grown so barren of useful fruit for the hungering minds of men ? Have its disciples made good its fair promises of wisdom that they should not be called to account ? I fear they have not, and I think the reasons are not far to seek. These are many and various, no doubt ; but they can be fairly summed up in the formula that Philosophy, in modern hands, has become very *unreal*. Now Reality is Truth, and in so far forth as Philosophy breaks with Reality it breaks with Truth. It becomes hollow and vain and unintelligible : it ceases to have a meaning or a message for the human mind and heart, and becomes a mere empty formalism.

Abstraction is often the *ignis fatuus* of the speculative philosopher, and *Unreality* is the morass into which it lures him. Rightly used, abstraction is the philosopher's

guiding light ; for Philosophy is the interpretation of things by thought, and thought is abstract. But then, too, if thought is abstract things are concrete ; and this is just what the philosopher is in danger of forgetting. Unconsciously almost, owing to his familiarity with abstract thought, he proceeds to substitute thoughts for things, and drifts complacently away into a dreamland of unintelligibilities. It was a scholastic, and one of the great scholastics,—Cardinal Cajetan¹—who warned philosophers in his day not to talk in the air, but to aim at acquiring a knowledge of the real things of the Universe, themselves of course included ; and it was Descartes, the father of Modern Philosophy, who dreamt the delusive dream that he could unlock the mysteries of Concrete Nature by the keys of Abstract Mathematics. His attempt to replace Philosophy by a ‘*Mathematique Universelle*’ was doomed beforehand to failure. And all the subsequent efforts of German and other idealists to weave a Philosophy of Nature out of their own inner consciousnesses, were not any more successful. It is not without some reason that the well known trilogy of German names—Fichte, Schelling, Hegel—is given as a reminder of the unintelligible depths that human thought is sometimes capable of sounding.

No, Philosophy is not true unless it sails close to Reality ; and as long as it keeps there, it will at all events avoid outrageous opposition to sound common sense. By Reality of course I mean not merely all *material* things. I include more than what the *senses* become aware of : I mean all that the whole *mind* can see and know. And by sound common sense I do not mean ordinary superficial observation, but that more judicious—and perhaps, therefore, less common—use of one’s natural intelligence. Those are reservations I make ; and another is as follows : when I insist that Philosophy ought to be real, and ought to cling to the facts of life, and that therefore it should not become unintelligible, I do not thereby imply that it cannot be difficult, but must be simple and easy. On the contrary,

¹ In *II. Post Analyt.*, cap. 13.

being, as it is, the highest, fullest and deepest human interpretation of the totality of things, it naturally demands the most careful and earnest application of our best reasoning powers. In the preface of a small volume on Philosophy,¹ I recently read the following sentence: 'No one can be a philosopher who is not willing to think, and to think hard, on his own account; no book or teacher can perform the operation for him.' That is perfectly true. The book or teacher may indeed *help* him to think for himself. They can never do much more. Indeed they often do less; and are sometimes even not so much an aid as an obstacle to straightforward, logical thought.

Now, the very invitation to think for himself, should, I imagine, attract rather than repel the student. And no doubt it does attract him; for Philosophy is the natural outcome of man's innate curiosity to know. It is that questioning sort of wonder at the unexplained, that *admiratio* of which the ancients speak, that develops the philosophical thirst for knowledge: a craving that finds expression in the poet's line:—

Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas.

The opening mind of youth feels itself borne onwards by this natural impulse to search and explain the unknown. In knowledge it recognizes its own power; and by progress in knowledge it realizes its own nobility in the scale of created things. Passing from the study of external Nature to the study of man himself, the student follows the selfsame mental march as all individuals and races have followed since Socrates told his strolling disciples to learn to know themselves. And when he has made some headway in this latter study he will begin to appreciate the force of the aphorism that 'Tis not the height nor yet the might but the mind that makes the man; ' if he does not even go so far as to say with Sir William Hamilton that 'in the world there is nothing great but man, and in man there is nothing great but mind'!

¹ *A Brief Introduction to Modern Philosophy*, by Arthur Kenyon Rogers, Ph.D. New York: Macmillan, 1901.

Philosophy, then, has its own natural fascination for us in spite of—or is it because of?—its own inherent difficulties. That there are obscurities in Philosophy—or mysteries if you prefer the word—is only another way of saying that our little minds are limited. Now, it may seem quite superfluous to observe that those minds of ours are not the measure of the truth of things. And yet I would set down—after its unreality—as the second great cause of the mistiness and vagueness of Modern Philosophy, the failure to realize, or the unwillingness to admit, this obvious limitation, this palpable inadequacy of the human mind, face to face with Reality. Man would fain know all things; that was the first inordinate craving born of human pride. And pride will seek to satisfy that craving, even by feeding it on delusions. Pride will peer beyond the veil; and, by trying to know the *unknowable*, only confuse what man *can know*. But sound human Philosophy has no such wild pretensions. Its aim is not to lead man to a knowledge of all things, but to make him know *well* the little he can know. It warns its disciples, as St. Paul did the Romans: 'Not to be more wise than it behoveth to be wise, but to be wise unto sobriety.' But some men do not like to have to admit that there is a Reality above them which they cannot understand; nor do they care to confess that Nature itself beneath them and around them abounds in enigmas which may never, perhaps, be solved. Hence the spectacle of modern philosophers who discard the mysteries of revealed religion on the one hand, and on the other hand proclaim the whole reality of the world to be simply the unconscious-product of the evolution of mind!

The old world of four hundred years ago witnessed a strange rebellion. It was a revolt of man against mystery imposed on him by authority from without. He would adopt a new attitude towards the content of Revelation, and apply new principles to interpret the meaning of Faith. No more external authority for him—he would be judge and teacher himself. By his own private interpretation of Revealed Truth he would *rationalize* his belief,

and he soon explained away all he could not understand ! Traditional Christianity ceased to have any meaning for him as a Philosophy of Life. He soon lost all hold on the supernatural ; and now unenlightened, unaided and alone, he commenced the dreary, hopeless task of rearing a stable edifice on the ever-shifting quicksands of individual reason. The eternal questions came up and clamoured for a solution : Whence and Whither and Why ? What is the meaning of life ? What is man's place in the Universe ? What is it ? and what is he ? and whither are they drifting ? But reason alone is slow to build up, and painful ; and it often selects, as materials, fancies instead of realities. Then, too, it is quick to demolish, and in that it is aided by passion. I think Newman speaks somewhere of the all-corrosive influence of the mere reasoning faculty in the domain of Religion and Morals. No wonder ; for unbridled human reason, consciously or unconsciously accelerated by the impetus of passion and prejudice, will run riot through the most sacred human beliefs, until it brings the cold blight of embittered doubt and indifference on all who allow it an undue licence.

These things it *has* done in non-Catholic Modern Philosophy. Wherever this latter does not rest in despondent doubt and denial, wherever it has anything positive to offer us as an interpretation of things, it tries to satisfy us with some sort or other of a dreamy, elusive pantheism. And that simply because it has dethroned God and deified Nature. It is thus, in very truth, that human thought is emancipated by Modern Philosophy ! Well may it sing of itself in Tennyson's words :—

I take possession of man's mind and deed,
I heed not what the sects may brawl,
I sit as God, holding no form of creed
But contemplating all.

But there are sects in Philosophy too : and in Modern Philosophy a veritable Babel of them. Where is the modern philosopher who is not a believer in some sect—either in his own or somebody else's ? People call them schools ; and many a modern philosopher's ambition seems to be to

anchor himself in some school for a while, and sooner or later,—often sooner,—to start a school of his own. 'What system of Philosophy do you teach?'—a German University student asked a youthful *privatdozent*. 'Is it Kant, or Hegel, or Schopenhauer, or Hartmann, you follow?' 'None of them now,' answered the other, 'I am teaching my own system'! And though their name is legion—those systems—they are all preoccupied more or less with the same few great, fundamental questions that bear on Religion, natural and revealed. Nor is this to be wondered at, for, in the world in which they move, Philosophy has taken the place of Faith. But it is a little surprising that although Philosophy has usurped the place of religious belief it seems still to be cultivated more as a speculative and academic pursuit than as something intensely practical in itself and fraught with momentous meaning for their lives and destinies.

To us believers it is also not a little saddening to see those revered and sacred truths of human Liberty and Immortality, of God's Existence and man's Destiny, so lightly doubted, and so easily denied or perverted by men who have never known what it is to believe. Multitudes of those men are excellent men morally, but their intellectual attitude is not a little puzzling. *La Morale laïque*,—Morality without Religion,—is of course the great fetish, the universal fashion, the accepted watchword of the infidel of the present day. Yet it is hardly necessary to remark that without the sanctions and restraints of religion the masses of humanity would make short work of 'Philosophical Morality' in their onward and downward rush towards the *bonum delectabile*. It might be all very well for Nietzsche's Uebermensch in Spencer's millennium of 'absolute ethics;' but for the merely human crowds who struggle for existence and for pleasure on this planet of ours it would soon bring society to a crisis. The most, I think, that can be said for the *morale laïque* is this, that it may furnish the more enlightened and well-meaning few with considerations of personal dignity and social justice, strong enough to secure for them pure and up-

right lives. Though even these, if they were men of thought, and if they addressed themselves to the three fundamental questions of God's Existence, and man's Liberty, and Immortality, would not be likely to settle down in comfortable unbelief.

But then, you see, many of these,—educated and otherwise enlightened men,—either are not men of thought, or, if they are, it is not about *these* matters they think : and so, many *do* remain in the profession of unbelief. And those who *do think* about fundamental problems,—the professional philosophers,—are inclined towards infidelity and prevented from believing by the very influences of the spirit of the age itself. Outside the Catholic Church it is, I fear, the prevalent impression that Philosophy is incompatible with Faith, that it is necessarily allied to universal criticism and universal doubt, that the philosopher must be free, independent of all the sects and above them all ; and that he is compromised by the profession of any intellectual assent of Faith. He may have his private beliefs and opinions and feelings, of course, in the matter of Religion. But then, he must be cautious and modest about importing these into the speculative and practical system he offers to the world as a Philosophy of Life. In other words, he is expected to give a critical appreciation of the phenomenon of Religion, as of all other phenomena. And the view that perhaps meets most favour just now is, that Religion is a peculiar psychological phenomenon, manifested in the evolution of the individual and of the race ; varying, moreover, in its manifestations both in individuals and in races ; and to be regarded, accordingly, rather as an outcome of sentiment, and a sort of variable private asset, than as being something fixed and objective, claiming intellectual assent ; rather as a purely personal and subjective curiosity that may be speculated on with due philosophical calm, than as a thing of such enormous concern that the philosopher should get troubled or excited about it : above all, he must not violate good taste, nor ruffle the slumbering indifference of his fellows, by arousing the *odium theologicum* of the dark and uncivilized Middle Ages !

Now, it appears to me that such an attitude as that is as great an insult to Philosophy as it is to Religion, and to Reason as it is to Faith. For if it is a necessity of human nature to bow to the unexplained, to assent to the unseen, then Faith is natural and reasonable, and to reject it is to do violence to Reason. And if Philosophy is the sum-total of what we accept and believe to be the meaning and explanation of the world and of man, and according to which we are to regulate our lives, then, as Natural Religion of some sort is a necessity of our nature, and is included in that Philosophy, to make light of the former is to be disloyal to the latter. And will any philosopher maintain that his life is not full of real assents to much that he cannot explain ? or that the religion which he calls his 'Philosophy of Life' is a system free from mystery ? No, for no matter who he may be who sets out to solve the enigma of Life, he soon stumbles up against one hard fact,—whether he may resent it or regard it as an unpleasant thing, will depend, I suppose, upon his temperament, but pleasant or unpleasant it is a fact, and it is this : that he *cannot* avoid mystery, that his explanation of things to himself and for himself will never be final or complete or satisfacory. Nor will he ever encounter any other individual in the flesh whose efforts to escape mystery will have been a success. Nor in the whole range of human history will he ever hear of a man for whom there was no mystery,—with the exception of just One, and He was more than man. Happy, too, will our philosopher be if he learns wisdom from that One. But he may not have heard of Him and may not know Him ; or, hearing about Him, he may, alas ! choose not to believe in Him. He may prefer to insist that human reason is able to find out for itself all it needs to know ; that it cannot and ought not accept what it does not understand ; that the revealing of mysteries to man by God would be useless, unmeaning, impossible, even supposing it certain that there is a God. Our philosopher may follow some such line of thought as that, or some other of the innumerable mazes and caprices of human speculation :

much of his system will always depend upon the surroundings and atmosphere in which his mind develops. But one thing is certain, let him turn where he will, think how he may, he will not avoid mystery. He may fly from the mysteries of Revealed Religion, but by rejecting them, he is only embracing other mysteries perhaps deeper and more difficult still. He may scoff at religious beliefs, and ridicule Christian dogmas as absurd and unmeaning. From the intellectual height of his Rationalism he may regard, with patronizing pity, the 'bondage' and 'superstition' of the faithful. But let him try to *build up for himself a Philosophy without Religion, a Morality without God*, and I promise you that he will soon get reason to pause, and to modify his hasty prejudices against religious belief. Whether he likes it or not, he will soon find himself involved in a veritable maze of mysteries: the glimmer of his own feeble rush-light will only make the darkness more obscure. And if he ignore all guidance and persist in being self-taught, he will in all probability render to real phantoms and fancies the homage he refused to apparent ones, when he judged the mysteries of Revealed Religion to be phantoms and nothing more.

The Babel of Modern Philosophy bears far more eloquent testimony than the Christian Religion itself to the widespread reign of mystery both in Nature and above it. The very extravagance of many modern systems shows that when Reason proudly rebels against mysteries imposed from without, it is often rightly punished by bowing itself in the end to self-imposed absurdities.

When Philosophy is interpreted in that full sense of a 'Philosophy of Life,'—a *Lebensphilosophie*,—it is easy for us, Catholics, to realize the weight of eternal consequences with which it is necessarily laden. For, in that larger and truer meaning of the word, it is an adequate interpretation of life, arrived at by man using his natural reason upon *all* available *data*, and accepted by him as in harmony with his nature and its needs. It is the *Sapientia* of the Latins: the solution of the Riddle of Life: the answer to our deepest questionings on our Origin,

Nature and Destiny. Thought and Action, Truth and Belief, are all regulated by its supreme dictates. All-embracing in its aim and scope, it harmonizes Reason and Faith, Knowledge and Mystery, and aims at establishing within us an abiding city of God.

It tells us that we are not sufficient for ourselves. Reason itself tells us that reason itself is limited. But then, we, Catholics, have been brought up in the Faith ; and before we knew we believed ; and we have never had experience of what unaided reason is like. Faith went before, and gave us possession of precious truths that grew into our souls and became, as it were, a part of our nature. That God exists ; that we were created by Him and for Him, immortal and free, but weak and finite ; that He has enlightened our minds by His Truth and strengthened our wills by His Grace ; that at first He raised us up beyond our natural state, and that He redeemed us when we fell ; that He is still our last end, and that the meaning of life is to serve Him : all these things we believed before we dreamt of asking could we ever have known them had we been left to ourselves. It was only later on we began to reflect and examine. And then we thought it so reasonable, nay almost natural, that God should have spoken to men ; and that, having once spoken to them, He should also provide them with a sure and abiding means of interpreting His message.

And as regards the contents of that message, we are but poorly able to judge how far it actually aids our reason, or what our natural powers, if left to themselves, could achieve. It is true that even at this very point—in determining the limits of the natural light of reason—the infallible guardian of that message comes to our assistance. For it tells us on the one hand, that there is in man the power of convincing himself with certainty that there is a Supreme God whose creature he is, immortal, and free, and responsible ; on the other hand, that men in general would never have avoided the darkest errors in theory, and the grossest corruption in conduct, without a message from on High. These, however, are but

guiding principles that define the extreme limits of a large domain still open to rational speculation : and the fact remains that when we, Catholics, begin to study Philosophy we are in the peculiar position of having our minds already permeated with the highest and noblest truths,—the Catholic child learns more Philosophy from the penny catechism than many a pagan philosopher learns in a life-time,—so that it is by no means easy for us to distinguish and separate from our whole mental treasure, the truths which we can arrive at by our own unaided reason ; and to build *these* up into the rational system which we understand by *Philosophy in its narrowest and strictest sense*.¹

And that it is of great importance to make such a distinction, and to make it accurately, is very easily shown. For, firstly, in dealing with non-Catholics, we ought to be very careful not to present to them *in the merely rational part* of our system, any elements or any truths which, though appearing demonstrable to our receptive minds, are in reality borrowed from Revelation either in whole or in part. And secondly, it is no less important that we, Catholics, should have *a purely rational philosophical system*, as complete as human reason can make it, to set up against modern erroneous systems, and to have it so evidently superior to all others that it will attract all impartial inquirers.

One of the greatest tests of such superiority at the present day is the all round harmony and conformity of the system in question with the findings of the various natural sciences. Hence our Philosophy must not only be in harmony with Faith, but in harmony with Science as well. Not only so, but it must be based and built on the sciences, and be a positive continuation of them, arrived at by the application of the selfsame principles of natural reason and experience as have built up the sciences themselves. And if I have been emphasizing in these pages the larger view of Philosophy as including Faith, and the relations of

¹ Cf. Laberthonnière, *Essais de philosophie religieuse*, pp. xxiii. and 201 ; Turinaz, *Une très-grave Question*, p. 38.

Philosophy in the narrower sense to Religion and to the Supernatural, I am not to be understood as implying that this Rational Philosophy, built upon the sciences, and carried as far as human reason will bring it, is of a secondary importance in itself, or that the Catholic need not cultivate it for its own sake. On the contrary,¹ I consider that one of the greatest services we can render to the Faith, and one of the surest ways of winning the attention and respect of our adversaries, is by basing our Philosophy on the sciences, cultivating it *for its own sake*, and thus showing that the Philosophy to which the sciences naturally lead is precisely that Traditional Philosophy of the Schools which has always been in harmony with Supernatural Truth.

That is the avowed object of the new Scholastic Movement.

P. COFFEY, D.Ph.

¹ Cf. Articles in the I. E. RECORD (Jan., Feb., May and June, 1903), on 'Philosophy and the Sciences in Louvain.'

CATECHISM

AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF LEGISLATION, TEXTS, AND METHODS ¹

THE mission of the Church is to teach mankind. That mission she fulfils by preaching. Preaching produces little fruit unless it is adapted to the capacity of the audience. No science can be effectually taught unless the teacher begins by instruction in its first principles. Those who have not mastered these principles are incapable of profiting by higher instruction. Instruction in the science of faith and morals is no exception to this rule. Hence, the Council of Trent laid on all pastors of souls, the obligation of preaching and of catechizing. Hence, too, the Pope, who now so wisely rules the Church, has reminded pastors of this two-fold obligation, and in particular of the obligation of catechizing. To ignorance of the elementary truths of religion, the Holy Father attributes the spirit of indifference and of irreligion to-day so widespread. Therefore, he regards instruction in Christian Doctrine as one of the most important duties of pastors, and as one of the most pressing needs of the Church. It may, then, be of interest at the present time to study the history of catechism, and to examine, first, what has been the legislation of the Church on the subject of instruction in Christian Doctrine; secondly, what texts have been made use of at various periods, in imparting that instruc-

¹ Sources:—*Histoire du Catechisme depuis la Naissance de l'Eglise jusqu'à nos jours*, par M. l'Abbé Hezard. Paris: Retaux, 1900.—Hefelé, *Histoire des Conciles*.—Duchesne, *Origines du Culte Chrétien*. 3 edit. Paris, 1903.—*Acta et Decreta S. Concilii Vaticani, Collectio Lacensis*, vol. vii.—Wilkins, *Concilia Magnae Britanniae et Hiberniae*.—*Histoire des livres populaires, ou de la littérature de Colportage*, par Charles Nisard. Paris, 1854.—Migne, *Patres Latini*, vols. 98 and 101.—Dom Gasquet, 'Religious Instruction in England in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries,' *Dublin Review*, October, 1893.—'How our Fathers were taught in Catholic days,' *Dublin Review*, April, 1897.—Mgr. Dupanloup, *Entretiens sur la prédication populaire*. Paris, 1866.—*Compendio della dottrina cristiana prescritto d SS. Papa Pio X.* Roma, 1905.

tion ; and, thirdly, what methods have been followed for the efficient communication of religious knowledge.

A.

What has been the legislation of the Church with respect to instruction in Christian Doctrine ? The primitive Church had to convert a world which was pagan. The mode of dealing with converts was fixed by a custom which had the force of law. Aspirants to Baptism were obliged to pass through the catechumenate. Catechumens were admitted to be present at the instructions in the church. After a period of probation, they were enrolled amongst the candidates qualified for Baptism, and then they received a special course of religious instruction to prepare them for that sacrament. The law of the catechumenate continued in force until the seventh century. With the spread of religion a new order began to prevail. The Church had to deal no longer with converts, but with the children of the faithful baptized in infancy. What rules did she prescribe for the religious instruction of youth ? St. Bede is a witness to the practices of the eighth century.¹ ' Priests,' he says, in a letter to the Bishop of York, ' should be appointed in every village to instruct the people in the Lord's Prayer and the Creed.' The synod of Cloveshoe, in 747, decreed that the system of instruction recommended by St. Bede should be faithfully followed. The Capitularies of Charlemagne in the ninth century urge pastors to instruct their flocks, and remind parents of the duty of instructing their children in the truths of faith. A synod held in Dublin, in 1186, ordered that the children be assembled at the church door on Sundays to receive instruction.²

The synod of Beziers, in 1246, and that of Albi, in 1254, decreed that on all Sundays parish priests should explain the articles of the Creed in a clear and simple style. They decreed, moreover, that children from the age of seven should be brought to church on Sundays and festivals, to

¹ Migne, *Patres Latini*, vol. 98, col. 939,

² Hefelé, *Histoire des Conciles*, vol. vii., p. 523.

be taught the *Pater, Ave*, and *Credo*. In 1281, the synod of Lambeth commanded pastors to give instruction in Christian Doctrine, and to repeat the same four times a year.

We order [says the synod], that, every priest in charge of a flock, do four times a year, on one or more solemn festivals, either personally or by some one else, instruct the people in the vulgar tongue, simply and without any admixture of subtle distinctions, in the fourteen articles of the Creed, the Ten Commandments of the Decalogue, the two precepts of the Gospel that is of true charity, the Seven Deadly Sins with their offshoots the Seven Principal Virtues, and the Seven Sacraments.¹

The synod of Ely, in 1364, ordered parish priests to preach frequently, and to explain the Ten Commandments in the vulgar tongue, and see that children were taught the Lord's Prayer, the Creed, the Hail Mary, and the Sign of the Cross.² In the early years of the fifteenth century the synod of Tortosa (1429), in Spain, directed that bishops should draw up abridgments of Christian Doctrine so arranged that the text might be explained in seven or eight lessons; and it commanded parish priests to explain the same to the people several times a year on Sundays and festivals. The synod of Toledo, in 1473, ordered that the Sundays from Septuagesima to Passiontide be devoted to the explanation of the text of the Catechism.

In the sixteenth century, the Council of Trent deemed the teaching of catechism worthy of its attention, and in its twenty-fourth session, 11th November, 1563, it decreed as follows :—

They (Bishops) shall also take care, that, at least on Sundays and other festivals, the children in every parish shall be diligently taught, by those to whom that duty belongs, the rudiments of faith, and obedience to God and to their parents, and, if need be, they shall enforce this obligation even by ecclesiastical censures.³

The legislation of the Council was obeyed. St. Charles

¹ Wilkins, *Concilia Magnae Britanniae*, vol. ii., p. 54.

² *Ibid.*, vol. iii., p. 59.

³ *Canones et Decreta Conc. Trid.*, Sess. XXIV., cap. iv.

Borromeo, so zealous for every work of reform, set the example. He instituted confraternities to teach Christian Doctrine, and drew up wise rules for their guidance. The bishops in other countries were not slow to follow. In Ireland the days of persecution had already commenced, but in those sad days the importance of teaching Christian Doctrine was not allowed to be forgotten. A synod of the province of Tuam, in 1630, decreed that parish priests, obliged as they were to move about from place to place, and to depend on the hospitality of their people, should catechize the family of every house where they should spend the night.¹ A synod of the same province, held in 1632, exhorted priests to catechize on Sundays and festivals. A synod of the province of Armagh, in 1660,² decreed that all parish priests should preach or catechize on Sundays and holidays, under penalty of a fine of five shillings of English money for each omission, and privation of benefice *ipso facto* should the omission be continued for ten consecutive weeks. Another synod of the same province, held in 1687, enacted that pastors negligent in fulfilling the duty of giving instruction should be suspended; and, that a duly qualified assistant be given to incompetent pastors. A synod of the province of Cashel, in 1782, ordered that catechism be taught on Sundays and festivals either in the English or Irish tongue, according to the requirements of the congregation.

The zeal of bishops and of local synods was stimulated from time to time by the action of the Popes. Clement VII, in an Encyclical dated 15th July, 1598, urged the importance of teaching Christian Doctrine. Benedict XIV, in a letter dated 7th February, 1742, reminded all pastors of the necessity of instruction in catechism. Succeeding pontiffs were no less earnest. Pius IX spoke in the most emphatic terms of the necessity of catechetical instruction. In our own days Pius X, in an Encyclical dated 15th April, 1905, has renewed the precept imposed by the Council of

¹ Renehan's *Collection, Archbishops*, p. 491.

² Moran, *Memoirs of Primate Plunkett*, p. 386.

Trent. He commands—(1) That the children shall be instructed in Christian Doctrine for a full hour on all Sundays and holidays throughout the year; (2) that they shall be prepared for Confession and for Confirmation by special discourses on several days; (3) that children shall be prepared for First Communion by daily instruction during Lent, and, if need be, after Easter; (4) that Confraternities of Christian Doctrine shall be established in every parish; (5) that in cities where universities or higher schools exist, courses of higher religious instruction shall be established; (6) that a course of catechetical instruction for adults be given in churches according to the plan marked out by the Catechism of the Council of Trent.¹

II.

Such, in outline, has been the legislation of the Church on the subject of catechetical instruction. Let us now pass on to examine what have been the texts or formulas on which that instruction has been based.

In the early Church the art of printing was unknown; the art of writing and reading was an accomplishment possessed by relatively few. Instruction, therefore, was necessarily oral. And this is the true meaning of the word catechism. In recent times the term has been applied to books containing the elements of knowledge; but in its primary sense, catechism is instruction given by word of mouth. But the matter of elementary oral instruction was not left to chance. The elements of religious knowledge were imparted according to a well defined plan. New converts aspiring to be admitted to the ranks of catechumens were first taught the existence of God, the fact of Revelation, the history of religion, the Incarnation, the establishment of the Church, and the doctrine of the Resurrection. They were forewarned of the temptations to which they might be exposed by scandals within and without the Church. When the time approached for the

¹ For a modification of these rules to suit the condition of things in Ireland, see *I. E. RECORD*, December, 1905.

reception of Baptism they were instructed in the articles of the Creed and taught the Lord's Prayer. They were taught, too, the obligation of observing the divine law, and avoiding the vices which it condemns. After Baptism the doctrine of the Blessed Eucharist was explained to them: All this is manifest from the *Didache* or *Doctrine of the Twelve Apostles*, from the treatise of St. Augustine, *De Catechizandis Rudibus*, from the *Catecheses* of St. Cyril of Jerusalem, and from the seventh book of the Apostolic Constitution. Thus, from the earliest times, the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, the Commandments, and the prevalent vices opposed to them, together with the doctrine of the Sacraments, formed the text of catechetical instruction.

In course of time compendiums were made of a full course of catechism, as an aid to teachers and learners. Amongst such collections that attributed to Alcuin, and used in the school of the Palace in the reign of Charlemagne, holds a prominent place. Its title is *Disputatio puerorum per interrogationes et responsiones*.¹ It treats, under the form of question and answer, of the work of the six days of Creation, of the six ages of the world, of the Old and New Testaments, of the Church, with its hierarchy, and the doctrine of the Mass. The *Disputatio* long served as the type of a catechism for the instruction of youth. Two centuries later St. Bruno of Wurtzburg made it the basis of a catechism for his diocese. Nor was the *Disputatio* the only catechism of the period. That of Kero, a monk of St. Gall's, in the eighth century, no doubt an echo of the practice of Ireland, and that of Olfried, in the ninth century, are also deserving of mention.

In the twelfth century Honoratus of Autun wrote a summary of Christian Doctrine, in the form of question and answer, entitled *Elucidarium sive dialogus de Summa totius Christianae Theologiae*.² The *Elucidarium*, though open to criticism, was highly esteemed, and was translated into French and Italian. An early French edition,

¹ Migne, *Patres Latini*, vol. 101, col. 1098-1144.

² *Ibid.*, vol. 174, col. 1109-1176.

published at Lyons in 1480, bears on the first page the following appreciation : 'Ung tres singulier et profitable livre appellé le Lucydaire ; auquel sont déclarées toutes les choses ou antedement humain peut douter touchant la foy Catholique. Et aussi y sont contenues les peines d'enfer,' in fol. goth. 37 ff, 2 col. 26.¹

In the thirteenth century the taste for contrasts created by the works of Hugh of St. Victor, *De quinque septenis seu septenariis*, and by the *De septem septenariis* of John Salisbury, made itself felt in the form of catechetical instruction. All the catechisms of that period treat of the seven petitions of the *Pater*, the seven Sacraments, the seven deadly sins, the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, and the seven principal virtues. The Creed was sometimes treated as consisting of two series of seven articles, seven relative to the Divinity, and seven to the Humanity, of Christ. A catechism published in France in 1279, and entitled *Somme-le-Roi* is arranged on this plan. Nor was this method confined to France. The decree of the synod of Lambeth, 1281, above quoted, directs pastors to teach the fourteen articles of the Creed, the Ten Commandments, the seven deadly sins, the seven Sacraments, and the seven principal virtues. One of the earliest books printed in England by Caxton, in 1484, was an edition of this catechism, with the title, *The Royal Book*.

In the fourteenth century the *Somme-le-Roi* was, to a certain extent, supplanted by a work of Guy de Montrocher, bearing the title, *Manipulus Curatorum*. The first and second part of this work treated of pastoral duties, the third of catechetical instruction. The points treated were the Lord's Prayer, the Commandments, the feasts of the Church, the works of mercy, and the Beatitudes.

In the fifteenth century, the celebrated Gerson, Chancellor of the University of Paris, published a short treatise which, to a large extent, eclipsed its predecessors. It bore the title, *Opusculum Tripartitum de praeceptis Decalogi, de Confessione et de Arte moriendi*. In the first part the

¹ Brunet, *Bibliographie*.

articles of the Creed were explained ; the second treated of the sins to be mentioned in confession ; the third part consisted of exhortations appropriate to the dying. In a short preface the author states that he composed this little treatise that pastors might have something solid and practical to read to their people on Sundays and festivals, to teach them for what end and by whom they were created, moreover, what they are bound by the divine law to believe, to do, or to avoid, and how to arise from sin. The catechism of Gerson was long held in esteem in France ; and the bishops had it inserted in their rituals and ordered the parish priests to read it for the people at Mass on Sundays and festivals.¹

The spread of the art of printing gave a new impulse to the production and diffusion of catechetical literature. Popular books with illustrations were printed for the use of the rural population. One of the most celebrated of those popular catechisms was the *Compost et Kalendrier des bergiers*, or Shepherd's Almanack, published in 1492.² It was divided into three parts. The first part contained the calendar, with the changes of the moon, a list of festivals, and the like. The second part treated of the 'Arbre des vices et Miroir des pecheurs,' that is, an enumeration of the seven deadly sins, which are the trunks from which innumerable branches spring ; all united in one root, pride, and forming a tree. Then follows a description of the pains of hell, such as Lazarus was represented to have described to Simon the Pharisee. The third part treats of the science of salvation, namely the *Pater*, *Ave*, the Creed, and the Commandments of God and of the Church ; it also includes the garden of virtues, moral and theological, and points out how they may be practised. The text was throughout ornamented with plates illustrating its meaning. The book concluded with an enumeration of the symptoms of good and bad health, and the rules for bleeding. One can easily see how much

¹ Joannis Gersonis, *Opera Omnia*. Antwerp, 1706, vol. i., pp. 426-450.

² *Histoire des livres populaires, ou de la littérature de colportage depuis le XV siècle*, 2 vols, par Charles Nisard. Paris, 1854, vol. i., pp. 108-150.

solid instruction was here presented in a popular and attractive form.

The fifteenth century was prolific in popular books of this class. Amongst them may be mentioned *Le Tresor des humains*, 1482; *L'Ordinaire des Chrestiens*, 1464; *L'Art de bien vivre, et de bien mourir*, 1492, the first part of which is a catechism arranged according to the plan of Septenaries. To this period belongs the *Speculum Christianorum*, composed by the monks of St. Victor. It treats of (1) what a Christian must do, and what he must avoid; (2) the truths he must believe; (3) of the seven petitions of the *Pater*, the seven prerogatives of the Blessed Virgin, the seven virtues, the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, the seven Beatitudes; (4) of the things on which a Christian should meditate, namely, the Passion, Sin, the Pains of Hell, and the Joys of Heaven.

At the same period appeared a book of like character in English, called *Dives et Pauper*, 'a compendious treatise or dialogue of Dives and Pauper, that is to say, the rich and poor, fructuously treating upon the Ten Commandments.'¹ This interesting work appeared in manuscript in the early part of the fifteenth century. Printed editions of it were published in 1493, 1496, and 1536. Pauper, or the poor man, acts the part of teacher in the dialogue, and gives to Dives, or the rich man, a full and practical explanation of the entire matter of the Decalogue.

The so-called reformers knew the value of popular books of instruction. Luther's catechism was published in 1520, that of Calvin in 1536. The Zurich catechism followed in 1639, and that of Heidelberg in 1563. To meet the danger arising from books of this class, the Council of Trent wisely legislated on the subject of catechetical instruction. Before that assembly had brought its labours to a close a celebrated German Jesuit, Blessed Peter Canisius, published in the Latin language at Vienna, in 1554, a catechism under the title, *Summa Doctrinae Christianae*. By

¹ See an article in the *Dublin Review*, April, 1897, by the Right Rev. Abbot Gasquet: 'How our Fathers were taught in Catholic Days.'

order of Ferdinand I, King of the Romans, the catechism of Canisius was adopted as the text-book for religious instruction throughout Germany. The zealous and saintly author made two abbreviations of his *Summa*, to which he gave the name *Parvus Catechismus*. The first edition of this compendium appeared in 1556. Numerous editions followed. The little catechism was translated into many languages. St. Charles Borromeo made it a text-book in his seminary. English editions of the catechism of Canisius were published at Louvain, in 1567; at Paris, in 1588; London, 1590; Edinburgh, 1591; Cambridge, 1595; St. Omer's, 1622; London, 1623. A Welsh translation was printed in Paris, in 1609.¹ To the present day the catechism of Canisius is held in high esteem in Germany. The preservation of the faith in that country in the sixteenth century is largely due to the solid instruction it contains.

The Fathers of the Council of Trent, convinced of the importance of catechetical instruction, appointed a committee of the most learned and experienced ecclesiastics of the time, to draw up a catechism to serve as a guide to pastors in imparting religious instruction. The labours of the committee were embodied in the *Catechismus Romanus*, or Roman Catechism, which was approved and published by Pius V.

At the request of Clement VIII, the learned Cardinal Bellarmine made a compendium of the Roman catechism, which was published with the approval of that Pope, 15th July, 1598. Bellarmine's catechism was still further abridged, by the author, and quickly spread throughout Christendom. It was translated into fifty-six different languages. Editions of it in English were published at Douay, 1604; Rome, 1678; without press mark in 1680; and in London, 1839. An Irish translation of Bellarmine's catechism was issued by the Propaganda Press in 1628, and again in 1707. Father Theobald Stapelton published it in Latin and in Irish at Brussels, in 1639, the

¹ Sommervogel, *Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus*, arts. 'Canisius,' 'Bellarmine.'

Irish text being in Roman characters. A Welsh translation was printed at St. Omer's in 1618.

The catechism of Bellarmine, by its simplicity, its order, and its diffusion, marks an epoch in catechetical literature. It has served as the type of catechisms since his day. Zealous prelates in various kingdoms imitated the example of Bellarmine, and published catechisms for the instruction of their subjects. Amongst them Bossuet holds a prominent place. That great man, who could rise to the highest heights of eloquence, could also adapt himself to the simplest intelligence. For the instruction of his flock, he published a catechism in three parts. The first, or elementary catechism, was destined for children preparing for Confirmation. The second part was more developed, and was destined for the instruction of those about to receive First Communion. The third part contained an explanation of the festivals of the Church throughout the year. Bossuet encouraged other writers capable of promoting the instruction of youth, and to his advice and persuasion we are indebted for the historical catechism of Fleury.

Nor were Irish ecclesiastics less active than those of other countries, in rendering the text of the catechism accessible to their people. Besides the Irish translation of Bellarmine's catechism, above referred to, many other Irish catechisms were published since the sixteenth century.

First amongst them stands the Irish catechism composed by Primate Creagh while a prisoner in the Tower of London, in 1585. In 1608, Bonaventure O'Hussey, an Irish Franciscan, published at Louvain a catechism in Irish, which was reprinted at Antwerp, in 1611, and 1616, and at Rome in 1707. In 1612, Father O'Hussey published a poetical edition of his catechism in two hundred and forty verses. In 1660, an Irish priest, over the signature D. D., J. D., V.G., T.S.T.D., which has been interpreted, 'Dom D. Joannes Dowley, Vic.-Gen., Tuamensis, S. Theologiae Doctor,' published a catechism in prose and verse—the latter at least being that of O'Hussey—a work which was reprinted at Louvain, in 1728. Another Irish Franciscan, Francis O'Mulloy, published at Rome a catechism

in Irish with a Latin title, *Lucerna Fidelium*. When the editions of these catechisms were exhausted, Dr. Andrew Donlevy, Superior of the Junior Division of the Irish College in Paris, published in that city, in 1742, a catechism in Irish and English, remarkable for its fulness and clearness. Donlevy's catechism was reprinted in Dublin, in 1822, under editorship of Rev. John M'Encroe, subsequently Dean of Sydney; and again by the firm of Duffy & Co., in 1848.

In 1749, the Most Rev. Michael O'Reilly, Bishop of Derry, and subsequently Primate of all Ireland, published a catechism in Irish and in English, which was generally adopted in Ulster, and the English edition of which was in general use in the province of Armagh until 1875. Dr. Nary, of Dublin, published a catechism in English for the use of his parish, in 1720. Dr. De Burgo, O.P., published an English catechism at Lisbon, in 1752. Towards the close of the eighteenth century, Dr. James Butler, Archbishop of Cashel, published a catechism in English. Of this catechism, Dr. Troy, in a letter dated 30th October, 1777, stated that he 'thought it peculiarly calculated to promote the Christian Doctrine among the lower classes of the people.'¹

Butler's catechism was translated into Irish by his successor, Dr. Bray, for the use of those unacquainted with English. The English edition of Butler's catechism has practically superseded all others in Ireland. A new edition of it, with some modifications whereby the substance of each question is repeated in the answer, was published after the synod of Maynooth in 1875, and is now the catechism in general use throughout Ireland. Some other Irish prelates also published diocesan catechisms. Amongst them may be mentioned Dr. M'Kenna and Dr. Coppinger, of Cloyne and Ross. Dr. O'Reilly and Dr. MacHale of Tuam, whose Irish catechism is well known in the Western Province.

So many editions of the catechism in various countries

¹ Renehan's *Archbishops*, p. 355.

are a proof of the zeal of the bishops. But the multiplication of texts was not without inconveniences. Differences of arrangement, and in form of expression, were inevitable. Some editors aimed at a theological exposition, where simplicity would have been more appropriate. Important points were occasionally omitted and unimportant questions introduced. Sometimes, too, an excess of rigour appeared in the statement of doctrine or of moral obligations. Moreover, the face of the world had been changing. More than in ancient times men pass in large numbers from one country to another. Finding the Christian Doctrine explained in their new abodes in a different order from that to which they had been accustomed emigrants were, to some extent, embarrassed. The clergy were no less perplexed in dealing with them. Gradually a desire sprang up in various quarters for the adoption of a universal catechism.

Provincial Councils discussed the subject. The synod of Vienna in 1858, of Prague in 1860, of Cologne in 1863, gave expression to the desire that a common text should be adopted. When the Vatican Council assembled in 1869, one of the subjects proposed for its consideration was the adoption of a universal catechism. A *schema* was submitted to the Fathers of the Council proposing for adoption the Latin text of Bellarmine's catechism: to be translated into the vernacular by the bishops of the various countries. The question was discussed in four General Congregations. The German bishops were reluctant to abandon the catechism of Canisius.¹ Mgr. Hefelé read a Memorandum by Cardinal Raucher, in which his Eminence pointed out the difficulties which a change of catechism might create in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in consequence of the approval by the government of the catechism then in use. The Archbishop of Avignon, and some other French prelates, put forward similar objections to a change of catechism in France. At length in the fifty-first General Congregation an amended *schema*

¹ Emilie Ollivier, *L'église et l'état au Concile du Vatican*, vol. ii., p. 262.

was submitted for discussion. It proposed that the Pope should publish an universal catechism in Latin, based on that of Bellarmine and other approved catechisms; that the bishops in each country should publish a translation of the Papal catechism in the vulgar tongue; and that they should be free to add such explanation as they might deem necessary to refute local errors, provided the additions were made in such a way as not to be confounded with the text.

On 4th May, 1870, the amended scheme, which we give below, was submitted for discussion.¹ Five hundred and ninety-one Fathers were present. Of these 491 voted *Placet*, fifty-six *Non Placet*, and forty-four *Placet juxta modam*. By this vote the principle of a universal text was adopted. But the question of Papal Infallibility was pressing for decision, and before that of the catechism could be reached the Council was adjourned. But the idea of a universal text had not been allowed to perish. In 1875, the Bishops of Ireland adopted a common text for the whole country. The Bishops of the United States, assembled at Baltimore in 1884, recommended the use of a common text in America. The Council of Latin America,

¹SCHEMA CONSTITUTIONIS DE PARVO CATECHISMO JUXTA EMENDATIONES A GENERALI CONGREGATIONE ADMISSAS REFORMATUM.

Pius episcopus, servus servorum Dei, sacro approbante Concilio, ad perpetuam rei memoriam.

De confectione et usu unius parvi Catechismi pro Universa Ecclesia.

Pia Mater Ecclesia sponsi sui Salvatoris Nostri Jesu Christi monitis et exemplis edocta, praeceptum semper curam et sollicitudinem erga pueros impendit, ut lacte coelestis doctrinae enutriti; ad omnem pietatis rationem mature informarentur. Hinc sacrosancta Tridentina Synodus nedum episcopis mandavit ut pueros fidei rudimenta et obedientiam erga Deum et parentes diligenter doceri curarent, sed illud praeterea sibi faciendum censuit ut certam aliquam formulam et rationem traderet Christiani populi, ab ipsis fidei rudimentis, instituendi, quam in omnibus Ecclesiis illi sequerentur quibus legitimi pastores et doctoris munus esset obeundum. Id vero cum ab ipsa sancta synodo perfici non potuerit, ex ejusdem voto, Apostolica haec Sedes ad optatum exitum, Catechismo ad Parochus in hanc edito, feliciter perduxit. Neque hic constit; sed Tridentinorum Patrum menti cumulatus respondere cupiens, ut unus deinceps idemque in docendo et discendo Christianam doctrinam ab omnibus teneretur, parvum quoque pro pueris erudiendis Catechismum a venerabili Cardinali Bellarmino, ipsa jubente, exaratum approbavit, omnibusque Ordinariis, Parochis, aliisque ad quos spectat, enixe commendavit.

Cum autem hac nostra aetate ex ingenti in diversis Provinciis atque etiam diocesis parvorum Catechismorum numero, non levia oriri

held in Rome in 1900, adopted a similar resolution. Last of all, in a letter dated 15th July, 1905, addressed to the Cardinal Vicar, his Holiness Pope Pius X has ordered the adoption of a uniform text of catechism in Rome, and in the suburban dioceses, and has expressed a desire that the same text shall be adopted in the other dioceses throughout Italy. By the adoption of a common text, unity of doctrine is better preserved, emigrants from one country to another are more easily instructed, and the encroachments of error are more easily guarded against.

The catechism now published by order of the Holy Father deserves more than a passing notice. It bears the title *Compendio della dottrina cristiana*,¹ or Compendium of Christian Doctrine. It contains three parts. The first part, the child's catechism, extends over three chapters and nine pages. The second part, or short catechism, in sixty-five pages, contains five sections which treat of Faith, Prayer, the Commandments and Sins, the Sacraments, and the Theological Virtues. Then follows the larger catechism with a similar division. The first part treats of the articles of the Creed, and under the ninth article, six sections are devoted to the Church—(1) the

incommoda compertum est; id circo Nos, sacro approbante Concilio ob oculos habitis imprimis praedicto Ven. Card. Bellarmini Catechismo, tum etiam aliis in Christiano populo magis pervulgatis catechismis, novum nostra auctoritate elucubrandum curabimus, quo omnes utantur, sublata in posterum parvorum catechismorum varietate.

Operam vero dabunt in singulis provinciis Patriarchae vel archiepiscopi, collatis prius concilio cum suis suffraganeis, deinde vero cum aliis archiepiscopis ejusdem regionis et idiomatis, ut illius textus in vulgarem linguam fideliter vertatur.

Integrum autem erit episcopis, ejusdem parvi catechismi usu pro prima fidelium institutione absque ullis additamentis jugiter retento, ad eos uberius excolendos, et contra errores, qui in suis forsitan regionibus grassantur, praemuniendos, ampliores catecheticas conficere institutiones; quas tamen, si cum textu praedicti catechismi et non seorsim edere voluerint, id ita fieri debere mandamus, ut textus ipse a Nobis praescriptus, ab hujusmodi institutionibus patenter distinctus appareat.

Denique cum parum sit catechismi formulas memoriae a fidelibus mandari, nisi ad illas pro cujusque captu intelligendas viva voce adducantur, et hac ipsa re maxime referat ut una sit tradendae fidei, et ad omnia pietatis officia populum christianam erudiendi communis regula atque munus impositum est, usum memorati catechismi ad Parochos, uti saepe alias Praedecessores Nostri, ita Nos denuo summo opere commendamus. —*Acta et Decreta SS. Concilii Vaticani, Schema XII, Collectio Lacerensis*, vol. vii., Appendix, pp. 666, 667.

¹ Roma, Tipografia Vaticana, 1905.

Church in general ; (2) the Catholic Church ; (3) the teaching Church and the Church taught ; (4) the Pope and the Bishops ; (5) the Communion of Saints ; (6) those without the Church. In the fourth part, which treats of the Sacraments, **under Penance a section is devoted to explain the doctrine of Indulgences.** Under Matrimony, the question of impediments, of civil marriage, and of divorce is treated. In the fifth part, which treats of the virtues, under Faith a section is devoted to the explanation of the meaning of Scripture and Tradition, and to the reading of the Bible. The gifts of the Holy Ghost and the Beatitudes are also explained. To the text of the catechism are added appendices. The first of these is a catechism of the festivals of the Church, explaining the meaning of the principal feasts of our Lord, of the Blessed Virgin, and of the saints. Next follows a succinct history of religion, as contained in the Old and New Testaments, and in the history of the Church up to the end of the general persecutions. Then follows a brief notice of the heresies and the general councils, together with suggestions how to study religion in the history of the Church. The little volume of 416 pages, 12mo, closes with formulas of night and morning prayers, prayers for confession and communion, and the manner of serving Mass. This admirable catechism is, perhaps, the presage of the universal text which, no doubt, will one day be adopted throughout the Church.

III.

The history of legislation shows us the mind of the Church ; that of texts shows the efforts that have been made to adopt instruction to the intelligence of the young. But legislation and texts produce little fruit, unless instruction be imparted with method. We proceed, therefore, to study the history of the methods which have been employed in catechetical instruction. In the early Church the teaching of Christian Doctrine was carried on according to a well-defined system. Before admission to the rank of catechumen, converts were taught the principal mysteries of religion. After admission they were gradually

initiated in the doctrines and practices of Christianity, by assisting at the services and instructions in the Church. When their conduct gave reason to hope that they would loyally bear the yoke of Christ, they were permitted to have their names enrolled as candidates for Baptism. That Sacrament was solemnly administered at Easter and at Pentecost. At the beginning of Lent, a careful inquiry was made concerning the conduct of aspirants to Baptism. The names of those who were judged competent were then enrolled:

During the entire Lent they assembled daily in the church to receive instruction. Here they were fully instructed in the truths of religion. From time to time the exorcisms, which now form part of the ceremonies of Baptism, were performed. As Lent advanced the text of the Creed and the *Pater* was explained, and the candidates were required to commit it to memory. This was called the *traditio symboli*. After an interval of some days they were individually examined, and made to repeat those texts. This was called the *redditio symboli*. Then they were obliged to renounce Satan, and his pomps and works; a ceremony full of meaning at a time when the attractions of the theatre, and the arena, and the circus exercised such fascination.

At length on Holy Saturday the history of religion was once more brought before them by the reading of the prophecies, which still form a part of the Office on that day. Then Baptism and Confirmation were administered, and the neophytes were admitted to Holy Communion. During the week which followed, their instruction in the doctrine of the Holy Eucharist was completed. Such, in substance, was the method of instruction, with but slight modification in detail, followed in the Eastern and Western Churches.

In the account of her pilgrimage to Jerusalem in the fourth century, given by Sylvia, a rich lady from the south of France, we have a graphic description of the manner in which religious instruction was imparted in the East. She speaks of the preliminary examination at the beginning of Lent into the conduct of aspirants to Baptism, of the

testimony of their sponsors, of the enrolment of their names. Then she describes their instruction by the bishop :—

Commencing with Genesis [she writes], he goes through the entire Scripture, explaining it, first literally, and then spiritually. He also explains during those days all that relates to the Resurrection, and to faith. Now this is called catechizing. When five weeks are completed from the commencement of the instruction they receive the symbol. And he gives the explanation of the symbol, first literally and then spiritually, by means of the Scriptures. In this way he expounds the symbol. And hence it comes that all the faithful in that locality understand the Scripture when it is read in the church, because they are taught it during those forty days from the first to the third hour, for the catechism lasts for three hours. . . . Then one by one, accompanied by their sponsors, they repeat the symbol.

When Easter comes Baptism is administered, then further instruction is given.

And as the bishop preaches and explains everything, the applause is so great as to be heard outside the church. And as in that country some of the people speak both Greek and Syriac, and some either Greek or Syriac only, hence as the bishop, though he should know Syriac, speaks only in Greek, and never in Syriac, a priest stands beside him, who interprets in Syriac what he says in Greek, so that all may understand. . . . And if there be Latins present who understand neither Greek nor Syrian, the bishop instructs them also, for there are brothers and sisters who know Greek and Latin, and who act as interpreters.¹

The *Catechises* of St. Cyril of Jerusalem, of St. Chrysostom, of St. Augustine, St. Ambrose, and St. Cesarius of Arles, are types of the method of instruction practised in the early Church. As Fénelon justly remarks,¹ it was the greatest men that were employed to give those instructions, hence the fruit was marvellous and now seems to us almost incredible.

But besides the solemn religious instructions given as a preparation for Baptism, in certain great centres there

¹ *Perigrinatio Silviæ*, apud Duchesne, *Origines du Culte Chrétien*, 3rd edit., Appendix 3, pp. 520-21.

² *Dialogue sur l'éloquence*.

were catechetical schools. The most remarkable of these was that of Alexandria, where Pantenus, and Clement, and Origen taught. The works of Clement show what the method of instruction was. His *Exhortatio* to the Gentiles, his *Pedagogue*, his *Stromata* or miscellaneous notes, are but a summary of his oral teaching.

Such was the method of catechetical instruction in use in the Church until the seventh century. The spread of the Gospel and the disappearance of paganism introduced a new order of things. Those now requiring instruction were no longer converts, but Christians baptized in infancy. For their instruction new methods were adopted. The discipline of the secret disappears. First of all, as we learn from St. Cesarius of Arles, parents were urged to instruct their children at home, in the dogmas and practices of religion. Sponsors were exhorted to teach their spiritual children by good example. But the duty of teaching Christian Doctrine was in a special manner urged upon the clergy. St. Bede in a letter above referred to, addressed to Egbert, Bishop of York, exhorts him to appoint a priest in every village to instruct the people in the articles of the Creed and in the Lord's Prayer. The Synod of Cloveshoe in 747, and of Calcut in 787, decreed that bishops should visit their dioceses annually; and that priests should instruct the faithful in the vulgar tongue in the Creed and the *Pater*. It is manifest from the Capitularies and letters of Charlemagne, that in the ninth century the clergy were obliged to instruct the people in Christian Doctrine, and to assure themselves that parents and sponsors at Baptism knew the text of the Creed and the Lord's Prayer. In the twelfth century, the custom was introduced, as we learn from a decree of a synod held in Dublin in 1186, of assembling the children for instruction at the church door on Sundays.

This usage appears to have been widespread. For the synod of Beziers, in 1246, and that of Albi, in 1254, command priests to explain the articles of the Creed in a clear and simple style, on Sundays and festivals. And they add, that the children shall be brought to church on Sundays

and festivals to be taught the *Pater, Ave, and Credo*. The decree of the synod of Lambeth, already referred to, imposed upon priests the obligation of instructing the people in a simple style in Christian Doctrine. Other synods repeat the same injunction; and add that priests shall remind the people to instruct their children. Confessors were directed to inquire of parents in confession whether they had fulfilled that duty. From all these facts we gather that throughout the Middle Ages, from the eighth to the fifteenth century, the method of religious instruction in general use was this: children were taught the elements of religious knowledge at home; as soon as they were sufficiently advanced in age they were instructed in the church on Sundays and festivals. Moreover, the general character of parochial instruction was catechetical. Formal sermons were rare. An instance of this is to be found in one of the earliest books published by Caxton in 1483. The book contained four discourses to be delivered to the people on Christian Doctrine. Now, the decree of Lambeth obliged the clergy to repeat those discourses four times a year. Hence we are justified in concluding that at least sixteen Sundays in each year were devoted to give to the people plain catechetical instruction. Such a method could not fail to render the faithful familiar with the dogmas and practices of religion.

The Council of Trent gave a fresh impulse to methods of religious instruction. Henceforward instruction in the schools and instruction in the church go hand in hand. The teaching of catechism in school became an established usage. But as poverty hindered many from attending school on week-days, the synod of Cambrai, 1565, decreed that school-masters should, on Sundays, after vespers, teach those unable to read; and chaplains and clerics were required to aid in the good work. The dioceses of Namur, Tournay, Arras, and St. Omer's adopted the legislation of the synod of Cambrai, then their metropolis. The synod of Malines, in 1570, urges the establishment of Sunday-schools to teach the poor the catechism and the art of reading and writing. Thus two centuries before Robert

Raikes organized Protestant Sunday-schools in Gloucester, Catholic Sunday-schools were in existence. They can be traced back even to the twelfth century.

The better to carry on combined secular and religious instruction, confraternities and congregations were established to undertake the work of teaching. St. Charles Borromeo established throughout his diocese confraternities of Christian Doctrine. St. Joseph Calasantius founded an Order, named *Scolopi*, or Of the Pious Schools, to undertake the education of youth. Orders of women, like the Ursulines, were established for the same purpose. In France the Venerable Cesar du Bus founded the Order of Christian Doctrine, which devoted itself to education. The great Society of Jesus held aloft the banner of religion in middle and higher education. St. John Baptist de la Salle founded the Order of Brothers of the Christian Schools, to instruct the humbler classes. Learned men, like Canisius, and Bellarmine, and Bossuet, endeavoured to produce texts capable of being placed in the hands of children. Others, like Fleury, published text-books of the history of religion, or of the festivals of the year. Artists lent their aid, and illustrated editions of the catechism rendered the texts more interesting and instructive. In Rome an illustrated catechism was published in 1587, by Father John Baptist Romano, S.J. At Antwerp, in 1589, Christopher Plautus printed an illustrated edition of the catechism of Canisius. At Augsburg, in 1614, another edition of Canisius was published with one hundred and three woodcuts. At Antwerp another illustrated catechism, with fifty-two plates, was printed in 1652, and sold at the moderate price of two sous. In France, M. Bourdoise, parish priest of St. Nicholas de Chardonnet, made use of an illustrated catechism for the instruction of the young. Two French illustrated catechisms excelled others as works of art—one published in 1607 for the education of Louis XIII, and the other edited for the instruction of Louis XIV, and afterwards published in 1645 with the title of *Catechisme Royal*. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the utility of illustrated catechisms has been

widely recognized. Many such catechisms have been published; amongst them the edition of the catechism of Bellarmine, with fifty engravings from the works of the great masters, published by Palmé of Paris in 1884, deserves mention.

But, excellent as is the method of teaching catechism in schools, it is not possible in all countries, and even where it is possible, it is imperfect unless completed by instruction in the church. Instruction in the school gives a knowledge of the text, instruction in the church is needed to impart an knowledge of the meaning of the catechism. In all countries catechetical instruction in the church is an object of solicitude. But in no country has it been so highly systematized as in France. In that country it is usual to divide catechetical instruction into three grades, namely, the elementary grade, for children between the age of seven and nine years; the first communion class for those between nine and eleven, and lastly, the catechism of perseverance for those above the age of eleven. The *Règlement des Catechismes*, prescribed by Mgr. Dupanloup, which is here summarized, will show the method adopted in France.

In the elementary grade the catechism class lasts an hour and a half. First the children are interrogated on the text of the catechism; in the second place they are examined on the subject of the discourse given by the priest at the previous class; next follows a discourse of about twenty minutes' duration by the priest in charge of the catechism explaining the text of the catechism, or giving a history of religion, dwelling on the history of the patriarchs and prophets, on the coming of Christ, the establishment of His Church and the institution of the Sacraments. After this the written notes of the previous discourse are examined. Then the presiding priest gives a short practical discourse on the method of making the Sign of the Cross, of saying morning and night prayers, of hearing Mass and preparing for confession. Lastly, the Gospel of the day is read, and a short explanation of its meaning brings the exercise to a close. In the intervals,

between the above mentioned exercises, hymns are sung or prayers recited.

In the first communion class a similar method is observed. The interrogations are made on the text of the larger catechism. When the date of the first communion is approaching the candidates are prepared by special instructions, extending over about two months. During that period the future communicants are assembled in the church at least twice a week. The exercise usually includes Mass, and lasts two hours. During Mass hymns are sung and prayers read aloud, then follows the instruction as above described. The whole catechism is gone over. Particular pains are taken to inculcate the duty of prayer, and to prepare the children for a general confession. After some weeks' instruction the children are examined, and a list of those qualified for admission to first communion is prepared. Special instructions are then given on Holy Mass and Holy Communion. The candidates are obliged to go to confession, at least every fifteen days, at this period. Finally, the preparation for first communion is brought to a close by a retreat of three days' duration.

The day of first communion is one of great solemnity, and on the day which follows, the first communicants assemble to assist at a Mass of thanksgiving. For eight days they continue to wear the white dresses or badges which they wore on the day of their first communion, a usage which is a reminiscence of the time when the catechumens were admitted to Holy Communion immediately after Baptism, and for eight days wore white garments, the emblem of innocence and joy.

After first communion the young are exhorted to frequent a higher course of catechism, called the catechism of perseverance. The same order of exercises is observed as in the catechism of first communion. In some places young people continue to attend the catechism of perseverance until their twentieth year.

The co-operation of several persons is necessary to conduct catechism in this way. Usually in large parishes

four catechists take part in it. One presides and gives the signal for the various exercises. A second sees that the children take their places in due order, and notes the absentees. A third directs the singing of hymns. A fourth keeps a register of the marks obtained by the children and of their certificates of confession. When the four catechists are priests, each gives the instruction in turn, but the admonitions are reserved to the chief catechist. Those who attend the catechism of perseverance are recommended to communicate every month.

It is manifest that children who have prepared for their first communion by a four years' course of instruction, and who then continue to attend for several years the catechism of perseverance, must possess a thorough knowledge of the doctrine and practices of religion.

In recent years religious instruction is being steadily banished from primary schools. Hence catechetical instruction in the church has become more necessary. But in large centres there are many children, such as errand boys, sweeps, circus children, who can hardly be reached by ordinary methods. Even these are provided for. Confraternities of catechists have been found to assist the clergy in instructing such children. In Paris alone, in 1900, the number of ladies who voluntarily gave their services to this good work amounted to 2,500, and the number of children instructed to over 26,500. In Paris, too, an ambulant school has been provided for the *forains*, or circus children, and in these they receive both secular and religious instruction.

Such is a summary of the methods which have been adopted at various periods in imparting religious instruction. It shows how zealously the Church has at all times enforced the duty of teaching Christian Doctrine. To carry on that work with success, many elements must be combined, parents at home, teachers in the schools, and the clergy must work together. The knowledge of the text of the catechism is not enough. The catechism must be known, it must be understood, it must be reduced to practice. Teachers in the schools can give a knowledge of the text

of the catechism. It is the office of the clergy to explain its meaning in such a way as to enlighten the intelligence of the young, and to move their hearts and wills to practice it.

This [says Pius X] is the office of the catechist, to treat some truth pertaining either to faith or Christian morality, and to illustrate it in every possible way; and as the end of instruction ought to be an amendment of life, the catechist ought to draw a parallel between what God commands to be done, and what men actually do: then by means of carefully chosen examples, either from Sacred Scripture, or ecclesiastical history, or the Lives of the Saints, he should persuade his audience, and point out to them clearly a rule of conduct, and conclude by exhorting all present to dread and fly vice, and pursue virtue.¹

To catechize with success requires greater diligence than any other kind of public speaking. It is easier, says the Holy Father, to find an eloquent preacher than a good catechist. Yet catechetical instruction is no less noble and far more necessary than preaching. It is the foundation on which the spiritual life of the people depends. Let us hope that the recent legislation of the Holy Father may stimulate the zeal of pastors, and elevate still more the standard of religious instruction.

PATRICK BOYLE, C.M.

¹ *Encyclical on Christian Doctrine*, 15th April, 1905.

DEVOTION TO THE SACRED HEART

TRUE AND FALSE

IT had been my original intention to discuss, in one paper, the whole question of devotion to the Sacred Heart of our Blessed Lord, in its varied latter-day manifestations. But some things which have rather recently come within the limit of my experience insinuated the belief that I should discharge my duty of speaking with more satisfaction to myself, and with more profit to my readers, if I confined my attention, in this article, to the devotion in its daily and general aspects, reserving the devotion of the Nine Fridays for separate treatment.


I trust I shall be pardoned if I discuss, at a little length, a subject which I referred to very briefly in a former article, namely, the Catholic idea of devotion to images in its relation to Catholic practice. I have no intention of dealing with the question in the hope of arriving at certainty in detail—for I believe such hope a vain presumption. I would speak of it simply because I feel convinced that discussion of the matter, though it cannot lead to finality, may lead to salutary self-examination.

The Catholic idea in the matter of images—what is it? Solemn definition has not quite decided it in terms of ultimate analysis, but it has fixed its limits. The Seventh General Council of the Church, held at Nice in 787, to put a stop to the unholy war against image-worship begun by the Emperor Leo the Isaurian in 724, decreed that the sacred images of Christ, of the Blessed Virgin, and of the saints should be restored to their places of honour in the churches, oratories, and private dwellings. It declared, moreover, that it is lawful to honour all such images with a true and sacred respect and reverence; but it solemnly warns the faithful that no image is to be worshipped with absolute, supreme worship, for such worship it declares to be due to God alone.

The sacred Council of Trent, it is true, in words of grave admonition, reminds the bishops of the Christian world of the solemn obligation which is laid upon them to preserve the truth and purity of public worship. Yet, right in the teeth of the iconoclasm of the so-called reformers, it flings the sacred challenge of the Lord :—

The images of Christ, of His Virgin Mother, and of the other saints, are to be kept especially in the churches, and are to receive due honour and veneration ; not that we believe them to possess any divinity or virtue which could give them a claim on our devotion . . . but because the reverence shown to them is referred to the prototypes whom they represent ; so that through the images which we kiss, and in whose presence we uncover the head and bend the knee, we adore Christ, and reverence the saints whose image they bear.¹

In my former article, of which I have already made mention,² I called the worship paid to images, relative. To prevent misconception, let me observe that I did not thereby mean to exclude, of necessity, direct reverence, that is, reverence paid directly and truly to the image itself. I simply wished to emphasize the declaration of the Seventh General Council, that to no image whatsoever, therefore to no image of Christ, our Lord, to no representation even of the Divinity, may we give the supreme worship of *latria*—as also to interpret shortly the evident sense of the Council of Trent, when it declares that, though



Mother, and the other saints, always of quite a subordinate character, no matter whom the images represent ; determined, therefore, at least in substance, by the fact that every image is a sacred symbol, and as such, worthy of our veneration ? Or must the nature of the reverence be definitely and wholly determined by the dignity of the person whom the image has been fashioned to represent ; the reverence due to the image being on precisely the same level as that given to the prototype, that is, co-ordinate though relative ?

I think it must be honestly admitted that a certain authoritative answer to these questions is a something still to be desired ; a fact which, considering the practical character of the matter at issue, seems to me to constitute a very mysterious phenomenon in the economy of Catholic definition and discipline. And certainly the mystery is not lessened when we turn and find ourselves face to face with such sharp conflict of opinion as this very question has given rise to in the domain of Scholastic theology.

St. Thomas, prince of the schoolmen, holds—and his opinion has been accepted by many of the greatest names amongst the earlier and later scholastics—that the reverence due to the image is precisely the same in character as the reverence due to the prototype ; that, by the one individual act, we reverence both the prototype and the image, giving to the former the fulness of homage which is its due and yet not excluding the latter.

Do we, therefore, suppose equality of dignity and identity of title ? The reply of course, is absolutely in the negative. For the homage, in as far as it is given to the original is absolute, while in so far as it extends to the original, it is purely relative ; it is paid to the original because of a dignity which is inherent, to the image because of a dignity which is entirely derivative. By an act of the mind, the sacred prototype is clothed with its image as with a garment, and being thus revered, the garment which it has assumed, that is, the image, becomes, as it were by accident, a sharer in the honour. The honour is, therefore, relative, because founded on, and the result of,

a relation which is extrinsic and of the purely intentional order.

Hence, according to St. Thomas, the images of the saints are to be revered with the reverence of *dulia*, those of our Blessed Lady with the reverence of *hyperdulia*, and those of the Divinity and of Christ our Lord with the reverence of *latria*.

The last portion of this statement seems, at first sight, to fly in the face of the Seventh General Council, which has declared that to no image whatsoever may we give the supreme worship of *latria*. That no such opposition really exists or was ever intended, can be inferred from the fact, which we are surely warranted in taking for granted, that the 'Angel of the Schools' was perfectly aware of the decree in which this prohibition is enunciated.

The ground of reconciliation I believe to be partly historical, and partly theological. It is historical, as supposing—which must be fairly evident—that the decree in question contemplates the existence amongst the faithful of a view of images which was either altogether superstitious, as giving to images a sacred dignity in their own exclusive right, or such a view as Cardinal Bellarmine holds to be the true one, as I shall explain a little further on. In either hypothesis, theology solves the difficulty in question; for, then, the reverence paid to images could never be the supreme reverence of *latria*, but of quite an inferior order, if paid at all. In St. Thomas's view of the office of images and of the proper mode of giving them reverence, the homage given to the images of our Lord, or of the Divinity, would be, not the absolute worship of *latria*, not *latria* by definition, not *latria* in virtue of inherent dignity, but the relative worship of *latria*, *latria*, as it were, by accident, *latria* founded on a borrowed, fleeting dignity, the outcome of the mind's endeavour.

Apart from the great and hallowed names which stand sponsor for this opinion, the manner of worship which it advocates does seem to be the ideal. While according to images their due meed of reverence and their true internal significance, it ever tends to keep us in touch with the

prototypes. In this view, images sweetly and silently introduce us to the court of heaven, but never intrude. They realize their office, and fulfil it faithfully; in their nature mere things of earth, they know their place and keep it.

It must be confessed, at the same time, that this attitude towards images, when reduced to practice, is not without its inconveniences; nay, for the uninstructed or unthinking, it has an element even of danger. Through inadvertence, or, it may be, through ignorance, it is very easy to confuse or even pervert the relation between the image and its prototype; to mistake the likeness for the original; to forget that the image is but a lifeless figure, having eyes which see not and ears which cannot hear; and, thus, to give to a soulless canvas or a senseless piece of sculptured stone or of clay the homage and reverence due only to God and to His saints. This is surely a *corruptio optimi*, a perversion which is necessarily tainted with the foul taint of superstition, and which may dip into the fouler pit of idolatry.

Still, the opinion advocated by St. Thomas seems to have held its ground, practically unchallenged, from his own day to the beginning of the sixteenth century, and after.

The sacred Council of Trent very significantly deals with the question of devotion to images under the heading, *De Reformatione* ('Reform'). It looked out upon a world of dire upheaval, a world in which so much mischief had been—and was still being—worked under the specious plea of 'reformation.' It was fully aware that the Catholic attitude towards images, and the abuses incidental to Catholic practice, had furnished one of the strongest pretexts for heretical attack. It speaks to the Christian world in solemn words of encouragement and in accents of solemn warning. And yet, on the question of the character of the reverence which we should pay to images, it has thought fit to speak in terms which, as we have seen, are strangely indecisive.

Not so the great Cardinal Bellarmine. Speaking

generally, it may be safely stated that, while preserving the doctrines of the Church intact, his aim seemed to be, when dealing with the heretics with whom in his time he came face to face, to explain and defend Christian dogma along the lines of least resistance. Not unnaturally, he considered the old Scholastic way of speaking in the matter of the reverence due to images, as very much open to misrepresentation; and he has very little hesitation about giving his thoughts expression, nor does he mince his words in the process.

Referring¹ to the opinion advocated by St. Thomas, Bellarmine says that such a way of speaking 'is fraught with danger'—a somewhat exaggerated presentation of the matter; nay, it 'is calculated to lead the faithful astray, inasmuch as it cannot be satisfactorily explained without a multitude of subtle distinctions, which the authors themselves do not understand'—surely the Cardinal's zeal in the cause of orthodoxy must have led his judgment captive here. Lastly, it 'gives heretics an opportunity of more freely blaspheming'—a conclusion drawn, we may presume, from his own observation and experience. With regard to this parting shot, I may remark that the Cardinal does not undertake to prove it; in fact it belongs to that class of statements which can be just as safely denied as affirmed, because equally incapable of being satisfactorily proved or disproved.

He quite admits that it is justifiable to reverence images with the reverence due to the original, provided it is given as it were by accident, and relatively. But he strongly asserts that such a way of showing reverence is neither feasible, nor is it ever, except very rarely, adopted by the faithful.²

His contention, therefore, is that we ought to regard images simply as sacred things, sacred symbols dedicated to sacred uses, and, as such, worthy of our respect and reverence; not, however, of such reverence as we would give to an intelligent being, for images have neither mind

¹ *De Imaginibus*, lib. 2, cap. xxii.

² *Ibid.*, cap. xxiii.

nor sense, nor life, but with a certain subordinate character of sacred reverence. The respect thus paid to images bears to the reverence due to the original a certain relation of analogy, and is quite incapable of being classed under the same immediate heading. The reverence given to the images of the saints the Cardinal would call not *dulia* properly so called, but *dulia secundum quid*, *dulia* only in a sense, a very imperfect imitation of the *dulia* given to the saints themselves, just as the image itself is an imperfect reproduction of the prototype. In a like sense the reverence given to images of our Blessed Lady would be *hyperdulia secundum quid*, and that paid to images of our Divine Lord, *latria secundum quid*.¹

This view of Cardinal Bellarmine contrasted with the opinion of St. Thomas, would explain itself somewhat after the following fashion. An image fresh from the hands of the artificer, and made to resemble in some sense our Lady, Queen of Heaven, for example, by that very fact puts on a certain inferior kind of consecration and an abiding character of sacredness. It has a sacred office; it is, or is conceived to be, a representation of a sacred prototype, and, as such, is a lasting memento or reminder. This precisely is its function, namely, not so much to represent our Lady, as to help, to suggest, devotion to her. And from the character of its office follows the character of the veneration which is its due. It is a herald, not an ambassador. It has a certain dignity abiding in itself, though not of itself; such dignity must necessarily be of quite a subordinate character, and can, therefore, claim only a subordinate character of veneration.

If the purposes of controversy and dogmatic defence be alone considered, I do not think there is anyone who could wholly disagree with this contention of the great Cardinal. But if we look at the matter from the point of view of discipline and liturgy, one may hesitate a little before subscribing to his opinion.

It is quite evident indeed that, if the faithful regard images as Cardinal Bellarmine contends they ought and

¹ *De Imaginibus*, lib. 2, cap. xxv.

almost invariably do, idolatry becomes so far an absolute impossibility. For, though I may forget the purpose of the statue which I venerate, though I may unduly regard it as having an excellence all its own, and consequently reverence it with a reverence which is quite unwarranted, because unfounded, still, since I look upon this excellence as something of a subordinate character, it follows that the reverence which I pay it, though not justifiable, is of a subordinate character as well. My reverence is misplaced and, therefore, superstitious, but cannot run into the enormity of idolatry.

But there is another view of the question which makes the opinion of Cardinal Bellarmine compare less favourably with that of the older schoolmen. For, the image is the thing which our eyes can see and our hands can handle. Therefore, to give the image an office and a dignity of its own, definitely distinct from the prototype whom it represents, is necessarily to bring the image well into the foreground of our thoughts and to keep the prototype somewhat in the background. At any rate, it may be fairly contended that, if the practice which the Cardinal so strongly advocates be the true one and the one of fact, devotion to images does not of necessity connote adequate, conscious devotion to Christ and His saints.

But perhaps we can, by one individual act of the mind, reverence the image with the lower reverence which is its due, and the original with a higher, becoming reverence? And again, is not reverence shown to the image, though of a lower order, ultimately resolvable into reverence shown to the saint?

The second question, I am quite prepared to answer in the affirmative—provided I am allowed to qualify my answer by another question: Will any saint be content with such devotion or reverence as the normal rule of our relations towards him?

With regard to the first question, if mere possibility be considered, there is only one answer, and that affirmative. But, *a posse ad esse non valet illatio*—possibility and fact are not convertible terms. Such composite

reverence is possible, but is it likely that it will ever become anything like a rule of life?

May I not reverence the original by a higher and independent act of reverence, at the same moment that I am paying lower homage to the image? Of course I may. But is there not some danger lest, with my eyes resting on the image, I may forget the higher and more fundamental duty? We all know how easily our senses lead us, and the knowledge is often a bitter awakening.

To the question—what is the actual attitude of the Catholic mind towards images? I honestly believe a definite answer utterly impossible. That Catholic devotion to images has always meant genuine devotion to Christ and His saints, it would be idle to affirm; that it has been often tinged with superstition, it would be just as idle to deny; to deny it would be to close our eyes against the clear light of history. That all Catholics, who give the images their due meed of reverence, look at them in the same way, or, that the same individual looks at them from the same point of view at all times and in all places, are propositions which I should feel very little hesitation in doubting or even denying.

It is now some years since I was witness to an exhibition of Catholic devotion which made an impression upon me beyond the power of years to destroy or weaken. It was in the afternoon of a bright harvest day. The slanting rays of a sweltering autumn sun were beating their golden light against the sheaves of yellow grain, which a score of men and women were busily engaged in saving. Suddenly, one of the harvesters called attention to something passing along the road hard by. It was only a statue of our Blessed Lady, which was being borne from one of the parish chapels to another. But it was uncovered; as it were, inviting reverence. All looked and saw—and to see was to fall upon their knees and pray. It was a sight not to be forgotten, a sight to treasure in one's memory. And truly, in these latter days of weak and calculating faith, it is only memory that can bring such sterling faith in cheering vision before us.

But, to my purpose. What view did these grand worshippers take of that statue passing by? Did they look upon it merely as a sacred symbol, a suggestion, an invitation to turn their thoughts towards her whose image it was supposed to bear? It may be that they really did. But to me they seemed—and still they seem—to look upon it as the mystic passing of their Queen.

I began this discussion by a confession that I did not open it with a view to saying the last word upon the matter. That confession I think I have amply justified. But, I premised as well that I trusted the discussion would not prove quite fruitless. I trust so still. For I think I have proved that this matter of devotion to images means a responsibility which cannot be shirked, neither in the catechism class, nor in the confessional, nor in the pulpit. Devotion to images is a most useful and a most salutary Catholic practice; but whatever view be taken of the office of images, this devotion can never be wholly free from danger. In the very nature of things, it must be so; that it has been so, more than one page of authentic Church history could furnish proof. The moral of the whole discussion is crystallized in the solemn command of the sacred Council of Trent, that, 'Everything superstitious in the invocation of saints, the veneration of relics, and the use of images be *removed*,' and that 'all bishops and others to whom is committed the office of teaching . . . should *diligently* instruct the faithful regarding the *legitimate* use of images.' ¹

So far I do not seem to have said much to justify the title of my article. To remove such an impression it will be sufficient to call attention to the fact that the image of the Sacred Heart in a church is the geographical centre round which rotate very many of the daily devotional practices in honour of the adorable Heart of our Divine Lord. It, therefore, becomes practically a question of specializing my criticism.

It is a dogma of Catholic faith that Christ as Man is t

¹ Sess. XXV. The italics are mine.

be revered with the supreme worship of *latria*. The thesis which maintains that 'devotion to the Sacred Heart of our Blessed Lord, as practised by Catholics all over the world, is free from all taint of superstition,'—though not an article of faith, admits neither of doubt nor denial, inasmuch as it is the voice of the Catholic Church believing, and advocates a devotion which has the solemn approval of the Apostolic See. It is also certain that the material object of this devotion, that is, the Thing which we love and venerate, is the living Heart of Christ, our Lord.

It would fit in with my argument here to draw the attention of my readers to an interesting rubrical enactment, which shows very clearly the anxiety of Holy Church to guard this cherished devotion against all danger of superstitious taint. In the year 1857, the Sacred Congregation of Rites forbade the public exposition or veneration of representations of the Sacred Heart of our Blessed Lord apart from the full figure. The prohibition was not quite absolute, inasmuch as it left it within the discretion of the bishop to permit such representations, if he thought fit.

The meaning of the law is evident. It is not the dead Heart, but the living, beating Heart, that we are to adore and venerate.

But there is another reason which might well have justified such an enactment. Theologians discuss the question whether we may venerate the Sacred Heart of the God-Man with a reverence less than divine. To give an answer to such a question is not my concern here. I merely refer to it as leading up to the proposition on which all are necessarily agreed, namely, that we are bound to reverence the Sacred Heart of Christ, primarily and in the first instance at least—if not exclusively—with the reverence of absolute adoration. Not that the Sacred Heart has within Its physical composition anything which constitutes It by nature divine; but because, in virtue of the hypostatic union, it is the Heart of God, of the Second Person of the adorable Trinity made Man. It is not something linked

with Christ our Lord, by a physical bond which is merely accidental, as were the garments which He wore as He walked by the shore of the sea of Galilee. Nor is Its connection with our Divine Lord something merely intentional, merely a relation of contact made by the mind of the worshipper, as would be an image of the Sacred Heart. The union is much more than all this, of an order infinitely higher. It is real and physical, it is intimate, it is substantial, that is, personal; so supremely intimate that to understand Its nature is quite beyond the capacity of human comprehension—it forms one of the chief mysteries of our holy faith.

On the other hand, however, though there is union, the most undying and the most profound, there is not identity. The Sacred Heart is, and always will be, human.

Why, then, worship It as a thing divine? Because It is divine, as it were, by participation. Therefore, we worship It not quite for Its own sake, but because we cannot do less than worship Him whose very Heart It is. And when we pay It the tribute of our humble adoration, He is always before our minds as the ultimate governing reason of our reverence; and of a surety, we must believe in Him God and worship Him accordingly.

It is just here that the prohibition of the Sacred Congregation of Rites comes in. For all true reverence to the Sacred Heart must ultimately resolve itself into reverence towards the person of Christ. What more helpful, or more salutary, than that the image of the Sacred Heart should always form part of a whole, which represents as far as the limitations of human skill permit, the living person of Christ, our Lord.

Methinks I hear around me just now a subdued, halting chorus of question and expostulation from certain quarters of the Church Militant: 'What is the necessity for a statue of the Sacred Heart in a church at all, if the Blessed Sacrament be reserved in the tabernacle? What does its usefulness come in? A statue of our Lady is good and helpful, no doubt, for it is a visible, constant reminder

of her who reigns Queen of Heaven. But it seems quite otherwise with a statue of the Sacred Heart placed within a few feet of the tabernacle. What need of a lifeless Heart to remind us of a Living One, when the Living Heart is right before us? And if we needed a reminder of the Real Presence, have we not got it, a sure and a safe and an unerring one, in the lamp which burns before the altar of the Living God?'

And the chorus seems to swell and grow insistent: 'Are not the abuses which are the daily concomitant of this devotion, as practised in our churches, a sufficient and convincing proof, if proof were needed, that a statue of the Sacred Heart in a church where Christ the Living dwells, is rather a hindrance than a help? For what does our modern daily devotion to the Sacred Heart too often come to? Look and see—a kneeling figure, a lifeless statue, a fleeting prayer, a lighted candle,—behold its history.'

What answer shall I make to all these indictments? I do not find the task an easy one. As a personal confession, I may state that I always prefer to kneel before the living tabernacle. But that is not necessarily more than a manifestation of individual temperament. At the same time, I must confess that it would be folly to deny that the statements and charges just enunciated are altogether without foundation. For it is true that, in the daily exercises of devotion to the Sacred Heart, in churches where the Real Presence abides, a dead Heart is sometimes substituted for a living, a heart of stone for a Heart of flesh and blood, a something far less than human for a Something by assumption divine.

It is a repetition all the year round of what often happens at Christmas time when the Christmas crib is erected. Worshippers, old and young—and for the young the practise is more hurtful—come and pray before the little Babe in the manger, and, by some strange fatality, often leave the church without turning their thoughts, even for a moment, to the living Prisoner of the tabernacle. They seem to have forgotten that for us, the Church is the real stable, and the manger is the tabernacle.

Ought we, therefore, remove the crib from its quiet corner, and the statue of the Sacred Heart from its pedestal ?

We dare not answer in the affirmative ; and I would not though I dared. To begin with, ecclesiastical authority not only permits, but equivalently approves of, such helps to devotion. Moreover, if incidental abuses be taken as the test of the utility of sensible objects which are intended as helps to true devotion and reverence, we should, if we wish to be consistent, identify ourselves with the naked ritual of utter Protestantism, and refuse to have or to worship any sacred image whatsoever. Until it is proved that a statue of the Sacred Heart in a church is, on the whole, more harmful than helpful—and we have at hand no evidence sufficient to warrant us in coming to such a conclusion—every consideration, not merely of reverence but of common sense, bids us hold our hand and leave the statue rest in its place.

But I think I am not giving utterance to an opinion peculiar to myself, when I say that such a statue so placed may very easily become something perilously like a stumbling-block. For it is not as a statue of our Lady or of St. Anthony. It is not a reminder of somebody that is far away, but a help to bring us nearer still in thought and affection to One who is very near.

It, therefore, ought ever be as a sacred finger-post, across which is written, in characters which the eye of faith cannot mistake, the legend, 'To the Tabernacle.' Be it the Lord's ambassador, or His herald, or what you will, its significance must be full and clear, and its invitation imperative. And every light burning before it is an *ignis fatuus*, a veritable will-o'-the-wisp, if its rays do not glance off the statue and, like the star of Bethlehem, rest above the living Christ in His cradle on the altar, beckoning the faithful to follow and adore.

How far is such an ideal realized ? To give a practical answer to this question, one or two things must be borne in mind. The formal aim of a statue of the Sacred Heart is, of course, to promote devotion to the Sacred Heart. Now, whatever be the objective of devotion to the Sacred

Heart in theory, it is concreted and localized in devotion to the Blessed Sacrament. The test, therefore, and the measure of the success or failure of a statue of the Sacred Heart in a church is the measure in which it furthers devotion to our Blessed Lord in the tabernacle.

How far, then, is its aim realized? Perfect, or even approximately perfect, realization is necessarily out of the question in a spiritual effort into which the imperfect human element so largely enters. But is the realization even moderately satisfactory? Is it such as, all things considered and all allowances made, one might reasonably expect? That it is so in some cases, in many cases, I should be very loth to deny. But, speaking generally, I am afraid that only the blindest of blind optimism could afford to answer these questions in the affirmative. And even this statement does not exhaust the truth, as it seems to me. For there is something which is worse than failure—there is perversion. And it has sometimes happened, owing to darkest ignorance—the result, it may be, of even elementary instruction on the legitimate use of images—that a statue of the Sacred Heart, instead of being a positive help towards the realization of its purpose, has become a positive hindrance thereto, has become, in its own despite, a stumbling-block and a rock of scandal. I speak with the energetic conviction of an eye-witness; and in more than one church in Ireland have my eyes been witness to the evil.

By way of conclusion, and as indicating whither misdirection may lead in this region of Catholic devotion, I beg leave to submit a contrast. Firstly, I would ask my readers to cast their eyes on the teeming petitions with which the enshrined statues in our churches are constantly besieged, from day to day and from week to week, petitions clad in countless varying hues, but few of them, very few, even tinged with the purple red of Calvary, or with the azure blue of heaven. Then, I would bespeak their attention to the solemn uplifting voice of the holy Council of Trent :—

Let the Bishops diligently teach the faithful . . . that much fruit may be derived from all sacred images; not only because

the faithful are thereby reminded of the gifts and benefit purchased by Christ our Lord, but also because the salutary example of the saints and the miracles which God has worked through their instrumentality are brought before the eyes of the people—to the end, that, for all these things, they may render due thanks; that they may model their lives according to the example set before them; that they may be led to adore and love God in their hearts, and to lead godly lives.¹

A crown of contrast and I have done. What I am about to state will, doubtless, be the signal for some of my readers to hold up their hands in horror and disbelief. I should like to be an unbeliever myself, but unfortunately I speak from open knowledge. And I speak of something which, in the opinion of not a few, is a natural variation of the modern phenomenon often called, and honestly mistaken for, devotion—though others would, I am sure, regard it as a very startling development. What, I ask, would the venerable Fathers of Trent have thought, in what terms would they have spoken, of the action of Catholics who, having developed a taste or a passion for betting, and having determined to gamble on a horse-race earnings which they can ill afford to mis-spend, enter the sacred temple of the Lord, light a candle at a shrine, and, on bended knee, dare to ask one of the saints of God—or even the Queen of Heaven herself—to direct their choice aright, or to crown their choosing with success?

I have inverted the usual order, and kept my text for the end. It is from Cardinal Newman: 'Only this I know full well now . . . that the Catholic Church allows no image of any sort, material or immaterial, no dogmatical symbol, no rite, no sacrament, no saint, not even the Blessed Virgin herself, to come between the soul and its Creator.'²

D. DINNEEN.

¹ Sess. XXV.

² *Apologia*, chap. iv., § 2.

THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL AND SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THE MASS

IT has been finally decided, by the important decision delivered in the Court of Appeal on Monday, February 5th, that bequests for Masses are valid charitable gifts in Ireland, though there be no direction that the Masses shall be celebrated in public. The judgments of the Judges not unnaturally differed somewhat in their conception and exposition of the manner in which Masses celebrated in private may be deemed to be of general public use. I am not, however, going to deal with the legal aspects of this important decision, but I take occasion from it to write a short paper on some questions connected with the holy sacrifice of the Mass, and in particular with the questions referred to in the judgments of the learned Judges of the Court of Appeal.

II

During the discussions on the validity of Anglican Orders some erroneous theories about the essential independence and the efficacy of the Mass, which had completely disappeared from the text-books of theology, were again disinterred from the tombs to which oblivion had charitably consigned them. The Pope pronounced against the validity of Anglican Orders on account of a defect of the essential form of ordination and defect of intention. Some of the Anglican divines sought to parry the blow by arguing that the English reformers never denied the true doctrine of the Eucharistic sacrifice, but only repudiated certain erroneous theories that had been advanced by some of the schoolmen; that, no doubt, words and phrases which gave special prominence to the priestly function of offering sacrifice were struck out of the liturgical formularies, but only as a protest against the pernicious errors that had been taught by continental

theologians ; that as the Church determined to retain the Eucharistic sacrifice, she must have preserved substantially the form of ordination, and that surely her bishops had the intention of conferring, when they gave orders, the power of offering the Eucharistic sacrifice.

Foremost among the theological offenders referred to was Ambrosius Catharinus. When the heretics urged against the true sacrificial character of the Mass the teaching of St. Paul ¹: 'For by one oblation He hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified. . . . Now where there is a remission of these, there is no more an oblation for sin. . . . And if we sin wilfully after having the knowledge of the truth, there is now left no sacrifice for sins ;' Catharinus replied ² by an original but very erroneous exposition of the teaching of St. Paul and of the relation of the sacrifice of the Mass to the sacrifice of the Cross. He distinguished two classes of sins to be remitted, original sin with the actual sins committed before Baptism, and the sins committed after Baptism. Original sin and the actual sins committed before Baptism he called one sin—which he also called the sin of the Old Testament—on account of the origin of these actual sins, as he said, from original sin ; and the sins committed after Baptism he called the sins of the New Testament. According to Catharinus the sacrifice of the Cross was offered for the sin of the Old Testament alone, that is, for original sin and the sins committed before Baptism, and employs the sacrament of Baptism as its secondary cause or instrument for the application of its merits ; and its superiority over the sacrifices of the Old Law is proved, because in them there was made an ineffective commemoration of the Old Testament sin every year, whereas it was effectively remitted by a single oblation of the sacrifice of Calvary. For the sins of the New Testament, he said, for our voluntary sins, the sacrifice of the Mass was instituted, and employs as its secondary cause or instrument for applying its merits, the sacra-

¹ Heb., x. 14, 18, 26.

² In Heb. *loc cit.*

ment of Penance ; and as our voluntary sins are many, the sacrifice is daily repeated. To the arguments against the sacrifice of the Mass from the Epistle to the Hebrews he replied that the Epistle deals solely with the sacrifice for the sin of the Old Testament, that there remains no bloody sacrifice for our voluntary sins of the New Testament, but that we have the unbloody sacrifice of the Mass operating through its own proper instrument, the sacrament of Penance.

This opinion Melchior Canus calls 'deliratio,'¹ and Vasquez is scarcely less complimentary : 'manifeste absurda et contra fidem Catholicam aperte pugnat';² and theologians teach as a truth of faith that the Mass is not an independent sacrifice, nor a universal cause co-ordinate with the sacrifice of the Cross and operating through the sacraments as secondary causes or instruments, but a dependent relative sacrifice occupying the position of secondary cause or instrument for applying the merits of Calvary.

The next to be pilloried by the Anglicans for extravagant views about the holy sacrifice are Gabriel and Peter Soto, who are accused of teaching that the Mass, by divine institution, has the power of remitting mortal sins immediately, like the sacrament of Penance ; so that if a person who had committed a mortal sin, elicited an act of attrition for his sin and got a Mass applied for himself, he would directly and immediately obtain pardon through the sacrifice of the Mass, as through the sacrament of Penance. But, as Suarez explains, these theologians did not claim for the Mass the immediate power of effectively remitting mortal sin, but they taught, in opposition to the view that it has no power to remit mortal sin, that the Mass has a real efficacy for the remission of mortal sin, that is, by impetration, by obtaining for the sinner the grace of perfect contrition or attrition with the sacrament of Penance.

The Mass, therefore, cannot remit mortal sin immediately, nor more probably venial sins, but indirectly by impetrating

¹ *De locis theologicis*, l. xii. c. xii.

² *Disp.* ccxii., c. iv. n. 35.

the grace of repentance : it cannot confer immediately an increase of sanctifying grace, but only by obtaining for us greater intensity of sorrow for past sins and greater fervour in good works : it can remit the temporal punishment due to sin immediately : temporal favours, such as recovery from illness, success in life, etc. : it can impetrate for us, like prayer, but not infallibly, either immediately or to be obtained through the medium of natural causes and whatever can be the legitimate object of prayer can also be lawfully asked for through the oblation of the sacrifice of the Mass.

Finally, few if any unprejudiced critics will admit that the Anglican reformers had in mind only the erroneous teaching of Catharinus and the somewhat ambiguous views of Gabriel and Soto when they enacted ' Wherefore the sacrifice of Masses, in which it was commonly said that the priests did offer Christ for the quick and the dead to have remission of pain and guilt, were blasphemous fables and dangerous deceits.'¹

II.

I will next very briefly consider who participate in the fruits of the Mass, and how the Mass though celebrated in private may be of public general use. I shall regard the Mass not as a private devotion of the priest, or of the faithful assisting at the Mass, or of the Church generally, but as a sacrifice offered in the name of Christ. The Mass is a sacrifice of adoration, of praise and thanksgiving, of propitiation and satisfaction for sin, and of impetration. The adoration and thanksgiving of the sacrifice are applied not to creatures, but to God, and in the name of all the faithful. And thus, as the Chief Baron argued, a gift for Masses is a gift to God ; and independently of its propitiation and impetration the Mass is of general benefit as an act of worship in which adoration and thanksgiving are offered to God on behalf of all the faithful. There remain the propitiation and impetration of the sacrifice ; and I shall consider to what extent

¹ Art. XXXI.

we participate in these fruits of the Mass by joining in the actual oblation, and to what extent by having Mass offered for us.

1. Suarez teaches that the priest who offers, and all who assist at the Mass, or co-operate in the oblation of the holy sacrifice, receive a part of the fruits *ex opere operato*, by reason of the act of offering. Vasquez on the contrary holds that the Mass, like the sacraments, acts *ex opere operato*, not in favour of the minister or by reason of the act of offering, but in favour of the subjects for whom it is offered, and to whom its fruits are applied.

2. Then these fruits of the Mass, and especially its satisfaction for sin, are applied in a special manner to those for whom the holy sacrifice is offered. But though the Mass be offered for a special person or for special persons, by the law of the Church a part of the fruits of every Mass, whether celebrated publicly or in private, must be applied for the benefit of all the faithful, living and dead; though it is disputed whether this general fruit includes impetration and propitiation, or is only impetration. Infidelity to this duty would not be, of course, blasphemous or heretical, but merely a grave violation of ecclesiastical law. Hence the Mass, though celebrated privately, is regarded by Catholics as an act of public general utility; and it was an inadequate and unsatisfactory and narrow theory of law that the Mass, as was supposed in previous legal decisions, is an act of public use to Catholics only because it tends, when celebrated in a public church, to the instruction and edification of the congregation present at the Mass; it took cognizance only of the effects of the Mass *ex opere operantis*.

III.

The Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Baron argued that gifts for Masses are of public utility, because they are a partial endowment for the maintenance of a minister of religion. 'I do not consider the money,' the Chief Baron went on to observe, 'a consideration for the celebration. It is an alms to the clergyman, accompanied by a request

for the celebration of Mass. . . . The Church then imposes on the conscience of the clergyman an obligation to say and apply the Mass for the prescribed intention ; but the obligation is one to the Church and not to the testator.'

The relation of money given for Masses to the Masses themselves is, in principle, the same as the relation of all ecclesiastical incomes to the spiritual functions for which they are given, for example, the administration of sacraments, preaching, conducting divine service. In all Christian communions it is regarded as simony to sell or buy for a temporal consideration a spiritual ministration. But in all Christian communions it is considered lawful for clergymen to accept an income, whether of a permanent or casual character ; though there is considerable diversity of opinion about the precise title and obligation of ecclesiastical incomes. I will speak solely of *honoraria* for Masses.

De Lugo mentions five different explanations of the obligation of *honoraria* ; but of these I shall refer only to the first and last. Some then, with whom the Chief Baron agrees, held that the obligation is one of obedience alone ; that there is a double precept, one on the part of the people of maintaining their priests, and the other on the part of the priests of performing for their people the prescribed ministrations. But the more common opinion is that, independently of any command of the Church, there is an obligation of justice ; without, however, regarding the general income as a consideration for the general ministrations, or a particular gift as a consideration for a particular ministration. If, for example, the teaching or medical professions were too sacred to be the equivalents of a temporal consideration, a district would yet be bound in justice, they would say, to support its doctor or teacher, and the doctor and teacher would be bound in justice to minister in their districts. And so the priest is bound in justice to say Masses for *honoraria* received ; and the faithful are bound in justice to give alms for the support of their priests, some of which is given in the shape of a

general income similar to their general duties, and some on the occasion of special ministrations in behalf of special persons, as when a priest offers Mass for particular individuals. But the title is specifically the same for the general and casual income : the income is received as an alms for maintenance with an obligation of performing certain spiritual ministrations. The donor, therefore, of gifts for Masses does not seek his or her own interest alone, but also contributes to the maintenance of the priest. And so the theological consideration of *honoraria*, whether they be believed to impose an obligation of justice or of obedience alone, favoured the judgment that gifts for Masses are of public utility, as being a partial endowment of a minister of religion.

DANIEL COGHLAN.

GENERAL NOTES

CARDINAL PERRAUD

IRELAND has good reason to lament the death and to honour the memory of Cardinal Perraud. At a time when her people were crushed and the exterminator was at work all over the land the heart of Adolphe Perraud was stirred within, and with the traditional affection of Catholic France for *Verte Erin*, he came over here, spent two years in this country, saw everything for himself, and on his return, published two volumes which brought the Government of England before the tribunal of the civilized world. Englishmen, with all their pride of independence, are particularly sensitive to the verdict of that tribunal when once the case is presented to it. Mr. Gladstone in some of his Home Rule speeches, admitted the feeling of shame and humiliation with which he read the works of Gustave de Beaumont and Mgr. Perraud. For although Perraud was an ecclesiastic and a bishop he was also an Academician, and it was felt that his voice was heard and respected in France; the voice that is heard in France soon makes itself heard to the ends of the world.

These two volumes on *L'Irlande Contemporaine*, reveal only a warm heart but a great mind. They show with unlimited pains and with what consummate art a Frenchman of the better class acquires his facts and presents them to the public. The historical introduction, the system of land tenure, education, poor laws, evictions, emigration, religion, everything is dealt with as if that alone were the sole object of inquiry. The accumulative result was overwhelming; and the generous words of sympathy with which the work concluded were words of the heart and hand that undertook the labour. Who knows what influence these very words may have had on Mr. Gladstone in after years?

'I wish,' wrote Mgr. Perraud, 'that after having read this book some Englishman with a heart and courage for the cause would say to himself, like that immortal Wilberforce who said that he would know no rest until he had vanquished slavery: "I shall not cease to labour, to write, to act on public opinion, to struggle, and to agitate, until England has done justice

Ireland and wiped out the last trace of a persecution that has been carried on for three hundred years."

'I remember one day in the Basilica of St. Peter what a great emotion took possession of me when I read on the humble door of a confessional these simple words, *Gens Hibernica*, and on another, *Gens Polona*. Thus, I said, conquerors have been able to blot out from the map of the world the very name of Poland, the glorious Catholic nation of Central Europe. Politicians and worldly sages take but little interest in the misfortunes of Ireland, because she suffered in the cause of Catholicism. But the Holy Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman Church has neither admitted this suppression nor shared in this indifference. Near the tombs of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul, in the centre of Catholicity, she guards these great names, immortal souvenirs, watchwords of holy and invincible hope. Ireland and Poland, noble sisters who have suffered so much and who suffer still for our holy faith, hold firm in your hands the standards of St. Patrick and St. Casimir! You have to your account no dishonest triumphs, no guilty successes. Through the long career of persecution and trial through which Providence has led you it is for noble causes that you have done battle, for justice that you have struggled to the last drop of your blood. In the eyes of those who measure all things by success you were wrong to fight, since you have been conquered; your enemies are right for they have succeeded. But for those who look to the morality of history far different is their judgment. To them your defeat is only apparent as is the victory of your persecutors; for besides the fact that God, the Master of the future, can, when and how He pleases, give you back what the violence of politicians has wrested from you, you have kept in spite of your enemies the treasure of which they wished, above all things, to despoil you. You have kept it, and it has increased and fructified in your hands. Like the Church, your mother, you have grown great under persecution; and whilst the triumphant nations are going to sleep in indifference and are growing sluggish and material in the abundance of their gain, you, the illustrious victims of the past and the present, hold up to the eyes of the world, the inextinguishable torch of faith, and hope, and love. Have courage! Your trials will not last for ever. The works of iniquity crumble and perish. "Vidi impium superexaltatum et elevatum sicut Cedros Libani, et ecce non erat" (Ps. xxxvi.)

Cardinal Perraud, soon after his ordination, joined the Congregation of the Oratory, the Congregation of which Malebranche, Morinus, Thomassin, Richard Simon, Massillon, and Gratry were members; but for many years he occupied the

position of Professor of Church History at the Sorbonne. It is usual to have at least one bishop in the Academy founded by Richelieu, and soon after the death of Mgr. Dupanloup, Mgr. Perraud was elected as one of the forty immortals.

He looked the very picture of a medieval bishop, and it was said that he was cold and distant in his manner. That he was not so to those who knew him well, I could give many proofs ; for Cardinal Perraud was the intimate associate and life-long friend of one who was near and dear to me. During the time he was writing and preparing his book on Ireland they were constantly together ; and when, after upwards of thirty years in the service of the French clergy, his Irish friend was called away to found a college in the United States, I find in the midst of a long correspondence the following letter, which whatever else it may be, is not cold or distant :—

‘ AUTUN, 25 *Juin*, 1884.

‘ DEAR FATHER HOGAN,

‘ Dans quelques jours vous terminerez votre longue et féconde mission au Grand Séminaire de Paris, et vous vous disposerez à franchir les mers pour vous rendre au poste où la Providence vous appelle.

‘ Ne voudrez-vous pas, avant de vous rendre en Irlande, où je sais que vous devez aller prendre congé de votre famille venir recommander à Notre Dame de Paray-le-Monial le Séminaire de Boston et me donner en même temps la consolation d’une visite ?

‘ Je serai à Autun toute la première quinzaine de Juillet. Si cette combinaison ne vous paraît pas absolument impossible laissez-moi la joie de vous embrasser et de vous revoir avant que la dynamite ou le choléra aient disposé de nous.

‘ J’ai reçu il y a quelques semaines une lettre de Maxime du Camp. Il est désolé de votre départ.

‘ Votre bien affectueusement dévoué en N.S.

✠ ADOLPHE LOUIS,

‘ *Evêque d’Autun.*

In 1899 he wrote him a long letter to America, telling him that he had been very ill, and was near ‘going over to the majority’ ; and he adds :—

‘ DEAR FATHER HOGAN,—Puisque je n’ai pas été dans l’autre monde je garde quelque espoir de vous revoir dans celui-ci.

‘ Votre bien affectueusement dévoué en N.S.

‘ A. L. Card. PERRAUD, *Ev. d’Autun.*’

And in another not long after, he concludes a business letter with the words :—

‘DEAR F. H.,—Nous reverrons-nous en ce monde ou seulement dans la région superocéanique des réunions définitives ?’

They are both now in the *région superocéanique*, enjoying, I hope and pray, the reward of their labours for the Church which they loved and served so faithfully.

SOCIAL ACTION OF THE ITALIAN CLERGY

MR. BOLTON KING, the well known writer on Italian institutions and history, in his work entitled *Italy To-Day*, gives an interesting account of the work accomplished by the Italian clergy in the revival of industries, co-operative organization, and other forms of social activity :—

‘Their social programme, as drafted at the Congress of Rome in 1894, aims at the building up of the “Christian Catholic Social Order.” It wishes to protect and develop the property of charities and religious corporations as a “reserve treasure for the people;” to protect national and municipal estates, which are to be used for the public good or leased to the poor; to encourage and protect small properties; to promote tenancy reform by long leases and compensation for improvements; to encourage profit sharing; to make usury illegal and regulate the operations of the Stock Exchange; above all, to promote “corporations” both of employers and workmen if possible, of workmen alone if the employers stand aloof. Their municipal programme includes a wage clause in public contracts, a fair wage for employees, fair rents for tenants on municipal or charitable estates, a reduction of local duties on articles of necessity, and a vigorous administration of sanitary and factory laws. But its most important work is independent of State action. It has done little in the towns, but in parts of North Italy it is carrying on a very valuable work among the peasants. It has almost monopolized the Village Bank movement; and, in 1899, could count 800 affiliated banks. It has at least three “Rural Unions” to defend the interests of all agricultural classes, a large number of small friendly societies, a few co-operative stores and co-operative dairies, a Hail Insurance Society, besides some thirty People’s Banks in towns to make credit easy to the small tradesman and artisan, and a central bank at Parma. In the diocese of Bergamo it has carried co-operation among the peasants to a high state of development’ (page 56).

Further on, he says (page 183) :—

' A very remarkable movement has arisen of late years, taking shape in various forms of co-operative activity, which promises to redeem the Italian peasant from his indigence. His first need is to obtain capital on easy terms. Till recently, if he wanted to add to his stock or plant vines or mulberries, or buy new instruments, or seed, or chemical manures, the small farmer, who always lives from hand to mouth, has had to borrow at an interest of from 4 to 12 per cent. per month. Under such conditions any general improvement was of course impossible. We have seen how the Government failed to meet the need. Some of the larger savings banks and People's Banks offered easy loans to agriculturists, but as a rule they required better security than the small farmer could give, and though they have lent a considerable amount to the proprietors and larger farmers they have only here and there reached the peasant. It needed something more popular in its constitution, more adapted to the means of the small man ; and the want has been met by the development of the Village Banks (*casse rurali*). They owe their existence to Dr. Wollemborg, now a Deputy of the Constitutional Left, who, copying in the main the German Raffeisen Banks, founded the first in a Lombard village in 1883. Nine years later, when there were nearly more than sixty of them, the Catholic Congress started a vigorous propagandism in their favour, and since then they have spread with marvellous rapidity. There are now over 800 Catholic, and at least 125 unsectarian, village banks. They are humble institutions, each confined to its own village with a membership usually between twelve and fifty, seldom with a capital of more than £300 or £400, lending little sums (averaging £8) as a rule for three or six months to the small farmers and peasant proprietors, who are the majority of their members. Their working expenses are very low ; they exactly meet the wants of the little farmer, and so prudent is their management that their losses hardly exceed .05 per cent. of their loans. Through a large part of Lombardy and Venezia they have banished the usurer. Exact statistics of their operations are not forthcoming, but two years ago they had a membership of about 19,000 and the Catholic Congress estimated at the same date that its young banks alone had advanced £280,000. In 1897, seventy-three banks in Piedmont lent £50,000, and had deposits exceeding £48,000' (pages 183-4).

Another form of organization is found in the *Consorti Agrari*.

' Their chief business is to supply chemical manures, which are always carefully analyzed, and they have succeeded in reducing their prices from 20 to 50 per cent. Sometimes they

allow credit and are said to have done so without loss. Probably they appeal to the middling rather than to the very small farmer, but so far as figures go they are of even greater importance than the Village Banks. One of the Milanese societies did a business of nearly £36,000 in 1898. The Agricultural Association of Friuli came hardly behind with £30,000. Altogether they sold £760,000 worth of stuff in 1899. Some of them are developing their activities in various directions. They keep high-class rams and bulls, or lend out model implements. They have done much to encourage co-operative dairies and agricultural education, they agitate for a reduction of railway rates; in Venetia they supply good maize as a protection against *pellagra*. Here and there they have made a few essays towards the co-operative sale of farm produce. Their Federation, which has three works for manufacturing chemical manures, sends samples to every parish priest, and affixes in the railway stations tables showing the relative value of fertilizers. So important is their work felt to be that Signor Ferraris has recently proposed that federated "Agricultural Unions" on very similar lines should be established by the State in every district, and that all rural proprietors should be deemed to be at least nominal members. His scheme amounts to a huge national co-operative society, embracing all agriculturists and supplying most of their needs. It would sell them manures and seed, implements and cattle, and work in close co-operation with the travelling teachers of Agriculture. It would provide for agricultural education. It would promote the co-operative manufacture of wine, and butter, and cheese, and olive oil. One branch of its work would be a great bank for agricultural loans at 4 per cent. for which every rural post office would act as an agency; and Signor Ferraris asks that the deposits in the Post Office Savings Bank, amounting to £2,000,000 a year, should form part of its capital. He hopes that the private Savings Banks and the People's Banks should advance an equal amount, and that thus £4,000,000 a year would be put at the disposal of Agriculture. It is a gigantic and attractive scheme, but in spite of what has been done in Prussia, it is extremely doubtful whether any scheme of this kind is desirable or possible in Italy. If the *Consorzi* remain voluntary associations as now, they are more likely to run in wholesome channels than if they are taken under the State's paralysing protection' (page 186).

NEW STATISTICS

IN an article in the February number of the *Nineteenth Century*, Professor J. W. Taylor, of Birmingham University, discusses the question of the declining birth-rate in Great Britain, and calls attention to the method of correcting

official statistics recently introduced by Drs. Newsholme and Stevenson. One of the remarkable things about this new and more scientific method is, according to Professor Taylor, 'the extraordinary position it gives to Ireland as heading European peoples in fertility.'

'Ireland (according to these authorities) has a low crude birth-rate, which becomes one of the highest in Europe, when correction is made for the fact that only 76.5 per 1000 of the population, as compared with 117.0 in England and Wales, are wives of child-bearing age, only 32.5 per cent. of the women aged 15-45 being married, as compared with 46.8 per cent. in England and Wales. . . . The low crude birth-rate of Ireland is owing to the fact that a large proportion of the child-bearing population of Ireland has been transferred to America. Those remaining in Ireland who are of child-bearing age are adding to the population at a much higher rate than the corresponding population of England, as shown by the fact that the corrected legitimate birth-rate of Ireland is 35.6 and that of England and Wales 27.3 per 1000 of population Ireland is chiefly a Roman Catholic country in which preventive measures against child-bearing are banned, and the birth-rate represents in the main the true fertility of the country, while in Germany and in England the birth-rate is the resultant of two forces the relative magnitude of which is unknown, viz., natural fertility and artificial measures against it.'

The following are the concrete results between 1901-1904 :—

		Total per 1000 of Population	Total Legitimate
Bavaria	..	40.37	35.59
Austria	..	38.50	32.84
Norway	..	37.79	35.62
Sweden	..	36.19	32.90
Ireland	..	36.08	35.59
German Empire	..	35.34	32.01
Italy	..	33.71	31.17
Scotland	..	33.38	31.65
Belgium	..	31.01	28.85
England and Wales	..	28.41	27.29
France	..	21.63	19.29

The general results of Professor Taylor's studies are as follows :—

'It is no good trifling with facts—(1) Our birth-rate is steadily declining; (2) this is due to artificial prevention; (3) the illegitimate birth-rate is affected as well as the legitimate,

and from the same cause: therefore, the illegitimate birth-rate is no longer a criterion of morality; (4) this is slowly bringing grievous physical, moral, and social evils to the community.'

In a recent publication of the Goerres-Gesellschaft I find some remarkable tables presented by Dr. Hans Rost of Augsburg. He is inquiring into the natural causes of crime and particularly suicide, and in this connection he studies the relations between crime and alcohol. One of the most remarkable tables which he has made out is that relating to Denmark. Here we find the consumption of alcohol steadily decreasing for sixty years, and with it a corresponding decrease in crime.

	Consumption of Alcohol in litres, per head		Number of Suicides to the million
1831-1840	8.0		103
1850-1854	3.2		107
1860-1864	2.2		86
1871-1875	2.8		70
1881-1885	1.7		67
1886-1890	1.5		66

It is remarkable that the recovery of its political independence has synchronized in Norway with the national recovery from drunkenness.

J. F. HOGAN, D.D.

Notes and Queries

THEOLOGY

ADVENT FAST

REV. DEAR SIR,—As the fast formerly falling on the Saturdays of Advent has been changed to the Wednesdays, may it not be argued that when Christmas falls on Saturday, or on Friday, as in the year 1903, and Saturday is consequently not a fast day, the Wednesday preceding Christmas Day in such years should not be marked a fast day?

SACERDOS.

In the I. E. RECORD, 1880, page 747, and 1881, page 51, his Grace the Archbishop of Dublin, then President of Maynooth, dealt at length with this practical question. We deem it sufficient for present purposes to give the conclusions of his Grace's articles, referring our correspondent to the articles themselves for a full discussion of both sides of the question. The transference of the Advent fast from Saturday to Wednesday was not a translation of the fast of individual days to other individual days, but rather a general transfer of the fast, previously observed on Saturday, to Wednesday, so that every Wednesday falling within Advent thereby became a fast day. This conclusion implies that even though a particular Saturday of any week would not have been a fast day according to the old system, every Wednesday occurring in Advent is a fast day according to the new system, brought into existence by the favourable reply of the Holy See to the request of the Irish Bishops made in 1875.¹

THE FAST AND THE USE OF PORRIDGE

REV. DEAR SIR,—Will you kindly give your opinion in the next number of the I. E. RECORD on the following question

¹ Cf. *Maynooth Statutes*, p. 352.

which has given rise to some controversy? A person who is bound by the fast may take eight ounces of bread, etc., for breakfast. How much porridge can he lawfully take? Can he take only eight ounces of porridge, or can he take as much as eight ounces of meal will amount to when boiled with the necessary quantity of water?

JEJUNANS.

There are two lines of thought to be found in theological works on the question proposed for solution, for while some theologians¹ consider that the Church, in ordering the fast, desires not merely the diminution of nourishment, but also the absence of satiety, others² of equal authority think that the Church regards alone the diminution of nutrition, brought about by the use of a smaller quantity than usual of those foods that are permissible as to quality either by the law itself or by legitimate custom. The former maintain that as much porridge may not be taken at the collation as eight ounces of meal will produce; but the latter hold that it is lawful to take as much as will arise from eight ounces of meal. The opinion of these latter seems reasonable in theory, and is certainly safe in practice on account of the authority of its patrons.

THE USE OF MILK ON FAST DAYS

REV. DEAR SIR,—Now that Lent is not far off I would like to get your opinion on a few points concerning the abstinence from milk. First of all, I take it for granted that as butter is allowed at the collation a person may use milk freely at the same time; secondly, that although butter is not allowed at the smaller collation (of two ounces) milk may be used to colour tea, etc.—say about one of milk to two parts of tea, etc.

Supposing these few points to be correct, I would like to know—1st. May persons who are bound to abstain take milk in tea, etc., as often as they wish during the day outside the two occasions already mentioned? If so, may they use it freely, for example, may it be a fourth of the drink?

2nd. As milk appears to take the place of wine in this

¹ S. Alphonsus, n. 1029; Lehmkuhl, i. n. 1211.

² Genicot, i. n. 437; Berardi, Praxis Cong. ii. n. 1474; Noldin, ii. n. 672; Antonelli, ii. n. 495.

country, and a drink of wine is not a violation of the law of abstinence, may a person drink milk just the same as he would wine, etc. ?

3rd. And supposing that he may not, would you consider the drinking of a cup of it a mortal sin ?

An answer to the above will oblige.—Yours faithfully,

CONFESSARIUS

In replying to the questions of our correspondent it is necessary to draw a distinction between the laws of abstinence and fast. The general law of abstinence prohibits the use of milk during the whole of Lent, but dispensation has introduced a relaxation into these countries, by reason of which only Ash Wednesday, Good Friday, and in some places Spy Wednesday, come under this strict abstinence. On these days milk may not be taken even in tea, and grave matter seems to be the same as in violation of the fast.

The law of fast, as distinct from the law of abstinence, prohibits the use of milk in the same way as it forbids the use of other kinds of food. Hence milk, like butter, may be freely taken at the principal meal, as also at the collation, provided such an amount is not taken as will violate the regulations of custom in regard to quantity. Hence, at this meal milk may be used as an accompaniment of bread, etc., to such an extent that the sum total of nutritious elements consumed does not exceed what is equivalent to eight ounces of ordinary food like white bread. Neither custom nor general dispensation allows milk at the light repast which is usually taken in the evening in Ireland.

There seems to be no difficulty in determining, at least approximately, the quantity of milk which is equivalent in nutritive elements to a given amount of bread, and it is, therefore, easy to find out how much milk is required for grave matter. Taking the analysis of Dr. Parkes as correct,¹ in 100 parts of white bread there are 40 parts of water, 8 of proteids, 1.5 of fats, 49.2 of carbohydrates, and 1.3 of salts ; while in 100 parts of milk there

¹ Chambers's *Encyclopædia*, art. 'Diet.'

are 86.8 parts of water, 4 of proteids, 3.7 of fats, 4.8 of carbohydrates, and .7 of salts. The nutritive elements are proteids, fats, and carbohydrates; so if we eliminate the water and the salts we can find by a simple calculation the amounts of food-stuff in a quantity of bread and in the same weight of milk. Expressed in terms of mechanical potential energy, one ounce of fats equals 351.56¹ foot-tons, one ounce of proteids equals 165.2 foot-tons, and one ounce of carbohydrates equals 151.66 foot-tons; hence one ounce of fats, 2.12 ounces of proteids, and 2.31 ounces of carbohydrates are equivalent to one another in food-stuff. By reducing proteids and carbohydrates to their equivalent in fats we find that in 100 parts of white bread there is an amount of nutrition which equals 26.47 parts of fats, while in 100 parts of milk the nutritive elements equal 7.66 parts of fats; in other words white bread is 3.45 or practically three and one-half times more nutritious than the same weight of milk. It follows that, four ounces of bread over and above the permitted allowance, being grave matter, fourteen ounces of milk are required for the same. In an ordinary breakfast cup of rich milk there are about eleven ounces, and, consequently, more than a breakfast cup of milk is required to constitute grave matter.

As for the axiom: *potus non frangit jejunium*, only those liquids which contain small quantities of nutritive matter can be classed under 'potus.' Water, wine, tea and coffee with a small infusion of milk and sugar, are such, and can, consequently, be taken as often and as copiously as a person wishes. Milk, which contains a large nutritive element, cannot be considered 'potus.' One part of milk to two or three parts of tea is, as it seems to us, too much to allow, still, it is better not to disturb the consciences of the faithful by laying down very rigid lines for them when they are not likely to reach the limits of grave matter, even taking coalescence into account.

Though we have not followed the order of our corres-

¹ The figures given in Chambers's *Encyclopædia* are 151.56, but the context shows that this is a misprint.

pondent, we hope that he will find a reply to all his queries in what has been said.

DELEGATED JURISDICTION TO HEAR CONFESSIONS OUTSIDE THE TERRITORY OF THE DELEGATING AUTHORITY

REV. DEAR SIR,—A bishop or a parish priest can delegate another priest to assist validly at the marriage of subjects outside the diocese or parish. Is the same true of jurisdiction to hear confessions? An answer will oblige.

C. C.

Speaking speculatively, bishops and parish priests can give jurisdiction by which confessions of subjects can be heard outside their territories. A parity with matrimony would go to prove this. But that delegated jurisdiction is of no use in practice, because approbation is necessary for the valid exercise of delegated jurisdiction in regard to confessions of seculars, and that must be obtained from the bishop of the place where the confession is heard. With approbation the confessor receives jurisdiction—from what source we need not examine—whereby he can hear the confessions of penitents who are ‘peregrini’ in the place. Hence a distinct and separate concession of jurisdiction is superfluous.

J. M. HARTY.

LITURGY

QUESTIONS ABOUT BAPTISM, BLESSED EUCHARIST, SCAPULARS, Etc.

REV. DEAR SIR,—I should be very much obliged if you would solve for me, in the I. E. RECORD, the following questions:—

1. *Baptism*.—When godfather of child is not actually present at the ceremony, is it necessary that someone should stand godfather by proxy?

2. If neither godfather nor godmother touches the child during Baptism when water is being poured over the head of infant, does that invalidate their spiritual relationship with the child?

3. In the case of an adult is it proper for the recipient to stand or to kneel while water is being poured?

4. According to Lehmkuhl, care should be taken that the water do not fall from the head of infant into baptismal font. If such be the case, is it proper, whilst holding bowl in order to catch water after it has been poured over child's head, to perform the ceremony over baptismal font, that the water may not drip upon the floor?

5. *Holy Eucharist*.—Do the Rubrics require that in extracting Blessed Sacrament from ciborium, for administration to the sick, that the priest should be vested in cassock, cotta and stole, or is it sufficient to use stole only, thrown over clerical coat?

6. *Indulgence 'In articulo mortis.'* Is confession and contrition followed by Extreme Unction *only* (not with Holy Eucharist), sufficient claim to blessing with indulgence *in articulo mortis*?

7. Is it proper in *all cases* to refuse Holy Communion (*pro tempore*) to one who makes confession after many years away from church, and is in immediate danger of death?

8. Could you let me know in what book I should be able to find the indulgences given, and prayers prescribed, for each and *all* the scapulars?

9. Am I right in supposing that a priest who has privilege of enrolling in all the scapulars, has power also to enroll himself in all these confraternities? If so, what is the formula to be used, when all the scapulars are joined together, and suspended by single ribbon.

JUVENIS.

Some of the queries raised by our correspondent possess more of a Theological than a Rubrical aspect, but as their solution does not involve any serious difficulty, and as they are severally treated of by Rubricists, we shall presume to answer them here.

1. One of the essential conditions for the exercise of valid sponsorship is that the *patrinus* should at least *touch* the infant whose spiritual paternity he wishes to undertake and assume. If the godfather cannot be present in person, he must depute some agent, or procurator, to perform in his name this all-important act. In this case it is the principal who is the true sponsor, and who, consequently, contracts the

impediment of spiritual relationship, and incurs all the other responsibilities attaching to the office of *patrinus*. The view maintaining the necessity of this contact with the infant on the part of the sponsor, either *per se* or *per procuratorem*, is based on the authority of the Roman Ritual, the Canons of the Church, and the Council of Trent, which speak of the *patrinus* as *levans, tenens, suscipiens*, or *tangens*, etc., *baptizatum*. None of these words will be verified, nor will the office connoted by the least exacting of them be discharged, unless there is some kind of contact between the sponsor and child. To be valid, Theologians lay down that this contact must have the following qualifications:—(1) It must be real and physical: a merely momentary, or moral contact is not enough. (2) It must be simultaneous, at least morally, with the actual administration of the Sacrament by the minister. (3) While it is not necessary that contact should take place on the flesh of the infant, yet it must be exercised on some part of the body, and not on the clothes merely, of the *baptizatus*. In a word, the sponsor must perform an act such as, in the estimation of men, may be construed into an equivalent of what is implied by the Latin word *tangens*. The case of an adult is no exception. ‘*Nam ceremonia susceptionis ac sustentationis patrini inducta non est ab Ecclesia ad supplendam corporis imbecillitatem sed ad significandam infantiam et imbecillitatem spiritualem.*’¹ In places where the child is held by the godmother, the godfather is required merely to put his right hand on or under the right shoulder.²

2. If neither godfather nor godmother touches the child, *vel per se, vel per procuratorem*, there is no valid sponsorship, and consequently, no spiritual relationship contracted.

3. The Rubric supposes that the catechumen *stands* while the water is being poured on his head. To facilitate matters for the minister he should ‘incline forward, his head and neck being uncovered, and his hands joined.’³

¹ Sanchez, D. 56, n. 5.

² O’Kane, *Rubrics of Rom. Rit.*, n. 343.

³ O’Kane, n. 372.

4. The basin, or vessel—*pelvis seu bacile*¹—necessary to receive the water which has been poured on the head, should be of sufficiently large dimensions for the purpose. If this is so then it will be impossible for any drops to escape, and it is immaterial whether the vessel is held immediately over the font or beside it. For convenience the latter would seem to be the better way. The water thus used as the matter of the Sacrament should be reverently disposed of, and the basin should be kept exclusively for use in the Baptistry. The construction of modern fonts, which are divided into two compartments, renders the employment of any vessel quite unnecessary.

5. The Rubric on this point² assumes that the Blessed Sacrament is carried to the sick in solemn procession, and therefore directs that the priest be vested in soutane, surplice and stole when he opens the tabernacle. In these countries, where the priest carries the Communion to the sick privately and in ordinary dress, Rubricists³ do not insist on the use of any sacred vestment for the purpose of merely taking the pyx from the tabernacle, unless it be necessary to uncover the ciborium in order to transfer some consecrated particles to a small pyx. In this case the reverence due to the sacred species thus exposed would require that the vestments above prescribed should be used, and also, that two candles should be lighted on the altar whilst the Blessed Sacrament is being transferred from one vessel to another.⁴

6. The *Benedictio Apostolica in articulo mortis* is intended to be the final complement of the consoling rites administered to the departing soul. Since its end is to impart the full remission of all temporal punishment due to sin, the recipient must be actuated by the proper dispositions, comply with the necessary conditions, and, if possible, perform everything the Church requires those to do who are preparing soon to appear before the Tribunal of their God. If it be impossible, owing to the suddenness of the illness

¹ *Rit. Rom. De Bap. Inf.*, c. i. n. 44.

² O'Kane, n. 807.

³ *Rit. Rom. De Com. Inf.* n. 12.

⁴ Wapellhorst, *Comp. Lit.*, n. 284.

and the want of facilities, or to any other cause short of the lack of proper dispositions in the dying person, to administer all the Sacraments, the Apostolic Indulgence may nevertheless be given if it is likely to be useful. 'Iis aegrotis concedi potest qui, etiam culpabiliter, non fuerunt ab inchoato morbo sacramentis refecti, subitoque vergunt in interitum' non vero 'excommunicatis impenitentibus et qui in manifesto peccato mortali moriuntur.'¹ It can be given, therefore, in every case except one of manifest indisposition and impenitence.

7. The Roman Ritual says: 'Fideles omnes ad Sacram Communionem admittendi sunt, exceptis iis qui iusta ratione prohibentur.' Whether there is a reasonable cause for advising a penitent, who gets absolution, to defer Communion, in certain circumstances, for a short time, with a view to securing better dispositions, is a matter that must be left to the prudence and direction of the confessor. Long absence from church and from the practice of religion, is, *per se*, no reason why a person who now comes to confession, and is otherwise quite prepared, may not be admitted at once to the reception of the Blessed Eucharist. On the contrary this very circumstance may sometimes dictate the advisability of receiving the Sacrament of the Altar as soon as possible in order to give proof of a reformed life and obtain grace and strength to persevere in it.

8. Our correspondent will find all the information he wants about scapulars, etc., in Maurel (*Indulgences*, etc.²). He will also find in the Roman Ritual the *formulae* for the blessing and imposition of all the scapulars sanctioned by the Holy See. These *formulae* may not be abbreviated nor can the common form be used without special authorization.³ It was decided by the Congregation of Indulgences that a priest having power to enrol generally (*indiscriminatim*) can invest himself in the scapulars for which he has these general faculties.

¹ S. C. Ind., Sept. 1775.

² Published by Messrs. Gill & Son, Dublin.

³ *Rescripta Auth.* n. 280.

THE BLESSING OF CHILDREN

REV. DEAR SIR,—We hear fairly often of the dedication of children to the Blessed Virgin, or to some saint. On the occasion of such dedication some ceremonies are used, but recurrence to the Roman Ritual, the authorized book in which one might expect to find such ceremonies, gives no *formula*. Can you tell us something of the matter? In so doing, you will oblige,

SACERDOS.

The Roman Ritual¹ contains a number of 'Benedictiones' in the *Appendices*, and we think that our respected correspondent might find among these some one that would be appropriate to the purpose in view. For instance, among the blessings which are not reserved we find the following: 'Benedictio infantis;' 'Benedictio pueri ad obtinendam super ipsum misericordiam Dei;' 'Benedictio puerorum cum praesertim in Ecclesia praesentantur;' 'Benedictio Vestium et Cinguli quae deferuntur in honorem B.M.V.,' and the 'Benedictio ad omnia' which has a kind of universal appropriateness. Supposing, then, that the children are brought to the church on some feast of the Blessed Virgin, or on the feast of the saint to whom they are to be dedicated, and the third blessing above mentioned is employed—some little external solemnity being also added—the result will be a ceremony that will lack neither impressiveness nor appositeness.

Our correspondent, we presume, has heard of the 'Union of the Holy Childhood.' Children may be enrolled in this Association from their tenderest years, and thus placed, in their helpless infancy, under such powerful protectors as the Blessed Virgin, the Holy Angels, St. Joseph, St. Francis Xavier and St. Vincent de Paul. The graces, too, attached to the membership will help to conform them in innocence and all the other virtues to the Divine Infant, and to realize the beautiful characteristics of this Divine Model. The *formula* of initiation into the

¹ Desclée, etc., Rome, 1902.

Union is given in the Roman Ritual among the *Be-
dictiones reservatae*. Authority to establish it may
had from the bishop, and the conditions of mem-
ship are very simple. A small tax is paid by mem-
This goes to assist in the noble and heroic work of bring-
the grace of Baptism and the light of faith to
abandoned infants of pagan parents in heathen countri-

P. MORRISROE

DOCUMENTS

REQUEST FOR MASSES—DECISION OF COURT OF APPEAL.

ON February 5th, in the Appeal Court, consisting of the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Baron, Lord Justice FitzGibbon, and Lord Justice Holmes, judgment was given in the case of *Felix O'Hanlon v. His Eminence Cardinal Logue*.

The appeal was by His Eminence Cardinal Logue against an order of the Master of the Rolls declaring that a gift under the will of the late Ellen M'Loughlin, of Portadown, dated 18th July, 1891, for Masses for the repose of the souls of her late husband, her children, and herself was void, because there was no direction that the Masses should be celebrated in public.


D. F. Browne, K.C. ; *John H. Pigott, and Patrick Walsh*, for the Appellant ; *Samuel Browne, K.C.* and *George Greene*, for the heir-at-law, when ascertained ; *Charles Drumgoole*, for the Plaintiff.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR said :—

In this case Felix O'Hanlon, the trustee of the will of Ellen M'Loughlin, applied by summons to the Master of the Rolls to have the important question involved in the appeal decided, whether a gift for the celebration of Masses for the repose of the souls of her named relatives and herself was a valid charitable gift, though the will contained no direction that such Masses should be celebrated in public. The gift is contained in a direction by the testatrix to her trustees to sell, in the events that happened the leasehold mentioned in the will, 'and to pay over the income of the proceeds from time to time to the Roman Catholic Primate of All Ireland for the time being, to be applied for the celebration of Masses for the repose of the souls of her late husband, her children, and herself.' The Master of the Rolls by his order dated the 13th July, 1905, decided that this gift is void ; and His Eminence Cardinal Logue has appealed. It would have been impossible, I think, for the Master of the Rolls, having regard to the existing decisions, to have made a different order. But we have been asked, and are compelled to reconsider the principle upon which the decisions in the *Attorney-General v. Delany* and the *Attorney-General v. Hall*

rest ; and assuming it to have been now determined in this Court, that a gift for Masses for the repose of the souls of the dead, to be celebrated in public, is a valid charitable gift, to consider further, whether such a gift is valid, though there be no direction for celebration in public ; in other words, whether its validity as a charitable gift does not rest upon far higher grounds than the existence of a direction for public celebration. I have had the advantage of reading the elaborate judgment which will be delivered by the Lord Chief Baron. The Court of Exchequer, presided over by the Lord Chief Baron, decided in the *Attorney-General v. Delany*, that a gift simply for the celebration of Masses was not a valid charitable gift, but the Chief Baron expressed his opinion that such a gift would be valid if there were a direction that the Masses should be celebrated in public. That opinion passed into decision in the case of the *Attorney-General v. Hall* ; and in this Court it did not become necessary for our decisions to go beyond that. I was satisfied myself that the very point before us would arise later, and I have thought that there was no valid reason for differentiating between the two classes of cases. Lord Justice FitzGibbon, however, did not shrink from considering the larger question on principle. He says :—

‘ I find it necessary to look more deeply for the real foundation of the law which the Attorney-General has expressly declined to challenge, viz., that bequests for Masses are valid, in order to see whether it is possible to base their validity upon any principle which will not also establish the charitable char-



provided it be not contrary to morals, and contains nothing contrary to law.

All religions are equal in the eyes of the law, and this especially applies since the abolition in this country of a State Church. Whether the subject of the gift be religion or for an educational purpose, the Court does not set up its own opinion. It is enough that it is not illegal, or contrary to public policy, or opposed to the settled principles of morality. A remarkable illustration is furnished by the decision in *Webb v. Oldfield*, where the gift was for the spread of vegetarian principles—ideas that might, in the view of many, be erroneous and visionary. It may also be treated as settled law that in Ireland a gift for Masses is not illegal as a superstitious use. On that point *Read v. Hodgens* is a binding authority, and the case of the Commissioners of Charitable Donations *v. Walsh* has been treated as a decision to the same effect, though it may well be that a careful examination of the gifts there might show, as pointed out by the Lord Chief Baron, that one gift involved a public celebration, and the other an endowment of religion.

In pre-Reformation times a gift for Masses was valid at common law, and charitable, as the word must be interpreted. In *Attorney-General v. Delany*, evidence was given by Dr. Delany as to the exact nature of a Mass. He states that, according to the doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church, the Mass is a true and real sacrifice offered to God by the priest, not in his own person only, but in the name of the Church whose minister he is. Every Mass, on whatever occasion said, is offered to God in the name of the Church to propitiate His anger, to return thanks for His benefits, and to bring down His blessings upon the whole world. Some portions of the Mass are invariable, and some are variable. Amongst those invariable are an offering of the Host for his own sins and for all present; as also for all faithful Christians, both living and dead; and the sacrifice is offered for the Church and the granting to it of peace, and its preservation. It includes commemoration of the living and commemoration of the dead; and he states that it is impossible, according to the doctrine of the Church, that a Mass can be offered for the benefit of one or more individuals, living or dead, to the exclusion of the general objects included by the Church. When an honorarium is given for the purpose of saying a Mass for a departed soul, the priest is bound to say it with that intention, but that obligation may be

discharged by a mental act of the priest; but it cannot be discharged by the ordinary parochial Mass which he says on Sundays and holidays. Such honoraria for Masses form portion of the ordinary income and means of livelihood of priests, and are generally in Ireland distributed by those to whom the distribution is entrusted, amongst priests whose circumstances are such that they stand in need of the assistance offered.

Such is the evidence as to the exact nature of a Mass, both generally and where a commemoration of named dead is included. It is settled by authority which binds us that where there is a direction to celebrate the Mass in public the gift is a valid charitable one, but that which makes it charitable is the performance of an act of the Church of the most solemn kind, which results in benefit to the whole body of the faithful, and the results of that benefit cannot depend upon the presence or absence of a congregation.

Furthermore, adopting the evidence of Dr. Delany, it seems to me that the bequest of a sum of money for the saying of Masses which cannot be satisfied by the ordinary parochial Mass, and the conferring of honoraria upon the priests who celebrate the Masses, are an endowment of the priest who celebrates this solemn sacrifice, and, therefore, an advancement of religion just as much in principle as the erection of a church in which they might be said, or the endowment of an additional priest to celebrate them. Authority is not needed for the proposition that a gift for such a purpose would be a good charitable one. I think the appeal should be allowed, and the question answered according to the result of our decision.

[We are obliged to hold over the judgments of the Lord Chief Baron, Lords Justices FitzGibbon and Holmes till next month.]

INDULGENCES FOR THE FRANCISCAN ROSARY

EX ACTIS SUMMI PONTIFICIS ET E SECRETAR. BREVIUM

PIUS PP. X.

Ad perpetuam rei memoriam.

**INDULGENTIAE CONCEDUNTUR CHRISTIFIDELIBUS RECITANTIBUS
CORONAM FRANCISCANAM SEPTEM GAUDIORUM B. MARIAE VIRG.**

**Dilectus filius Bonaventura Marrani Ordinis Fratrum Mi-
norum Procurator Generalis impense cupiens ut erga Deiparam**

Immaculatam magis magisque Fidelium cultus augeatur, retulit ad Nos inter multiplices cultus ac pietatis significationes in eandem Beatissimam Virginem consueta, nobilem sane locum obtinere laudabilem eam praxim, ut peculiari Corona Septem devote recolantur Gaudia, quibus Deipara in Annuntiatione, Visitatione, Partu, Adoratione Magorum, Inventione Filii, huius Resurrectione et ipsius Divinae Matris in coelum Assumptione in Deo Salutari suo mirabiliter exsultavit. Hinc factum esse, ut decessores Nostri Romani Pontifices, non modo speciale Festum Septem Gaudiorum Beatæ Mariæ Virginis cum officio ac Missa propria agendum plurimis in locis permiserint; verum etiam Fratribus et Sororibus Ordinum Seraphici Patris Francisci Assisiensis, quos inter ipsa devotio maius incrementum reperisse noscitur, Indulgentiam Plenariam, pluries vel eadem die lucranda, benigne concesserint. Verum idem dilectus filius Procurator Generalis Minorum Fratrum animo perpendens devotionem erga Septem Beatæ Mariæ Virginis Gaudia nullo adhuc spirituali lucro cunctis Fidelibus communi esse exornatam; probe autem noscens eandem Gaudiorum Coronam publice in ecclesiis ipsiusmet Ordinis cum aliorum Fidelium interventu recitari, Nos enixis precibus flagitavit, ut huic Septem Gaudiorum Virginis Coronæ, prout iam concessum fuit Coronæ Septem Virginis eiusdem Dolorum. Plenarias nonnullas ac partiales Indulgentias vel ab omnibus Fidelibus rite lucrandas adiungere de Apostolica Nostra benignitate dignaremur. Nos autem quibus antiquius nihil est neque magis gratum, quam ut per universum orbem Fidelium pietas erga Virginem Immaculatam latius propagetur, et Divina Mater in Gaudio non minus quam in Dolo admirabilis, pari a christiano populo recolatur obsequio, votis hisce piis ultro libenterque annuendum existimavimus. Quæ cum ita sint, de Omnipotentis Dei misericordia ac Beatorum Petri et Pauli Apostolorum eius auctoritate confisi, omnibus et singulis Fidelibus ex utroque sexu, qui publicæ recitationi Coronæ Septem Gaudiorum Beatæ Mariæ Virginis apud Ecclesias ubique terrarum existentes trium Ordinum Seraphici Patris habendæ, adstiterint, easdem tribuimus Indulgentias, quas Fratres et Sorores eiusdem Ordinis, quibuscum sunt in recitatione sociati, promerentur. Insuper iisdem Fidelibus admissorum confessione rite expiatis et Angelorum pane refectis, qui Coronam eandem quotannis tum Festis

cuiusque e Septem Gaudiis, cum potioribus Beatae Mariae Virginis Festivitatibus, vel quovis die intra respectivi Festi octiduum, ad cuiusque eorum lubitum eligendo pie recitent, quo ex iis die id agant, Plenariam; et iis, qui singulis anni Sabbatis Coronam eandem recitare consueverint uno cuiusque mensis die, ad lubitum pariter eligendo, dummodo vere ut supra poenitentes et confessi ad Sacram Synaxim accedant, etiam Plenariam; tandem iis qui memoratam Coronam retineant, illamque frequenter in vita percurrerint, in cuiuslibet eorum mortis articulo, si vere poenitentes et confessi ac Sacra Communionem refecti, vel quatenus id facere nequiverint, saltem contriti nomen Iesu ore, si potuerint, sin minus corde devote invocaverint, et mortem tamquam peccati stipendium de manu Domini patienti animo acceperint, similiter Plenariam omnium peccatorum suorum Indulgentiam et remissionem misericorditer in Domino concedimus. Praeterea ipsis Fidelibus ex utroque sexu, ubique terrarum degentibus, qui contrito saltem corde aliis per annum Beatae Mariae Virginis festis diebus Coronam eandem recitent, de numero poenaliū dierum in forma Ecclesiae solita trecentos annos; et iis qui id agant diebus de praeccepto festivis, ducentos annos; quoties vero Coronam ipsam quocumque alio anni die persolverint, toties illis septuaginta annos totidemque quadragenas; iis tandem Fidelibus qui Coronam memoratam Septem Virginis Gaudiorum apud se fideliter retinentes, eamque frequenter recitantes, quodvis pietatis opus in Dei honorem, vel in spirituale aut temporale proximorum utilitatem item contrito corde exercuerint, sive in honorem Septem Deiparae Gaudiorum Angelicam Salutationem septies recitaverint, de numero similiter poenaliū in forma Ecclesiae solita, quoties id agant, decem annos expungimus. Porro largimur, ut excepta Plenaria Indulgentia in mortis articulo lucranda, Fidelibus ipsis, si malint, liceat Plenariis supradictis ac partialibus Indulgentiis functorum vita labes poenasque expiare. Verum praecipimus, ut in omnibus supradictis pietatis operibus rite exercendis Coronae Gaudiorum Virginis a Fidelibus adhibendae, sint a Ministro Generali pro tempore Ordinis Fratrum Minorum, vel ab alio Sacerdote sive saeculari, sive regulari, per ipsum deputando, in forma Ecclesiae solita, servatisque servandis, benedictae. Contrariis non obstantibus quibuscumque. Praesentibus perpetuis futuris temporibus valituris. Volumus autem ut praesentium Litterarum authenticum ex-

emplar transmittatur ad Indulgentiarum Congregationis Secretariam, alioquin praesentes nullae sint : utque item praesentium Litterarum transumptis seu exemplis, etiam impressis, manu alicuius Notarii publici subscriptis et sigillo personae in ecclesiastica dignitate constitutae munitis, eadem prorsus fides adhibeatur, quae adhibeatur ipsis praesentibus si forent exhibitae vel ostensae.

Datum Romae apud Sanctum Petrum sub annulo Piscatoris die XV Septembris MCMV, Pontificatus Nostri Anno Tertio.

Pro Dno. Card. MACCHI.

NICOLAUS MARINI, *Subst.*

Praesentium Litterarum authenticum exemplar transmissum fuit ad hanc Secretariam Sacrae Congregationis Indulgentiarum Sacrisque Reliquiis praepositae.

In quorum fidem, etc.

Datum Romae ex eadem Secretaria die 18 Septembris 1905.

L. ✠ S.

DIOMEDES PANICI, Archiep. Laodicen., *Secret.*

NOTICES OF BOOKS

LIFE OF ST. ALPHONSUS DE' LIGUORI, Bishop and Doctor of the Church, Founder of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer. Written in French by Austin Berthe, Priest of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer ; edited in English by Harold Castle, M.A., Priest of the same Congregation. Dublin : Duffy & Co., Ltd., 1905.

SPIRITUAL writers agree that the reading of the lives of the saints is most useful. The saints are the Gospel in practice, and the heroism of their virtues humbles us. Saint, however, differs from saint. So, too, do the authors of their lives. We have under consideration the Life of one who lived nearly a century ; who was brought into contact with every class of society ; who was so powerful in word and work, and who, after a long life of spotless innocence and astounding industry, has had placed on his head one of the brightest diadems of glory. But this is not enough. We need, moreover, a scholar who knows how to select from superabundant materials just those things which enables him to give a perfect portrait of the man and the saint. We venture to say, that for judicious selection, for interweaving of incidents, for the formation of his pictures, for each chapter is a picture, few will surpass Father Berthe. He makes us live with the Saint, and our interest in him, in his work and sufferings, and humiliations and triumphs, grow with every page we read.

The late Cardinal Parocchi was so charmed with Father Berthe's book, that he wrote to him, ' The Saint is profoundly studied in your Life, and from every point of view.' He then mentions how he was an example to seculars, to priests, and bishops. ' You present,' His Eminence continues, ' to us an ascetical writer of the highest order, who knew how to select from the rich stores of his predecessors the most safe rules illustrated by examples, enriched by tradition making accessible to the people things which before were the patrimony of priests and religious. You give us, Rev. Father, an apologist of our faith in times full of impiety, but above all you give us the Doctor of Morals, declared such by the Apostolic

See, recognized as such and venerated by the whole world.' He then refers to attacks made by enemies of holiness and truth, on one whose life was most innocent, and who would die rather than tell an untruth, and concludes : ' All this, Father Berthe, is luminous in your work, which I desire to see translated into every language in Europe.' The author was honoured by a Brief from the late Holy Father, Leo XIII, and the Italian edition is dedicated to Pius X.

It is not easy to give in a short review an idea of a work which runs into 1,600 pages. Let us begin with a description of the Saint :—

' Alphonsus was middle height, but his head was somewhat large and his complexion fair. He had a broad forehead, a beautiful eye a little blue, an aquiline nose, a small mouth, pleasant, and rather smiling. . . . His voice was musical and clear, and however large the church, or how long the mission, it never failed him, not even in extreme old age. His appearance was very dignified, with a manner both grave and weighty, yet mingled with good humour, so that he made his conversation pleasant and agreeable to all, young and old. His gifts of mind were admirable. His intellect was acute and penetrating, his memory ready and tenacious, his mind clear and well arranged, his will effective and strong. These are gifts which upheld the weight of his literary undertakings, and did so much for the church of Christ.

' His temperament was irascible rather than phlegmatic, but by the dominion of his virtue he made it peaceable and gentle beyond belief. Always recollected he was master of all the movements of his soul, and from the time when he gave himself altogether to God (1723) he was never seen to be surprised by passion, being able to open or shut at will the door of his own heart. He was an enemy of a pleasant and easy life, yet the more austere he was with himself, the kinder and more compassionate was he with others.'

To life in the bosom of a model family succeeded his life as lawyer, as cleric, and then as Priest. In each case the author is able to give us the rules that regulated the conduct of Alphonsus. The lawyer, the Saint says, ' is bound to thoroughly study the evidence, so as to put the case in the best way, and he must do this with as much care as though his own interests were at stake (page 9, No. 3). . . . Justice and probity should be the lawyer's two companions, and he should regard them as the apple of his eye ' (No. 7).

. After his unprecedented success as a lawyer comes his conversion, which the author gives in his chapter, 'The Road to Damascus' (chapter iii.) ; and a little later his ordination. In chapter vi., 'The Sacred Fire,' we have the resolutions of the young priest, starting with, 'I am a priest ; my dignity is above that of the angels ; my life therefore should be one of angelic purity, and I should strive that it should be so, by every possible means ;' and ending, 'I am a priest ; it is my duty to inspire others with a love of virtue and glorify the eternal priest, Jesus Christ' (page 41).

Speaking of his works, the reader will find a careful description and appreciation of all that are more important, and although Father Berthe is sometimes, perhaps, a little too long, he is always interesting, for he gives us the stand-point of the Saint. This is particularly true of the Saint's long fight for his moral teaching, in which he had to defend himself against friends as well as open enemies.

A glance at the table of contents reveals the order and variety of the matter. For example, in Vol. ii., after his consecration, we have, 'A General Mission,' 'Reformation of the Seminary,' 'Pastoral Visitations ;' and then comes 'The Famine,' which bade fair to destroy everything. Then we have 'Reformation of Morals,' 'Promotions,' 'Sacred Functions,' from which we pass to 'Father Patuzzi,' or his great combat for his theology. The chapters in Vol. i., 'The Rector Major,' 'The Golden Days,' 'The Saviour of Souls,' are charming. One sees everywhere the greatness of Alphonsus' soul. Whatever was of interest to the Church and souls was full of interest for him, as will be seen in the chapter on the suppression of the Society of Jesus, in his letter to the Cardinals after the death of Clement XIV (page 358), and his correspondence, in his old age, with the Abbé Francis Nonnotte (page 446). The aged saint was in desolation to find the efforts of this noble priest so hampered in Paris, that he had to get his refutation of Voltaire printed in Geneva. When the Saint heard this, he exclaimed :—

'O God ! in Paris amongst these professors there is not one to stand up against so great a monster, and such an enemy of religion and the Church. And the refutation of his errors has to be printed not in Paris, but in Geneva ? Alas, for us, the authority of the Church has come to such a pass in Paris that it cannot confront an unbeliever, and repress his audacity ! Poor

Archbishop! Poor Church! This sin certainly will not go unpunished. Poor France! I weep for thee, and for so many poor innocent souls, who will be overwhelmed in thy calamities.'

This zealous priest wrote, in 1783, to a friend, about the last letter he had received from our Saint. 'I cannot describe the deep feeling with which the little letter sent me by our holy Bishop, Mgr. Liguori, filled me. I look on him as the Simeon of the Gospel, to whom the Holy Ghost has made known such high mysteries. . . .'

The Saint's own great trials did not even lessen his interest in the Church, and God alone knows how great those were. We are prepared for them in chapter vi. (page 463), 'The Hush before the Storm.' The storm itself is described in the chapters that follow; but it was more than a storm, it was a tragedy, and one can say that Alphonsus died on the Cross. The heart that is not moved by the sufferings of this great man must be hard indeed—and never did a word of complaint against those who were the agents escape his lips.

The editor has added valuable Appendices. The first gives notes and corrections, the second an admirable Chronological Table, the third, Missions given by the Saint, fourth a list of Confessions of the holy Founder's companions; fifth, Letters used in the Life. Then follows the most complete Alphabetical Index. Besides a very full Table of Contents there is an Alphabetical Index in each volume.

The author, the editor, and his helpers, have had at their disposal all the sources of information, with the result that we have now, in English, a standard life of this great Doctor of the Church.

THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIANITY: AN Examination of the more Important Arguments for and against Believing in that Religion. By Lt.-Col. W. H. Thurton, D.S.O. London: Wells, Gardner, Darton & Co., Ltd. Fifth edition (revised), 1905.

PREVIOUS editions of this excellent volume have been warmly welcomed by leading organs of almost every Christian denomination, and we are glad to be able to add a few words to the chorus of commendation it has received. After reading the

book our general impression is, that it would be difficult within the same compass to present the fundamental arguments in favour of theism and of Christianity in a simpler or more solid and convincing way than Colonel Thurton has done. His reasoning and scholarship leave little to be desired ; the straightforward directness with which difficulties are met, and their value allowed, adds considerable force to his argument ; while the style, which is calm and unpretentious, is in thorough keeping with the general moderation maintained. We are all the more gratified with the unusual merit of the book, as it comes from the pen of a layman. It is not the kind of book that will altogether satisfy the advocates of the *new* Apologetics ; but we are old-fashioned enough to believe that, side by side with whatever is useful in the new, the substance of the old Apologetics must be retained.

P. J. T.

ADDRESSES TO CARDINAL NEWMAN WITH HIS REPLIES, etc.
1879-81. Edited by Rev. W. P. Neville (Cong. Orat.)
London : Longmans, 1905.

THE publication of a volume like this may appear to some to be uncalled for, and in the case of any other than Newman we should be inclined to agree with that view. But in his case, we believe the public is sufficiently interested in everything connected with the great events in his career to welcome a memorial like this, of one of the most notable of those events—his elevation to the College of Cardinals. To Newman himself, after all he had passed through, it must have come as a great triumph and a glorious vindication, to receive the very highest and strongest pledge of trust and esteem and approval which the Head of the Church could bestow ; and we want to know, as this volume enables us to know, how the Catholic world received the news of his elevation, and more especially how he himself bore the burden of his honour—what thoughts and feelings were uppermost in his mind, and rose to his lips on the occasion.

Admirers of Newman will come away from a perusal of his replies in this volume, with a heightened admiration for the purity and simplicity of his character.

P. J. T.

DEVOTION TO THE SACRED HEART OF JESUS. By Rev. H. Noldin, S.J. Authorized translation from the German. Revised by Rev. W. H. Kent, O.S.C. New York : Benziger Bros., 1905.

WE are glad to welcome this valuable addition to our English literature on Devotion to the Sacred Heart. It is intended specially for priests and candidates for the priesthood, and represents the substance of instructions on this devotion given by the author to the students under his charge in the theological seminary at Innsbruck. Father Noldin is widely and favourably known for his excellent work in the department of Moral Theology, and his name will be enough to recommend this volume to those who know him as a theologian. Priests and students will find in the body of the work just the kind of material they are often in search of, to aid them in preparing their own instructions to the people on the nature and object of this devotion, and the grounds and motives for its practice ; and in the Appendix they will find a good deal of useful subsidiary matter. We do not hesitate to recommend this little volume to our readers.

P. J. T.

THE SPIRIT OF SACRIFICE AND THE LIFE OF SACRIFICE IN THE RELIGIOUS STATE. From the original of Rev. S. M. Giraud, Mss. Priest of our Lady of La Salette. Revised by Rev. Herbert Thurston, S.J. New York : Benziger Bros., 1905.

THIS volume is a treatise on the religious life viewed as a life of sacrifice. Part I. explains various motives on the practice of the life of sacrifice in the religious state, and points out the excellence of that practice. In Part II. the novitiate ; in Part III., the religious vows ; and in Part IV. the community life are dealt with in detail, in such a way as to exhibit every duty and circumstance of the religious life in its relation to the spirit of sacrifice. The book is instructive and edifying, and will doubtless be welcomed by those to whom it is addressed. To people living in the world, and even to non-Catholics, who desire to understand the true inward spirit of the religious life, this book may safely be recommended. The style is better than in many works of the kind, and the translation reads very well. The publishers also have done their part satisfactorily.

P. J. T.

SUMMA THEOLOGICA AD MODUM COMMENTARII IN AQUINATIS SUMMAE. Auctore L. Janssens, S.T.D. Tomus VI. : Tractatus De Deo Creatore et De Angelis. Friburgi Brisgoviae : Herder (pp. xxxiv. + 1,048).

FATHER JANSSENS has already done so much well-known work for Theology, it is almost needless to state that the present volume, the title of which sufficiently indicates its subject-matter, is replete with deep thought and painstaking research. The author accommodates to modern needs the *Summa* of St. Thomas—a work for which the theological world will be grateful to him.

In view of the fact that Father Janssens now holds the responsible position of Secretary to the Biblical Commission, the part of his work that is of greatest interest to our readers is his chapters on the Mosaic Cosmogony. He begins his Scriptural discussion by laying down some general principles which he intends to follow, the chief of which is that it is not necessary that the sacred writer, even whilst under the influence of divine inspiration, should be free from error in regard to what he writes about matters which the Holy Ghost does not directly intend. In narrating, for instance, the wonderful story of Josue, prolonging by prayer the light of day that victory might be gained, the sacred writer could not merely, by accommodating his mode of speech to the scientific knowledge of the day, state that 'the sun stood,' but could also have thought, while he wrote these words, the Copernican theory to be true, and the Heliocentric teaching false. Father Janssens does not explain how this principle can be reconciled with the Encyclical *Providentissimus Deus*.

The learned author, then, proceeds to examine critically the text of Genesis, the historical evolution of Catholic interpretation of the Hexaemeron, and the principal opinions which hold the field in present-day criticism. In performing this last task he deals with two broad divisions of thought—the historical theories and others. Speaking of the historical theories he examines the views of those who hold the literal interpretation of six natural days of twenty-four hours each, and who explain the different strata now existing within the earth's surface by an appeal either to the upheavals of the flood or to the convulsions of nature which took place between the events narrated in the first and those told in subsequent verses of Genesis.

He afterwards discusses and carefully weighs the arguments for and against the theories which maintain that the days of Genesis are long periods of time.

Passing to the *non-historical* theories of the creation, Father Janssens divides them into *ideal* interpretations which are explained with or without visions, and *traditionalist* opinions whether these connect the Biblical Cosmogony with Gentile myths or explain it independently of them. He notes, with justice, that the ideal and traditionalist interpretations in his dissertation on traditionalist views rather supplement than contradict one another. He subjects to criticism the opinion of Father Lenormant, that early Gentile myths are found in a purified state in the Mosaic story of Creation ; and also the more definite theory of Father Lagrange that the Biblical Cosmogony contains vestiges of myths deprived, however, of their mythical character, and that it holds an intermediate place between the Babylonian Cosmogony which is Pantheistic and the Phœnician which is Materialistic, the Mosaic narration showing a substantial divergence which can be attributed only to revelation and inspiration.

In putting forward his own view which is traditionalist, Father Janssens holds that the Biblical story is not derived from the Cosmogony of Gentile nations, but contains vestiges of a remote tradition consigned to tablets which were preserved amongst the Chaldeans, and brought by Abraham into the land of Canaan. This ancient tradition was based on primitive revelation, traces of which remained with the Babylonians and Phœnicians, and which so coloured their myths that these must of necessity have had points of contact with the Mosaic story of Creation. The Chaldaean tradition was, moreover, affected by the astronomical, geological, and zoological theories of ancient days, so that the Biblical narrative derived from it could not but have had some similarity with the Cosmogonies of those Gentile peoples who held the same scientific views.

The remaining parts of Father Janssens' monumental work show the same thorough grasp of principles and the same commendable research which his readers will find in his Scriptural discussions. We warmly congratulate him on the success of his laborious undertaking.

J. M. H.

FR. DENIFLE, O.P. Dr. Grabmann. Mainz: Kirchheim. 1905.

THE numerous admirers of the deceased will be grateful for this interesting sketch. It is from the pen of one who knew him well, Professor Grabmann of Eichstatt. Though the pamphlet is small (62 pages, 8vo), it contains a most valuable account of Denifle's labours in palæography, criticism, history, and biography. We may say that, putting aside his many essays and articles of which only a summary could be given, all his large works are fully described—from those on the German Mystics, Tauler, Suso, Eckhart, etc., and his *History of the University of Paris*, *History of the Hundred Years' War*, etc., to his last publication, *Luther und Luthertum*, the book which caused such commotion in Protestant circles throughout Germany. It is the record of an extraordinary savant's life, and shows that Denifle more than deserved the veneration in which he was held by all the learned bodies of Europe. The graceful tribute of the University of Cambridge (page 55) is sure to be read with pleasure.

R. W.

PARIS MANUSCRIPT OF ST. PATRICK'S LATIN WRITINGS.

By Newport J. D. White. Dublin: Hodges & Figgis

Price 6d.

FROM a review of his former work in the *Analecta Bollondiana*, the Editor learned that one of the oldest MSS.—that of St. Patrick's *Confession*—was to be found in the Bibliothèque Nationale, at Paris. We are surprised that a man who had set himself to give a correct edition of St. Patrick's writings should have been ignorant of such an important fact. But, unlike many other writers, Dr. White paid some attention to his reviewers, and immediately set himself to repair the defect in his previous work. The result of his examination of the Paris MS. is contained in the present booklet, and we heartily commend it to all who are interested in arriving at the true text of our Apostle's *Confession*.

J. MACC.



THE FOUNDATION OF UNBELIEF

THE Bampton Lectures of Dean Mansel,' says a writer in an English review, 'delivered in the University of Oxford in the year 1859, will be long remembered by those who were then in residence.'¹ Nor is it strange that this should be so. Clear, wise, apparently logical, they made sceptics of many whose faith they were meant to strengthen. In these courses, intended as they were to uphold the dogmas of Christianity, agnostics profess to find a complete and answerable presentation of their views. Hence, a word put them here, by way of introduction, may not be out of place.

The period of their delivery was a critical one for the Protestant Church in England. The philosophic theories of previous writers, of men such as Locke and Berkeley,

Hume and Kant, in the hands of their less reverent disciples, were working havoc with the traditional beliefs of the educated classes. Revelation and supernatural religion were being openly assailed by men who, nevertheless, admitted the existence of a God and the necessity of divine worship. In their difficulties, the orthodox anxiously looked around for a champion who might check the onward march of naturalism by a brilliant exposure of the weakness of its position, and of the fallacies

¹ *The Month*, July, 1882.

by which it was supported. Their choice fell upon Dean Mansel, and, as the results showed, no choice could have been more unfortunate. From that day Oxford ceased to be, what it always was, the home of conservatism and, comparatively speaking, of orthodoxy. It has since 'been undoing one by one, whether deliberately or under compulsion, the ties which bind it to the Church of Christ.'¹

The method of defence adopted by the learned lecturer was well calculated to secure the attention of his audience, and in the hands of a skilled philosopher might have proved completely successful. He undertook to show that the very same difficulties by which unbelievers sought to overturn the Christian revelation, might be urged with equal force against all who ventured any positive statement regarding God. You reject, he argues, the Christian dogmas, because your reason cannot perceive their truth; nay, rather, it perceives that they are contradictory and mutually destructive. But examine your own concepts regarding the divine nature and attributes—concepts which you have independently of revelation—and you will find that they, too, labour under the same defect. They lead only to confusion. Nor in your despair of finding truth can you turn to Atheism as the safe harbour, the only secure position for poor human intelligence, for the atheist but involves himself in difficulties even more insurmountable.

Yet, the escape from this dilemma must be evident to any thoughtful observer. God does not wish to be known by human intelligence. He is entirely outside its range; and when, in their mad thirst for knowledge, men endeavour to unveil Him by their natural powers they are acting as inordinately, and, therefore, as unreasonably as they would be, were they to give full rein to their animal passions. The great Creator is separated from us by an impassable gulf which no human powers can ever bridge. Hence, at the very outset, men must distrust their reason and accept faith as the only safe guide towards a knowledge of the Divinity. 'Of the nature and attributes of

¹ University Sermon, 4th June, 1882—Canon Liddon (*apud* the *Month*).

God in His Infinite Being,' the Dean declares, 'Philosophy can tell us nothing; of man's inability to apprehend that nature, and why he is thus unable, she tells us all that we can know and all that we need know.'¹

The Dean was unequalled in expounding the difficulty, but his reply could not bear analysis. There were men in England who had long been thinking that the dogmas declaring the nature and attributes of God were but the delusive figments of the human imagination, and that He could not be known, Who, if He exists, must be outside the field of mortal cognition. Imagine their surprise when they heard expounded from the Oxford pulpit, as they themselves could never have expounded them, their own most cherished convictions. They were quick enough to perceive that, by elevating faith at the expense of reason, the learned Dean had destroyed the very foundations of faith itself, and prepared the way for denying all knowledge of God. Professor Huxley boldly proclaimed that Agnosticism, as he loved to call his system, in memory of the Athenian Altar to the Unknown God,² was the only possible position for a scientific man. Experience, he contended, was the only guide to knowledge, and God does not fall within the range of experience. But, though Huxley is the most violent, he is by no means the ablest champion of the new belief. The writings of Herbert Spencer, interesting and attractive as they undoubtedly are, have contributed most to its dissemination amongst the English people. Hence it may be useful in the beginning to briefly sketch the system which he propounds.

Spencer himself tells us that his philosophic theory on the nature of human knowledge logically forced him to join the Agnostic ranks.³ On the one hand, against

¹ Lect. viii., p. 26.

² ἀγνώστου θεοῦ (Acts xvii. 23).

³ And this feeling is not likely to be decreased but to be increased by that analysis of knowledge which, while forcing him into agnosticism, yet continually prompts him to imagine some solution of the Great Enigma which he knows cannot be solved.—*Nineteenth Century*, Jan. 1884, p. 12.

About this article of Mr. Spencer, Frederic Harrison writes: 'It is the last word of the Agnostic Philosophy in its controversy with Theology. That word is decisive.'—*Nineteenth Century*, March, 1884 (*apud* Ward's *Witnesses to the Unseen*.)

the idealists, he maintains that man can know of the existence of an external world, of something outside and beyond himself. Unless this be conceded physical science can be but a dream. On the other, believing as he does that 'mind and nervous action are the subjective and objective faces of the same thing,'¹ he cannot consistently admit those higher intellectual operations of abstraction and intuition for which the followers of Aristotle and the schoolmen contend. According to him, then, human knowledge is limited to the very narrow field of sense-perception.

Yet, even with this limitation he is not satisfied. He contends furthermore that man's cognitive faculties cannot stretch out as if beyond the man himself into the external world, and grasp things as they really are in themselves, with their several attributes, and powers, and qualities, and relations. Man can know only his own sensations, or, to put it more philosophically, his own mental phenomena, which must necessarily, however, be produced by some external agent; he can compare these and realize their various relations of co-existence or sequence—that when one appears another should be present or immediately succeed, but about the objective agents or their relations he can never know aught for certain.² The external reality is known and spoken of in terms of his own diverse states of consciousness, which are to the object outside as algebraic symbols to the quantities they represent; and, thus, human knowledge is relative not absolute—of subjective phenomena, not of external realities. 'What we are conscious of as properties of matter, even down to weight and resistance, are but subjective affections produced by objective agencies which are unknown and unknowable.'³

Yet, we are forced to conclude 'that behind every group

¹ *Psychology*. Pt. ii., p. 140.

² Spencer's system is but a scientific statement of the principles of the whole Agnostic School. Thus, Huxley says: 'It admits of no doubt that all our knowledge is a knowledge of states of consciousness.'—(*Lay Sermons*, p. 373.)

³ *Psychology*, chap. 'Relativity of Feelings.'

of phenomenal manifestations' there is some 'persistent reality, which itself 'remains fixed amid appearances that 'are variable,' and 'which must forever remain inaccessible to consciousness.'¹ Thus, for example, walking in the garden on an evening in autumn we pluck an apple from the tree that overshadows our path. As we hold it in our hands, we are conscious of a certain form and colour, of a certain weight, and, it may be, of a certain taste and smell. If we leave it outside and come again in an hour, in a day, in a week, or a month, exactly the same impressions are produced. May we not, then, safely conclude that behind these phenomena and producing them there must be some permanent reality, nay, more, that for every different 'cluster' of sensations there is a corresponding object which holds them together, or, at least, a power which energizes differently, and still is uniform in its differences? Thus, we arrive at our notions of different bodies, and by a more universal classification of phenomena at our notion of matter.

Nor is this the ultimate stage; for what is matter, in itself, but a mode, by which the unknown and unknowable agent manifests itself to our consciousness? This agent we indicate by the symbol Force, drawing our inspiration from an analysis of our own activity. And so, the conclusion is inevitably forced upon us, that the world and all its countless phenomena are but the ever varying manifestations of an unknowable force, energizing unceasingly and everywhere, which is outside us and still within us according to its different modes. 'Consequently, the final outcome of that speculation commenced by the primitive man is, that the power manifested throughout the universe distinguished as material is the same power which in ourselves wells up under the form of consciousness.'²

Experience, however, teaches us that the relations between these mental symbols correspond with the relations between the external agents, and this knowledge is sufficient

¹ *Nineteenth Century*, Jan., 1884, p. 10.

² Spencer, in the *Nineteenth Century*, Jan., 1884, p. 9.

for everyday life. Indeed, the true scientist never undertakes to explain what things are in themselves, but, admitting the existence of an individual cluster of phenomena, he merely strives to reduce it to one of the classes already experienced; and as his experiments proceed, he continues to reduce the particular classes to a few which are inclusive of all the rest till, at last, a time comes when he must bow his head and humbly confess that science can bring him no further. Knowledge is *but classification of phenomena*; how, then, could the most universal class be known?

While man is thus engaged, his intellect is being employed in its own proper sphere, and its conclusions can be accepted with certainty; but once he endeavours to pierce the veil which enshrouds the objective world from his gaze, once he strives to conjure up in his mind what it is that lies behind and how it exists in itself, once he dares to transfer, what are in reality the emotions of his own mind, to that which is outside it, he is merely building upon a foundation of sand—he is only leading himself into a hopeless maze of difficulties and contradictions.

It is because he knows this that the really scientific man is willing to spend his energies on the phenomena which lie within his observation, without allowing himself to follow the beckonings of his imagination—contenting himself with knowing that there is some mighty energy outside which manifests itself in his various states of consciousness, but which as it is in reality must ever remain for him unknowable:—

There may be Absolute Truth, but if there is, it is out of our reach. It is possible that there may be a science of realities, of abstract being, of first principles and *a priori* truths, but it is up in the heavens far above our heads, and we must be content to grovel amid things of earth, to build up as best we can our fragments of empirical knowledge, leaving all else to the future.¹

Science admits its inability to comprehend this mighty power which lies beneath phenomena; so, too, should

¹ 'The Prevalence of Unbelief'—the Editor (the *Month*, June, 1882).

religion. By professing to understand something about the nature and attributes of the ultimate reality, and picturing it to its devotees as endowed with magnified human powers, it is only degrading the objects of its worship, and involving its disciples in hopeless contradictions.

Thus, the theist endeavours to account for the world around us by the existence of a Supreme Creator, Himself uncreated, by Whom all things were produced from nothing, yet, creation from nothing is impossible for it is unthinkable.¹ Besides, if this hypothesis were true, He must have created space which was, therefore, at some period non-existent, and space could never have been non-existent because its non-existence cannot be conceived by any process of imagination. Again, the supposition of a self-existing being must necessarily involve the supposition of infinite past time; yet, pile up time how you will, it could not have been infinite—it must have had a beginning. The First Cause, too, if there be a First Cause, should be, as is evident, both infinite and absolute, but how could He possess either attribute, if He be imagined as the producer of the world to which He must necessarily stand in the relation of a producer, and the production of which must have implied some change—of addition or subtraction—in His own mode of being? Furthermore, how could the Supreme Creator possess infinite power and yet be unable to do evil, infinite goodness and yet the cause of sin, infinite justice and yet always full of mercy, infinite freedom and yet living on without change or alteration? Such are a few of the contradictions in which Theism involves its believers, and surely it would be more in accordance with human intelligence and more agreeable to the ultimate reality to honestly confess our ignorance, and bow our heads in silent worship before

¹ Spencer's first principle and 'Ultimate Postulate' is that whatever is unthinkable is not true, and that is true whose contradictory is unthinkable.

that which must ever remain for us the unknown and 'unknowable.'¹

Yet, all things unite in proclaiming the existence of such a power. Unless it be supposed whence are the phenomena of sense whose relations we perceive? Merely relative and symbolic as our knowledge is, does it not necessarily suppose some objective being of which it is the symbol, and must not science in its most advanced stage arrive at that absolute reality which it can never know because it can never classify? Yes. The existence of this ultimate reality 'is the primary datum of consciousness,'² the indefinite and almost imperceptible concept which is supposed by all cognition, and though we are confined to mere phenomena, 'yet the momentum of thought inevitably carries us beyond conditioned to unconditioned existence as this ever persists in us as the body of a thought to which we can give no shape.'³ 'Hence our belief in objective reality, a belief which metaphysical criticism, cannot for a moment shake.' And, thus, 'amid the mysteries which become the more mysterious the more they are thought about, there will remain the one absolute certainty that we are ever in presence of an infinite and eternal energy from which all things proceed.'⁴

There is, then, according to Spencer, a first cause, an ultimate reality, an infinite, absolute and unconditioned existence, but we can never know aught of it except that it is—whether it is personal or impersonal, endowed with intelligence or unintelligent, mind or matter. It is the unknowable. It has nothing to do with us, and in pursuing it we are like the child that for hours vainly pursues its own shadow. It may have some mode of existence far transcending anything which the human imagination can ever conceive, and our clear duty is to recognize that

¹ 'What is knowable,' writes Mr. Balfour, 'Spencer appropriates without exception for Science. What is unknowable he abandons without reserve to Religion. Religion has the "Real," Science the "Intelligible" and "Relative."'—(*Foundations of Belief*, p. 285).

² *First Principles* (Spencer).

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

this is so, to admit that we are incapable of bringing it within the sphere of our cognition, that all our concepts of it—for we cannot help conceiving it—are but the merest symbols in no way corresponding with the reality. This is the true position for a religious man to assume. Better any day an honest confession of ignorance than an absurd pretence of knowing what can never be known.

Before discussing the merits of a system, which, in the hands of a writer of Spencer's ability, must necessarily appear plausible, it might be well to mention that this particular form of error is by no means of recent date, and that even to-day it is rejected as puerile by many of the ablest scientific men. One might think, as the writer was often tempted to think, on hearing the oft-repeated boast that the dogmas of religion were fast crumbling before the triumphal march of science—that some new discovery in Philosophy had been made, or, at least, that all the modern scholars were ranged in the Antitheistic camp—both of which conclusions would be equally misleading. The progress of knowledge has given us nothing new in this matter ; it has only helped to serve up in a more agreeable form what is as old as the days of Pyrrho and his disciples. No doubt, Professor Huxley asserts with more warmth than courtesy, that 'those who believe that God created the world have not yet reached that stage of emergence from ignorance in which the necessity of a discipline to enable them to be judges has as yet dawned upon the mind,'¹ but that we may rightly appreciate the worth of such generalizations we have only to remember that even in England such men as ² Faraday, Lord Kelvin, Professor Stokes, Sir William Siemens, Balfour Stewart, Tait, Sir Robert Owen, Clerk, Maxwell, Mivart have no fear of maintaining that 'the existence of God, the Creator and Preserver, is absolutely evident.'³ Reassured by such trustworthy support from the physical science camp, we

¹ *The Tablet*, Aug. 20, 1881, *apud* Ward's *Philosophy of Theism*, vol. ii., p. 107.

² *Vide* Zahm, *Catholic Science and Catholic Scientists*.

³ *The Unseen Universe*, p. 71, ed. 5, Profs. Stewart and Tait. We have not referred to Catholic Scholars like Cauchy, Ampère, Le Verrier, Biot, Pasteur, Becquerel, Babinet, Faye, etc.

can proceed with more confidence and self-possession to examine the imposing structure built by the ceaseless activity of the man whom agnostics love to call 'our great philosopher,'¹ 'the apostle of the understanding.'²

Though at first sight Spencer's system appears to have at least the merit of consistency, yet on closer examination, one may discover some startling breaks in his chain of argument, bridged over, no doubt, by an imposing phraseology; and, what is still more dangerous for his reputation as a philosopher, not a few inexplicable contradictions. Beginning with the fundamental principle that man can never know aught but the relations of phenomena, and that all else is but a delusion and a dream, he should in very consistency have denied that we can ever know for certain whether any objective reality exists beneath this world of appearances. Indeed, Professor Huxley, in this respect more logical than 'his philosopher,' appears to have accepted this conclusion. Yet Spencer vehemently contends that the existence of an ultimate reality is the primary datum of consciousness, that—

The momentum of thought [whatever it may be in his system] inevitably carries us beyond conditioned to unconditioned existence, as this ever persists in us as the body of a thought to which we can give no shape, [that on the occurrence of certain phenomena, we are compelled by the

only in the better classification of phenomena, how 'could the momentum of thought' carry us beyond conditioned existence into another and a real world? If the human mind has no powers of intuition, if it cannot immediately perceive some judgments as necessarily true for all times and places, why should we be compelled by the very relativity of our thoughts to refer these impressions to a positive cause, or why should they generate in us the notion of real existence? Thus, in direct contradiction to his own most cherished canons, Spencer crosses the boundary of the phenomenal world, and tells us what he sees; he admits that the human mind has the power of abstracting altogether from the individual notes and rising to a true concept of the universal (in this case the Infinite), and he confesses the objective and necessary validity of the judgment which, from its very nature, the mind is forced to pronounce, that whatever begins to be must have a cause.¹

Again, Spencer's fundamental principle is that knowledge is merely symbolic, and without any objective validity. But evidently this very principle itself must either embody an absolute truth or not. If he regards it as absolutely true, then, at the very start, he is guilty of the blunder which he asserts to have been the great blot upon all philosophic systems till the days of his 'Transfigured Realism,' namely, assuming the validity of a metaphysical principle, which must have been received independently of experience, and whose validity can never be verified, because in every attempt to do so its validity is supposed. He thus begins with a certain assumption upon which all his arguments are based, and the logical conclusion he arrives at is that this assumption must be false! If, on the other hand, this principle is only relatively true, as is, indeed, all human knowledge, then why should he have spent himself in 'unifying

¹ Professor Clifford says of Spencer's Theory: 'And, accordingly, he considers that there is something different from our perceptions, the changes in which correspond in a certain way to the changes in the worlds we perceive He attempts to make my feelings give me evidence of something that is not included among them. A careful study of all his arguments has only convinced me over again that the attempt is hopeless.'—(*Atheism*, by Mallock.)

philosophy,' and in issuing a myriad of learned treatises intended to force his conclusions on other men? If human knowledge is only relative, then it may vary not alone for different individuals, but even for the different stages of development of the same individual; so that, for all he can tell to the contrary, each intellect may be at each moment of its existence its own standard of truth, and what is true for one man and for one time may not be so for another. This is the logical conclusion of his system, if he only had the courage to push it to its conclusions; and if it is, his days might have been more profitably spent than in a fruitless endeavour to force the world to accept as truth what were at best his own individual notions. Dr. Mivart may well be pardoned when he speaks of such philosophy as 'intellectual thimble-rigging intended to rob the human mind of its certainty.'¹

Furthermore, if man can know nothing about the external world, how is it possible that Spencer can speak of the relations between the external agents, of the properties of bodies, of Matter and Force. No doubt, in his *Psychology*, he tells us that all these are but the manifestations of the 'Eternal Energy,' but he should be consistent, and not write in other places as if he knew of the existence of different external agents having different powers and relations. Let him say that the friends who hang so anxiously on his words, and whom in private life he reveres, the species of animal life which, as a zoologist, he submits to examination, the chemical compounds which in his laboratory he reduces to their elements, or combines in still more complex masses—let him say that all these, including himself, are but the various manifestations of an unknown agent, and he shall be consistent as a philosopher, but very much out of place as a scientist or as a man. Unless the humorous faculty was but indifferently evolved, the conclusions of Spencer, the philosopher, must have proved an inexhaustible source of amusement to Spencer, the physicist and biologist, during his weary years of labour.

¹ *Truth* (speaking of systems of Idealism).

Again, Spencer indignantly denies to man any intuitive faculty, and has no confidence in the validity of inferences drawn from the phenomena, unless in so far as they can be verified by experiment. Yet, as Dr. Ward¹ so clearly proved against another adversary, his whole system presupposes at least one such power, and the validity of at least one unverified inference. He tells us, for example, that the atmosphere has the property we call weight, and if we ask for a proof, he refers us to the numberless experiments which he has witnessed. If we inquire how he can be certain he ever witnessed such experiments, he can only answer that his memory is unfaltering in its testimony about them ; but, if we ask further, how does he know that the declarations of memory correspond with the past stages of consciousness, and are not rather the delusive constructions of the human brain, he can only reply, as Mill has done, that we cannot go behind memory—we can offer no proof of the validity of its testimony, and we must be content to accept this or give up the pursuit of knowledge. If Spencer trusts his mind in this one department, why should he show himself so suspicious of all its other declarations ?

Besides, ' the uniformity of nature '—the fixity of nature's laws—is, according to Bain,² the most fundamental principle of human progress, and yet how is it perceived by man ? Spencer tells us that a knowledge of the relations of the phenomenal manifestations of the objective reality is sufficient for everyday life, but how are we certain that these relations will ever remain the same ? My memory tells me that on every occasion on which I saw fire applied to gunpowder an explosion followed, every time a vein was pierced blood freely flowed, that on the recurrence of the spring months all things seem suddenly endowed with a new life and energy ; but why should these phenomena necessarily succeed one another, and all human progress supposes such succession ? We can arrive at such a conclusion only by arguing from what was to what must be, and if this process

¹ *Philosophy of Theism.* •

² *Ibid.*

of inference be valid, why should it lead in all other cases only to error and contradictions ?

But, perhaps, the greatest puzzle in Spencer's system is his doctrine about the unknowable ; for, ' if the momentum of thought carries us beyond the world of phenomena,' how can he assert that the objective reality is unknown ? Though our concept of it must necessarily be imperfect, yet it is ever present before our minds, and we are absolutely certain of its existence. But might not the same process which led Spencer thus far lead him with equal security a step further ? If the presence of his own mental phenomena forced him to admit the existence of an ultimate reality, why may not the presence of different ' clusters ' of phenomena compel him to assert that the objective reality is modified in this or that particular way ? There is the same data for arriving at the *mode of being* as at the being itself, and if he does not hesitate to swallow the camel, why should he strain out the gnat ? If our concept of it as existing is not a mere fictitious symbol, neither can be our concept of it as existing in this or that particular way. To his credit, however, be it said, it is only in his *Psychology* he clings to such views.

Nor does his acquaintance with the unknowable end here. It is not only the infinite, the absolute, the unconditioned being, the ultimate reality, the first cause, that which underlies all phenomena, and which is manifested in all phenomena, but, he says, ' it is absolutely certain that we are in the presence of an Infinite Eternal Energy from which all things proceed,'¹ It is surely a consoling spectacle to find the philosopher of Agnosticism asserting that there is a Being which must remain for us unknowable, and telling us almost in the same sentence that it is infinite, that it is eternal, that it consists not of several energies but of one, that from it all things proceed, and, consequently, are distinguished. Surely Spencer is not consistent in calling the Being unknowable about which he has such reliable and definite information, unless, indeed, he meant to except himself from the common herd.²

¹ Article, *Nineteenth Century*, January, 1884, p. 12.

² *Ibid.*

These are only a few of the many interesting puzzles in Spencer's system, of which one would naturally desire a solution, but the limits of the present essay preclude a further discussion. Let us now briefly examine the foundation upon which the whole system is built, namely, the author's theory on the nature of human knowledge. Nor will it be thought strange that so much attention should be devoted to this portion of our subject, if his own boastful assertion be borne in mind, that the analysis of human knowledge must ever force a man into Agnosticism.¹ There is very little use in attempting to purify the stream unless we can remove the pollution from its source. Besides, by establishing that man is capable of intellectual acts, which are completely and essentially different from sense-perceptions, and all the combinations of such, and which must, therefore, suppose a power that is far above the sensuous faculties, we shall have proved that there must be in man a substance in which these powers are rooted, which is itself different from matter and all its modifications—a conclusion which, as will be evident later on, is all important in an argument with Spencer.

In his desperate efforts at combining the Idealist with Materialistic Philosophy, he has fallen into the characteristic errors of both systems without the apparent consistency of either. According to his theory, since human knowledge is limited to the world of sensations, of the vivid order or of the faint,² man can have no knowledge of that which has never been so experienced as to make an impression on the human organism, and even the knowledge which he has, is not of the objective things as they are in themselves, but only of subjective phenomena—in other words, it is not absolute but only relative.

As usual, there is so much truth underlying Spencer's main contentions, that one is forced to bewail the intellectual 'thimble-rigging' of the Kantian School of Philosophy.

¹ Frederic Harrison on Spencer's 'Unknowable,' *Nineteenth Century*, 1884, *apud* Ward's *Witnesses of the Unseen*.

² *Vivid* sensations are these which are produced here and now by the external agent. *Faint* sensations are the reproductions of these sensations which have been previously experienced.

as well as the defences of revelation founded upon them, which are equally responsible for driving him into the Agnostic ranks.

Without doubt, it is the common teaching amongst the followers of Aristotle and St. Thomas, that all knowledge is acquired through the senses, but they do not intend to convey by this that the senses are man's highest cognitive faculty, or that sensations are his most perfect intellectual product. It is true that there is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the senses, except, as Leibniz puts it, the intellect itself.¹ The sensitive faculties merely supply the material upon which this higher power works, and any system which pretends to unfold the genesis of knowledge whilst ignoring its existence, is very aptly compared by Dr. Mivart to a production of the play of 'Hamlet' with the Prince of Denmark's part omitted.²

No doubt, too, since truth consists in the relation of conformity between the intellect knowing and the object known, all human knowledge must be essentially relative, and, furthermore, since the perfection with which any power performs its specific operations depends largely on the dispositions, whether internal or external, by which it is well or indifferently fitted, it follows that the accuracy and minuteness of this conformity will vary with different individuals, and at different periods of life, even for the same individual. But though thus relative and varying, it is in all cases a more or less perfect conformity with the objective thing; it is not, as Spencer would have us believe, a mere symbolic representation.

Nor do we assert that men can know things as far as they can be known, that the human mind is like a two-edged sword, reaching unto the division of the soul and of the spirit, of the joints also, and of the marrow. We are not forgetful of the words of Ecclesiastes³: 'As thou knowest not what is the way of the spirit, nor how the bones are joined together in the womb of her that is with child, so thou knowest

¹ *The Great Enigma* (Lilly).

² *Nature and Thought* (Mivart).

³ Chap. xi., verse 5.

not the works of God.' But we do fearlessly assert that human knowledge is not confined to sensations, or the mere reproductions of sensations, and that truth is not measured by subjective and variable standards, but is the conformity of the intellect with the objective reality outside ; that crossing the boundary of the phenomenal world, man can apprehend the realities outside with their several qualities and forms, and powers and relations, and that by observing the operations and interplay of these different bodies, he can comprehend in some measure the nature of that which produces the subjective phenomena, and is itself hidden from the senses.

Fortunately for us, Spencer supplies the weapons for his own refutation. The arguments which he so forcibly urges against the Idealist theories will lose little, if any, of their force when turned against himself. These theories, he asserts, irreconcilable as they are with the postulates of physical science, cannot be entertained by any reasonable man. But will the demands of science be a whit more satisfied with the conclusions at which he arrives ? How the physicist would stare with wonder, were he told that the different substances with which he deals are but the varying manifestations of the same unknowable reality, and that 'the properties of matter, even down to weight and resistance, are but subjective affections produced by objective agencies which are unknown and unknowable.' Physical science, if it supposes anything, must suppose that there exist outside the mind objects numerically and substantially distinct, with certain well-defined forms and powers ; certain clearly marked properties, such as solidity, extension, resistance, and, though in a less degree, certain qualities, such as colour, taste, and smell. Can anyone maintain that when the physicist combines several simple substances to produce some chemical compound, he does not clearly perceive that he is dealing with bodies which are distinct and endowed with certain properties independently of his mind ? Does he not know, for example, that gold in its very nature differs from silver, oxygen from hydrogen, carbon from potassium ? Let him take two pieces of gold and iron, let him do with

them what he will, 'heat them to the liquid or even the gaseous state, colour them, mould them into innumerable shapes, and yet, through all these changes, one will remain gold and the other iron.'¹ Surely such persistence amidst such changes can only be explained, by asserting that there is in each some objective reality which is shown to be different, by the uniform difference of energy displayed under all these varying forms. Can he bring himself to believe that he must ever remain in ignorance of that which lies behind these various 'clusters' of phenomena, that when Kepler discovered his laws of planetary motion, when Le Verrier successfully predicted for years the discovery of the planet Neptune, when Cuneus received the rude shock which was to revolutionize electricity, they knew nothing about the external world, but only their own subjective sensations? Evolution, too, says Spencer, would be in the Idealist system but a dream. But let him, laying aside his phraseology about 'the rhythmical pulsations of myriads of suns and systems,' 'the pulsations of molecules on the earth in harmony with molecules in the stars,' 'the thrilling of every point of space with an infinity of vibrations,' explain the doctrine of Evolution according to his own ideas and his own principles, and if we are not convinced we shall at least have one other proof—the latest and most striking—that the age of miracles is not long since gone.

Such a conclusion, too, is forced upon us by the common sense of mankind. Despite the eccentricities of philosophers, the great body of men have believed, and will continue to believe, that they know of the existence of bodies outside themselves, distinct and endowed with certain properties. Until the mind has become warped by prejudice, or the miserable speculations of men who delight in destroying rational certainty, a man would never dream of questioning the testimony of his senses, and even the veriest sceptic shows himself to be in agreement with his fellows in all the practical affairs of life. Such a belief is natural to man and cannot be misleading, unless, indeed, we accept the hypo-

¹ I. E. RECORD, January, 1887.

thesis of Huxley, 'that some powerful and malicious demon may find his pleasure in deluding and in making us at every moment believe the thing which is not.'¹

Thus, to-day, my memory carries me back over the years that are gone. I recall with a vividness that is startling, the features, and looks, and words, and gestures of those who have long since passed away. The place where they lived, the scenes in which they figured, the kindly advices they have given, the circumstances under which the last farewells were said—all these rise up before my mind without effort and almost against my will, and am I to believe, as Spencer would teach, that all these friends of earlier days are but the varying 'clusters' of phenomena under which the same unknowable being manifested itself, and of which I, too, am but another manifestation; that the companions with whom I converse in everyday life, the words that they speak, the books which I consult, as well as the authors who compile them, are but for me so many subjective affections produced by some external agent which must ever remain unknown?

Looking across the scene before me, as I stand upon one of our Irish hills, can I persuade myself that all the objects that I see are but clusters of phenomena differing only because the one unknowable being energizes differently? All the reality and half the poetry of life would have disappeared were such philosophy true. Against such doctrines I have the testimony of my own nature, the common sense of mankind, from the earliest ages, even till to-day, the wonderful adaptation and suitability of the sensuous faculties, the conclusions of physical science—the very admissions of the adversaries themselves, once they have laid aside the rôle of philosophers; and backed by such reliable evidence, despite Huxley's imaginative possibility of a grinning demon, I shall continue to trust, as I have always trusted, the testimony of the senses in their own proper sphere.

But is all human knowledge to be confined to mere sensuous perceptions of the vivid order or of the faint; is that

¹ Huxley's *Lay Sermons*, p. 356, *apud* Dr. Ward's *Philosophy of Theism*.

which we call the concept of the universal, but a mere blurred symbolic representation, formed by combining the images of individuals of the same class ; are man's cognitive faculties so many instruments to be acted upon by things outside and receive impressions thereof, as does the photographer's plate ; is there no power of the soul which can survey the whole range of subjective sensations as the senses survey the external world, which can go behind the accidents and appearances of things, and apprehend in some way the reality by apprehending its operations, combining or dividing the concepts of the essence thus formed according as it perceives that some necessarily agree or disagree, and using these necessary judgments as principles through which by comparison it may arrive at other truths which are not at first sight evident ?

We assert there is in man a cognitive faculty transcending all the faculties of sensation, and however brilliantly Spencer may have argued against such conclusions, still the very brilliancy of his arguments tend to convince us the more that he was led by other guides than sense. Self-analysis will show that there are within us actions which essentially differ from sensation, and which must, therefore, suppose a power entirely transcending the powers by which sensations are produced.

And, first, there is the idea or intellectual concept, which is clearly distinguishable from the image of the individual object impressed on the sensitive organism. No doubt, the idea cannot exist without some accompanying picture in the imagination, but though always co-existent their very co-existence proves them to be distinct. The concept pre-scinds altogether from the accidental and individualizing notes, and represents the essence of the thing perceived ; it is, therefore, common to all objects of this particular class, and is, in a certain sense, necessary and immutable. The image, on the contrary, represents only the concrete individual thing with a certain figure and extension and qualities—it is in no way common to the class, but varies for the different individuals. The proof for this doctrine is not far to seek.

Let each man analyse his own acts of cognition, and see whether or not he can distinguish in himself the intellectual concept from the sensible image of the imagination. When he says, for example, that 'money is a useful commodity,' 'the dog is a useful animal,' that amongst plants 'the cryptogamic differ completely from the phanerogamic,' he cannot have before his mind merely the sensitive image produced upon his organism by some individual, for he speaks not of the individual, but of what is common to the class. Even Spencer would admit words are but the external expressions of that which is within ; and, therefore, independently of and superior to the phantasm there must be another picture representing that which underlies the individualizing notes, and is common to the whole class. This picture, as is evident, cannot have been directly produced by anything outside, for it exists in nothing that was experienced. It cannot be the blurred symbolic representation produced by the superposition of like sensible images, for even such superposition would imply a power of *self-reflection and classification* utterly inconsistent with our notions of material force ; and, besides, even if such a generic picture were produced, it could never have, as Spencer would admit, any objective validity. Yet, that our mental concept faithfully represents that which is common to members of the class independently of individualizing traits may be proved by our experiments—whenever we choose. So universally admitted is this, that were one to deny the validity of such concepts, he would be forced to assert that nearly all human language is but a meaningless medley of sounds ; for in most cases, it is not concerned with the individual concrete thing, and, therefore, not representing the sensitive image, it would represent nothing. There is, then, in the mind a picture for which only the materials have been supplied by the sensuous faculty, a picture which, representative of no concrete particular object that could have been experienced, yet faithfully represents that which must be found in every individual of the class wherever it exists. May we not fairly assert that such a concept is essentially different from the perceptions of sense, and therefore requires a different faculty ?

Physical science, too, supposes such concepts and supposes them to have objective validity—to represent something which, individualized by certain accidental notes and traits, must be common to all the members of a class. Is it not because he has such a concept of the substances with which he deals, that the scientist can be absolutely certain of the effects which they will produce, and is it not upon the validity of such concepts that all his reasoning and prediction are based?

Again, if the idea is but a faint reproduction of that which has been once experienced, how do we arrive at our notions of these things which never could in any way affect our senses? How, for example, has Spencer acquired his concepts of 'something' or 'nothing,' for he must have had some picture before his mind when he tells us that it is impossible to imagine 'nothing ever becoming something'? how has he arrived at his notions of 'existence,' 'similarity,' 'disagreement,' which are so necessary in his system of knowledge? what sensitive faculty could ever conjure up for him his ideas of 'virtue,' 'morality,' 'goodness,' 'beauty,' 'religion,' about which he writes so learnedly? and, lastly, how can he explain the fact that let us picture to ourselves man as we will, whether young or old, Negro or Mongolian, clean-shaven or bearded, yet behind these varying forms there is something in the mind that is common to all, and which itself remains unchanged? Further proof of this doctrine is needless, for its accuracy is formally admitted by such an opponent as G. H. Lewes,¹ and substantially, at least, by Spencer himself. He would not deny that we can have a symbolic concept of 'the farmer,' for example, by recalling a few typical specimens, and remembering that they could be multiplied indefinitely, and that such a concept is reliable in so far as its validity can be testified by experience. Now, were there ever more contradictions involved in a single paragraph? How could we ever get our notions of a 'class,' if there was nothing in the mind but the impressions of the concrete thing? How could we ever know that the

¹ *Maher's Psychology.*

picture we conjure up represents a typical specimen, unless there be in the mind a concept of something behind the individualizing notes which is essential and common to all, and if such a representation be valid every time we test it by experiment, why may we not conclude that it is always trustworthy? Thus, even Spencer is, in some way, forced to admit the existence of the intellectual concept differing essentially from sensations, and requiring, therefore, an essentially different faculty.

When the intellect has thus formed from the individual objects its several concepts, it perceives immediately that some of them necessarily agree or disagree, so that to separate or combine them would imply a positive contradiction. It sees clearly that they must be combined or divided, and that anything else would be contradictory and absurd. Thus, when the several terms have been understood, the mind cannot help perceiving as true for all times and places 'that a thing cannot be and not be at the same time' (or in the concrete, 'that a man cannot eat his cake and have it too'), 'that the whole must be greater than any of its parts,' 'that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another,' 'that three and two are five,' 'that whatever begins to be must have had a cause.' The mind, by its very constitution, must affirm such judgments—to do so is as natural to it as digestion is to the digestive organs, and unless we are prepared to run counter to our own very nature, however we may have got it, unless we are resolved without reason or proof to distrust the certain testimony of our intellect, we must accept such judgments as true, independently of our mental state, of matter and all its modifications, of space and time and eternity, and by this very admission, we confess that all that is within us is not a mere material power to be acted upon by other material things outside.

But, it may be said, does not Mill explain the necessity of such judgments as the result of the habitual association of two ideas, so that the mind cannot possibly conceive them as separated, and does not Spencer improve on the speculations of Mill, by substituting the experience and peculiarly modified organism of the race for those of the individual

and, thus, accounting for our necessary judgments, by the peculiar bent which our mind has got during the ages in which we were being slowly evolved ? We join such concepts not because we positively see them agree, but because in our present state we cannot imagine them as separated. The necessity arises not from the objective evidence, but from the impotence of our mind, and hence, no conclusions based upon them can be objectively true.

No doubt, such hypotheses are put forward, but let him believe them who can. It is obvious that Mill's theory cannot be a sufficient explanation, if the mind immediately, and without any previous association, recognizes the necessary agreement of certain concepts once they have been formed, and if, on the other hand, it can conceive as divisible and actually divided concepts which have been long and invariably associated. Now, as soon as the terms have been explained the child at school, for example, will immediately affirm the necessary truth of certain judgments, 'that three and four are seven,' that 'the whole is greater than any of its parts,' that 'two straight lines cannot enclose a space,' and will declare that their contradictories would be positively absurd ; whilst, on the other hand, though it knows well by experience that food, if not daily, at least at reasonable intervals, is an absolute necessity for life, yet it has no difficulty in accepting as truthful the Gospel narrative of the Redeemer's fast for forty days, and though it has often seen fire shrivel up and consume whatever came within its reach, it sees no contradiction in the inspired account of the preservation of the children in the fiery furnace. Nor is even Spencer's genius able to render the Associationist theory defensible. For if the necessity of our combining two concepts arises completely from the peculiar bent of our organism, produced by the habitual and simultaneous recurrence of certain phenomena, why was not a like effect produced in the case of other phenomena, which are connected together far more frequently ? And though, as far as we know, from the time when our progenitors first formally made their appearance upon the earth—however they may have come there—they were accustomed to see water always

flowing with the incline, the leaves falling from the trees at the coming of the winter's wind, extended bodies possessing the attribute of impenetrability, yet we have no difficulty in believing on reliable testimony that the contrary may have occurred in a particular case. On the other hand, could anyone ever persuade us that the part may be at any time greater than the whole, or that the non-existent can begin to be existent without some extrinsic force?

Unlike Spencer's, our first principles are founded on their own objective evidence, forcing the assent of the mind, so that dissent is excluded; and it is, we think, because his 'ultimate postulate that whatever is unthinkable must be untrue' is based not on the objective evidence, and hence for the intellect, objective truth, but on the impotence of the human mind to arrive at anything better, that his whole system is vitiated. Besides, how could that be 'ultimate' which itself evidently supposes the validity of the principle of contradiction? That objective evidence is the ultimate criterion of truth, and that in the end we must accept as final the necessary 'avouchments' of the intellect, is proved from the action of the adversaries themselves. When they loudly appeal to 'experience' as the only sure test, one may reasonably inquire how can this test avail unless they are first certain they exist, that they are now experiencing certain sensations, that they have had in the past others with which the present ones are compared, and how can they be so certain unless by accepting what their intellect avers as evident?¹ How can Spencer even be sure that the words which he spoke, the volumes which he has written, represent in any way what was in his mind, and not rather the contradictory, unless because he trusts the testimony of the intellect? Thus, the conclusion stands that there are truths which are independent of the individual and the concrete—of matter and all its modifications—of this or that particular time or place or circumstance—whose contradictory is seen to be absolutely impossible and the

¹ If Agnostics trust the testimonies of their intellect about these facts, why should they refuse to accept its necessary judgments, e.g., 'that whatever begins to be must have had a cause'?

apprehension of which, therefore, supposes a power higher than that of sense.

When the mind is thus furnished with its intellectual concepts and first principles, it can then easily arrive by comparison at other truths which are not at first sight evident. The power of reasoning is as natural to it as the power of self-reflection, of memory, of intuition, and if Spencer's is content to trust the testimonies of these, why object to the validity of the conclusions of reason? In mathematics, for example, granted the validity of the primary axioms, the truth of the consequent deductions cannot be denied—least of all by a man of Spencer's mathematical tastes. Does not the same hold good for every other department? Once the scientist has got his intellectual concepts, which are representative of the essences of things, once he has got his first principles, upon which all knowledge must be based, once he is certain that his faculties may be trusted when they tell of the presence of the concrete individual object outside—does he not feel that he has, at least, a consistent and reasonable system of philosophy, and that he is standing on a secure foundation, instead of floating around in a world of sensations and of possibilities of sensation, as Huxley and Spencer would have him to believe? If, again, our senses affirm that the fields which yesterday were green are to-day covered with a coat of snow—are we unreasonable if we infer that this phenomenon must have had a cause, and if we proceed to inquire about its nature?

Thus, we have proved against Spencer—unless the arguments were weakly stated—that the theory of human knowledge upon which Theists outside of the Kantian School base their convictions, is more intelligible, more consistent, more in accordance with the common sense of mankind, the requirements of our own nature, the postulates of physical science, and involves far less difficulties than the principles upon which scientific Agnosticism rests. We have proved that human knowledge is not confined to mere phenomena, or to the combinations of such; that there is a power in man which can pierce the veil that hides the outer world from his gaze, and apprehend the realities that lie behind these

relations, which passing from the individual, the concrete, the actual can rise to the abstract, the possible, the unchangeable—a power which itself cannot be material, since it energizes as matter never could. And so, having firmly established the validity of his methods of argument, the Christian philosopher can proceed to discuss with his opponents the existence and the nature of the First Cause.

JAMES MACCAFFREY.

COMPULSORY EDUCATION

SPEAKING at Carlow on January 31st, Most Rev. Dr. Foley said :—

Lastly, there is the subject of education, and especially of primary education, which is the foundation from which must spring any effort that may be made to better and brighten the condition of the great body of the people. As long as the average attendance at the Primary Schools remains as low as it is in the schools of their county at present, and as long as the attendance in the higher standards is so poor, I do not see that much progress is possible towards the material improvement in the great mass of the people. The present average attendance of 64 per cent. in the rural schools was a disgrace to their model county. It should be at least 75 per cent.

Some time ago, Most Rev. Dr. Healy, in the course of his official visitation of Clifden, urged the local authorities everywhere to put the compulsory clauses of the Education Act, 1902, into force. 'What,' said he, 'is a paltry expenditure of a few pounds on its working compared with its material uplifting of the country?' Perhaps in view of these two episcopal utterances on compulsory education, the I. E. RECORD may devote a few pages to some consideration of the subject.

In the past history of our people it is painfully evident that though they had an ardent love of knowledge, yet their condition precluded them from giving education that prominence in their social programme that it demanded. They were engaged in a struggle for their very being, not only as Catholics, but even as Irishmen. In such circumstances it would be foolish to expect that a mode of existence would trouble them when their very existence itself was threatened. It is little wonder to-day that, as a consequence, we find them behind other nations in many matters. Prolonged peace has given others an opportunity of filling in their social programme and providing themselves with these advantages that distinguish life from mere existence. One of the ways in which the Irish mind

remains undeveloped and the Irish character crippled is the current popular view as regards education. Their best friends see that they are behindhand, and yet the bulk of the people does not seem to realize the fact. What is worse, deprived as they have been themselves of a good education, the parents seem reckless of the injury they are doing their children, by either keeping them from school or allowing or forcing them to attend irregularly. From the returns of the National Board we find that there are nearly 400,000 children of school age in Ireland who either do not attend school, or do so in such an unsatisfactory manner that their attendance is useless from an educational standpoint.

The average Irishman may attend a meeting in favour of University Education, but it is mainly his implicit faith in the leadership of his bishop or priest that makes him do so, not from a genuine perception of all the good that lies in such a high training for the leaders of the people. As for Technical Education, it is making, if not a bloody, at least a difficult entrance, and those who see and make use of its advantages are not five per cent. of the available population. We are a long way as yet from the spectacle to be seen in some of the continental towns, where the artisans come in their hundreds to the local technical school to learn what would seem so remote from their daily crafts as drawing and mathematics. What hope would there be amongst us at present for those winter schools of Grundtwig, that have been working in Denmark since 1844? Even amongst the pupils who attend our technical schools I think I see the result of what I alluded to in the commencement. The proportion of Protestants who attend is far in excess of the figure given by the religious census. This is due to the fact that they, so long dominant, have the instinct and traditions that teach them the value of education. With regard to Primary education, the bulk of the people, under the expressive name of 'schoolin', still look on that as an end, instead of a means to an end. My readers know that with regard to this whole subject the progressive nations of to-day look on education in a far

different light. They regard it as the breath of a nation's nostrils. They freely tax themselves to bring its full advantages within their reach, they make any sacrifice to enable their children to avail of it and they point with pride to the results achieved.

As we have so much leeway to make up we should not lose time in commencing, and in the hope of making an easy and natural beginning I ask for a consideration of the claims of compulsory education. I say easy, because the law is there to our hands, it needs but the enforcement. Perhaps a consideration of our leeway may awaken some interest in the means of covering it. Taking the usual standard of a nation's advancement or otherwise, illiteracy, we find that we stand thus, compared to the nations that are worth copying, the year giving date of returns :—

TEST—ARMY RECRUITS

1901	German Empire	0·05
1900	Sweden and Norway	0·08
1900	Denmark	0·20
1901	Switzerland	0·13
1902	Belgium	9·39
1901	Netherlands	2·30

'TEST—SIGNING MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE

1901	Scotland	2·46
1901	England	3·00
1901	Ireland	7·90

The only nation of this class that has anything nearly as high in illiteracy as Ireland is Belgium, and here they have been playing fast and loose with compulsory education. Moreover, the ignorance in the mining districts goes far to swell the percentage of illiterates. If a separate return could be taken of the non-mining localities the result would be similar to that of other countries. Everyone knows that we cannot make absolute comparison between countries, because there is not the same standard in use, but anyhow we can see the value of the above tests. The 'army recruit' seems to furnish an excellent guide in these lands where conscription prevails, and the figures furnished in this manner show us what marvellous spread of

elementary education must obtain in nearly all the continental States given above. The signing of the marriage certificate, used as a standard of comparison, puts Ireland very far below England and Scotland, and I am inclined to think that because of the relative lowness of the marriage rate in Ireland, the figures mean even more than they imply at first glance. Again, we have yet another way of applying a test. The voters for a general election are supposed to be of some social status, and we find that about one-sixth of the population of these countries are electors. In 1895, the total voters who polled in England were 3,190,826, and the illiterates (whose papers were read to them and signed for them) were 28,521. In Scotland, the numbers were 447,591, and the illiterates were 4,062, whilst in Ireland we have the surprising figures of a total of 220,506, with 40,357 illiterates ! The proportions here are simply alarming, and at the same time distressing to the last degree. One-fifth of those men, who are supposed to decide on questions of the greatest political import, are unable to read or write !

There are some conclusions that I think can be drawn from these figures. The first is, all true Irishmen should be ashamed of the fact that at the commencement of the twentieth century our country should be so low in the scale of educated lands. But there are other and more serious considerations. How can a country move evenly towards any goal of educational, political, or religious character, whose people are divided into strata so widely divergent ? Taking the highest object, the spiritual welfare, in the first place, what part can intellect play in the religion of a land, when we know that one-tenth of our people are devoid of the elements of education ? What impression can be made on the minds of such people by the discourses from the pulpit ? To twenty per cent. of such a congregation a sermon is but a stream of language on which a few tokens are floating that the untutored mind feebly recognizes here and there. What a small modicum of religious truth remains in the mind of a man of forty who has never been able to read about his faith, can poorly understand a

sermon, and has scarcely ever refreshed his mind on what he was taught in the Catechism class so many years ago? Cardinal Manning said that if a priest neglected his studies for three years, he should require to begin over again. What a poor residue of the catechism must remain in the mind of one who never read it, who learned it by rote, and who never refreshed an idea of it. I think that the illiteracy of our people can account for a great deal of the leakage in England and America. Their religion being principally of an emotional nature, without a backing of intelligence, perishes by a natural law when the surroundings become frigidly Protestant in character. It would seem then that even from the point of view of the spiritual well-being the priests should lay to heart this abnormal illiteracy of our people.

Again, there can be no steady and uniform social improvement in a people of whom twenty per cent. are thus stunted in their mind's growth. This is clear from a contrast between our people and others. In a land like Switzerland, or Denmark, or Bavaria, any project for the well-being of the people, if it have reason to recommend it, is taken up generally in a brief space of time. The experiments of the laboratory of to-day are the property of the people to-morrow. Economic theories that are proved to be true speedily become the current principles of everyday life. There is not that heart-breaking distrust of methods simply because they are new or savour of science, nor that self-satisfied acceptance of childish reasons against change. Anyone who compares the rapid growth of scientific principles in every department, as shown in these well-educated countries, and the slow movement of similar principles amongst our people, will realize how handicapped we are by the uneven education that prevails amongst us. A very recent example may be adduced. The officials of the Society for the Prevention of Consumption report that the ravages of this dreadful plague have fallen fifty per cent. in England during the last few years, and this beneficial result is attributed to the education effected through the schools. In Ireland the consumption record is going up. The people are as reckless to-day with regard to

ordinary precautions as they were twenty years ago. This must be put down to ignorance as the principal cause. To show how the ground-work of a good education affects movements of this kind, I may quote the *London Times* in reference to the people's winter schools in Denmark :—

Between 1870 and 1880, when Danish agriculture was on the brink of ruin, and it became necessary to turn from corn growing to dairy work, and again, in 1880, when co-operative dairies were required, it was the bright, ready intelligence of the old high school pupils (winter school pupils) that enabled the requisite changes to be made with rapidity and success.¹

These words must be pondered on if we wish to seize their full meaning. To change from cultivation to dairying meant to this people to break with the traditions of centuries, to look at this life and the markets of the world from a totally opposite view. It meant a shifting of the value of their land and of their labour, a changing of their methods, even to the smallest routine of daily life. Even the labour of the sexes had to assume a changed value. Yet all this was accomplished, and most successfully, in a few years! The revolution was made easy by its being accomplished amongst an educated people. The very same process had to be gone through to enable Germany to become an industrial land from being a purely agricultural one. Yet using the same leverage of popular education, the change has been effected, and with phenomenal success. How long would it take such a movement in Ireland, as at present educated? With how many broken hearts and shattered frames and disappointed lives would the road be strewn, before the mass of the people would take courage to tread it.

Lastly, we must consider the case of the teacher and the interests of the pupils that attend regularly. There is nothing so discouraging to a teacher as irregular, intermittent attendance of a pupil. No real, abiding impression can be made on such a mind. The actual knowledge imparted is forgotten as rapidly as it is taught. From a psychological standpoint, matters are even worse. The

¹ *American Educ. Report*, 1897, vol. i., p. 86.

formation of character depends on the acquisition of habits. What habits can a child acquire whose only permanent habit seems to be that of coming spasmodically to school? As regards the children who attend regularly, their progress is also hampered by the irregulars. The master has to give the latter special attention in order to help them to cover the ground which has been lost, and all this time is taken from the general work of the class.

To listen to the 'cry of the teacher' as regards attendance in school is very painful. From returns I got recently I can lay before my readers some proofs of the awful apathy that exists in parents' minds where the education of the children is concerned. Out of a very large number of representative schools, where there was little difficulty in getting the children to and fro, I learned that in no instance was the attendance satisfactory from the teacher's standpoint. Mondays and Fridays are practically *dies non*. The excuse for not sending the child on Monday is because it is tired after Sunday! Often it is the father or mother that is 'tired,' or both keeping St. Monday. The invariable reason for not sending the children on Friday is that, 'it being the last day's school, it is not worth while'! Thus the school-week is reduced to three days. According to some returns Thursday is now beginning to show a noticeable decrease and the able teacher who called attention to this said that 'the mothers now think they are conferring a wonderful favour on you when they send their children to school.' One teacher—very enthusiastic, but disheartened—writes: 'During my twenty-two years as teacher, I never knew of the same set of pupils being in attendance on two successive days. This applies to Cork, Dublin, Derry, Armagh, and Down, where I taught.' There is no hope whatsoever of dealing with people who neglect the most sacred duty to their children in this way, save by having a Compulsory Attendance Act applied to the whole country, and very vigorously enforced.

It may encourage us in our efforts in this direction if we reflect that the verdict of the civilized world is in favour of compulsory attendance. Through a mistaken

notion of liberty the English legislator is to-day the one exception to the rule. He will muzzle dogs, force the motorist to observe a maximum speed, he will tax the window panes and the man-servants, and yet all this hampers liberty. But he will allow ignorant and unnatural parents to pour out a horde of semi-brutal offspring on society every year, because, forsooth, the liberty of the parent must not be interfered with

If we turn to the pages of the *Statesman's Year Book*, we find that in every country in the world that is making any progress, primary education is stamped as having two characteristics, 'compulsory' and 'gratuitous.' In Germany, the leader of the educational world, not alone are parents compelled to send their children to school up to a certain year, but the children are compelled to attend continuation schools until eighteen years of age. In France, attendance is compulsory, and not alone that, but an employer who should accept of the service of a boy or girl without demanding the school leaving certificate, would expose himself to a heavy fine. Even little States like Montenegro, and Bosnia, and Herzegovina, tax themselves to give gratuitous and compulsory education to the child. Turkey, with all her effete traditions, is ahead of England in this respect, because she has compulsory education. We cannot do better in Ireland than follow such conspicuous examples as are given us by the enlightened peoples that have adopted this law.

It is to be hoped, therefore, that the managers of the schools, from the standpoint of religion, of patriotism, of consideration for the teachers and pupils, will take the matter into their earnest consideration. Any excuse that may be urged might be put forward with equal force in any country where compulsory education prevails. I fear that some of the racial characteristics of our people incline them to take a thoughtless view of the matter, and hence on the enlightened action of the managers we must rely for such measures in regard to the matter as will bring us up to the level of the progressive countries of Europe.

P. J. DOWLING, C.M.

THE VATICAN EDITION OF THE 'KYRIALE' AND ITS CRITICS

NO sooner had the Vatican edition of the *Kyrie* appeared when, to the surprise of many, it was met with immediate and stormy opposition. This has had the effect of disturbing the minds of many as to the authority of this edition ; and, although the official acts of the Holy See stand in no need of defence before the Catholic faithful, it seems, however, advisable that some reply should be made and the real worth of all this opposition be carefully weighed. In Italy and Germany the outcry has perhaps been the loudest ; and it has now spread to our islands. Father Bewerunge, in his article, 'The Vatican Edition of Plain Chant' (whose inspiration was sought at Appuldurcombe), published in the I. E. RECORD, January, 1906, has now ranged himself among the opponents of the *Vaticana*. As far as I can judge, his criticisms are the most detailed and searching that have yet appeared ; and I should like to pay him the compliment of saying that if we can offer a satisfactory answer to his objections, we have answered all.

Before entering upon the main argument, it may be as well to correct a few errors of fact. On page 44, Mr. G. Bas is described as 'one of the Consultors of the Commission.' This is not the case, and the statement has caused a good deal of amusement among those who took special pains that this gentleman should be kept out of the business. If Mr. Bas states that 'the cases in which the Vatican differs from "the authentic" (that is, the Appuldurcombe) version, number 135,' he is rendering a very dubious service to his friends, for this information could only be obtained by a violation of the Pontifical secret. But a much more serious error, and one which underlies the whole article, is the statement that Dom Pothier was made 'the sole judge of the version of the new edition' (page 47), and the assumption throughout that Dom Pothier is responsible for all variants and corrections. Thus, we read that 'Dom Pothier shows

a strange predilection for the German tradition of the Chant ; another correction is supposed to bear 'testimony to his amiability, but what about his critical judgment ?' (page 51). In another part 'Dom Pothier changes the c. . . . Could anything be more discreditable to an editor ?' Another passage is due to 'his whim' (page 61), and finally the official edition is termed 'his edition' (page 62). There is not a single passage, as far as I can see, in which the Pontifical Commission is mentioned, the whole brunt of the attack falls upon Dom Pothier, and on him alone.

Now, this is a serious and fundamental error on the part of the critic, which vitiates the whole of his contention. Dom Pothier was not 'sole judge,' was *not* solely responsible for the changes. By the direction of the Holy Father, Dom Pothier was 'entrusted with the delicate mission of revising and correcting the edition, and in this work he will seek the assistance of the other members of the Commission',¹ and with that 'amiability' which distinguishes him, we may be sure that Dom Pothier did seek and accept the aid and suggestions of the other members of the Commission. There is not a single correction, not a single one of the versions that Father Beyerunge condemns, that has not been fully discussed and approved, by the *major pars* in many cases, and in *every case* by the *sanior pars*, of the Commission. When we find such men as Dr. Wagner, Dom Janssens, members of the Pontifical Commission ; M. Moissenet, Canon Grospeillier, M. Gastoué, Consultors, publicly extolling and defending the versions of the *Vaticana*, it is not difficult to gather that they have thrown in their lot with Dom Pothier, and accept the responsibility for the character of the edition. Against such a weight of authority and learning, we have but one opponent, the Archæological School of Appuldurcombe, from whom all the attacks, directly or indirectly, emanate.

‡ This attribution by the critic of the whole of the revision of the *Kyriale* to Dom Pothier alone gives rise to some unpleasant reflections. Did Father Beyerunge learn this at

¹ Letter of Cardinal Merry del Val, June 24, 1905.

Appuldurcombe, where he repaired for the material of his article? But at Appuldurcombe, if anywhere, the true facts of the case were well known, and the share of the other members of the Commission in the corrections well understood. If, then, they gave their champion this false impression, and allowed him to hold up Dom Pothier *alone* to the scorn and derision of the public, it gives rise, I say, to many unpleasant reflections. But the whole statement is inaccurate, and the other members of the Commission are not at all grateful to Father Beyerunge for the manner in which he completely ignores their share of the work.

What, then, is the fundamental position that Father Beyerunge has taken up in his criticisms? It is that the Pontifical Commission has not followed in every minute detail the reading of the majority and of the oldest MSS. I need not cite passages from the article, for I fancy the author will not object to this statement of his position. Now, if we can show that this principle is unscientific, inartistic, and at variance with the terms of reference of the Commission, the whole of his objections must fall to the ground.

Father Beyerunge, in his article, the material of which he declares were gathered at Appuldurcombe, has enrolled himself as a disciple of that school, whose cry is Archæology, and nothing but Archæology, in the Chant. Perhaps we can put the position more clearly in the form of question and answer.

‘Is there not such a thing as art in the Gregorian?’—‘No,’ is the reply, ‘archæology is the only art.’ ‘But is there no possibility of an improvement in details?’—‘No; such a statement is an archæological absurdity.’ ‘Is there no place for a development in tonality and music in general?’—‘Absolutely none.’ ‘Still the universal practice has surely some title to recognition?’—‘None whatever.’

This little dialogue will give us some idea of the uncompromising position taken up by the School of Appuldurcombe.

And what is this archæology that embraces the whole

truth, and nothing but the truth, of the Gregorian? Dom Mocquereau describes it for us in the article, 'L'Ecole Grégorienne de Solesmes.'¹ You must first obtain, at very heavy cost, a large number of copies of the ancient MSS.; only those who can afford the expense of obtaining these reproductions are entitled to enter upon the study. After obtaining a sufficient number of copies, you proceed to take a given piece of chant and number its groups and neums. Write underneath in horizontal columns all the versions of each group. Count up the agreements and the differences, which are further sub-divided according to the age of the MSS. Tabulate these and the votes of the oldest MSS. carry the day. If, however, the votes are equal, you may toss up for it, or, as Dom Mocquereau euphemistically puts it, 'follow the proceeding in the election of Matthias.' All this is excellent and valuable work, and I am far from any wish to disparage it. But, we may ask, is this science? On such a system as this anyone could undertake to restore the Gregorian. It is unnecessary to have any artistic gifts; an array of statistical tables would be all the equipment necessary for determining the text of the music. Nay, a man might not have a note of music in his composition, be unable to sing the most common interval, and yet might, on this theory, claim the right to reconstruct the Gregorian with his arithmetic against the most artistic and learned master of Plain-song. Surely this argument alone should be a *reductio ad absurdum* of the claim of the Archæological School to have the sole voice in the correction of the Chant. Such mechanical proceedings are very useful and meritorious, but they cannot be raised to the dignity of a science.

It is an assumption to say that the true Gregorian Chant is contained in the oldest codices alone. Our oldest MSS. are certainly not older than the ninth century. A good two hundred years yawns between them and the work of the great Pontiff. Are we sure that our MSS. faithfully represent the reform of St. Gregory? Some very eminent historians are strongly of the opposite opinion. In any case,

¹ *Rassegna Gregoriana*, April, 1904.

there is no proof for the assertion of our archæologists ; it amounts to little more than a probable guess. Is this a scientific basis on which to claim the right to reform Church music in the name of archæology ? It is still possible that some day the libraries of Europe may disclose a MS. of the seventh or eighth centuries, and then what would happen ? The whole of the statistical tables, the whole of the conclusions hitherto come to, would have to be revised and brought into conformity with each new discovery. Is this a scientific basis to rest a claim so proud that archæology puts forth ? And must the music of the Church be dependent upon every fresh discovery of archæology ?

But there is something more. Is it quite certain that the tradition of the Chant flowed with pure and undefiled stream from the days of St. Gregory to the ninth century ? The archæologists affirm it. But this is far from certain. Dr. Wagner, in his recent work, *Neumenkunde*, was the first to point out that in the centuries immediately after St. Gregory some very decided attempts were made to make the Chant learned and accurate, by bending its forms to the prosody of classic times, or the *Chronos* of the Greeks. Different kinds of ornaments and *fioriture* were also introduced about this time, and, under Greek influence, not only half-tones, but even quarter-tones, began to be cultivated. All this, of course, was exceedingly distasteful to the ordinary singer of the Latin Church, and a struggle ensued, which ended finally in the Latinization of the Chant, not only in the melody, but also in the execution. Had it not been for this successful resistance against the designs of the experts and theorists, the *cantus planus* would have disappeared from the Church by the twelfth century.

Until these doubts relating to the composition and execution of the melodies by the masters of the ninth century can be dispelled, we must be allowed to suspend our judgment as to perfection of the ancient MSS. in their smallest details. A scientific basis for the reform of the Chant can hardly be erected on such unsteady foundations.¹

¹ One of the most eminent historians of France thus expresses himself on this question : 'If historical research is directed solely to the discovery

The claims of archæology seem to ignore the point of view with which the Church regards the Chant, which, after all, is a collection of compositions of all times and countries, of all degrees of art ; but all distinguished by one particular style. Thus, we have productions of the later Middle Ages, those of the Renaissance, the compositions for modern and new offices, all forming the body of song that passes under the name of the Gregorian Chant, and all receiving the stamp of the Church's authority, as 'possessing in the highest degree those qualities which are proper to the liturgy of the Church.'¹ But the archæologists would have us believe that there is a certain aristocracy in the Church, that the MSS. of the ninth century are alone of pure blood, all the rest of low degree, with no claim to associate with those who can trace back their descent to Charlemagne. We often wonder how the archæologists can resign themselves to the chanting of these later barbarisms, which they are compelled so frequently to meet with in the course of the Divine Office. But the Church has to deal not with savants, but with the large body of the faithful, to whom all such questions are a matter of supreme indifference, and she will continue to add to, to revise, to complete, choral books, and to give to modern melodies a place of honour in her liturgy equal to that of the oldest chant. For the Plain Chant is a living energy, not a musty old parchment, an energy that, like the coral insect, is ever battling with the demands of the day and ever building upon the old foundations.

What does all the indignation, all the pother of the archæologists really amount too? That perhaps one note in three hundred has been corrected! It really comes to little more. . And even this is an exaggerated estimate, if we confine ourselves to the oldest MSS. of all. For the *Kyriale*, as is well known, is quite in a different condition from that of the Proper of the Time of the old Offices. The *Kyriale* chants, on the whole, are of very much later composition. In fact,

of the ancient documents of the past just as they were; the *traditional practice* is not bound meekly to assimilate the results of this investigation; it ought to show in a certain measure due respect for the work of time.'—Gevaert, *Mélopée antique*, p. 211.

¹ *Motu Proprio*

the triple invocation of the *Agnus Dei* was not introduced into the liturgy until after the ninth century. Many of the melodies are compositions of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. And still, although these compositions are acknowledged to be distinctly inferior to those of the earlier centuries, yet we are invited to draw up statistical tables, to count up the number of agreements, and to adopt towards the corrupt precisely the same methods to be employed with the incorrupt, under penalty of being branded as arbitrary, whimsical, and unscientific, if we disagree. As if any amount of concordances of a corrupt version could establish a correct reading! This, I maintain, is an unscientific method of dealing with the revision of the Chant.

But if this claim to reform music by archæology alone be unscientific, it is also *inartistic*. To judge from the writings of the archæologists, one would conclude that there is no art in the Gregorian. But, in turning again to Dom Mocquereau's article above mentioned, 'L'Ecole Grégorienne de Solesmes,' we come across a delightful passage on Gregorian art, which quite made our mouths water at the prospect of the interesting discoveries that the archæological process seemed to offer.

Sometimes [he says], and not uncommonly, we may come across some very curious secrets of the old notation, notably certain equivalences, which, far from contradicting some teaching, go far to strengthen it. Above all, we may discover the laws of adaptation of the same melody to different texts, and we recognize how often these rules have been ignored in the adaptations made in modern times.

It is here that we can probe to the quick the methods of composition of the ancient Gregorian artists, we can admire the delicacy of their taste, the variety of the resources at their command, the deftness with which they know how to expand or contract a melody in order to clothe the text with grace. The art which they display in these circumstances is inimitable, and the æsthetic rules which they obey are lost to those who have not the means that our statistical tables offer of analysing patiently and curiously their methods.

Nothing could be more fascinating than these prospects of unfolding *the art* of the Gregorian. The secrets of the neums, the methods of composition, the art of equiva-

lences, of adornment and development of melodies, are precisely the points on which the musical world is most anxious to have a systematic exposé, for the chapter has not yet been written. The articles regularly contributed by Dom Pothier for a number of years to the *Revue du Chant Gregorien* have also revealed to us many of the secrets of the art of the Chant, the laws of cadences, the characteristics of the different kinds of Gregorian melodies, the combinations and formulas of the different modes, the relation of accent to text, the evolution of tonality, its relations with evolution of the accent and rhythm of the language, these have been unfolded to us with rare skill and insight by Dom Pothier. We feel here that we are being admitted into the arcana of the Chant, that an order and beauty here reigns which excludes all question of arbitrary proceeding. Surely, if there is any criterion by which we should proceed to the editing of the correct text, it should be that which applies these delicate and subtle laws, that can only be grasped by those who are equipped with rare musical gifts and knowledge.

After Dom Mocquereau's happy indication of the discoveries that had followed the compilation of the statistical tables, one naturally looked to see some of these principles applied to the elucidation of a Gregorian text. In this we were disappointed. Dom Beyssac, of Appuldurcombe, in his study of the *Kyrie, Fons bonitatis* (which Father Beverunge terms 'masterly'), proposes to restore to us the best reading of this melody. Is there any application of the principles of art, so charmingly sketched by Dom Mocquereau, bestowed upon this task? Absolutely none. It is nothing but a counting of MSS., the number of agreements, the determination of the majority of the votes; but as far as the writer of the article is concerned, the art of the Gregorian might be non-existent. The same remarks will apply to the whole of Father Beverunge's criticism; it is again merely a question of enumerating MSS., of pitting one nation against another, while of the principles of Gregorian art, of its claims in any recension of a text, not a word! If Dom Mocquereau has made the important

discoveries of the principles of Gregorian art, which he professes to have made from his statistical tables, he seems to have taken great pains to lock the secret up in his own breast. In any case the Archæological School have let it be clearly understood that they recognize no claims of the voice of art of the Gregorian in the preparation of the critical edition.

Now, having endeavoured to show that the methods favoured by the Archæological School are neither scientific nor artistic, let us examine how far they are in harmony with the wishes and commands of the Holy See. It has long been recognized as a dictate of practical wisdom that, when a Commission is appointed, terms of reference must be imposed, otherwise there would be great danger of the members wandering off at their own sweet will into the most opposite directions. Nor did the Holy Father neglect to take this precaution when he appointed the Commission for the Restoration of the Gregorian Chant, on April 25, 1904. The terms of reference of the Pontifical document are: 'The melodies of the Church, so-called Gregorian, shall be restored in their integrity and purity, according to the testimony of the more ancient codices, but in such a manner that particular account shall be taken of the legitimate tradition contained in the later codices and of the practical use of modern liturgy.'

The three points which the Commissioners are directed to observe in their recension are : (1) The more ancient codices ; (2) the legitimate tradition contained in *later codices* ; (3) the practice of the modern liturgy. These terms of reference indicate a perfectly intelligible line of procedure, but they completely exclude the platform of the archæologists. The latter admit no 'legitimate tradition,' beyond the ninth century ; in their eyes 'later codices' have no more value than the evolution of the Gregorian art which they represent. It is clear that those who, holding such views, entered the Commission, would find themselves bound to struggle against the terms of reference imposed by the Holy Father. If the archæologists could not see their way to accept the Papal instructions, an impasse was bound to result. And

so it happened, in point of fact. The history of the deadlock is too well known to require re-telling.

It was hardly to be expected that the Holy Father would yield. Nothing then remained for him but to override the objections of the opponents and give Dom Pothier, who was loyally carrying out his wishes, the supreme direction of the work. It was hoped that after the Head of the Church had given such a decided mark of his disapproval of the views of the archæologists, the latter would have had the good grace to yield to such authoritative decisions. It is disappointing to have to state that this is far from the case. Discomfited in the Commission, they have now transferred their opposition to the *Vaticana* to the public Press, and the numerous attacks on the typical edition all proceed from one source, the School of Appuldurcombe. There is no use in mincing matters; by their attitude they have placed themselves in direct antagonism to the Holy Father and to ecclesiastical authority. It is true they claim the right to hold their views on a theoretical question; but the public will note that all the same they are attacking principles which the Holy Father and the Sacred Congregation hold very strongly, and that the archæologists are striving their utmost to discredit these principles in the eyes of the Church.

Let us put the question fairly: Is the Plain Chant to be restored for the sake of its antiquity, or because it is an admirable vehicle for the expression of the faith and piety of the people? Or, in other words: Is the Plain Chant made for man or man made for the Chant? To most minds the framing of this question brings its own answer. And yet the archæologists do not hesitate to state that *man was made for the Chant*, and not *vice versa*. Dom Mocquereau maintains¹ that the Chant 'must be taken just as it is with its good and bad points.' Even if it is a question of restoration, it must not be an adaptation or improvement, but the restoration of the original.' No consideration is to be shown to the feelings or needs of the singers. If the old forms are

¹ L'évolution dans l'esthétique et la tradition Grégorienne,' *Rassegna Gregoriana*, 1904.

harsh and uncouth, so much the worse for the singers.¹ They must leave the Plain Chant alone. The same writer says : 'Let us hope we have done for ever with mutilations in order to make the Chant easier to sing everywhere and by everyone. Nobody is obliged to sing the Gregorian melodies.'¹

It is unmistakably the case of 'man for the Chant,' and not 'the Chant for man.' We seem to see a reproduction of the old Pharasaism that jealously guarded the forms and overlooked the spirit which had given these forms their life and being.

In any case, this is not the object of the Holy Father. In his *Motu Proprio*, he has given public and official expression to his wish that 'this Chant (Gregorian) should especially be restored for the use of the people, so that they may take a more active part in the services, as they did in former times.'² This is again a case where the Holy See lays down the principle that the Chant is meant for the people, to which the archæologists reply that they see no reason why attempts should be made 'to make the Chant easier to sing by everyone and everywhere.'

I might here bring my article to an end, as I have adduced abundant proof that the principles upon which the archæologists have founded their objections to the *Vaticana* are supported by neither science, art, nor authority. However, it may be as well, in order to avoid all suspicions of shirking the question, to follow the critic in his patient

¹ This is one of the stock objections to the *Vaticana*. Another critic says : 'Dom Pothier has evidently been inspired by the wish to come to the aid of choirs whose artistic aspirations are very limited, and whose means of execution restricted.' It is rather amusing to note the inconsistency of the archæologists on this point. These lovers of antiquity have invented certain rhythmic signs, with which their editions are 'adorned,' in order to meet the wishes of these very singers of aspirations and execution so limited. Not that there can be any objection to such a proceeding, but it is curiously inconsistent with those sneers at Dom Pothier playing, so to speak, to the gallery. The amusing part is, that these rhythmic signs have absolutely no claim whatever to antiquity. No author of medieval times can be quoted in support of their theories of binary and ternary rhythms. And yet these sticklers for antiquity do not hesitate to introduce into their notation all sorts of hybrid modern signs precisely in order 'to make the Chant easier to be sung everywhere and by everyone.'

² *Motu Proprio*, ii. 3.

enumeration of the examples which he finds so faulty. On page 49, the critic offers two general reflections. The first is that 'Dom Pothier shows a strange predilection for the German tradition of the Chant.' I need not again enter into the persistent misrepresentation which makes Dom Pothier the 'sole judge' of the revision. If the critic had been better informed, he would have discovered, with some surprise, that the so-called German readings of the *Kyriale* are met with in MSS. of very different origin. The editors would be the last to admit that they have shown 'predilection' for any special group of MSS. ; they have carefully weighed the claims of any notable portion of the Gregorian tradition.


If Dom Pothier had 'Germanized' the *Kyriale*, many more *e*'s and *b*'s would have disappeared to make place for *f*'s and *c*'s. But if the editors weigh the claims of the general voice of tradition, as expressed in German, French, Italian, and English MSS., it then becomes a question of making a selection. Our critic dreads such an idea and sounds a note of alarm. 'On what principle, then, is this selection to be made? The æsthetic taste of an individual?' And he quotes Dom Gaisser to point out the danger and instability of such a criterion. He is ever recurring to this point of 'the taste of one individual,' meaning, of course, Dom Pothier, until we shall begin to believe he is as much haunted with Dom Pothier as Mr. Dick was with King Charles' head. This perpetual fear of anyone venturing to make a selection, this marked distrust of the ability and science of any person whatsoever to form a critical judgment is characteristic of the School of Archæology. It is fortunate that the Holy Father believes that there are still artists and erudite men in the world to carry out the reform he has so much at heart.

One of the examples over which the critic waxes merry is No. 7. Referring to the change of the reciting note from *b* to *c*, he says :—

As the change was almost universal, I could understand the position of those who claim that it should be maintained. But what does the Vatican edition do? It evidently goes on the

principle of 'pleasing both parties,' and gives half the recitation

7




to *c*, half to *b*, thus :—

et om - nes ad quos per-ve-nit

Three syllables on *c*, three on *b*, nothing could be fairer, and nobody has any right to complain! The procedure is a great testimony to Dom Pothier's amiability, but what about his critical judgment? (page 51).

We can hardly expect the archæologists to enter into the niceties of Gregorian art that are displayed in the disposition of the notes over *ad quos* and *pervenit*. The first accentuate and determine the reciting note, while the two *b*'s in *pervenit*, the ancient reading, constitute a modulation properly so-called; the second serves as a binding to the following note. It is thus an improvement of the old reading of the *Liber Gradualis*

7 a



quos per-ve-nit


which gave, so to speak, a jolt to the melody, perhaps not a very grave fault, but certainly not very perfect. The editors thus combine the vigour and clearness of the reciting note *c*, which was an improvement of the medievalists, with the smoothness of the ancient version. It is, therefore, a test, not of 'Dom Pothier's amiability, but rather of his critical judgment.' We can hardly expect those who are pledged to the archæological party to appreciate such matters of art, but others will gain therefrom renewed confidence in the skill and taste of the revisers.

The critic never tires of repeating that the different corrections are not found in any MSS. To this I can only reply that in not a single case has any correction been adopted which is not justified by one or more MSS. I will, however, take one of the critic's own examples, and show the method he adopts to prove that the Vatican version 'is not found in any single one!' In order to still

further impress the reader with this charge, he makes a special appeal to his eyes by printing the last words in italics. Turn to example 8, on page 50, he says: 'In the *Vidi aquam* we find the following:—



'The MSS.,' he says, 'are divided as to the figure on the last syllable of *templo*; some have



etc. The version of the Vatican is *not found in any single one!*' The reader will see at once that the only difference between the two versions is the liquescent note *la*! Now, it is well known, both by the teaching of the ancient masters and from the MSS. themselves, that there was a good deal of latitude allowed in the use of liquescent notes. As Guy of Arezzo lays down: 'Si autem eum vis plenius proferre non liquefaciens, nihil nocet.'¹ In the example 9 (a), the liquescent is omitted, in the *Vaticana* it is inserted. For this grave tampering with the MSS. the editors are accused of introducing a version *not found in a single MSS.*! I feel sure this is quite an oversight on the part of the critic, otherwise such an accusation might give rise to unpleasant rejoinders.

Example 10 of the *Kyrie* (*Fons bonitatis*) has, as I have remarked above, been the subject of a special study by the archæologists, and the Vatican version differs in one or two points from that favoured by Appuldurcombe. The Vatican





version is

¹ Gerbert, *Scriptores*, t. ii.

The recension favoured by Dom Beyssac (*supra*) and Father Bewerunge omits the two *a*'s marked with asterisk, and changes the *e* into *d*. The reasons which induced the editors to change the *d* into *e* seem to have been somewhat of this nature : In the primitive version the *d* would be followed by *b*, *tristropa*. When the *b* was early changed to *c*, to give more precision and vigour to the melody, certain copyists felt the necessity of changing the *d* into a *clivis*, *e d*, with stress on the *e* and not on the *d*. The *d* then became superfluous, and the editors of the Vatican suppressed it, thus restoring to the ancient phrase the freedom of the primitive attack. This same phrase has long been under consideration, and Dom Pothier in discussing it some years back held that the *d* was still possible. The Commission, however, voted its suppression. These views will not commend themselves to the archæologists, but they will show the impartial reader the scrupulous care and art that the editors lavished over every phrase of the Chant.

In examples 12 and 13, Dom Pothier is reproached with changing the melody of *all* the MSS.



But the critic has omitted to place before his readers the whole of the passage, or they would quickly see the reason why the editors changed it. The oldest MSS. have




This is a case where the 'variety of resources at the

command of the ancient Gregorian artists' were evidently exhausted. The editors very cleverly corrected this to



a correction to which none but those with archæological 'bees in their bonnets' could object.

In example 14, the critic complains that the *Sanctus* of Mass III. does not follow any MSS.



The older version put a *b* instead of a *c* for the third note, and inserted another *b* after the third note. The editors, he complains, have omitted both *b*'s. The reason is a most obvious one. If the first *b* was changed into *c*, according to the traditional demand for a more decided note, it must not be left behind, but suppressed. The second *b* would induce that position of the tritone against which nearly eight centuries of musicians have protested.


This will lead us to the discussion of the views of the critic on the nature of the 'tritone.' On page 54, after citing the above example, he goes on to say :—

The reason for this change is easy to guess. It is to avoid that *diabolus in musica* of the medieval theorists, the tritone. I admit that the tritone sometimes causes a little difficulty to modern ears. But if we are to eliminate all the tritones from the Gregorian melodies what is to become of them? . . . I think that the full tone under the tonic causes far more difficulty to the modern musician than a few tritones.


Let us take this last statement first. It is strange that Father Beverunge should maintain this with the Irish melodies ringing around him. One of their great charms is the presence of the flattened seventh, and the humblest son and daughter of Erin in England and Ireland is not known to experience any special difficulty in singing 'a full tone below

the tonic.' But with the tritone it is different. For centuries the European ear has developed a decided objection to certain positions of the tritone. This is one of those cases of 'legitimate tradition' which the Holy Father has directed the editors to respect. In the Vatican edition some of these repulsive intervals have accordingly been removed. It is somewhat surprising that Father Beyerunge has not called attention to these departures from the *most* ancient MSS. in his eagerness to establish their monopoly. It was, perhaps, more prudent to pass them by, or he would have badly damaged his case before the impartial reader. I will, however, supply the omission. In some old MSS. we

find the following :




Had the archæologists had their way, we should have had this forced down our throats :



Again in the *Agnus* of Mass IV. (*Cunctipotens genitor Deus*) the archæologists tried actually to impose on us these

horrors :



We must remember that these melodies are intended to be sung by the ordinary singer whose ear is almost entirely educated by modern tonality. To propose such things to modern singers is only to implant in them a deep hatred of the Chant.

It is quite intelligible that these archaic intervals could be rendered more or less familiar to a community of religious who are accustomed to no other style of music. But the Chant is intended, not for the chosen few who can give to it an undivided attention, but for the ordinary singer nurtured in modern tonality, in order to induce him to 'take a more active part in the services of the Church.' Here, again, we see that archæology, in crying 'Hands off' to the average chorister, is opposing the wishes and directions of the Sovereign Pontiff.

Are these objectionable intervals, however, really primitive? It is allowable to doubt it. It is not at all unlikely that in these instances the *fa* was sharpened. But what is certain is that in some MSS. the *Agnus* is found written a tone lower, showing that in the Middle Ages it was felt that, with the traditional method of execution, the notation was faulty. It was therefore written thus:



And Dom Pothier, yielding to the strong feeling on the point, expressed by many members of the Commission, agreed to write it in the sixth mode in the *Vaticana*, whereby the objectionable interval is avoided. In the face of these examples, we recognize the prudence, and are grateful for the intervention, of the Holy Father, who has delivered us from the 'Chamber of Horrors' of the archæologists. This is not the only passage where the rendering seems to be at variance with the notation. It gives rise to a well-founded suspicion that some of the old MSS. did not correctly give the intervals that were actually sung. We know that the most ancient MSS. were written in neums-accents, which gave no idea whatever of the intervals. It was only by degrees that the intervals came to be represented in diastematic notation, first with one line then with two or more. But for a long time the outlines of the melody were, so to speak, in a very nebulous state, and it was

impossible that under these circumstances errors and variations in small matters should not creep in. And yet we are asked by the archæologists to believe, that in these long periods of tentative gropings after diastematic perfection, not a secret was lost, not a note misplaced.

The critic produces nearly fifty more passages for reprobation, and it is surely unnecessary to enter into a detailed discussion on each, to say nothing of the expense of furnishing musical examples, a very pressing difficulty. Of these fifty, eleven are distinctly erroneous. The critic complains that in the *Gloria* of Mass VII. the editors omit the *b_b* and sharpen the leading note. As a matter of fact, there are only two *b*'s in the piece and *both of them are flattened*. In the *Cantus ad libitum*, Kyrie II., he says there are only two *Christe*. I have examined three editions, and in all I find *three Christe*. In *Gloria III.*, the MSS. give a double *d* at *Te* in *Laudamus Te*; the critic declares 'Dom Pothier' only gives one. As a matter of fact, the editors have given the double *d*. Seven other statements are erroneous in their assertion that 'Dom Pothier's' version is unsupported by any MSS. This, as I have shown above, is altogether inaccurate, and an imputation on the venerable Abbot's honesty of purpose. Nearly forty out of the incriminated passages are condemned for the guilt of not following the statistical tables of Appuldurcombe. I have at length, in the previous part of the article, discussed the value of this archæological criterion. While giving it all due importance, I have endeavoured to prove that it has not the right to claim to be 'the sole judge' of revision of Gregorian melodies. Moreover, *every one of the changes* are such manifest improvements from a practical and artistic point of view that I wonder the critic's well-known musical taste did not rise in judgment against his archæological prejudices. I cannot resist the temptation to give an extreme example of this. He complains (page 55)

that while the MSS. give





'It is hard,' he says, 'to suppress one's indignation at this.' What it is that has so stirred the critic's bile we cannot understand. For years he has probably sung the Vatican version without a qualm, and even with pleasure. But now that the version of the MSS. appears (and what a clumsy one, too), he is filled with holy indignation against those who have hidden from him such a pearl of melody!

I think that I have now trespassed quite enough upon my readers' patience, but I have some confidence that they will admit that we have good and solid reasons for supporting the Vatican edition against the attacks directed against it. These attacks, we hold, are bound to fail, for on the scientific side their principles are so feeble, and still more from the point of view of authority, in that they are in direct antagonism to the directions of the Holy See. It is gratifying to be able to record that the new *Kyrie* is spreading at a most extraordinary rate throughout the world, and it will soon be a question of the ancient dictum: '*Securus judicat orbis terrarum.*'

The critic indulges in some melancholy reflections on the 'procession of "reformers," as they pass through the centuries, although they are headed by a St. Bernard.' Is not the critic at fault here? Has he not been guilty of a most important omission? Most people are under the impression that the procession of reformers was 'headed' by St. Gregory the Great. Such a procession was far from a melancholy sight in the Church, as the centenary celebrations in honour of St. Gregory, held in Rome in 1904, can testify. St. Bernard hardly deserves to be included in the same category as the Medicean reformers, as his reform was chiefly confined to his own Congregation, a very small body in the Church.

There is, however, one aspect of the critic's case, which has caused a good deal of pain in his readers, and that is the

style in which he has allowed himself to speak of the official acts of the Holy See. Certainly the authorities at Rome would be the last in the world to attempt to stifle discussion on theoretical and scientific questions of the Chant ; but the antagonists should surely refrain from dragging in the official acts of the Sacred Congregation. I am sure that the critic hardly realizes how distressing it is to a loyal son of the Church to come across such passages as these : ' One thing is certain to me, the *Vaticana* cannot stand. Dom Pothier has, indeed, already got a considerable number of authoritative pronouncements in favour of his edition ' ¹ (page 62).

How has Dom Pothier got these pronouncements ? Are we invited to believe that the Abbot has only to walk into Cardinal Tripepi's office, and go forth with the documents desired, much in the same way as we get passports from the Foreign Office, just for the asking ? The whole situation would be too amusing to those who know something of Dom Pothier's retiring and humble ways, were it not that the respect and authority of the Sacred Congregation are at stake. It is neither correct nor respectful to insinuate that Cardinal Tripepi issues decrees for the whole world on a most far-reaching matter, simply at the dictate of another, without any sense of responsibility of his exalted position. Had the critic known something of the personal holiness and integrity of this Prince of the Church, he would have realized how singularly unhappy are the suggestions that anyone could ' get ' at him.

But this is not all. The critic goes on to say : ' No, this question cannot be settled by decrees. If the *Vaticana* cannot stand on the strength of its intrinsic excellence, no artificial propping up by decrees will prevent it from tumbling down ' (page 62). This is really going too far. If the direction of the Chant of the Church is not to be determined by official decrees of the Holy See, by what is it then to be determined ? By archæology ? God forbid ! There is always danger that controversialists, in their eagerness to score points, lose a sense of the proportion of things. Surely

¹ ' His edition.' This is, perhaps, one of the most offensive forms of this persistent misrepresentation.

if there is one thing clear, as the Holy Father has declared more than once, it is that the Gregorian Chant is 'the patrimony of the Church,' and it belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff, and to him alone, *to settle all questions relating to the Chant by his decrees*. If another Pope thought fit some day to cut down and shorten the melodies of the *Gradual* (an act which some people would gladly welcome), the Church would not hesitate to obey. It is surely a startling proposition to put before the faithful, that the settlement of the Plain Chant must be dependent upon the studies and decisions of a school of archæologists, and not upon Rome. Even if, by supposition, the archæologists were to succeed in impressing upon the Holy See their views and contentions (*quod Deus avertat !*) how would the 'question then be settled' for the Church except by the issue of 'official decrees'? As well might we expect the Atlantic to retire before the labours of Mrs. Partington, as to expect that the faithful of the Church will disregard 'official decrees,' in favour of an unscientific, inartistic school of archæology. This is the only distressing part of a study that is distinguished by most careful research and a thorough grasp of all the details of the edition, and our regret is all the keener that these reflections should have proceeded from a Professor of Maynooth, a College always distinguished for its almost exuberant loyalty to the Holy See.

Who but must laugh, if such a man there be ?
 Who would not weep, if Atticus were he ?

T. A. BURGE, O.S.B.

THE CHURCH AND THE SCHOOLS IN COUNTRIES OF DIFFERENT RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS

THE primary school question has been engaging for a considerable time and still continues to engage the most serious attention and consideration of thoughtful men of all shades of religious and political belief in these countries. Yet, it is not the improvement of the programme of secular education, nor the greater adaptability of the school course to modern conditions and present-day requirements, that is the subject of all this anxious pre-occupation. No ; it is rather the problem of the separation or union and mode of union of religious and secular instruction in tax- and rate-aided schools in England. It is the question, whether secular instruction alone shall be given in these schools, or secular and religious education combined ; and in the latter hypothesis what form of religion shall be taught, and how it shall be taught, in a country where the tax-payers and the rate-payers belong to so many different religious denominations.

I have already described,¹ in a previous number of this journal,² the law of the Church relative to the union of religious and secular instruction in private and State schools in Catholic countries. And I now proceed to fulfil the promise then given of explaining, in a later number, the principles which guide and shape the educational policy of the Church in countries where Catholics live side by side with fellow-citizens of a different or of various different religious denominations. But to prevent misconception of the question now at issue, and to have before our eyes the guidance of the Catholic ideal for Catholic States, I will begin by briefly re-stating the law of the Church relative to combined

¹ Following Cardinal Cavagnis' *Institutiones Juris Publici Ecclesiastici*, I. iv., c. i., a. iii. (edit. tertia)

² I. E. RECORD, January, 1906.

religious and secular education in the State schools of Catholic countries.

According then to the Catholic rule children can be educated in their parents' home by tutors and governesses : private persons too can open and conduct schools for primary and higher education : the Church can establish her own schools for general education, for the State has no right to a monopoly even in secular education : and, finally, the State, of course, can establish and endow schools and colleges for a complete course of civic education : but in all Catholic primary and intermediate schools, where a full course of education is given, whether they be established by private persons by the State or by the Church, ecclesiastical law requires that the system of instruction shall be the system of combined religious and secular instruction. This implies that in Catholic schools religion shall be included in the programme of obligatory subjects to be taught in the schools ; that the teachers shall be Catholic and imbued with the Catholic spirit ; that religious instruction shall be given some time during the obligatory school hours, for if religion be an obligatory school subject the time during which it is taught should be reckoned obligatory school time, whether it be taught in the school or in the church, by the teacher or by the priests of the parish ; and finally that, though the right of appointing the teachers belongs to the State or municipal or rural authority, the representatives of ecclesiastical authority shall have the right of visiting the schools, of exercising vigilance to see that unworthy teachers be not appointed or continued in office and that the moral and religious formation of the children be diligently and zealously attended to, not merely by teaching the words of the catechism, which canonists call *instruction*, but also by good example, by application of the truths taught to the cultivation of the character, of the will, of the whole man as a Christian and as a citizen, which canonists call *education*.

Hence the claim for religious teaching in State-aided schools in Catholic countries—and the same may be said of non-Catholic countries—is not a question of the ecclesi-

astical ownership of the schools or right of managing the schools and appointing the teachers, of bureaucratic control whether civil or ecclesiastical versus popular control; nor a question of sacrificing, or neglecting, or undervaluing the secular side of education in deference to an antiquated method of religious education; nor a question of fighting or curbing Democracy in the interest of Aristocracies. In Catholic countries, according to Catholic canonists, the State schools and municipal and rural schools and the appointment of teachers are vested by right in the State or municipal or rural authority and can be under popular control as much as similar schools in America or Australia, and the programme and method of instruction can be made as perfect and modern and suitable to the future avocations of the children and to the economic conditions of the country as it is possible for them to be; only, the local authority, whether aristocratic or democratic, being itself Catholic and the parents and children being Catholic, would and should according to Catholic law appoint Catholic teachers, the programme of obligatory school teaching should include Christian doctrine, religious instruction should be given some time during school hours and the local priests should have access to the schools and the right of exercising vigilance over the teaching of Christian doctrine and the general moral atmosphere of the schools.

The conditions however of the school system can be such in a particular country, as when primary education is administered not by local bodies representative of the parents of the children, but by a Board half Catholic and half Protestant, that the Church can demand, as a condition for accepting the State schools, that they be placed under clerical managership, if this be necessary to prevent danger or suspicion of attempts at proselytism, to secure that Catholic teachers be appointed to schools frequented exclusively or mainly by Catholics and that the children be instructed in the faith of their parents. But this is due to the special circumstances of a particular country and of a particular educational system and is not an essential part, in all circumstances, of

the Catholic theory of combined religious and secular instruction; and it is for the Church to pronounce authoritatively, according to the circumstances of place and educational system, on the necessity of establishing and continuing ecclesiastical control if the schools are to be freely availed of by Catholic parents for the education of their children.

Such in substance is the Catholic law respecting the union of religious and secular instruction in primary and intermediate schools in Catholic countries. I will now proceed to examine the principles that determine the educational policy of the Church in non-Catholic countries—and I might add in Catholic countries too, when the law of the Church in regard to combined religious and secular instruction is disregarded. I will examine first, generally, the different lines of policy that are open to the Church; and secondly what the actual policy of the Church is in regard to different circumstances and educational systems.

I.

There is no one inflexible rule of Church educational policy applicable to all the varying circumstances in which individual Catholics may be placed in non-Catholic countries. The difficulty that arises when the State schools are not conducted on lines acceptable to Catholics is not a dogmatic difficulty that might be solved once for all by an authoritative decision of the Church, but a moral difficulty which must be solved or coped with in a different way in different times and places and conditions of government and school systems. The Church is the mother of the faithful, and her anxiety and solicitude for her children and her direction of them in their moral difficulties are like the anxiety and solicitude and provident care of the human parent. There are places of amusement and spheres of human activity and forms of worldly careers which parents would absolutely forbid to their children. There are others which they can positively and heartily approve. There are others again which they permit and recommend because, though they do not fully satisfy the parental ideal, they can

be made harmless and even highly advantageous by a good will and effective protective measures. And I suppose there are cases where rare and exceptional prospects, a noble career, a brilliant alliance, appear on the horizon, but the avenue to them is beset with most serious perils and the parents cannot bring themselves to give a formal and explicit approval or recommendation, or deliver a formal prohibition, but content themselves with a serious and solemn warning of the dangers of such a career or of such an alliance. And so it is with the Church. There are educational systems which she absolutely condemns and prohibits; others she declares intrinsically dangerous to faith and morals without adding a further ecclesiastical prohibition; others again she tolerates; and others she formally approves.

1. It is absolutely forbidden to attend schools or colleges which Catholics cannot enter without conforming to non-Catholic worship and renouncing their faith, or where attendance at lectures on false doctrine and acceptance, even if it be only external, of this doctrine form an obligatory part of the course. Attendance at such schools is forbidden by divine law independently of any ecclesiastical prohibition.

2. The Church declares certain schools and colleges, 'to be intrinsically dangerous to faith and morals.' What is the import of such a condemnation? It is of course *per se* unlawful, by the natural law, to frequent institutions that have been authoritatively declared intrinsically dangerous to faith and morals. If to this be added a special ecclesiastical prohibition, it binds all to whom the prohibition is addressed without exception; for ecclesiastical prohibitions which are motivated by and founded on the presumption of general danger are understood to bind all to whom they are addressed without exception, even though the reason of the law be not found to exist in particular cases. But in the absence of an ecclesiastical prohibition, formal or virtual, the prohibition of the natural law notified by the declaration that certain schools or colleges are intrinsically dangerous to faith and morals is not necessarily of universal application. For there may be a very grave cause or necessity for attending such schools or colleges,

and there may be no danger in a particular case, or means may be taken to counteract the danger to faith and morals and to make it remote ; but one should not trust his own judgment about the likelihood and means of escaping danger in schools which have been declared by the Church to be intrinsically dangerous to faith and morals.

3. Other schools there are concerning which the Church declares, 'that they can be tolerated.' The constitution of these schools may be somewhat different in different countries, but in general we may take it that, though they fall short of the Catholic ideal of obligatory combined religious and secular instruction, they contain no special danger to faith or morals and tolerable provision is made for the religious instruction of the children attending the schools ; and these schools may be freely availed of by Catholics.

4. Finally the Church positively approves the school system and the schools which are constituted according to the provisions of canon law ; where Christian doctrine is an obligatory school subject, where the teachers are Catholics, and where religious instruction is given as a part of the obligatory school work during the school hours.

These are the usual forms of ecclesiastical policy in regard to schools. Before proceeding to consider the attitude of the Church towards particular educational systems I will here notice an argument that is sometimes advanced to prove that the Church is inconsistent and unfaithful to her fundamental principles in the matter of education. It is said : 'When pleading the cause of Catholic schools and negotiating with governments, ecclesiastical authorities lay stress on the sacredness and inviolability of parental rights and argue that the education to be given in the schools should be such as the parents desire for their children ; but when it is a question not with governments but with the parents themselves, if the parents wish to send their children to such institutions as Trinity College, the Queen's Colleges, etc., the ecclesiastical authorities quickly make it evident that it is not the wishes of the parents but the wishes of the Church that have to be consulted in the

matter of education. Hence Catholic apologists should abandon the argument from the sacred and inviolable rights of parents, or the Church should discontinue her interference with Catholic parents in the matter of education and refrain from these forms of condemnation of educational systems which have just been described.'

This, I submit, is not a fair presentment of the Catholic position. The Catholic Church has the right and the duty, which her lay subjects no less than ecclesiastics claim and vindicate for her, of defining the rights and obligations of parents in regard to the education of their children. And the Church position is this, both before parents and governments : parents have a right that the constitution of State-aided schools shall be such that they can send their children to be educated in them without violence to their religious convictions or opposition to the discipline of their Church ; the wish of the parent acting according to the rule of his Church and religion is the proper criterium of the kind of education his children should receive. If she were treating with Catholic governments the Church could interpose immediately her own authority as well as the argument of parental claims ; but dealing with non-Catholic governments, if they refuse to recognize her own authority, she defines for Catholic parents their duties in regard to education, and they demand a Catholic education for their children on the ground that State-aided education should be such that Catholic parents can accept it for their children without violence to their religious convictions or infidelity to the discipline of their Church.

II.

I will now deal with the attitude of the Church towards particular systems of education. It is unnecessary to speak of those systems of education which are forbidden by divine law, irrespective of the laws of the Church, such as a system that would demand of Catholics conformity to Protestant worship. Besides these we can consider the following systems of education : absolute secularism, modified secularism, secular instruction combined with undenominational re-

ligion, secular and denominational religious instruction combined.

ABSOLUTE SECULARISM

What is absolute or pure secularism ? I understand by it the political and educational theory which teaches that secular instruction alone should be given in State-aided schools and that there should be no religious tests for teachers. Secularists then distinguish between moral training and religious instruction, and while excluding dogmatic religion they seem to admit generally that moral training should form a part of the obligatory work in State schools. But what system of morality should be taught ? 'Lay morality,' which is atheistic or positivist or agnostic ? or deistic ? or Christian ? There's the rub. All accept in some sense the formulæ, 'Thou shalt not kill,' 'Thou shalt not steal,' 'Thou shalt not bear false testimony'; but what shall be taught about the sanction or motive of these Commandments ? It is not permitted in purely secularist schools to speak of God or the God-Man, Jesus Christ, of the immortality of the soul or of a future life, of heaven or hell ; and to be consistent nothing should be taught about the sanction or motive of the Commandments, lest in schools that are accessible to all and are paid for by all offence should be given to Christians or to deists or to agnostics or to atheists.

It sounds plausible to say that the State is bound to give only a secular education. The expression, secular education, is ambiguous and misleading. The Church view and the correct view would be stated by saying that State schools, even in pagan countries, should give a good 'civic education' and aim at forming good citizens. What then does a good civic education imply ? Is it enough that reading, writing and arithmetic be taught and a good technical or professional training be given ? No ; a good civic education requires that children shall be taught the relations of subjects to their rulers and their country, the duties of various classes of mankind

to one another, the positive duties and prohibitions of the Commandments, the nobility of virtue and of labour and of the many modest avocations of the humble and lowly in the world. And what sanction and motive shall civic education invoke and advance for the observance of the Commandments? Shall the children be taught that in the distant past a gregarious mode of existence appeared suddenly, by innate variability, amongst our brute progenitors; that it was found useful in the struggle for existence and survived; that gregarious existence depends on the 'tribal virtues' opposed to dishonour, disloyalty, murder, injustice, and lying; that these virtues have descended to us, improved and developed, by heredity; that they should be respected and observed as beneficial to ourselves and to the human race in the struggle for existence? Is it supposed that this theory is true, or that, if Christianity disappeared, it could restrain and keep within the bounds of civic order the passions of the multitude without faith in a Supreme Ruler or a future life, without hope of reward or fear of punishment? Nor let it be said that the Church can supply moral training; for surely the State itself should establish a complete system of civic education in its schools.

Then Catholics want a Christian, a Catholic education for their children. They want them to be instructed in supernatural religion, in the doctrine of the Redemption, in prayer, in the sacraments, in the worship of the Church, in the nature and existence and beauty and advantages of Church life, in which, unlike individualism, all the faithful profess the same doctrine, partake of the same sacraments, assist at the same sacrifice, and are governed, taught and ministered to by the pastors of the Church. They object to separate the cultivation of the intellect from the cultivation of the will, or secular from moral and religious education. Experience too proves that when secular education alone is given by the public authority of the school religion is in danger of being neglected. This is realized by the friends and foes of religion; and thus while the Church, for the protection of religion, insists on the union of religion

and secular instruction in the school, continental free-thinkers are always striving for the exclusion of religion from the schools for the express purpose of destroying Christianity.

The Church then declares secularist or neutral schools, such as the State schools of America, our Model Schools, the Queen's Colleges, etc., to be 'intrinsically dangerous to faith and morals.' It is *per se* unlawful for Catholics to frequent such schools. If they are prohibited specially by ecclesiastical law no one can lawfully send his children to them. But in the absence of ecclesiastical prohibition the circumstances can be such that, notwithstanding the declaration that they are dangerous to faith and morals, it would be lawful to avail of such schools ; for example, if there be no other schools, if the danger to faith and morals be made remote and if satisfactory provision is made elsewhere for the religious education of the children.

There is nothing positively wrong in reading or writing or arithmetic, etc., even when separated from religion : secular schools are condemned not for anything positively immoral, but for their incomplete and therefore dangerous curriculum, just as a system of dietary may be condemned as well for its insufficiency as for its poisonous character. And Catholics who through necessity lawfully attend secular schools are not violating ecclesiastical law, nor are they under the ban of the Church, but they are supposed to be the objects of the special vigilance and zeal of their spiritual pastors.

MODIFIED SECULARISM

Modified secularism can assume a multiplicity of forms ; but I shall speak only of two. The National School System in Ireland is a secular system. It makes no provision for, but rather excludes religious instruction from the obligatory work of the legal school hours. But religious instruction can be given in the schools outside the hours of secular instruction. The managers are generally priests or ministers of other religious denominations. Though there are no tests the teachers are of the same religion as the

generality of their pupils. And hence the schools, though theoretically undenominational, have become practically denominational ; and such schools are said to be tolerated by the Church.

Another interesting form of modified secularism occurred in the diocese of St. Paul, U.S.A. Archbishop Ireland, on account of the peculiar circumstances of the parishes of Faribault and Stillwater, came to an agreement with the municipal authorities by which Religious were appointed teachers in these schools, but religious instruction was not to be given in the schools. The Religious of course recognized the Archbishop's authority in the matter of school books, there was no danger of false or immoral teaching in the schools, and provision was made for the religious instruction of the Catholic children outside of school. Propaganda decided that '*conventio inita a R.P.D. Joanne Ireland relate ad scholas de Faribault et Stillwater, perpensis omnibus circumstantiis, tolerari posse.*'

SECULAR AND UNDENOMINATIONAL RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION COMBINED

Many people in England, including Churchmen and Nonconformists, alarmed at the prospect for the State of a number of children growing up without any religious instruction and unable or unwilling to suggest a scheme for denominational religious teaching in State schools advocate the inclusion of undenominational or fundamental religion in the programme of obligatory teaching in the schools; but still there should be no religious tests for teachers. But what is undenominational religion ? If the schools are to be available for agnostics it can include only the religion of the great Unknowable and of 'lay morality.' If they are to be available for deists and unitarians the programme of religious instruction must exclude all the distinctive truths of the Christian religion. And if the prescribed religion be an undenominational Christian religion, the fundamental religious truths about which all Christians agree, what shall we say that it includes in modern times ? It is difficult to define it. It does not include the divinity of Christ, nor the

existence of supernatural religion, nor our redemption, nor the sacraments, nor the inspiration and divine authorship of the Holy Scriptures, nor the divine origin of and necessity of membership with the Church. It would seem then to be reduced to the reading of the Bible or of simple Bible lessons and truths and to natural morality ; and even for these no reasonable sanction or motive can be alleged, they may be disbelieved by the teacher who is charged with religious instruction, they have only the sanction of Parliament or of the Board of Education. Such a scheme of education scarcely differs in theory from absolute secularism.


This system of secular and undenominational religious instruction combined is considered by the Church 'intrinsically dangerous to faith and morals'; and the same principles apply to it that apply to the system of absolute secularism :—(1) Generally speaking parents cannot with a safe conscience send their children to these undenominational schools. (2) Wherever the State schools combine secular and undenominational religious instruction the Church exhorts Catholics to establish voluntary Catholic schools, and everywhere Catholics respond to this exhortation of the Church in a spirit of wonderful docility and sacrifice. (3) Where efficient Catholic schools are available, if a Bishop forbids parents to send their children to these State schools, no one can lawfully send his children to them. (4) But in the absence of a special prohibition, circumstances may arise when it would not be unlawful to send Catholic children to such schools, for example, if voluntary Catholic schools cannot be established, if it becomes a choice between no education and education that includes undenominational religion, if provision is made elsewhere for the denominational religious instruction of the children, and if the danger to faith and morals can be made remote. For undenominational religious teaching, like simple Bible lessons and moral instructions, does not contain anything positively wrong. Still some Prelates have a grave objection to subjecting young children to such teaching, and the Church prefers that secular subjects alone be taught in mixed schools rather than

that the common articles of faith should be taught in the schools and denominational religion afterwards in the homes. 'Tutius multo esse [judicavit] ut literarum tantummodo humanarum magisterium fiat in scholis *promiscuis*, quam ut fundamentales, ut aiunt, et communes Religionis Christianae articuli restricte tradantur, reservata singulis sectis peculiari seorsum eruditione. Ita enim cum pueris agere periculosum valde videtur.'¹

SECULAR AND DENOMINATIONAL RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION COMBINED

We find different forms of this system according as religious instruction is given only at the request of the parents or by the absolute rule of the school, in mixed schools or in separate schools for the children of different religious denominations.

1. In Italy the primary schools are under the control of the local authorities. Priests are sometimes appointed teachers and, generally speaking, the local authorities have religious instruction given in the schools if the parents request it ; so much so that to exclude the catechism from the schools the Freemasons and Socialists are anxious to transfer the control of the primary schools to the central government. This system does not come up to the Catholic



If there are not enough children to fill three schools of adequate size, one school receives children of two faiths, the head master being chosen from among members of the Church to which the majority of the parents of the children belong, and the second teacher from the members of the other Church. This second kind of school, called a *Simultanschule*, is regarded in most parts of Germany as a temporary expedient to be used only till there are enough children of the two Churches to fill two schools.¹

In the simultan schools as in the schools for one denomination every child must be educated in the faith of its parents unless exempted under the 'conscience clause,' but children are not exempted unless the head master is assured that they will receive religious instruction elsewhere from a person of the faith they profess, or of the faith which they are supposed to profess.

It is scarcely necessary to add that, of these, the Church 'positively approves' for Catholics the separate denominational school and 'tolerates,' where they are necessary, the simultan schools.

III.

Finally a few words about the English school question. At this moment the sympathy of all Catholic Irishmen goes out to the Bishops, priests and Catholic people of England in their anxiety about the future of their Catholic schools.

Since 1870 the Voluntary Schools have been receiving aid from the parliamentary grants, but before the Bill of 1902 they were not entitled to aid from the rates. The schools during this period were thoroughly Catholic: the managers and teachers were Catholic, religious instruction was an obligatory part of the school course, the atmosphere of the schools was Catholic. But the expenses of providing and maintaining well-equipped schools, and of paying such salaries as would command the service of good teachers were pressing heavily on the managers of the Catholic schools. Then came the Bill of 1902, admitting the Voluntary Schools

¹ *The Amendment of the Education Act of 1902: by Passive Resistance or by a more Excellent Way?* By T. C. Horsfall (Sherratt & Hughes, Manchester and London).

to a share of the rates. But in place of the existing managers the Bill provided that the managers should consist of foundation managers not exceeding four, and two representing the local authorities. It was further enacted that religious instruction should be under the control of the managers. However, the schools still remained substantially Catholic.

But the Nonconformists objected that in the present system there are religious tests for teachers, that rate-payers have to pay for teaching doctrines which they very strongly condemn, that the rate-payers are not fairly represented on the Board of Managers of Voluntary Schools, that these schools are an impediment to a truly National system of education; and it is generally supposed that Mr. Birrell's Bill will propose that tests shall be abolished and that tax- and rate-aided schools shall be placed completely under local control.

But Catholic and Anglican defenders of denominationalism fairly reply that the justice or injustice of religious tests for teachers cannot be regarded as a self-evident truth or as a decisive principle in this controversy. We must determine the duties of an office, like the office of teacher, before we can determine the qualifications to be required in those who seek the office. If children are to be educated in the faith of their parents, then it is necessary to adopt some means, whether it be by religious tests or otherwise, to appoint Catholics to instruct Catholic children, Anglicans to instruct Anglican children, Nonconformists to instruct Nonconformist children, etc. This is the fundamental question upon which the appointment of denominational teachers depends.

And if Nonconformists have recourse to passive resistance as a protest against paying for Catholic education, may not Catholics complain of paying taxes and rates for a secular or undenominational system which they condemn? Nonconformists undoubtedly have grievances under the law as it stands; but it is to be hoped that their grievances are not going to be removed by creating grievances for Catholics. In a country of various religious denominations

there must be give and take, without sacrificing principle. Individual claims and burdens cannot be regulated with mathematical precision. It is not necessary that the same number of questions in grammar, geography, natural history, etc., be taught in all the schools, or that the views put forward be acceptable to all the rate-payers. And why should it be objected that Catholics teach more dogmatic truths than Nonconformists, or that their doctrines are not acceptable to the rate-payers? Parents of all religious denominations pay rates and taxes to receive for their children a full civic education, and therefore a religious education. In a country of so many religious denominations the State cannot satisfactorily decide on a system of religious education except by educating children in the faith of their parents. It is to be hoped that in the legislation which is to be proposed Catholic schools can remain organically united with the National system of education. It is for the English Bishops to decide, when legislation is proposed, whether they can accept the Liberal proposals. But neither in England nor anywhere else can there be a truly National system of education, except on paper, unless the just claims of Catholics and other denominationalists for religious education are respected.

DANIEL COGHAN.

GENERAL NOTES

THE ORIGIN OF LIFE

THE whole world was interested last summer when the news went forth that a professor in Cambridge University, Mr. J. Butler Burke, had discovered, by experiments made on sterilized *gelatine bouillon*, acted on by radium, that organic life had been developed from what had hitherto been regarded as *dead matter*. In his volume just published, on *The Origin of Life*, Mr. Burke has reduced his discovery to more modest proportions. In this volume he has described with great care and minuteness the interesting experiments which he and others have made in their efforts to reach the solution of a problem which nature has not hitherto revealed. He holds that there is no such thing as *dead matter* in the strict sense of the word; that all matter is endowed with certain properties which, if they do not constitute life in the strict sense of the word, do not at least imply absolute inactivity. He takes *life* in a large sense, and anything that acts upon other substances and induces chemical change, he regards as in the broad sense living. In the borderland between living matter in the wide and the strict sense, he places *mind-stuff* or *bioplasm* (as distinct from *protoplasm*) which is indeed inorganic, but contains 'the germ and mode of motion of vitality.' It is not a seed that grows on every soil, but only flourishes in the chosen environment of beef-jelly. It is indeed in the inorganic body that the vital principle resides, and the vital flux of radium only enables it to manifest itself in the organic form. The blending of the organic and inorganic world has not, however, yet been reached. It is the goal: but evidence is still wanting to establish the complete connexion.

The product of radium and bouillon which he has observed in his experiment, he does not now regard as having established the connexion, but 'as being the nearest approach hitherto observed between visibly living and apparently not living nature. In a word, on the borderline between what we call living and what we regard or have regarded as dead.'

Thus, whilst Mr. Butler Burke does not adopt in the usual sense the theory of *biogenesis*, neither does he admit that of

abiogenesis. His whole theory, worked out with great learning, great ability, and great wealth of illustration by experiments with radium and various other luminous and phosphorescent substances, is the most important contribution to biological science of recent times.

From his theory of life or activity of some kind in all matter, Mr. Burke advances rather daringly to a general conception of the Universe, which does not seem to differ very much from that of Hegel and his followers. A conscious universe, of which we are conscious units; and that conscious universe being the beginning and the end of all things, looks very like a pantheistic vision. No doubt, Mr. Burke endeavours to rescue it from the commonplace materialistic theories by combining with it, in a tentative fashion, Berkeley's system of Idealism. He is not very positive, however, in his speculations. He does not appear to have reached finality on these questions, even in his own mind; and there is a singular absence of dogmatism and self-sufficiency about his conclusions which in no way detracts from the fascination of his book, and from the value and interest of his experiments.

THE KEY TO THE WORLD'S PROGRESS

MR. CHARLES S. DEVAS, the well known political economist, has just published a work of the highest interest and value. It is something indeed refreshing and uplifting to get from a man of his vast experience of the world, of men and of books, a reasoned, enlightened, dispassionate judgment on the ground works of civilization which concludes with so precious a testimony as the following :—

‘Lovers gaze fondly on the likeness of one they love; and gladly, therefore, should we gaze on the authentic portrait of the Church, and dwell lovingly on the features of the never-failing friend of all the sons of men: this Church, who by her very nature is the loving mother of us all; the mother of those whose fresh youth is not yet dimmed by sophistry nor made crafty by deception, nor soured by disappointment, nor hardened by iniquity; the mother who may be thrust aside in the hour of prosperity, but is the ever ready refuge, to whom those can turn whose burdens are heavy, whose hopes are shattered, whose days are drawing to a close, whose hearts are aching with irremediable sorrow. Ah! indeed in this dark world of illusion

it is worth while to make her known ; for to know her is to love her.'¹

In a series of succinct but luminous chapters, in every one of which the reader meets with something striking and impressive, the author deals with 'The Course of Civilization,' 'The Course of Christianity,' 'The Church and Culture,' 'The Church and Prosperity,' 'Christian Morality,' 'The Church and the State,' 'The Social Question,' 'Scandals and Sanctity,' 'Liberty of Conscience,' 'Heretics and Schismatics,' 'Development,' 'Defeat and Victory' 'Explanation of the Miraculous.' From the passage quoted above it will be evident that these subjects are dealt with in a thoroughly Christian and Catholic spirit. But what I should like to call attention to here is the great and varied learning of the author, and the singular beauty of the style in which each subject is treated. I should like to call particular attention to his treatment of the two objections most frequently made against the Church, viz., that she is international and independent (chap. iv., p. 124).

ST. BERNARD ON INTEMPERANCE

AUDI Domini nostri Jesu Christi verba : *Attendite ne corda vestra graventur crapula et ebrietate* (Luc. xxi. 34). Paulus etiam Apostolus castigando suos discipulos ait : *Nolite inebriari vino in quo est luxuria* (Ephes. v. 18). Et Salomon : *Luxuriosa res est vinum et tumultuosa ebrietas* (Prov. xx. 1). *Ne intuearis vinum quando flavescit, nec cum splenduerit in vitro color ejus : Ingreditur enim blande, sed in novissimo mordebit ut coluber, et quasi serpens venenum effundit* (Prov. xxiii. 31, 32). Nullum secretum est ubi ebrietas est. Multos exterminavit vinum et perduxit eos ad periculum corporum et animarum. Vinum in jucunditatem creatum est non in ebrietatem (Eccli. xxxi. 35). Ubicumque saturitas abundaverit ibi luxuria dominabitur. Ventrem distentum cibus et vini potationibus irrigatum voluptas luxurie sequitur. Ebrietas corpus debilitat, animam illaqueat : ebrietas generat perturbationem mentis : ebrietas auget furem cordis ; ebrietas nutrit flammam fornicationis ; ebrietas ita alienat mentem ut homo nesciat semetipsum ; homo ebrius est ita a semetipso alienus ut nesciat ubi sit. Plerisque laus

¹ *The Key to the World's Progress.* By Charles S. Devas, M.A. Oxon.—Longmans, Green & Co., 1906.

est multum bibere sed non inebriari ; quos propheta increpat dicens : *Vae qui potentes estis ad bibendum vinum et viri fortes ad miscendam ebrietatem* ; et iterum : *Vae qui consurgitis mane ad ebrietatem sectandam et potendum usque ad vesperam ut vino aestuetis* (Isaias v. 22, 11). Etiam Joel propheta clamat dicens : *Expergiscimini, ebrii, et flete, et ululate omnes qui bibitis vinum in dulcedine* (Joel i. 5). Non dicet *qui bibitis vinum in necessitate*, sed *qui bibitis vinum in dulcedine*, hoc est in delectatione. Ebrietas mortale crimen est : ebrietas grave peccatum est : ebrietas inter homicidia et adulteria et fornicationes reputatur : ebrietas ejicit, hominem a regno Dei ; ebrietas expellit hominem a paradiso : ebrietas demergit hominem in infernum.—(*De Modo bene Vivendi*, c. xxv.)

DECISION OF THE HOLY SEE ON ' DAILY COMMUNION '

It is unnecessary for me to call the attention of the clergy to the very important Decree of the Sacred Congregation of the Council (which I give at page 376) on ' Daily Communion.' All controversies as to the dispositions necessary for the privilege of being admitted to Daily Communion are by this Decree set at rest for ever. All Christians, no matter what their occupation or condition, who are in the state of grace and firmly resolved to avoid sin in the future, should be encouraged to receive the Holy Eucharist every day. The reasons of this decision will be found fully set forth in the Decree.

J. F. HOGAN, D.D.

Notes and Queries

THEOLOGY

RULES OF THE INDEX

REV. DEAR SIR,—I have been recently asked by a penitent whether the rules of the Index prohibiting the reading of condemned books are binding in this country. Will you be so good as to reply in an early number of the I. E. RECORD to the following questions :—(1) Do the rules of the Index bind in this country? (2) If they do bind, who can grant a dispensation?

CONFESSARIUS.

I. There seems to be no reasonable ground for denying that the rules of the Index, by which the reading of certain books is forbidden to the faithful, bind in these countries both in *actu primo* and in *actu secundo*. When the new rules were published in 1896 they were promulgated for the whole world and were declared binding everywhere. ‘Itaque matura deliberatione, adhibitisque S.R.E. Cardinalibus e sacro Consilio libris notandis, edere Decreta Generalia statuimus, quae infra scripta, unaque cum hac Constitutione conjuncta sunt: quibus idem sacrum Consilium posthac utatur unice, quibusque catholici homines *toto orbe* religiose pareant.’ And again, ‘Libri ab Apostolica Sede damnati, *ubique gentium* prohibiti censeantur, et in *quodcumque vertantur idioma*.’ This proves that at least in *actu primo* the rules of the Index are binding in these countries.

That they are also binding in *actu secundo* seems clear. The Cardinal-Archbishop and Bishops of England asked the Holy See whether the new Constitution was or was not intended to supplant the *status quo* which had hitherto existed in their country. In reply the Propaganda sent most ample faculties for dispensation, so that owing to the special circumstances of the country they should be fully em-

powered 'to modify the rigour of the law by their prudence and counsel, according as the case might demand.'¹

That the Propaganda gave these ample faculties of dispensing, not as a practical way of getting rid of a difficulty, but because they were thought necessary, is clear from the subsequent decision of the Index, 23rd May, 1898, which replied in the affirmative to the question: 'Utrum dicta Constitutio vim obligatoriam habeat etiam pro regionibus britannici idiomatis, quas tacita dispensatione frui quidam arbitrantur?' The plain meaning of this affirmative response is that not merely in *actu primo*, but also in *actu secundo*, the rules of the Index are binding in these countries, since the question which was asked had reference to the binding force of the law in *actu secundo*, in face of the tacit dispensation which some thought to exist.

II. The Congregations of the Inquisition, Index, and Propaganda for its own subjects, can give general permission to read books prohibited by special or general decrees. Bishops and Prelates having quasi-episcopal jurisdiction can give permission to their subjects 'for single books and only in urgent cases' (art. 25). The Vicar-General, having one court with the Bishop, enjoys this power, but Vicars Forane and Parish Priests have no such power, except in so far as they receive it from the Bishop by general or special delegation.

Further powers are at times granted to Bishops, as witness the special faculties, already mentioned, granted to the English Bishops. In the *Formula Sexta* our Bishops receive powers in virtue of which they can grant permission to read books prohibited by the Index (with some exceptions mentioned in the *Formula*). It can, however, be granted only to *priests* who are known to be suitable subjects for the privilege, and only *ad tempus*. The latter phrase excludes permanent permission, but a dispensation once granted without limitation, probably lasts till it is revoked.²

¹ Cf. *Tablet*, 18th Dec., 1897.

² Putzer, pp. 54, 264, and Vermeersch, p. 120.

AGE AT WHICH OBLIGATION OF FASTING CEASES

REV. DEAR SIR,—Theologians are, I believe, unanimous in teaching that when persons come to the age of sixty, they are exempt or excused from the law of fasting. But I find in reading the modern authors, that many of them—and these of note—are more benign in their teaching on this point with regard to the 'devout female sex.' They hold that when women come to the age of fifty, they are no longer obliged by the law of fasting. I have no opportunity of investigating or becoming acquainted with their various reasons for this view. I believe their principal one is : that women grow old and feeble more quickly than men, and therefore are less constitutionally fitted to bear up against the rigours of fast. If that be their *sole* reason for the opinion, I fear it can scarcely be sustained as solidly probable, since the *fact itself* cannot be maintained undeniable, according to the experience and judgment of some of the ablest of modern physiologists. For example, Eschbach says : 'Quando circa hanc aetatem (50) menstrus fluxus desinit saepe mulieres quasi novas vires acquirere videntur.'

This being so, the reason on which their opinion depends is proved fallacious, and consequently the opinion itself is not probable or tenable, according to the recognized rules of probabilism, viz. : 'Supponitur tamen eorum auctoritatem non elidi, vel documento aliquo positivo . . . vel etiam perspecta falsitate . . . *erroneae doctrinae veterum physicorum.*'¹

Kindly, then, say if you consider the above-mentioned opinion of these modern authors safely and practically probable, and if it may be prudently and securely preached to the faithful? I have known it to be so promulgated, but I should be chary in following the example, especially as I find no similar teaching or direction put forward in any of the Lenten Regulations of our Bishops.

A SUBSCRIBER.

The opinion which holds that women, by reason of advancing years, are free from the obligation of fasting at the age of fifty is maintained by many modern theologians,² but it can scarcely be called new, since Sanchez³ held it in his

¹ *Vide* Genicot, vol. i., p. 61, n. 66 2°.

² Gury-Ballerini, i., n. 509; Palmieri, ii., n. 1142; Bucceroni, i., p. 470; Noldin, n. 676; Sabetti, n. 337; Slater, p. 486; Genicot, i., n. 445, who, though not holding the opinion speculatively, still looks on it as probable in practice.

³ *Consil.* v., c. 1, 4, n. 6.

day and some of the older theologians with him. St. Alphonsus¹ did not reject it as improbable, though he did not vouch for its probability. The argument on which it rests is that mentioned by our correspondent; women, it is said, feel the weight of years sooner than men, and should, in consequence, be excused from the fast at an earlier age. If it has been clearly established by physiologists that this argument has no foundation in fact, then the view that has been built on it cannot be looked on as probable. But if the argument has not been disproved, the number and authority of the theologians who hold the opinion would seem to be sufficient to make it probable.

Eschbach² maintains that women, as a rule, gain new strength about the age of fifty, and quotes Drs. Richard and Brachet in his favour. On the other hand, Dr. Capellmann,³ though he mentioned the opinion of Sanchez, did not reject it on physiological grounds, as he would have done had he thought the argument of Sanchez false. At the present time physiologists seem not to have definitely rejected the argument on which the opinion is based. Black's *Medical Dictionary*, edited by Dr. Cormie (1906), makes the following statement: 'In women, at the grand climacteric (about fifty), there is a special liability to bodily and mental weakness, although in those of a previously robust constitution any such change is generally merely temporary' (page 159). Though a previously robust constitution will generally overcome this liability to weakness, its very existence makes it more difficult for women to ward off the feebleness of old age; so that it is hard to hold that the mild opinion is not probable.

Seeing that Bishops have no power to settle questions disputed between approved theologians, it is not surprising that in their Lenten Regulations they do not refer to opinions which are at most probable, especially when the probability arises, to a great extent, from extrinsic authority.

J. M. HARTY.

¹ n. 1037.

² *Disp. Phys.*, p. 52.

³ *Med. Past.*, p. 95.

LITURGY

'ORATIONES IN MISSIS DE REQUIE'

REV. DEAR SIR,—In the I. E. RECORD of November, 1883, under the heading, Liturgical Questions, the following *Quaeritur* and Decree are found : ' Utrum in Missis quotidianis de Requite, quae in plerisque ecclesiis Parochialibus absque ministris a solo celebrante cantantur, dicendae sunt tres orationes ? an vero una ? ' S.R.C. resp. : ' Dicenda una oratio,' 13 July, 1883.

I assume—if I may—that there is in this reply an *a fortiori* argument for saying only one prayer, ' *in Missis de Requie quotidianis Solemnibus.*'

In the *Ordo*, page xv., the substance of a Decree of 30th June, 1896, is given : ' In Missis quotidianis quibuscunque, sive lectis, sive cum cantu, plures sunt dicendae Orationes, . .

Will you kindly say in next issue of the I. E. RECORD if the latter Decree annuls the former in either or both cases ?

SACERDOS.

The General Decree of June, 1896,¹ has considerably changed and modified the legislation that hitherto prevailed, regarding various phases of *Requiem* Masses. To the points affected by the new Regulations belong the *number* and *order* of prayers to be said in these Masses. Formerly only one prayer was to be said in Masses *de Requiem* that were either *solemniter aut cantatas*. Now the number of prayers

solemniter celebratur, nempe sub ritu qui duplici respondeat; et in Officio quod recitatur post acceptum nuntium de alicujus obitu, et in Anniversariis late sumptis.' The distinction, then between High and Low *Requiem* Masses is no longer a guide in determining the number of prayers—which must be fixed rather by the nature of the occasion on which Mass is said—except to this extent, that in *Missae Quotidianae Cantatae* the number of prayers must not exceed *three*, while in *Missae Quotidianae Lectae* there may be *three, five, or seven*. It may be well if under a few headings we indicate briefly the application of the new legislation, (a) in regard to the number and (b) in regard to the *quality* of the prayers to be said in the various classes of *Requiem* Masses.

I.—NUMBER OF PRAYERS

1. Only *one* prayer is to be said in *Missae de Requiem*—whether *solemnes, cantatae, or lectae* (low or private)—that are celebrated on the occasion of a death or interment.

2. In *Missis solemnibus et cantatis* celebrated for a deceased person on the *third, seventh, and thirtieth* day from the death or burial, and on anniversaries, whether in the strict or the wide sense, only *one* prayer is to be said.

3. Similarly only *one* prayer is to be said in the Mass, *solemnis* or *cantata*, celebrated for a person immediately on receipt of the news of his death.

4. Outside all these privileged occasions, that is to say, in the ordinary *Missae Quotidianae*, if they are *solemnes* or *cantatae* *three* prayers and only *three* are to be said; and if they are *lectae* then at least *three must* be, but *five or seven may* be, said, the last one being *Fidelium*. If on the occasions mentioned in (2) and (3) a *Missa lecta* is permitted, by the current rite, only *one* prayer is recited.

II.—SELECTION OF PRAYERS

1. *In die obitus*, the prayer in Masses offered for a deceased Pope, Cardinal, Bishop, or Priest, must correspond to the *dignity* of the person deceased, and is found among the *orationes diversae*. For clerics inferior to a Priest, and for laymen, the second Mass with its proper *oratio* is taken.

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¹ Vide I. E. RECORD.

solemniter celebratur, nempe sub ritu qui duplici respondeat; ut in Officio quod recitatur post acceptum nuntium de alicujus obitu, et in Anniversariis late sumptis. The distinction, then between High and Low *Requiem* Masses is no longer a guide in determining the number of prayers—which must be fixed rather by the nature of the occasion on which Mass is said—except to this extent, that in *Missae Quotidianae Cantatae* the number of prayers must not exceed *three*, while in *Missae Quotidianae Lectae* there may be *three, five, or seven*. It may be well if under a few headings we indicate briefly the application of the new legislation, (a) in regard to the *number* and (b) in regard to the *quality* of the prayers to be said in the various classes of *Requiem* Masses.

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CORRESPONDENCE

THE MAINTENANCE OF INVALID PRIESTS

REV. DEAR SIR,—In the September and October numbers of the **I. E. RECORD**, there appeared some correspondence about the establishment of a Home for Infirm Priests. I am disposed to think that many priests, and especially those who have got parochial houses built, would prefer to end their days amidst the scenes of their labours—even if such a Home existed.

But to solve the existing difficulty about the appointment of a curate (or of an additional curate as the case may be) to the assistance of infirm parish priests in charge of parishes which are inadequate for the support of an additional priest, I would venture to suggest for the consideration of your readers an arrangement which seems to me both natural and feasible. It is this : that aged parish priests, as soon as their infirmities render necessary the appointment of another priest to their assistance, should, upon his being appointed, receive, or become entitled to receive, annually, a portion of the **Diocesan Infirm Priests' Fund**, except of course in a case where there would be some special reason to the contrary.

If this arrangement existed in every diocese there would be no financial difficulty about appointing a curate even to a poor parish in charge of a parish priest, who, through age or infirmity, would be unable to attend to the spiritual wants of the people. For the curate, on his appointment, could be assigned a congruous and adequate portion of the parochial revenues ; as the infirm parish priest's portion would be subsidized by an annual sum from the **Diocesan Infirm Priests' Fund**.

By this arrangement it would not be necessary to ask an infirm parish priest to resign the parish : nor, on the other hand, would there be any reason to defer the appointment of an assistant priest until an aged parish priest would have become so infirm as to be unable to perform even the essential functions of the mission—and until devotion and religion among his people would have flagged or decayed.

With this arrangement existing, then, even though old

and infirm parish priests might cling tenaciously to their parishes—'as they sometimes do,' according to a writer in the October number of the I. E. RECORD—their presence would not be an obstacle, but perhaps in some cases rather an aid to the continuous efficient carrying on of the work of the mission.

The arrangement suggested, it may be said, would necessitate the enlargement of the Infirm Priests' Fund, in order to meet the new demand that would come upon it. But should not a necessary fund be enlarged to the necessary dimensions by the untied contributions of the clergy and laity? (Vide 'Acta et Decreta Conciliorum Provinciae Tuamensis.'—Decr. 'Quum Episcoporum' et 'Quum Justitia').—Faithfully yours,

A C.C.

DOCUMENTS

DECREE OF THE SACRED CONGREGATION OF THE COUNCIL
REGARDING 'DAILY COMMUNION'

DECRETUM

DE QUOTIDIANA SS. EUCHARISTIAE SUMPTIONE

Sacra Tridentina Synodus, perspectas habens ineffabiles quae Christifidelibus obveniunt gratiarum divitias, sanctissimam Eucharistiam sumentibus (Sess. 22, cap. 6) ait : *Optaret quidem sacrosancta Synodus, ut in singulis Missis fideles adstantes non solum spirituali affectu, sed sacramentali etiam Eucharistiae perceptione communicarent.* Quae verba satis aperte produnt Ecclesiae desiderium ut omnes Christifideles illo coelesti convivio quotidie reficiantur, et pleniores ex eo sanctificationis hauriant effectus.

Huiusmodi vero vota cum illo cohaerent desiderio, quo Christus Dominus incensus hoc divinum Sacramentum instituit. Ipse enim nec semel nec obscure necessitatem innuit suae carnis crebro manducandae suique sanguinis bibendi, praesertim his verbis : *Hic est panis de coelo descendens ; non sicut manduca- verunt patres vestri manna et mortui sunt : qui manducat hunc panem vivet in aeternum* (Ioan. vi. 59). Ex qua comparatione cibi angelici cum pane et manna facile a discipulis intelligi poterat, quemadmodum pane corpus quotidie nutritur, et manna in deserto Hebraei quotidie refecti sunt, ita animam christianam caelesti pane vesci posse quotidie ac recreari. Insuper quod in oratione Dominica exposci iubet *panem nostrum quotidianum*, per id SS. Ecclesiae Patres fere unanimes docent, non tam materialem panem, corporis escam, quam panem eucharisticum quotidie sumendum intelligi debere.

Desiderium vero Iesu Christi et Ecclesiae, ut omnes Christi- fideles quotidie ad sacrum convivium accedant, in eo potissimum est ut Christifideles, per sacramentum Deo coniuncti, robur inde capiant ad compescendam libidinem, ad leves culpas quae quo- tidie occurrunt abluendas, et ad graviora peccata, quibus humana fragilitas est obnoxia, praecavenda ; non autem praecipue ut Domini honori, ac venerationi consulatur, nec ut sumentibus id quasi merces aut praemium sit suarum virtutum (S. August

Serm. 57 in Matth. De Orat. Dom., v. 7). Unde S. Tridentinum Concilium Eucharistiam vocat *antidotum quo liberemur a culpis quotidianis et a peccatis mortalibus praeservemur* (Sess. 13, cap. 2).

Hanc Dei voluntatem priores Christifideles probe intelligentes, quotidie ad hanc vitae ac fortitudinis mensam accurrebant, *Erant perseverantes in doctrina Apostolorum et communicatione fractionis panis* (Act. II., 42). Quod saeculis posterioribus etiam factum esse, non sine magno perfectionis ac sanctitatis emolumento, Sancti Patres atque ecclesiastici Scriptores tradiderunt.

Defervescente interim pietate, ac potissimum postea Ianseniana lue undequaque grassante, disputari coeptum est de dispositionibus, quibus ad frequentem et quotidianam Communionem accedere oporteat, atque alii prae aliis maiores ac difficiliore tamquam necessarias, expostularunt. Huiusmodi disceptationes id effecerunt, ut perpauci digni haberentur qui SS. Eucharistiam quotidie sumerent, et ex tam salutifero sacramento pleniores effectus haurirent; contentis caeteris eo refici aut semel in anno, aut singulis mensibus, vel unaquaque ad summum hebdomada. Quin etiam eo severitatis ventum est ut a frequentanda caelesti mensa integri coetus excluderentur, uti mercatorum, aut eorum *qui essent matrimonio coniuncti*.

Nonnulli tamen in contrariam abierunt sententiam. Hi arbitrati Communionem quotidianam iure divino esse praeceptam, de die ulla praeteriret a Communionem vacua, praeter alia a probato Ecclesiae usu aliena, etiam feria VI in Parasceve Eucharistiam sumendam censebant, et ministrabant.

Ad haec Sancta Sedes officio proprio non defuit. Nam per decretum huius Sacri Ordinis, quod incipit *Cum ad aures*, diei 12 mensis Februarii anni 1679, Innocentio Pp. XI adprobante, errores huiusmodi damnavit et abusus compescuit, simul declarans omnes cuiusvis coetus, mercatoribus atque conjugatis minime exceptis, ad Communionis frequentiam admitti posse, iuxta singulorum pietatem et sui cuiusque Confessarii iudicium. Die vero 7 mensis Decembris a. 1690, per decretum *Sanctissimus Dominus noster* Alexandri Pp. VIII, propositio Baii, purissimum Dei amorem absque ullius defectus mixtione requirens ab iis qui ad sacram mensam vellent accedere, proscripta fuit.

Virus tamen iansenianum, quod bonorum etiam animos infecerat, sub specie honoris ac venerationis Eucharistiae debiti, haud penitus evanuit. Quaestio de dispositionibus ad frequen-

tandam recte ac legitime Communionem Sanctae Sedis declarationibus supervixit; quo factum est ut nonnulli etiam boni nominis Theologi, raro et positis compluribus conditionibus, quotidianam Communionem fidelibus permitti posse censuerint.

Non defuerunt aliunde viri doctrina ac pietate praediti, qui faciliorem aditum praeberent huic tam salubri Deoque accepto usui, docentes, autoritate Patrum, nullum Ecclesiae praeceptum esse circa maiores dispositiones ad quotidianam, quam ad hebdomadariam ut menstruam Communionem; fructus vero uberioris longe fore ex quotidiana Communione, quam ex hebdomadaria aut menstrua.

Quaestiones super hac re diebus nostris adauctae sunt et non sine acrimonia exagitatae; quibus Confessoriorum mentes atque fidelium conscientiae perturbantur, cum christianae pietatis ac fervoris haud mediocri detrimento. A viris idcirco praeclarissimis ac animarum Pastoribus SSmo. Dno. Nostro Pio Pp. X enixae preces porrectae sunt, ut surpema Sua auctoritate quaestionem de dispositionibus ad Eucharistiam quotidie sumendam dirimere dignaretur; ita ut haec saluberrima ac Deo acceptissima consuetudo non modo non minuatur inter fideles, sed potius augeatur et ubique propagetur, hisce diebus potissimum, quibus Religio ac fides catholica undequaque impetitur, ac vera Dei charitas et pietas haud parum desideratur. Sanctitas vero Sua, cum Ipsi maxime cordi sit, ea qua pollet sollicitudine ac studio, ut christianus populus ad Sacrum convivium perquam frequenter et etiam quotidie advocetur eiusque fructibus amplissimis potiatur, quaestionem praedictam huic Sacro Ordini examinandam ac definiendam commisit.

Sacra igitur Concilii Congregatio in plenariis Comitibus diei 16 mensis Dec. 1905 hanc rem ad examen accuratissimum revocavit, et rationibus hinc inde adductis sedula maturitate perpensis, ea quae sequuntur statuit ac declaravit:

1. Communio frequens et quotidiana, utpote a Christo Domino et a Catholica Ecclesia optatissima, omnibus Christi-fidelibus cuiusvis ordinis aut conditionis pateat; ita ut nemo, qui in statu gratiae sit et cum recta piaque mente ad S. Mensam accedat, prohiberi ab ea possit.

2. Recta autem mens in eo est, ut qui ad S. Mensam accedit non usui, aut vanitati, aut humanis rationibus indulgeat, sed Dei placito satisfacere velit, ei arctius charitate coniungi, ac divino illo pharmaco suis infirmitatibus ac defectibus occurrere.

3. Etsi quam maxime expediat ut frequenti et quotidiana Communionem utentes venialibus peccatis, saltem plene deliberatis, eorumque affectu sint expertes, sufficit nihilominus ut culpis mortalibus vacent, cum proposito, se nunquam in posterum peccaturos; quo sincero animi proposito, fieri non potest quin quotidie communicantes a peccatis etiam venialibus, ab eorumque affectu sensim se expediant.

4. Cum vero Sacramenta Novae Legis, etsi effectum suum ex opere operato sortiantur, maiorem tamen producant effectum quo maiores dispositiones in iis suscipiendis adhibeantur, idcirco curandum est ut sedula ad Sacram Communionem praeparatio antecedit, et congrua gratiarum actio inde sequatur, iuxta uniuscuiusque vires, conditionem ac officia.

5. Ut frequens et quotidiana Communio maiori prudentia fiat, uberiusque merito augeatur, oportet ut Confessarii consilium intercedat. Caveant tamen Confessarii ne a frequenti seu quotidiana Communionem quemquam avertant, qui in statu gratiae reperiatur et recta mente accedat.

6. Cum autem perspicuum sit ex frequenti seu quotidiana S. Eucharistiae sumptione unionem cum Christo augeri, spiritualem vitam uberius ali, animam virtutibus effusius instrui, et aeternae felicitatis pignus vel firmitus sumentis donari, idcirco Parochi, Confessarii et concionatores, iuxta probatam Catechismi Romani doctrinam (*Part. II.*, n. 60), christianum populum ad hunc tam pium ac tam salutarem usum crebris admonitionibus multoque studio cohortentur.

7. Communio frequens et quotidiana praesertim in religiosis Institutis cuiusvis generis promoveatur; pro quibus tamen firmum sit decretum *Quemadmodum* diei 17 mensis Decembris 1890 a S. Congr. Episcoporum et Regularium latum. Quam maxime quoque promoveatur in clericorum Seminariis, quorum alumni altaris inhiant servitio; item in aliis christianis omne genus ephebeis.

8. Si quae sint Instituta, sive votorum solemnium sive simplicium, quorum in regulis aut constitutionibus, vel etiam calendariis, Communiones aliquibus diebus affixae et in iis iussae reperiantur, hae normae tamquam mere *directivae* non tamquam *praeceptivae* putandae sunt. Praescriptus vero Communionum numerus haberi debet ut quid minimum pro Religiosorum pietate. Idcirco frequentior vel quotidianus accessus ad eucharisticam mensam libere eisdem patere semper debebit,

iuxta normas superius in hoc decreto traditas. Ut autem omnes utriusque sexus religiosi huius decreti dispositiones rite cognoscere queant, singularum domorum moderatores curabunt, ut illud quotannis vernacula lingua in communi legatur intra Octavam festivitatis Corporis Christi.

9. Denique post promulgatum hoc Decretum omnes ecclesiastici scriptores a quavis contentiosa disputatione circa dispositiones ad frequentem et quotidianam Communionem abstineant.

Relatis autem his omnibus ad SSmum. D. N. Pium PP. X per infrascriptum S. C. Secretarium audientia diei 17 mens. Dec. 1905, Sanctitas Sua hoc Emorum. Patrum decretum ratum habuit, confirmavit atque edi iussit contrariis quibuscumque minime obstantibus. Mandavit insuper ut mittantur ad omnes locorum Ordinarios et Praelatos Regulares, ad hoc ut illud cum suis Seminariis, Parochis, institutis religiosis et sacerdotibus respective communicent, et de executione eorum quae in eo statuta sunt S. Sedem edoceant in suis relationibus de dioecesis seu instituti statu.

Datum Romae, die 20 Decembris 1905.

✠ VINCENTIUS Card. Episc. Praenest., *Praef.*
C. DE LAI, *Secretarius.*

NOTICES OF BOOKS

Ḥcátán na ḡpíréan. Dublin: Browne & Nolan, Ltd.
 Size, $3\frac{1}{2} \times 2\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{4}$ inches. Prices, bound in Leather,
 from 2s. to 4s. 6d.

THIS neat little book contains all the matter found in ordinary prayer-books, such as Morning and Evening Devotions, Prayers at Mass, Devotions for Confession and Communion, Rosary, Stations, and Benediction Service. It also gives an Irish Litany to the Blessed Virgin, indulgenced by Pius IX, some prayer-poems, and an Irish version of the Marriage rite. The compiler, who is anonymous, ought to have made use of the little prayer-book published by the Catholic Truth Society. His Act of Reparation to the Sacred Heart, and many of his prayers, are not so simple nor so beautiful as those in the book which we have just mentioned. Of the prayers in metrical form, one was sung at the consecration of Armagh Cathedral, the other does not appear to be old, at all events it has not the flavour of the old prayers. The successful composition of a prayer depends on a very rare combination of gifts natural and divine. Most of our modern prayers are straggling or spiritless.

The translation of the Ordinary of the Mass (Latin and Irish juxtaposed) is faithful and simple. In fact, if the compiler will pardon me for saying so, the former of these epithets is a little too well earned. His anxiety to give an accurate version has led him here and there into the mistake of cleaving to the letter of the original. Irish, like French, seems to me to be intolerant of foreign idiom, whilst English, on the other hand, seems to permit of every liberty with its traditional forms, the result being that translations in that language are in great part unintelligible to the people. The compiler translates *Gloria in excelsis Deo* and *Hosanna in excelsis* by Ḥlóire oo Ṯóia inḡ na ḡápsaib and Ḥoranna inḡ na ḡápsaib where, I think, he should have used ḡlaiteasraib or ḡlaicir with acá so ḡápo or ir áoirve. Compare the French rendering which I have before me: *Gloria à Dieu dans le Ciel*, and *Hosanna à celui qui habite au plus haut des Cieux*. I think the compiler, if he studies any French work, such as the


Office Divin, which gives the translation of the Ordinary of the Mass and a translation of the Psalms, will lose a good deal of his timidity, and will feel himself at liberty to make free use of the scholarship and good taste which he manifestly possesses. It will be understood, that what I conceive to be blemishes are few in number, and do not detract seriously from the value of the book, which, from its neatness and convenient size, will be welcomed by many.

M. UΔ S.

ASPECTS OF ANGLICANISM ; OR, SOME COMMENTS ON CERTAIN EVENTS IN THE NINETIES. By Mgr. Moyes, Canon of Westminster Cathedral. London : Longmans, Green & Co. 1906. Price 6s. 6d.

THE chapters of this book, as Mgr. Moyes reminds us in his preface, appeared substantially in the *Tablet* between 1890 and 1899. They are now republished in book form in the conviction 'that certain principles of faith are more easily set forth in the light of concrete illustrations than by abstract statements, and that such concrete illustrations are most conveniently sought in the facts and incidents of the religious world of our time.'

The work is, therefore, a sort of doctrinal chronicle with a commentary by the author. It is a real mine of information.



the substance of all the doctrinal controversies of a decade will find them here in a very convenient form.

J. F. H.

LE MAITRE ET L'ÉLÈVE. Fra Angelico et Benozzo Gozzoli, par Gaston Sortais. Desclée, de Brower et Cie. Lille, Paris, Rome, Bruxelles. 10 frs.

THIS is one of those beautiful books which we need not expect from the Catholic press of these countries for many years to come. It is an account of two great painters, the master and the pupil. Fra Angelico and Benozzo Gozzoli—beautifully illustrated with engravings and chromo-lithographs of the masterpieces of the two great painters. In his account of Fra Angelico M. Sortais gives a very brilliant description of the struggle between the idealist and the naturalist schools in Italy, between the painters who aimed at a presentation of the beauties of the soul, and those who preferred to study and present the beauties of the body. The part taken in the the movement by Fra Angelico and his pupil is clearly shown. The frescoes of Benozzo at Montefalco, at San Gemignano, at Florence and Pisa are described with great skill, and some of them very well reproduced. For a gift book costing only 10 francs a Catholic could not get a handsomer and more artistic book.

J. F. H.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The Tradition of Scripture. By Rev. William Barry, D.D. London : Longmans, Green & Co. 1906. 3s. 6d.

Theory and Practice of the Confessional. By Dr. Caspar E. Scheiler, Mayence. Edited by Rev. H. J. Heuser, D.D., Professor of Theology, Overbrook, Pa. New York, Cincinnati, and Chicago : Benziger Bros. 1905.

The Priest in the Pulpit. By Rev. Ignaz Schneck, O.S.B. Translated from the German by Rev. Boniface Luebberrmann, Cincinnati. New York, Cincinnati, and Chicago : Benziger Bros. 1905.

Letters from the Beloved City. By Rev. Kenelm Digby Best. Re-issue. London : Longmans, Green & Co. 1905. 1s. 6d.

L'Evangéliste des Dimanches, par l'Abbé C. Broussolle. Lycée Michelet, Paris. Paris : Lethielleux, Rue Cassette. 4 francs.

Œuvres Oratoires du Père Henri Chambellan, S.J. Tome premier, Paris : Gabriel Beauchesne et Cie, 117 Rue de Rennes. 4 francs.

L'Enseignement de Jesus. par Pierre Battifol, Recteur de l'Institut Catholique de Toulouse. Paris : Blond et Cie, 4 Rue Madonne. 3 frs. 50 c.

The Eternal Sacrifice. By Charles de Condren. Translated from the French by A. J. Monteith. London : Thomas Baker. 2s. 6d. net.

In the Brave Days of Old. By Dom Bede Camm, O.S.B. London : Burns & Oates. 2s. 6d.

Stories of Grace. By Rev. Charles Isaacson. London : Elliot & Stock.

The Teacher's Handbook of Bible History. By Rev. A. Urban. New York : Joseph F. Wagner. \$1.50.

The Ordinary of the Mass. By the Rev. Arthur Devine, Passionist. London : R. & T. Washbourne, 1-4 Paternoster-row. 1906.

Short Spiritual Readings for Mary's Children. By Madame Cecilia. London : R. & T. Washbourne, 1-4 Paternoster-row.

The Apocalypse, the Antichrist, and the End. By J. J. Elar. London : Burns & Oates. 5s.


Demain en Algerie. Par M. Ferreol, ex Capitaine aux Zouaves. Paris : Lethielleux, Rue Cassette. 3 francs.

La Providence et Le Miracle devant la Science Moderne. Paris : Beauchesne et Cie, Editeurs, 117 Rue de Rennes. 2 frs. 50 c.

St. Francis of Assisi, Social Reformer. By Leo L. Dubois, S.M. New York : Benziger. 4s. net.

Irish Education as it should be. By Jacques. Dublin : Gill & Son. 1s. net.

The Stations of the Cross. An Account of their History and Devotional Purpose. By Herbert Thurston. London : Burns & Oates. 3s. 6d.



THOUGHTS ON PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION—II

A.—SOME CURRENT CONTROVERSIES

TOWARDS the end of a previous article¹ I had occasion to refer to Philosophy in its relation to the Sciences, thus digressing somewhat from the main subject with which I was dealing: Philosophy in its relation to Religion, as an Apology for our Faith, and as forming a part of our larger 'Philosophy of Life.' Viewed under this aspect it is a study that is giving rise to controversies and discussions of very living interest.

The ordinary method of Christian Apologetics—what has been claimed to be the traditional method²—is that which first establishes on grounds of historical evidence the Divinity of the Christian Religion, and the authority of its claims to be accepted as such by all; and then takes up and examines the contents of the Christian Revelation, already accepted by faith on Divine Authority, and defends its truths and mysteries by the same sort of rational principles and arguments as we employ in Philosophy and in the other sciences.

But those principles differ, at least in their applications, in different systems of Philosophy; and it is a simple fact

¹ Cf. I. E. RECORD, March, pp. 193 *sqq.*

² Whether such claim is justifiable may perhaps be, and indeed has been, questioned amongst Catholics. Cf. *Essais de philosophie religieuse*, par le Père Laberthonnière, de l'Oratoire (Paris: Lethieuleux, 2^e edit., 903), p. 197.

that the philosophical principles which have been actually applied for centuries to the interpretation of the Divine Deposit, are the principles of Scholastic Philosophy. Scholastic Philosophy, however, was not always fixed and finished; it grew and developed with time. St. Augustine was rather a Platonist, the medieval scholastics Aristotelians; and generally the question might be debated whether there could not be many distinct (purely rational) philosophical systems all equally in harmony with Christian revelation—or at least all orthodox, that is, in essential agreement with Revealed Truth.

In attempting an answer to so important a question we must try to avoid excessive narrow-mindedness or attachment to system on the one hand, and excessive liberalism that would misinterpret Revelation or make Truth relative, on the other. The Truths of Revealed Religion are meant to be interpreted by men and to be applied to the conduct of their daily lives. God's message must be *assimilated* by them—and not only by their minds, but by their hearts and wills—before it becomes operative in them, or finds its individual expression in their words and works.¹ That being so, I can easily understand that the way in which the contents of Scripture and Tradition are accepted and interpreted may differ somewhat from one individual believer to another. One may have systematized the natural truths of Science and Philosophy in one way, another in a different way. And the mind of each will have its own corresponding bent, and use its own method of assimilation, and its own terminology in expression. The Divine Gift will be received by each *ad modum recipientis*. To no one mode of conception, and to no one form of expression, must God's saving Truth be exclusively tied down. If the supernatural perfects the natural, as it does, it must respect existing natural and acquired variations in mind and character, from one individual to another.

Nor is it the scope of Divine Revelation to teach men purely natural truths, whether in Science or in Philosophy.

¹ Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 221: 'La vérité révélée . . . nous est donnée non pour être subie, mais pour être vécue.'

I would therefore go so far as to say that if by different philosophical systems are meant presentations and combinations of the same general natural truths, looked at from different points of view, then you can have a number of such systems in accord with Revelation ; and its contents will harmonize, though differently, with each, to form a larger 'Philosophy of Life.'¹

But then, on the other hand, the contents of Revelation *must* find admittance in all their fulness into every such system. For if men differ individually their nature is one and the same, and their destiny the same ; and the meaning of God's message must be the *same in substance* to all. Not only so, but for precisely the same reason, Nature itself, the World, Reality, if rightly interpreted, whether in Science or in Philosophy, must be the same for all too.

Hence the answer to the interesting question how far Catholics may adhere to different schools or systems of Philosophy will depend very largely on the view taken as to the meaning of a 'school' or 'system.' In so far as these are merely different expressions or presentations of the same natural truths from different standpoints they are in necessary harmony with Revealed Truth, and a Catholic is free to choose. But in so far as they are contradictory

¹ That the vast majority of believers—not being philosophers—never think of troubling themselves with the harmony or want of harmony between Christianity and the world's varying philosophies, is of course very obvious. That I take to be the meaning of Père Laberthonnière when he writes *à propos* of Pascal's Apologetics (in the work and place referred to in the preceding note) : 'Ce qui est vrai . . . c'est que, tout en cherchant et tout en trouvant dans le Christianisme la vérité dont on avait besoin pour vivre on n'a pas eu l'idée de systématiser méthodiquement la vérité chrétienne en se plaçant délibérément à une point de vue plutôt qu'à l'autre.' But the author in question would have even those who undertake the work of Christian Apologetics,—who try to give themselves and others a deep and abiding conviction that Christianity is the only real Philosophy of Life,—he would have those also regard Christianity independently of any special point of view peculiar to any philosophical system,—though it may be doubted if this be at all psychologically possible. Defending M. Blondel from the charge of attempting to reconcile Kantian subjectivism with Catholicism (*Op. cit.*, p. 322), he reminds his opponents very explicitly : 'Qu'il n'est pas de manière d'apologetique contre laquelle nous nous soyons élevé plus énergiquement que celle qui consiste à concilier le Catholicisme avec une philosophie donnée et acceptée d'avance, d'où qu'elle vienne et quelle qu'elle soit' (*Cf.* also pp. 157, 201, 202, 210).

of each other, some of them must be erroneous, and such error *may* be in logical opposition—directly or indirectly—to some revealed truth ; and if it be, just as no philosopher should adhere to it if he saw its erroneous character, so also no Catholic should adhere to it if he saw its opposition to Revelation. But a Catholic may see neither the error nor the opposition in question ; and, so long as he does not, may adhere to the system without seeing the logical inconsistency of his position. All the more so as he may in good faith interpret Revelation in a sense which he regards as true, and which is *de facto* consistent with his philosophical views. But all that will not make these latter any less erroneous or any less opposed to the true meaning of the revealed truth in question. St. Augustine, Scotus Eriugena, Abelard, St. Thomas, Duns Scotus, William of Ockam, Nicholas of Cusa, Descartes, Gassendi, Malebranche, Pascal, Rosimini were all alike Catholics ; but is that any proof that their philosophical systems, which differed so widely, were all substantially true or substantially orthodox, or that some of those mentioned did not remain Catholics rather *in spite of* their philosophy, so to speak, and through *bona fide* ignorance of the unsoundness of their systems ?¹

No ; however systems may differ there is only one *true* Philosophy of Life, varied and manifold as its expressions may be. Life has its departments of thought and of action ; but these, though distinct, are related. The true and the good are standards in all, in Nature as well as in Faith. If man's mind and heart conform to them fully, he is a philosopher and a Catholic. In so far as he deviates, he falls into error and evil. If his Philosophy is out of harmony with Revealed Truth, it stands convicted of error. The man who loves the Truth and seeks it will embrace a Philosophy that makes room for Revelation and recognizes on earth an Infallible Exponent of that Divine message to mankind.²

¹ Cf. De Wulf, *Introduction à la Philosophie Néo-Scolastique* (Louvain, 1904), pp. 100-105.

² I have already emphasized the fact that no philosophical system arrived at by the mere natural light of reason, can offer a final and complete explanation of man's nature and destiny. To do so it must be sup-

We, who recognize all this, must, however, remember that the Church expects us to use our own reason in learning, teaching, and defending *all* truth.¹ It is our duty as well as our privilege to interpret God's word for ourselves and for others; to examine the thought-systems of our day, and discern the true from the false in men's ever-varying speculations; to seek and find out the fittest methods for putting the Christian Philosophy of Life in all its entirety, before the minds of unbelievers. It is just for this very purpose of gaining souls to Christ that we are told to be all things to all men.

If we see, therefore, that a certain method of apologetics, hitherto effectual, is now no longer able to bring men to the Faith or even to defend it from their attacks, we are bound to look around for a method more in harmony with the tendencies of the times. If we feel, for example, that our traditional Scholastic Philosophy has its own intrinsic shortcomings, or that it is more an obstacle than a help to us in presenting Christianity to modern minds, just because these latter are so unacquainted with Scholasticism, if for no other reason; and if we think, moreover, that there are modern systems of Philosophy with which numbers are already familiar, and which meet their wants and their tastes, and have not the defects of Scholasticism; and that the Christian religion, interpreted after their principles, will have as full, as deep, and as true a meaning as Scholasticism has ever given it: then we should think seriously of changing both our Philosophy and our Apologetics.²

plemented by the Christian Revelation. It is only this same truth, I think, that is expressed from another point of view by Père Laberthonnière, when he says: 'Le cas ne se présente donc pas d'une philosophie, c'est à dire, d'une doctrine de la vie, que vous auriez à garder dans non intégralité et avec laquelle nous serions obligés de concilier le Christianisme. Si le Christianisme contient la vérité sur nous, c'est que le reste ne la contient pas' (*Op. cit.* p. 210). Elsewhere, explaining and defending the 'immanent' method of apologetics, he writes: 'De cette façon on conçoit qu'il puisse y avoir une philosophie Chrétienne, ou plutôt que la philosophie doive être chrétienne, sans cesser d'être la philosophie et sans que le Christianisme cesse d'être surnaturel' (p. 172 note).

¹ Cf. Laberthonnière, *op. cit.*, pp. 159, 219.

² Cf. *op. cit.*, Introd. p. xxvii., also however pp. 188, 189.—*New York Review*, June-July, 1905 (Vol. i., No. 1), pp. 36, 46, 'Scotus Redivivus,' by James J. Fox, D.D.

Now, these are just the things that some Catholics in recent years have been both thinking and doing. They say it is labour in vain to try to win over the modern mind to the Christian Religion by endeavouring *first to establish* its Divinity directly on strictly historical grounds, and to impose it by way of authority on all who are in search of it ; and *then* to pass on to examine its contents for them, after they have first believed it. Rather these apologists would endeavour to put its contents *in the first place, before* the modern world. They would show forth its beauty and truth and grandeur, and its perfect accord with all man's higher and nobler instincts : they would vindicate its power over man's whole nature, his emotions and affections and will and heart as well as his intelligence : they would present it to men as a ' Philosophy of Life and Action,' capable of attracting and fascinating and satisfying all honest and upright seekers after a meaning to attach to their lives.¹ They would put it forward as the only means on earth of ' filling up the void ' that is felt in human nature, as the one mysterious something of which human nature feels the need. In the restless heart of man—the *inquietum cor*—there is a *need* for the supernatural : and this latter must be appropriated and assimilated into the very life and activity of the hungering soul if it is to satisfy its craving. The super—

deposit to the individual's conscience, but it is within his own soul the Divine voice speaks ; for God is in the soul, and has given Himself to the soul, and so the soul hearing His voice hears its own, and assenting yields itself at one and the same time to its own natural craving after the Divinity and to the Divinity speaking within it.

Such are a few of the main tendencies of this new school of Apologetics which is known as the Method of Immanence—*—La Méthode de l'Immanence*,—and which attaches itself to a conception of Philosophy outlined not many years since in a book entitled *L'Action* by a French writer, M. Blondel. As a method of Apologetics it has not been allowed to pass unchallenged. In fact it has been severely attacked by Catholics throughout France since it began to attract attention and to win over adherents. Père Laberthonnière, a French Oratorian, and editor of the *Annales de la Philosophie Chrétienne*; M. Le Roy, in his now famous article, 'What is a Dogma?' in the *Quinzaine* of April last year, and in other articles on the same subject in more recent numbers of the *Revue Biblique*, of the *Bulletin de Littérature Ecclesiastique* (Toulouse), and of other periodicals; M. Blondel—developing the Philosophy of *Action* in the *Revue de Deux Mondes* and elsewhere,—these are a few of the leading advocates of the system. Mgr. Turinaz, Bishop of Nancy, M. Wehrlé in the *Revue Biblique*, and a whole host of Catholic writers criticise the system and condemn its principles and tendencies more or less vehemently ;—generally more, for the controversy which has now found an echo in most of the Catholic reviews of Philosophy and Theology in France, and in many outside France also, has been carried on rather vigorously on both sides, and sometimes in a tone and manner that cannot contribute very much to the advancement either of truth or of charity. But such feeling is not altogether inexcusable, for the issues involved are of the most far-reaching importance, and the propagation or error in regard to them would do an incalculable amount of mischief.¹

¹ Since the above was written Père Laberthonnière's book has been placed upon the *Index*

The gravest charges against their doctrines on theological grounds, are that they destroy the distinction between natural and supernatural, between Reason and Faith ; that they pervert the true teaching of the Church upon Faith and Dogma ; that they make Religious Truth relative and subjective, and ultimately reduce Religion to a matter of subjective feeling. These are charges of the most serious nature, and doubtless there are serious grounds for them ; but it is not so easy to bring them home against the defenders of the Method of Immanence and the Philosophy of Action.

The fact is that those latter descriptive titles cover a wide and ill-defined group of tendencies rather than any definite doctrinal system. And those tendencies have partially found expression not in France only but also in Italy, as in the writings of Semeria and Murri in the *Cultura Sociale* ; in England, as in the writings of Father Tyrrell ; in the United States, as in the pages of the *New York Review*.

In France, where those views have been most freely ventilated, their advocates disclaim any conscious intention or desire of forming a school apart. They protest that they are teaching no new doctrines—and that is most probably the fact—nor anything which has not been propounded by Catholic writers already—and that too is most probably the case—nor anything incompatible with the genuine Catholic Tradition,—but this latter is at least open to serious doubt. They attach great importance to the idea of doctrinal development in Christianity, and claim to be largely inspired by the views of Cardinal Newman on the nature, growth, and motives of Religious Belief. And indeed there can be no doubt that Newman has received quite a special cult amongst French Catholics in recent times. His Theory of Assent—which has been the object of such controversy in the past, and bids fair to provoke further controversy in the near future, if we can judge from the *Dublin Review* and the *Tablet*—has been taken up and defended by the advocates of the New Apologetic. They insist upon the importance of the *Will* as a factor in Religious

Belief. They contend that the traditional Scholastic Philosophy as applied to Religion by modern Catholic apologists is too exclusively *intellectualist*; that it exaggerates the influence of *pure reason* over life, and neglects to attach sufficient importance to the appetitive and emotional side of man; that it makes him as it were a mere thinking machine, and sets up abstract thought alone as a standard for judging those concrete moral and religious facts which are meant for the whole man.¹ They insist that in the domain of moral and religious truths conviction is not the result of evidence alone, that the heart and the will have their share, and that it is the whole man that believes. Their Philosophy therefore is not intellectualist but *voluntarist*.² Hence too, they call it a Philosophy of Action, a practical, concrete Philosophy of Life, in opposition to the supposed speculative and abstract character of Scholasticism.³

¹ Cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 163, 186, 227.

² 'On dit souvent : la vérité ne peut pas changer. Non assurément elle ne peut pas changer. Mais ce qui peut et ce qui doit changer, c'est la connaissance que nous en avons. Vivre c'est se mouvoir . . . ce qui importe c'est de ne pas aller à l'aventure. La vérité pour nous n'est pas dans le repos, elle est dans la fixité de l'orientation. Et la fixité de l'orientation c'est la bonne volonté qui nous la donne. On peut dire vraiment que c'est pour nous le critérium, critérium vivant et toujours libre, mais toujours aussi à notre disposition. . . . C'était un axiome dans l'École que le bien et le vrai sont une même chose. Cet axiome nous le transposons de l'objet au sujet en disant que c'est aussi la même chose qu' être bon et avoir la vérité. Mais tandis que du point de vue intellectualiste on devrait dire que c'est du vrai qu'on va au bien, et que c'est par la connaissance de la vérité qu'on est bon—ainsi disait Socrate—nous disons que c'est par la bonté qu'on possède la vérité et que c'est le bien qui est vrai. Dieu est vérité, mais il n'est pas vérité que parce qu'il est bonté . . . Et ce n'est point en tant qu'il est vrai que nous le connaissons d'abord, mais en tant qu'il est bon : c'est en effet en tant qu'il est bon et par bonté qu'il est en nous ; et c'est dans la bonne volonté et par elle qu'il se révèle à nous.

'Mais puisque c'est par la bonté qu'on possède la vérité et puisque c'est par la volonté qu'on est bon, c'est donc du point de vue de la volonté qu'il faut envisager la vérité, c'est à dire du point de vue subjectif et immanent.'—(*Op. cit.*, pp. 185-6. Cf. pp. 179 *sqq.*)

³ Father Laberthonnière says it could be shown that one cannot be an intellectualist and a Christian, except by the extraordinary compromise of admitting contraries, and living *en partie double* with theory divorced from practice. The contraries referred to are :—

(1) 'Le surnaturel et le naturel sont hétérogènes.—Le surnaturel et le naturel doivent former un système rationnel et pouvoir être objet de la science ;

(2) 'La foi est libre dans son principe et elle est toujours une solution personnelle et singulière.—La science amène à des conclusions qui

Now, I venture to think that those indications of its general attitude and tendencies,—brief and inadequate as they necessarily are,—can hardly fail to suggest the suspicion of a more or less close connexion between this whole movement of ideas and *another* Philosophy,—a Philosophy which has practically reigned supreme all over the Continent for the greater part of the last century. It is, in fact, the avowed aim and ambition of the New Apologetic to put forward the claims of Christianity in such a form as to be both intelligible and acceptable to what is called the 'Modern Mind.' Now, this 'Modern Mind' is largely the outcome of Kantism, and looks at everything through the medium of Kantian conceptions and theories.

It will be remembered that the Philosopher of Koenigsberg denied to the Pure Reason—rightly or wrongly, as he understood it, we will not here enquire,—but anyhow he denied to the Pure Reason the power of attaining to certainty about the fundamental truths of natural religion: God, and Freedom, and Immortality; and that he then proceeded,—religious and upright and well-meaning man as he certainly was,—to set up and establish on a new

s'imposent nécessairement selon un déterminisme logique et rigoureux, et ses conclusions sont impersonnelles et universelles' (*Op. cit.*, p. 186, note).

He then goes on to give this summary of his method: 'En partant du christianisme, comme nous l'avons fait, en nous demandant comment nous croyons et comment la vérité surnaturelle devient notre vérité, nous avons dû reconnaître que, bien qu'en un sens elle s'impose à nous du dehors, elle ne devient nôtre cependant, et nous ne la possédons, et nous ne la connaissons que parceque du dedans nous allons vers elle. En conséquence pour nous montrer comment la vérité surnaturelle devient légitimement notre vérité—ce qui est le but de l'apologetique—c'est donc bien la méthode de l'immanence qu'il faut employer. Cette méthode d'immanence implique, il est vrai, une philosophie de la volonté, une philosophie de la vie et de l'action, mouvante comme la vie et l'action elles mêmes. Elle se trouve ainsi en opposition avec l'intellectualisme que est une philosophie de l'idée, et qui aspire, sans pouvoir aboutir du reste, à la fixité et à l'immobilité qu'il prête artificiellement à "l'idée."' Such intellectualism he calls an *idolatry*: 'Il consiste en effet en ceci que l'esprit humain, prenant ses conceptions pour la vérité définitive et totale, veut s'y arrêter et les adorer, sans s'apercevoir qu'elles sont un produit de son activité et une expression de sa vie. . . .' (p. 187). The intellectualism of which those things are true is not that of Scholastic Philosophy, which on the one hand sees in the object of the abstract idea far more than a product of mental activity, and on the other hand, nevertheless, recognizes fully that that abstract object is but a mere aspect, and a very inadequate aspect, of concrete reality.

basis, that of Practical Reason, or Will or Moral Conscience, the truths he had just pulled down. It is also a well-known fact that amongst Kant's followers themselves, as well as amongst his critics, there soon appeared two different ways of interpreting both the intentions and the achievements of the master. Some held what we may briefly call the heterodox view of Kantism: that Kant's chief work is the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and that it was only as an afterthought, and in a sort of desperation at contemplating the ruin he had wrought in it, that he attempted to mend matters in the *Critique of Practical Reason*: that he failed to accomplish his purpose, and has left to posterity a legacy of subjectivism and scepticism. Others interpret their master's teaching in a more orthodox way. These give the primacy of importance to his second *Critique*. They maintain that he knew what he was about and saw the whole way before him from the beginning, and that in the *Critique of Practical Reason* he has placed Religion and Morality on their proper basis,—where they will be for ever safe from the corroding influence of the faculty that merely doubts and criticizes.

Most Catholics hold the view that Kant's first *Critique* is destructive of the very foundations of Faith; and that whatever his intentions may have been, his subsequent efforts—in the second *Critique*—have utterly and hopelessly failed to reconstruct the shattered edifice. There are some Catholics, however, especially in France, who adopt the second view, and who are prepared to hold that in that interpretation of Kantism there is nothing whatever incompatible with the Faith. The existence of this view is accounted for by the fact that French Kantism, or rather Neo-Kantism, as it is called, has always emphasized the primacy of the *Practical* over the *Speculative Reason*, thereby spreading the notion that Kantism is by no means opposed to Theism and Religion. But on the other side it is contended that the religion it allows is necessarily a *subjective* belief, not based upon *reason* but rather upon moral and religious *instincts* and *feelings* and devoid of any real or objective value.

Those alternative tendencies to emphasize now the subjective and now the objective elements in Religious Belief, and indeed in all Truth, have not been born of Kantism or of any modern system ; they are of the same hoary antiquity as the earliest human speculations on the relation between Thought and Things. To emphasize unduly either aspect of Assent is to give a one-sided and erroneous account of it. The advocates of the Apologetic of Immanence blame the intellectualism and the exaggerated objectivity of traditional Scholasticism : they feel the need of a reaction which would give their due share of importance to the *personal, subjective* factors in our Religious Belief. In dwelling on these factors they are looking in the same direction as Kant. But to Catholics generally the name of Kant is *anathema*—with some, even to look in his direction is not quite safe ! Hence the new apologists prefer to have it said of them not that they are moving towards Kant, but rather that they are at one with Newman . . . Query : is it so very easy to distinguish Newman's doctrine on Notional and Real Assent from Kant's teaching on Speculative and Practical Certitude ?

The new apologists complain of the cold and arid intellectualism of the traditional Catholic Philosophy. As against occasional exponents of Scholasticism the complaint is justifiable, but that there are any grounds for a general accusation I should be very slow to allow.¹ It is easy to set up a one-sided view for the sake of showing its shortcomings, and a great many views of that sort are set up and pulled down in their writings. But they are not the views of the great scholastics. Their own views they do not claim to be original : indeed what is best in them may be found in Scholasticism some place or other.

That Scholasticism exaggerates the office and influence of Reason, those people would never, I believe, have alleged, did they understand the recognition it gives to the various kinds of evidence requisite for certainty in the various spheres of human research ; and did they but remember

¹ Cf. *New York Review*, vol. i., p. 38.

that when all is said and done by man's other faculties, his *reflecting reason* alone must be always supreme judge and high court of appeal in deciding his Philosophy of Life. If the worth and sincerity of thought are often measured by action, it is no less true that the value of conduct itself must be finally measured by thought.

No, I fear it is rather those philosophers themselves who commit the fatal error of which they accuse Scholasticism. It is they who really undermine the influence of the appetitive side of man's nature on his Philosophy of Life; it is they who render useless the promptings of the moral instincts, and reduce the voice of conscience to a hollow, empty sound. All this they do by separating the pure from the practical reason, and by allotting to each 'part' a separate and independent domain. They allow the pure reason to run riot in a world of abstractions, and then proclaim it powerless to reach the world of the real and the concrete. Then they try to build up their concrete beliefs on the foundations of moral feelings and instincts. But those latter, being already divorced from reason proper, can never yield a basis for a reasonable faith. And reason will have its revenge, by pronouncing the last word on all such beliefs: *that they are subjective and worthless*. It is the new apologists and not the scholastics who make the mistake of forgetting that it is the whole man and the same man who *reasons* and *believes*;—of dividing him up into fractions and speculating on each apart.


I do not say that all the writers who advocate the Method of Immanence or who favour the Philosophy of Action go to such extremes. There are many who employ the New Apologetic as supplementing and completing the objective, historical method and not at all as supplanting the latter. Such an attitude has everything to commend it. Likewise, there are many who insist that the rôle of the will and the feelings, and the whole personal element in our Religious Assents must not be lost sight of in any system of Philosophy. This too is just, provided the objective element be not sacrificed. But it cannot be denied that at least some of those writers expose that element to grave danger. And

if they err in that respect they will vitiate their whole system,—even although in other respects it may contain much that is good and true. And it cannot be denied that their writings contain much that is good and useful. But so, of course, does Kantism itself, and indeed so do most systems of Philosophy. And this is just the danger. If a system contained nothing true or good it would never do any harm, for it would attract nobody.

Our own Scholastic Philosophy is capable of assimilating whatever of goodness and truth it finds in other systems : and our obvious aim should be to enrich it, to improve it, and to modernize it by the addition of everything valuable to be found in modern systems. Its principles are tried and true, its method is judicious and fruitful, and its gradual assimilation of all the best products of modern scientific progress can have only the one desirable effect of infusing into its system an ever-increasing store of vigour and vitality.

B.—SOME FINAL REFLECTIONS

All those questionings and discussions which are stirring the minds of educated Catholics abroad, are the inevitable outcome of the contact of Christianity with the restless



indifference about religious questions of the weightiest moment. We should be at least as much afraid of stagnation as of unrest. There is danger in both, but neither is an unmixed evil : though some simple Catholics seem to see no evil at all in the former and nothing but evil in the latter. The latter is with us anyhow, and is likely to remain. And while it would be a great mistake to exaggerate its dimensions, or to be alarmed about it, neither would it be the wisest policy to pretend not to see it at all.

To try to persuade ourselves that there is no Unbelief in Ireland, that there are no doubts and questionings, that infidel ideas are unknown, that there are no pernicious social and ethical theories current, and no 'nominal' Catholics amongst us, would be simply to close our eyes to the facts and live in a fool's paradise. With the means of communication that actually exist between all civilized countries ; with thought transmitted from end to end of the earth, and through all classes of society, in the novel and magazine and newspaper, it is simply childish to think that our Catholic people are going to live for ever in the immunity of a 'splendid isolation.' It is a simple fact that by means of imported literature, English and foreign thought—good, bad, and indifferent, such as it is—is permeating our people's minds and hearts, and is influencing their lives. Education of a kind is increasing and will continue to increase. Intellectual activity of some kind,—the dissemination of some sort of ideas—is bound to grow apace, quite independently of any University. Economic conditions will surely demand that Ireland be inhabited and its land and resources worked by a people able and willing to work them, and prospering by their industry. Whether these people of the future be the children of the Planter or of the native Gael, there is a possibility that such prosperity may bring in its train materialism and indifference to the higher things of life.

It is beyond all question that Ireland is passing through changing conditions, and that her future will in many things differ from her past. The early Christian Church was attacked by false philosophies, when the weapons of

flesh and blood had failed. The Irish Church has stood faithful through centuries of persecution ; perhaps the weapons of error and indifference are being forged in those days to do war against her. If that be so it behoves us to watch the enemies' tactics, and to attend to those special departments where their attacks are made. The Church in all countries at the present day needs three classes of scholars in particular to defend and propound her teaching : the historian to establish her divine institution and to interpret her tradition ; the Scripture-scholar to defend the Bible and interpret its contents ; and the Christian philosopher and apologist to show that faith is reasonable, and to hold up Christianity as the only true and satisfactory Philosophy of Life.

Is it not all-important that we should be beforehand with that Christian Philosophy, that we should settle the doubts of enquiring people, and save the reading public from the poison of infidelity and error ? I have often thought that the Irish mind has a leaning towards the spiritual, a bent for speculation on the meaning and reasons of things. If that be so, it is doubly necessary to feed it with sound principles ; for the Irish, like the French, are logical and push things to extremes. They will be usually very good or very bad ; but rarely will they settle down, as people of neighbouring races can, in comfortable inconsistency. They will, therefore, demand from us, what is already the great need of the day at home as well as abroad, a defence of the rational foundations of the Christian Faith against the attacks of modern Unbelief. It is the study of Philosophy in its widest sense that will prepare us for that work, and equip us with that knowledge which the lips of the priest are to guard. We should be eager and enthusiastic in garnering that knowledge : to acquire it should be the passion of every student's life ; and to possess and utilize it the life work of the priest.

I will go even farther and say, that every educated Catholic, layman as well as priest, should live upon this Philosophy and make it part of his life. The uninstructed Catholic will rest in simple faith. But the educated Catholic

must be at least so far a philosopher as to be able to answer the questionings of his own reflecting reason. His faith must be a *rationabile obsequium*,—a reasonable service,—and that it will not be unless his reasons for his faith are in proportion to the development of his mind.

And if this be true of the layman how much more so for the priest? The priest's daily life is spent in constant contact with the highest, deepest, most sacred truths in the Christian Philosophy of Life. He must needs be a philosopher, if he *realizes* those truths in his life and ministry. And if he does not realize them, what can there be of depth, or reality, or power in his preaching or priestly work?

That is the highest application of the great general truth, that Philosophy in its fullest sense must be in continuity with every conceivable department of human thought and activity. No matter what problem we may face in any science or art of life, we have only to push the inquiry far enough and we shall soon find ourselves raising some one or other of those eternal questions around which all Philosophy centres. We may take up social, political, economic, educational, industrial work amongst the people: in no one department may we dispense with the sound rational and religious principles drawn from the Christian Philosophy of Life. That we may have occasion to administer those principles as an antidote against the poison of passing errors, the circumstances which recently called forth a remarkable publication on *Catholicity and Progress in Ireland*¹ will furnish us with ample proof.

Nor, finally, must it be imagined that the study of this Philosophy can be approached only in the one way with which our college students are familiar. It can be cultivated everywhere: for it is so ubiquitous that it cannot well be avoided. In the wide world of literature—where the Irish priest should make his influence felt far more than he does—the need of a pure and wholesome and elevating Philosophy is very great indeed. If the genius of the Irish mind is speculative, it is also highly imaginative, and ought to

¹ *Catholicity and Progress in Ireland*. By the Rev. M. O'Riordan, D.Ph., D.D., D.C.L. London: Kegan Paul, 1905.

be capable of fine literary work both in prose and poetry. But it is sometimes thought that the literary and philosophical casts of mind are somehow incompatible, and cannot be developed together. Nothing, I think, could be farther from the truth. I do not believe, for example, there was ever a great poet who was not a great philosopher as well. The great poets have held a place in posterity not alone or chiefly because they excelled in the art of elegant expression but also, and no less, because they had great thoughts, noble ideas, and inspiring messages to convey to their fellow-men. And where is there such a message as is to be found in the Philosophy of the Catholic Religion? Then look at modern prose literature. See how every other Philosophy is preached and popularized, and put into the minds and hearts of the millions by means of the modern novel. Is there any reason why a Catholic should not or could not do for Catholicity what a host of non-Catholics have so ably done for their chosen beliefs? Is there any reason why the future Irish priest with a literary turn should not emulate the example of some few we know, to the best of his ability? There is an urgent and an ever-growing need for a popular Catholic literature, both in Irish and in English: and who is to meet that need if the Irish priest does not set the example?

Let us, therefore, cultivate our gifts, literary or otherwise, with the greatest zeal and care. Be they as five talents, or as two, or only as one, the Irish Church has need of them, and the Master has given them to us to trade with them till He come.¹ But let us attend to Christian Philosophy if we want to write anything enduring. Else we are mere dabblers in literary conceits and empty forms, without a soul or a meaning.

P. COFFEY.

¹ Luke xix. 13.

RELIGION AS A CREDIBLE DOCTRINE¹

I.—FREE-WILL

PASSING over Mr. Mallock's historical sketch of the free-will controversy, which contains nothing very interesting beyond the exposition of the conclusions he hopes to reach, let us consider his method of presenting the 'fundamental facts' of the problem.

Everyone admits that we will only those things which we think for some reason or other desirable. But does Mr. Mallock's illustration (pages 97, 98) prove—and he has attempted no other proof—that if only one object of desire is present, only one act of will is possible; and that if several are present the will is determined by the most desirable. Let us take Mr. Mallock's example of the famished man in a boat, too weak, for want of food, to row, or hoist sail, or signal. He *wishes* to live, but can do nothing to save himself. He might do something if he could eat; without food he is helpless. Suddenly a fairy or an angel puts down before him, an excellent meal, consisting of roast mutton and claret—and the starving one devours the good things!

We submit the only conclusion is—that action, following on wish, must be of that specific kind which, in the circumstances, is the only possible means of fulfilling the wish. But the *Deus ex machina* is prodigal. Roast mutton and claret on the one hand, rotten blubber and bilge water on the other, and between them our solitary starving one, who, be it remembered, wishes to live, and cannot live without the food. Inevitably, says Mr. Mallock, the choice falls on the mutton, and, therefore, the theory that the will is determined by the most desirable objects present rests on facts. We are not so sure on this point as

¹Space difficulties have led to a change in the original plan. We have been obliged to interweave text and criticism in the present article. It is to be hoped that the page references to Mr. Mallock's work will be an acceptable substitute for an independent summary of his views.

Mr. Mallock, because we do not know the precise value of blubber in a struggle for existence ; and, further, because we do not know the ascetic capabilities of the individual in question. If rotten blubber and bilge water have no sustaining power, and if the starving one knows that, we admit the inevitability of his mutton choice for the precise reason that he wishes to live. In such a hypothesis, the only conclusion warranted by the facts is that already pointed out, for the second illustration adds nothing to the first. If, however, the solitary starving one is gifted with a stomach of Laplandic fibre, and if he believes that his wish of saving his life can be fulfilled by stuffing himself with blubber, we deny the inevitability of the mutton choice. In this case, we hold that the starving one may deliberately reject the roast mutton. A fool, then,—rejoins Mr. Mallock. In certain circumstances—yes, and we hold that men are capable of foolish, very foolish actions. A fool—if his only outlook on life is that of the epicure, or if his only reason for choosing blubber be mere caprice. Not so very certainly a fool, if he is accustomed to think of mutton and blubber from other standpoints than that of their epicurean desirability, or than that of their more pleasurable sensual sensations. A Benedict Joseph Labre, in such circumstances as those of the solitary, starving one, might wish to live, and yet most rationally choose the blubber in the hypothesis that blubber would give him strength enough to row or signal.

We have studied Mr. Mallock's illustration thus closely to show that it proves nothing in favour of determinism, except in so far as it seems to conceal a *petitio principii*. The first stage of the illustration, which proves that a man who wishes to live, and who has only one means of doing so, necessarily accepts that means, has nothing to say—as we shall see—to the free-will problem. As for the second stage, if Mr. Mallock means it to have any significance beyond that of the first, he must needs admit the staying power of blubber as well as abnormal digestive powers. If admitting these, he rejects our hypothesis of the different modes of action which saint or fool might possibly

follow in such circumstances, he slyly assumes without a particle of proof the most narrow-minded form of determinism, namely, that the will is necessarily determined by the most pleasurable present good. Should he give us more rope, and admitting the possibility of the different actions of fool or saint, maintain that both fool and saint, because influenced by motives, are therefore necessarily determined, the one to the act of caprice, the other to the act of self-denial, again he is assuming without proof the more modern form of determinism.

Free-will—and this is capital—does not imply choice without motive. ‘Nil eligitur nisi sub specie boni,’ wrote St. Thomas. Free-will implies choice of motives, but of motives that are not determining. The point at issue is : ‘Is my voluntary act at every moment determined (1) by my character (a) partly inherited, (b) partly formed by past actions and feelings ; and (2) by my circumstances or the external influences acting on me at the moment ? or not ?’ Determinists answer—Yes ; libertarians answer—No. Mr. Mallock’s illustrations certainly furnish no proof, except a skilfully cloaked *petitio principii*, and his conclusion from these illustrations that ‘the bondage of our wills in every act of willing to the sole desire, or to the strongest desire of the moment, is absolute, necessary, invariable’ is in its deterministic interpretation—the one clearly meant by Mr. Mallock—wholly unproven. We are conscious that we have not yet furnished any proofs of free-will, and we merely characterise his conclusions as unproven.

Let us see if he advances further on his way when he asks whether men can determine their desires. From Mr. Mallock’s description of desire (pages 101, 102) we gather that he intends by desire to indicate either a blind organic craving such as the desire for food, or the feeling of attraction towards an agreeable object. And Mr. Mallock’s language implies that libertarians must uphold that man has the power of imposing desires—in the sense defined—on himself. Otherwise, he argues, man is the puppet of his desires, not the master. This is a complete mis-

representation of the libertarian position. The doctrine of free-will does not need to suppose man the creator of such desires, it does suppose that man can resist or permit the spontaneous movement of the appetite towards the desired object. That is to say, libertarians admit as fully as Mr. Mallock, that certain desires—for instance, the organic craving for food, the animal attractions of sensuality, the higher attraction for knowledge—are imposed on man by his nature, his circumstances, his general character, and by the qualities of the desired objects. They maintain, however, that man can control this attraction in the sense that he can reject or assent to the spontaneous movement. Mr. Mallock, therefore, in proving that desire depends on factors over which we have no control proves nothing to his purpose, unless once more he assumes, without furnishing proof, that we are incapable of resisting these desires. If we are capable of resisting them, we are not the puppet of our desires, however these desires may have been created. Whether we have this capacity or not, is the point to be proved, the point which Mr. Mallock has not even touched. Further, no apologist maintains that variety of desires is a *necessary* indication of freedom (page 103). And the statement that most apologists reduce the operation of free-will to those peculiar cases where dutiful desire is opposed to unlawful desire is misleading. Apologists hold that the most evident proofs of free-will are to be drawn from the mental phenomena observed in such moral crises, and hold, too, that a very large part of man's daily action is indeliberate; but they hold that man possesses permanently the power of free choice, and may exert it when he pleases.

At this juncture, Mr. Mallock really begins his criticism of the libertarian position, by singling out Dr. Ward. We shall cite the particular proof to which Mr. Mallock draws attention, and then review his criticism. Dr. Ward's proof runs thus:—

I am a keen sportsman, and one cloudy morning am looking forward with lively hope to my day's hunting. My post, however, comes in early; and I receive a letter just as

I have donned my red coat and am sitting down to breakfast. This letter announces that I must set off that very morning to London, if I am to be present at some occasion on which my presence will be vitally important. [Now continues Mr. Ward] there is one course of action which the determinist does not—and consistently with his theory cannot—admit to be a possible one ; but in regard to which we confidently maintain by appeal to experience, that it is abundantly possible, and by no means infrequent. It is most possible, we say, that I put forth on this occasion anti-impulsive effort ; that I act resolutely and consistently in opposition to my spontaneous impulse, in opposition to that which at the moment is my strongest desire. Thus on his side the spontaneous impulse of my will is quite decidedly in favour of staying to hunt ; or in other words, the motive which prompts me to stay is quite decidedly stronger at the moment than that which prompts me to go. On the other hand, my reason recognizes clearly how very important is the public interest at issue, and how plainly duty calls me in the direction of London. I resolutely, therefore, enter my carriage, and order it to the station. And now let us consider what takes place while I am on my four miles' transit. During the greater part, perhaps during the whole of this transit, there proceeds what we have called in our essays 'a compound phenomenon,' or in other words, there co-exist in my mind two naturally distinct phenomena. First phenomenon: My spontaneous impulse is strongly in the opposite direction. I remember that even now it is by no means too late to be present at the meet, and I am most urgently solicited by inclination to order my coachman home again. So urgent, indeed, is this solicitation, so much stronger is the motive which prompts me to return than that which prompts me to continue my course, that unless I put forth unintermitting and energetic resistance to that motive, I should quite infallibly give the coachman such an order. Here is the first phenomenon to which we call attention—my will's spontaneous impulse towards returning. A second, no less distinctly pronounced and strongly marked phenomenon is that unintermitting energetic resistance to the former motive of which we have been speaking. On the one side is that phenomenon, which may be called my will's spontaneous, direct, unforced impulse and preponderating desire ; on the other side. that which may be called my firm, sustained active, antagonistic resolve. We allege as a fact obvious and undeniable on the very surface, that the phenomenon which we have called 'spontaneous impulse' is as different in kind from that other which we have called 'anti-impulsive resolve' as the desire of wealth is different in kind from the recognition of a mathematical axiom. On the one side is that impulse which results according to the

laws of my mental condition, from my nature and the external circumstances taken in mutual connexion. On the other side is the resistance to such impulse, which I elicit by vigorous personal action.

This statement of the case, declares Mr. Mallock (page 109), comes to nothing. If our power of resolve is free, that means that we can, irrespective of circumstances, equally exercise it or leave it in abeyance. If we never exercised it, our spontaneous or necessarily determined impulses would direct life's conduct in ways which would be perfectly reasonable, and which would not be distinguishable on the surface from what they would be if resolve operated. This, says Mr. Mallock, Dr. Ward grants, and then Mr. Mallock asks : Would any rational being, without any determining motive, incur the pain of resolve to set aside such spontaneous impulses ?

Evidently Mr. Mallock's point is—that resolve without determining motive, is impossible. Now, Dr. Ward does not admit that absolute submission to our spontaneous impulses induces as rational, as noble, a life as earnest efforts of resolve. On the contrary, he insists that devout theists—and he eulogizes frequently devout theists in his articles on free-will—are only devout theists because they unceasingly elicit acts of resolve.¹ And, again, Dr. Ward expressly states that resolve—as opposed to simultaneous impulse—may have one of two motives : '(1) my resolve of doing what is right ; (2) my desire of promoting my permanent happiness in the next world, or even in this.' Dr. Ward, therefore, postulates motives for the act of resolve but denies that they are determining. Mr. Mallock once more introduces 'determining motives,' and we shall soon see why.

I am aware, replies Mr. Mallock, that you pretend you have a motive for resolve, but your very criticism for the existence of that phenomenon styled 'resolve' proves that it is the same phenomenon as that desire you style spontaneous impulse. The sense of struggle tells you of the 'resolve,' but does not every spontaneous impulse imply

¹ Vol. i., pp. 252, 293 ; vol. ii., pp. 44, 323, etc.

a similar sense of struggle? 'Dr. Ward and his friends imagine that there is a difference between them (*i.e.*, between spontaneous desire and resolve) only because whilst they have carefully analysed the one, they have instinctively refrained from any similar analysis of the other' (page 111).

Again, admitting that resolve implies only the intensification of an existing desire, whence comes the desire of intensifying the existing desire? With no circumstances to produce it, how can it possibly be produced? For instance, is not the pretended resolve of the hunting-man as dependent on his circumstances as his spontaneous resolve. Dr. Ward tells us that he resists his desire to hunt, because 'his reason recognizes how very important is the public issue at stake.' But is not this act of reason part of the circumstances of the moment? 'It is only because Dr. Ward arbitrarily neglects this fact that the opposition between the impulse, which is the necessary resultant of circumstances, and resolve, which he alleges to be independent of them, is invested with even a semblance of reality' (page 115).

To put this truth in a stronger light, Mr. Mallock considers the struggles of St. Antony in the desert, and here, too, there must come a moment when the love of Christ carries each struggling resolve to its completion, and therefore, a moment when St. Antony is no longer free. 'Determinism has caught us up once more' (page 118).

What is to be thought of this criticism? Does Mr. Mallock prove that Dr. Ward's distinction between spontaneous desire and resolve is a fiction, and that resolve implies determining motive? We think not.

Dr. Ward does not admit that the sense of pain is the criterium of the presence of 'resolve,' and he would certainly admit that, if I 'resolve' to go to business despite my desire to hunt, the act of reason on which my resolve is contingent is as much part of my circumstances at the moment as the desire to hunt. Where, then, does Dr. Ward find a basis for his distinction?

We found [he writes] our whole argument on what we consider to be an unmistakable fact of immediate experience. That

fact is, that very frequently my will's spontaneous impulse is in one direction at the very moment when my conduct is in a different—often the very contrary—direction.

And, again :—

We allege as a fact obvious and undeniable on the very surface, that the phenomenon which we have called 'spontaneous impulse' is as different in kind from that which we have called 'anti-impulsive resolve' as the desire of wealth is different in kind from that of the recognition of a mathematical axiom. On the one side is that impulse which results according to the laws of my mental constitution from my nature, and the external circumstances taken in mutual connexion. On the other side, is the *resistance* to such impulse, which I elicit by vigorous personal action.¹

Stripped of technicalities, this means that during acts of choice or decision or deliberation, every man is conscious, unmistakably and incontrovertibly conscious, that he can elicit one of many alternative acts. At such times, a man feels that he can resist freely all that his former character and any accumulating present motives can achieve. If his act of resistance involves energetic effort as that of the politician in question, the fact of freedom is all the more evidenced. During that drive to the station, our politician's mind was busily engaged weighing the pros and cons; at any moment he could freely have accepted the pro or the con; he has accepted one alternative, but he is overwhelmingly convinced that he can at any moment just as freely accept the other. Motives attract him to one course as to the other, but the assertion that the knowledge of the importance of the public business makes the fact of leaving the hunting field the pleasantest course, or necessarily constitutes a motive of such force as to draw our politician inevitably and inexorably to London is extravagantly untrue in the light of every man's personal experience. No amount of theorising or of balancing of profit and loss motives can touch these, the fundamental facts of consciousness. The great question is: Does introspection tell us that we are determined or necessitated by motives? The libertarian answers, No. He

¹*Philosophy of Theism*, vol. ii., p. 52.

admits that consciousness testifies that we are influenced by motives, but he denies that we are inexorably determined thereby. That is his reading of the facts of his own internal life, and, therefore, he concludes that he himself is free. Are the rest of men free? Yes, if their consciousness reveals the fact. Judging, then, from the facts of his own mental life, Dr. Ward put within the brain of the politician that 'compound phenomenon' which he himself personally experienced in every act of choice, and he appealed to the personal experience of his readers as to the possibility and actuality of such a case. Mr. Mallock seemed to have been partisan to the operation, but his subsequent deductions from the 'compound phenomenon' prove his partisanship to have been only apparent.

Mr. Mallock's identification of spontaneous desire and resolve on the ground that both imply determining motives demands special attention. This attempt to show that Dr. Ward contradicts himself must have arisen from forgetfulness of Dr. Ward's definitions. Dr. Ward distinctly describes spontaneous desire as the outcome of determining motives, and as distinctly 'resolve' as the outcome of motives that are not determining. In spontaneous desire, writes Dr. Ward, the will is entirely passive, in resolve it is active. Dr. Ward's employment of technical terms may possibly lead to confusion of thought, but it does not imply contradiction in doctrine when fairly interpreted. Spontaneous desire includes all the circumstances of the moment, and, proceeds Mr. Mallock, is not the act of reason on which resolve is based one of the circumstances of the moment? Yes, but from every page of Dr. Ward's Essays it is luminously evident that this act of reason is essentially excluded from those 'circumstances of the moment' which lead up to mere spontaneous desire, for these latter are determining, and it is writ large that this motive act of reason, basis of resolve, is non-determining. We think Dr. Ward's language unfortunate. His thought is clear, and Mr. Mallock has succeeded in making it seem self-contradictory only by completely changing it.

Again, Mr. Mallock seeks to prove that spontaneous

desire and resolve are really one and the same phenomenon, on the grounds of Dr. Ward's statement that resolve depends on an act of reason suggesting a motive. Evidently, there is no proof unless Mr. Mallock assumes that every motive, and therefore this particular motive, must be determining—which is the whole point at issue. And, turning to that illustration which Mr. Mallock introduced to put the oneness of 'spontaneous desire' and 'resolve' in a stronger light, we find that St. Antony's 'resolve' is *determined* by circumstances, and is no longer free. Mr. Mallock, therefore, offers no proof of this, the basis of psychological determinism, beyond his own analysis of the act of choice, wherein he always assumes that motive is determining and irresistible. If this assumption implies that the motive which has been *de facto* accepted by the will was in every case incapable of being refused by the will, we reply that the assumption contradicts the experience of men generally, as revealed in their accounts of their act of choice, and contradicts personal experience. Dr. Ward's analysis of the mentality of the politician, if true to life, proves determinism to be false. And the appeal as to the truth and actuality of such mental phenomena must ever be referred to each one's consciousness. That is the supreme tribunal.

A brief consideration of the struggle of St. Antony endorses this conclusion. Men are continually experiencing such trials. The devil does not always come in visible form, but his suggestions are ever the same, ever an appeal to the lower part of our nature. What is the actual mental condition of the earnest Christian at such crises? Is it true that he cannot entertain the impure thought? No; at every moment of the struggle he feels that he can only too easily yield to the temptation. A moment's pause, a moment's cessation of effort, and his soul is black as hell? On the other hand, is the earnest Christian so inevitably and necessarily drawn to the side of virtue, that he cannot accept the impure thought, that he must needs reject it? St. Antony loved Christ dearly, but if his nature was human nature, the assertion that during those painful struggles

with violent and protracted temptations, his love for Christ made consent even to the foulest of impure actions an absolute impossibility, is in the light of all human experience utterly false. Search out that soul on which God has poured His choicest graces, and tell it that its love for God makes sin an impossibility, that heaven is secure and the devil powerless, and you will hear the old answer with a new meaning—*Homo sum et nil humanum alienum puto*.

The same fallacy of 'every motive a determining motive' runs through Mr. Mallock's references (page 119) to Christ's words, to the conversion of Paul and Augustine, and to the language of Christians in describing their own moral crises. Free-will does not exclude motives: it excludes only such motives as are determining, and its adherents appeal to the consciousness of each one in proof of their doctrine. That circumstances and character and motive influence our will is admitted on all hands: that they do not inexorably constrain men's wills on every occasion is the libertarian thesis. That men generally do not believe their fellow-man's deliberate action to be the inevitable outcome of his circumstances is proved by their allotment of praise and blame. 'The whole feeling of reality, the whole sting and excitement of our voluntary life, depends on our sense that in it things are really being decided from one moment to another, and that it is not the dull rattling of a chain that was forged innumerable years ago.' Yet these acts are never described as independent of circumstances and of motive, for the reason that they are not thus independent. To rush off to the conclusion that they are in all cases inevitably determined by circumstances, or by motives, is to make an inference not warranted by the data, and an assumption which contradicts all human experience.

Mr. Mallock next seeks to explain how libertarians have succeeded in maintaining their thesis in spite of the fact that free-will is unthinkable (page 122). First of all, they have changed the proposition into its half-brother—a truism, namely, 'That when not physically coerced we

are free to act as we will, and that, at any given moment, out of two opposite courses we are free, if we will, to take one or the other.' How Mr. Mallock comes to regard this proposition as a truism, is made abundantly clear thus: 'This simply amounts to saying that if I am thirsty and will to drink I am free to drink; or, if I am hungry, and will to eat, I am equally free to eat.' But, adds Mr. Mallock, the real proposition to be defended by the libertarian is: That whether I am hungry or thirsty is a question I decide for myself—that if, at a given moment, I am longing for a glass of water, I am able to make myself long for a dry biscuit instead.' This is simply not true. No libertarian supposes that such desires, as Mr. Mallock mentions, are free. The question is, can we reject or consent to those desires. What the libertarian denies is, that our acts of will are on every occasion necessitated by our desires.

No libertarian puts forward as a proof of free-will the truism that the will is the cause of a man's doing whatever he ultimately does do. And no libertarian contests Mr. Mallock's sagacious analyses of the causes that give rise to the organic cravings of hunger and thirst. All that is wholly beside the point. Free-will has its basis in the will, and not in the stomach. Expressed in terms of stomach, the free-will thesis runs: Given the keenest of keen appetites in the healthiest of healthy men, and given the most savoury of savoury dishes, and all the other requisites for a hearty meal, except the act of willing to eat, does that act of willing to eat necessarily, inevitably, inexorably arise? The libertarian boldly says, No; and he appeals to the personal experience of each one in proof of all that is contained in that 'No,' namely, that in cases of deliberate choice, the mind is not wholly determined by phenomenal antecedents and external conditions, but that it itself, as active subject of these objective experiences, plays the part of determining cause. So far then as psychology carries us, the last word is not determinism; and now we pass on to the physical sciences, triumphantly styled by Mr. Mallock the second Sinai of determinism.

Mr. Mallock begins by declaring that physical science, by

a wholly different route, reaches the same conclusion that physiology had reached before it—the absolute necessity of our volitions.

The doctrine of free-will, according to Mr. Mallock (page 127), is a doctrine that energy can be annihilated and that new energy can be created, and, therefore, is in absolute and direct contradiction to the law of the conservation of energy. That we may grasp the utter falsity of this statement, it will be useful, first, to determine exactly what the law of the conservation of energy means, what are its claims on our acceptance, and secondly, how the doctrine of free-will fits in with this law.

Here is the scientific expression of the law of the conservation of energy : The sum of the kinetic and potential energies of any isolated system of bodies remains constant. Science claims no revelation for this law. Since 1842, scientists have verified it by accurate and painstaking observation of innumerable isolated systems, and the demonstrations have been the more rigorous according as the experiences have been the more carefully conducted. Still, these observations have not proved with mathematical exactitude the law, and if anyone chooses to affirm that slight variations are possible, he cannot be refuted in the actual conditions of scientific research. Further, these experiments have all been conducted on the principle that every form of energy, whatever be its specific quality, possesses a determined mechanical equivalent. The law refers, therefore, to the constance of the quantity of energy : it leaves untouched the question of qualitative variation. But scientists have enlarged their conclusions. Since, they argue, in all the cases observed, facts tend to confirm the principle of the conservation of energy, we may extend this principle to the whole cosmological system and declare : ‘The sum total of energy in the universe always remains the same.’ We do not contest the right of science to this generalization ; we wish to insist, however, that while facts tend to justify such generalization, no demonstration of the truth of the principle as applied to the universe has been furnished. In its primary form, the

principle leans on authenticated experiences, more or less exact : in its more sweeping form—and only in this form can it be presented as a difficulty for the libertarian—it leans on the probability of a host of convincing facts.

What attitude shall the libertarian take up in face of this scientific principle ? Suppose that he found himself constrained to admit that the doctrine of free-will absolutely contradicts the principle of the conservation of energy, should he forthwith capitulate ? Evidently not, his liberty is a fact of direct and internal observation, and no theory, however ingenious, can rob him of the certainty that he is free. *De facto*, the principle of the conservation of energy, taken in its more sweeping form, is only a theory, though a very probable theory, and if logic commanded a sacrifice, this theory must cede to the certainty and the certitude of free-will. However, libertarians deny any such contradiction or conflict, and Mr. Mallock has cited two of many replies. We think that other solutions, more convincing, are forthcoming, but as our concern is with Mr. Mallock, we shall content ourselves in setting forth the full value of these two replies.¹

Some apologists point out that vital phenomena differ from the phenomena of inorganic matter merely in this, that vital phenomena exhibit energy which, drawn from the common stock, is guided—not increased or diminished—by an influence absent elsewhere. Accordingly, we may conceive of free-will as a force which acts at right angles on the normally moving molecules of the brain, and so deflects them into non-natural courses without any violation of the law of the conservation of energy, it being a principle of physical science that a force acting at right angles can produce deflection without expenditure of energy.

Others hold that the operation of free-will, inextricably connected as it is with the movements of matter, cannot fail to involve a violation both of the laws of the conser-

¹ Among the most remarkable solutions are :—Couailliac, *La Liberté et la Conservation de l'Energie*, Livre iv. ; Mercier, 'Le Determinisme et le Libre Arbitre,' in the *Revue Catholique*, 1884 ; De Munnynck, O.P., *La Liberté Morale et la Conservation de l'Energie*.

vation of energy and of the conservation of momentum. Science, however, can do nothing to exhibit these laws as absolute in the wider sense that they are valid in respect of the universe considered in its incalculable totality, and it is clearly scientifically demonstrable that the total energy of the universe might suffer minute subtractions or receive minute additions, without affecting the practical accuracy of the doctrine of the conservation of energy.

It is evident from what we have said that even the risky solution which postulates slight variations of constancy is in our present state of scientific knowledge tenable. The second solution, based on scientific data, proves that to reject free-will on the grounds of conflict with the principle of the conservation of energy is wholly arbitrary. Since scientific data admit the possibility of reconciling the most rigorous constancy of energy with the most absolute liberty, what right has any scientist to maintain that the doctrine of free-will is inadmissible for him, that it implies creation and annihilation of energy ?

Mr. Mallock next proceeds (page 132, etc.) to furnish facts which prove, in his opinion, that the brain dictates to the will, besides occasionally refusing to serve it, from which he concludes that brain and will are all one mechanism. We accept these facts fearlessly, we reject Mr. Mallock's conclusion. Employing the illustration of Handel at the organ, Mr. Mallock tells us facts show that 'our organ, the brain, is not only capable of refusing to play the tunes which the will or mind would impose on it, but it is capable also in reference to purely physical stimuli of grinding out tunes, totally different, of its own.' If this means anything, it means that the material organ, the brain, is capable of 'thought, emotion, purpose, will.' Now, the brain is but a mass of matter, so many countless atoms of hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, etc., combined in certain proportions, and we have proved at an early stage of our examination of Mr. Mallock's views, the absurdity of assuming—for proof is never given—that matter can be the source of intellectual activity. Yet it is this assumption that monists make everywhere, and that Mr. Mallock employs here to give a

semblance of basis to his discussion of the determinism of matter. Reverting to Mr. Mallock's illustration, wherever the jigs and waltzes come from, proved they are jigs and waltzes, and differ only in degree from Handel's 'Israel in Egypt'—differ only as honest thought differs from dishonest thought, and chaste thought from unchaste thought—they cannot come from a mass of mere matter. The indubitable facts of self-consciousness and free-will—as we have seen—postulate a spiritual faculty, a spiritual principle.

Mr. Mallock's facts (pages 137-141) prove that in the cases cited, integrity of character, strength of memory, fear, courage, the sense of sin, honesty, chastity, were interfered with by certain changes in the brain-substance. Such cases prove indisputably the close union of soul and body. That, however, they prove that each modification of the mind is inexorably conditioned and determined by certain molecular changes in the substance of the organism is false. The doctrine that intellectual cognition and free volition involves self-action on the part of the mind, but that such self-action is conditioned by the impressions in the inferior recipient faculties, explains every fact that can be furnished by Mr. Mallock or anyone else, and at the same time agrees with the unmistakable testimony of each man's consciousness that he possesses a self-determining faculty, a will that is free.

Changes of conduct owing to brain accidents point to the conclusion that the removal of, or the tampering with, cerebral matter influences the moral life, provided that the other conditions remained the same. Mr. Mallock has said nothing on this latter important point, but we may concede it and pursue our argument. Influence, we admit; such influence as Mr. Mallock postulates, the influence of inexorable necessity, excluding all free-will, we refuse to admit without proof. And where is the proof? *Post hoc, propter hoc*—a fallacy. Mark, we do not deny the possibility of such an arrangement of cerebral matter and of the other sensuous faculties as can destroy responsibility. The insane, the sleeping, the drunken, are evident proofs to the

contrary. But we deny Mr. Mallock the right to conclude from an accident plus change of conduct straight off to determinism. Phineas Gage or the elderly Roman lady may have been perfectly free *post factum* to resist such influences as their respective fates induced—that is, Mr. Mallock has given no proof to the contrary. Should, however, the accident have resulted in such a change of material organization as to cause loss of liberty, this fact does not in the least invalidate our free-will thesis, no more than the undoubted existence of idiots invalidates the thesis of the existence of many people who are not idiots.

To speak of the brain as investing human acts with a new moral quality is but a result of Mr. Mallock's previous confusion of thought. If the new influences are determining, there is an end to responsibility, an end to morality of action. If the new influences are merely influences, however strong, and not determinants, the acts performed preserve their moral quality, because they originate in a will that is free. In this latter hypothesis, Handel has given us jigs and waltzes, when the audience, and rightly, asked for 'Israel in Egypt,' and Handel is to blame for the consequences.

Mr. Mallock passes on to the problem of heredity. He ushers it in by some rhetorical periods on the origin of ideas, which do not concern us, for they contain no proof of anything (page 143).

Idiosyncrasies of character are dependent primarily on heredity—this is Mr. Mallock's thesis, and his proof is the recurrence through all the ages of the vagaries of amative desire. Numerous well-strung periods are subjoined. Can the Ethiopian change his skin? Where does this child get his taste for music or sport? That child his good or bad temper? We interject the further question: Where is the proof of determinism in all this? That generation after generation experiences the vagaries of amative desire, that Ethiopians are ever born black, that Patrick has inherited traits different from those of Michael, and Bridget tastes different from either—these are everyday facts of experience, which all who believe in free-will accept. It is a far cry from that


to determinism. No libertarian maintains that one man's free-will encounters the very same obstacles as another's. If I have inherited a bad temper, patience is therefore more difficult for me. But that such inherited dispositions for good or evil destroy the individual's liberty in every case—that is just the point for Mr. Mallock to prove, just the point he conveniently assumes, and just the point which men at all times and in all places have denied. Mankind has ever asserted its possession of free-will, has ever based its assertion on the unmistakable affirmations of consciousness. Determinism gathers together a number of facts which mark the influence of matter over mind, and then quietly assumes the further point, namely, that this influence is determining and inevitable in every case. Mr. Mallock has merely reproduced in eloquent language this *petitio principii*.

He has consequently failed to supply the links of that chain by which determinism would bind man to the mechanism of the universe. Man is not a mere machine, his soul is not a fleeting phenomenon, appearing and disappearing with the body, and leaving nothing behind. He is immortal, he is free—a being, which, if there be a God, has everything to hope from His love, and everything to fear from His displeasure.¹

JOHN O'NEILL.



THE FIVE OFF



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
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(page 12*), has no flat at this cadence. My reply is, first, that this MS. is too late (fifteenth century) to be of account, when we have good MSS. of the beginning of the twelfth century. Secondly, the MS. still writes the melody in *c*, thus leaving it possible to sing *bb*. At *Spiritu* a later hand put in a flat, which proves that the flat there was sung, even after the date of the MS. If this later hand did not put in the flat in the other case, the reason was possibly that it was not thought necessary, the full tone at the cadence being generally understood. Still I admit that my statement was not literally correct.

Incidentally Father Burge calls my attention to another inaccuracy. Page 52 (11) I quoted the 'Christe' of the *Kyrie Fons bonitatis* from the *Rassegna Gregoriana* thus: (2)



In doing this I overlooked the fact that the version supplied for the Vatican edition, although not adopted by the editor, differed from this in one detail. It should be observed in this connexion that the Solesmes monks turned their special attention to the *Kyrie* only lately, and got a large number of MSS. for this portion of the Gradual only within the last year or so. Some very old MSS., then, prove that the original version of the *Christe* was thus



We have, therefore, an additional case in which the Vatican edition differs from the original version. We shall see below how badly Father Burge blunders over this *Christe*.

Before entering on Father Burge's critical remarks (if they deserve that name), I must dispose of a few points he mentions by way of introduction. In his first paragraph he points out, with an object, no doubt, that the

inspiration of my article was sought at Appuldurcombe. I should like to know where else I might have sought my information. There is no other single place anyhow in the world where I could have found it. I dare say Dom Pothier and his friends would have preferred if I had stayed at home, and left my article unwritten. But if Father Burge means to insinuate—his remarks, page 333, point that way—that a suggestion to write my article came from Appuldurcombe, I must protest. I claim the full credit for initiative in this matter. In fact, when I first wrote to Appuldurcombe asking for some information on the subject, my request was met by a blank refusal, which, indeed, was coupled with a polite invitation to come and study the matter in their library for myself.

In his second paragraph Father Burge scores a great victory over me. He points out that Mr. Bas is not a consultor of the Commission! Perhaps he is not. I really do not know, and I have not gone to the trouble of finding it out. It does not make the slightest difference. I happen to know that he was secretary to the meeting of the Commission held at Appuldurcombe, in August, 1904. As to a violation of the Pontifical secret, Father Burge himself shows such an intimate acquaintance with the doings of the Commission that one might think he was a member or consultor himself. How can he know, for instance, that the *major pars* in many cases, and the *sanior pars* in every case, was in favour of Dom Pothier's version (page 325)? Or that 'the Commission voted the suppression' of a note (page 338)? Again (page 340), he quotes certain readings as proposed by the 'archæologists.' How could he know these, or, knowing them, publish them, without a 'violation of the Pontifical secret'? Father Burge, you are altogether too innocent for controversy!

Next, Father Burge finds fault with my statement that Dom Pothier was made 'the sole judge of the version of the new edition.' To justify myself I need only quote from Father Burge himself. He says (page 333): 'Nothing then remained . . . but to give Dom Pothier . . . the supreme direction of the work.'

We come now to Father Burge's main argument. He holds that my fundamental position is wrong. He tries to prove that the principle on which I proceed is unscientific, inartistic, and at variance with the terms of reference of the Commission. This principle of mine, according to Father Burge, is 'the reading of the majority and of the oldest MSS.' He says: 'I need not cite passages from the article, for I fancy the author will not object to this statement of his position.' The author, however, objects very much. He would be very sorry, if he had laid down such a foolish principle. Of course, when a certain reading has for itself all the oldest MSS. and, in addition, the majority of all the MSS., there can be little doubt about it. But it is just the cases where these two conditions are not realized simultaneously, that cause the difficulty. No; if I were to formulate my principle, I should say, 'The melodies of the Church in their original purity.' If Father Burge considers this principle unscientific and inartistic, he should address his remarks to the Pope. For, if I am not mistaken, it was Pius X who originated the phrase.

Father Burge next defines my position by a series of questions and answers. These are really too silly to call for any reply.

Again, he describes the principle by quoting from an article of Dom Mocquereau's in the *Rassegna Gregoriana* (April, 1904). He sums up Dom Mocquereau's plan thus: Count the number of the oldest MSS. for each version, and the majority carry the day. But if the votes are equal, you may toss up for it. This, indeed, does not sound very scientific. But let us see what Dom Mocquereau really says. He distinguishes three classes of melodies. The first class is formed by those for which the MSS. are practically unanimous; the stream of the tradition flows down through the centuries in perfect uniformity. Here there is no difficulty in fixing the proper version of a melody. In a second class we are at first confronted by a bewildering number of variants. But if we examine more closely into the matter, we find that these variants group themselves into a small number of divisions, cor-

responding to a similar number of families of MSS. By comparing these families, one with the other, we are then enabled to see which was the original version, and again we can fix a version definitely. But there is a third class in which even this procedure does not settle the question. The first thing the Solesmes School does in such a case is to try to get more MS. material. They get more photographs, and write round to their friends to look out for additional information. If even this does not bring clearness, a definite decision cannot be made for the present, and if some version must be adopted for practical purposes, a provisional selection has to be made. For this provisional selection, then, they follow these rules. If there is among the various versions a Roman one, they take that in preference to the others. If there is no Roman one, they select the one which seems the more beautiful. But if, even on the ground of beauty, there is nothing to choose between various versions, they 'toss up.' I should like to know what other procedure Father Burge could suggest. But I leave it to the reader to decide whether he quoted Dom Mocquereau fairly.

But Father Burge has greater difficulties against the archæological principle. He doubts whether it is possible at all to restore the original version, whether our codices really contain the true Gregorian Chant. How foolish, then, of the Pope to order a return to the original form of the melodies! Why did he not first ask Father Burge whether such a return was possible? My critic points out (page 327) that a good two hundred years yawns between our oldest codices and St. Gregory. 'Are we sure that our MSS. faithfully represent the reform of St. Gregory?' In the next paragraph, he says: 'But there is something more. Is it quite certain that the tradition of the Chant flowed with pure and undefiled stream from the days of St. Gregory to the ninth century?' I do not quite see what is the difference between these two interrogations. But let that pass. I must, however, before I take up the argument, dispose of a statement made on page 328 about Dr. Wagner's *Neumenkunde*. I have read this book with great care, but found

nothing like what Father Burge makes it say. Perhaps he could explain away the 'bending its forms,' but about the ornamental neumes (hook neumes), which, according to Wagner, implied quarter-tones, the latter says (page 59): 'At all events the hook neumes were adopted in Rome, not later than at the fixing of the Roman Chant about 600'; and (page 60): 'The supposition that the ornamental neumes were added to the accent neumes as late at the eighth or ninth century is an impossibility from the point of view of historical development.' To be charitable to Father Burge I must suppose that his knowledge of German is only slight, and that he has misread Wagner.

The answer to Father Burge's difficulty, then, is simply that what we aim at restoring is the chant of the MSS. We hold that there is one definite form of melody underlying all the readings of the different codices, notwithstanding their being at variance in certain details. This underlying melody, then, we want to get at. Whether this melody is the melody of St. Gregory, is another question. The weight of historical evidence is in favour of the assumption that it is. At present Gevaert is the only man of note who is holding out against this conclusion. But if the Chant of St. Gregory is not contained in our MSS., then it is irreparably lost, and it would be Utopian to try to restore it. What we concern ourselves with directly, therefore, is the chant of the MSS. That is what Pius X ordered. He speaks of the chant 'which the Church jealously guarded in her liturgical codices,' and he is careful enough to designate it as the chant 'which is called the Gregorian.'

But, can this chant be restored in its smallest details? I may anticipate here another difficulty which Father Burge raises later on (page 341). He says that 'for a long time the outlines of the melody were, so to speak, in a nebulous state, and it was impossible that under these circumstances errors and variations in small matters should not creep in.' This is a very serious point. If the old scribes were so deficient musically that they did not know whether to write a tone or a semitone, our position is very precarious. One might imagine, therefore, that Father

Burge would devote some space towards proving his assertion. But no. All he has to say is that a certain melodic passage 'gives rise to a well-founded suspicion.' I might satisfy myself with pointing out that Father Burge has given no proof. To prove positively that he is wrong, is impossible for me here. It would require a critical apparatus altogether beyond my reach. But let me assure the reader that there is no foundation whatsoever for the suspicion that the old scribes were not sufficiently equipped for their task. They sometimes had difficulties, no doubt. But these difficulties arose not from their incompetency, but from a conflict between the traditional melodies and the prevailing theories. The prevailing theory included two things, the tone system and the mode theory. The tone system accepted only the natural scale with *b* as the only chromatic tone. The mode theory stated four modes, those of *d*, *e*, *f*, and *g*, on one of which notes any melody should end. But when the first attempts were being made to write down the traditional melodies in diastematic notation—in some places these first attempts were made in the tenth, in others as late as in the fourteenth century—it was found that they showed semitones in places where they could not be expressed, above *d* and below *g*.

To overcome this difficulty various expedients were adopted. The simplest was transposition. By transposing a melody a fifth up, an *eb* could be expressed by *bb*; by transposing a fourth up, an *f* could be expressed by *b*. Thus we find the Introit, *Exaudi Domine*, of the Sunday after the Ascension transposed from *d* to *a*, the Communions, *Surrexit Dominus*, of Easter Monday, and *De fructu*, of the Twelfth Sunday after Pentecost transposed from *f* to *c* to express the *eb* (Dom Pothier's *Liber Gradualis* has all these in their untransposed form, omitting the *b*). Also the *Gloria* of Mass VII., as I mentioned before, was written in *c* instead of *f*, in order to express the full tone under the final note. Similarly, the Communion *Beatus servus* of a 'Confessor non Pontiff' was transposed from *e* to *a* to express an *f*. By thus setting aside to a certain extent the mode theory, things were adjusted pretty easily. A greater

difficulty, however, would arise, if a melody required both an *e*♭ and a *b*♯. Here a transposition a fifth up would convert the *b*♯ into an *f*♯. It seems that such cases did confront the scribes, though it is only by indirect means that we can now reconstruct such melodies. An interesting case is the Alleluia verse of the fourth Sunday of Advent. Here the Alleluia is in *e*, but the verse is transposed a tone lower, to *d*. If the verse were written in *e*, it would require *f*♯ and *c*♯. Some MSS. transpose both Alleluia and verse to *a*. The *f*♯ of the verse, then, is expressed by *b*♯, but the *c*♯ must be sacrificed. As here the different parts of a composite piece are altered in their relation to each other, so also sometimes individual phrases of a melody are transposed a tone up or down to preserve a characteristic interval. Thus the Sarum Gradual writes the opening of the Introit, *Exaudi Domine*, mentioned above, which, in the normal position of the first mode, would read *d e b c f*, as *e f d g*, giving the rest of the melody in its proper form. An instructive example is the Alleluia verse of the Seventh Sunday after Pentecost, as given in the *Liber Gradualis* and the *Liber Usualis*. The latter writes it in *a*, thus having both a tone and a semitone above the final. Transposed down to *d*, the melody would have *e* in the Alleluia, *e*♭ in the middle of the verse, and *e* again in the repetition of the neuma at the end of the verse. The *Liber Gradualis* has it in *d*, but from the beginning of the verse transposes the melody a tone up, thus representing the scale

$$\widehat{d e b f g a b b c d}$$

by


$$\widehat{e f g a b c d e}$$

On the third syllable of the final word, *exsultationis*, however, it returns to the normal position. But here, as in the Alleluia, it has both *b*♯ and *b*♭. In the transposition of the *Liber Usualis* this *b*♯ would require an *f*♯, and has, therefore, to be sacrificed.


Such cases, though fairly numerous, form only a small portion of the whole body of the chant. We could con-

clude, *a priori*, that if the large majority of the melodies had not been in accordance with the theory, the theory could not have stood. Apart from these special cases, then, there is not the slightest indication in the codices that the scribes were 'in a nebulous state' as to how they should represent the melodies in diastematic notation. The opposite statement is a mere excuse for the unwillingness to accept the clear testimony of the documents.






Another source of discrepancies in the MSS. are the changes which took place in the tradition of singing during the course of the Middle Ages. Father Burge quotes in this connexion a remark of Gevaert, who holds modern practice should show respect for the work of time. Gevaert makes this observation with reference to the Antiphon type *Benedicta*, which he holds belonged originally to the 7th tone and, after various vicissitudes, became a 4th tone melody with a chromatic / \sharp expressed by transposition a fourth up, as I explained above. In a foot-note he refers to the change of the dominant of the 3rd tone. In a more general way we might speak of the tendency to substitute the upper note of a semitone interval for the lower one. I mentioned in my article, page 51 (10), that I can understand the position of those who claim that such a substitution should be preserved wherever it became universal, or almost universal. I think that this is a debatable question. Personally, I advocate in all cases the return to the original version. I am influenced, in the first instance, by the fact that in a great many cases the older version is decidedly more beautiful than the later one. I mentioned the case of the passage *et omnes, ad quos pervenit* in the *Vidi aquam*. Similarly the *Christe* of the *Kyrie Fons bonitatis* given above seems to me much finer in its older form with the *b*. As another example in the eighth mode I mention the following from the Introit of the First Sunday of Lent :




Mark how emphatically the accented syllable of *ex-audiam* stands out after the short recitation on *b*. This effect is much weakened in the later version :



Compare under the same aspect the following examples of the 3rd tone, taken from the Introits of the Tenth (5), Twenty-second (6), and Twentieth (7) Sundays after Pentecost :





Omni- a quae fe-cisti no- bis


In example (6) I would also call attention to the figure on the third syllable of *iniquitates*. The gradual rise of the melody to *c* on the accented syllable is marred in (6b) by the anticipation of the *c* on *qui*. Corruptions like this are frequent in the later versions.

The psalmody, too, of the 3rd tone seems to me much more beautiful with *b* as reciting note, thus :


b d c b c || b c a c b a

than what we have at present, and I hope sincerely it will be reintroduced.

As in the 8th and 3rd tones *c* was substituted for *b*, so we find in the 4th tone *f* often substituted for *e*. As an example of the bad effect of this I quote the beginning of the *¶ Ecce quomodo moritur* of Holy Saturday :




Ec- ce quomo-do mo-ri-tur



Ec- ce quomo-do mo-ri-tur

Similarly the change of the reciting note at *de angustia et de iudicio* in the *¶* is to the detriment of the melody. Again, in the Introit of Easter Sunday



mi-ra- bi- lis fa- cta est

is decidedly superior to



But even if the superiority of the older version were not so evident at the first glance, I should advocate the return to it. It is always a precarious thing to interfere with a work of art, and the presumption is always that the best form of it is that in which it left the hands of the composer. Moreover, I hold that I have Papal authority on my side. For I cannot see why Pius X's direction about the 'original purity' of the melodies should not apply in these cases also.

I need scarcely point out that even if this view of mine were not adopted, it would not weaken the case I made out against the *Kyrie* in the least. For the instances which I singled out for consideration in my former article were such as Dom Pothier had either no support for in the MSS. at all, or only the support of a few that have no special importance.

In his next paragraph (page 329) Father Burge charges the 'archæologists' with ignoring the fact that the Church recognizes as Plain Chant also compositions of a later date. Seeing that the Solesmes monks supplied the reading for a large number of melodies of comparatively recent origin in the *Kyrie*, this is a most surprising statement. As I do not want to charge Father Burge with wilful misrepresentation, I must assume that his mind is 'in a nebulous state.'

Then the work of the archæologists is made little of, because it amounts merely to one note in three hundred having been corrected. Supposing this were so, why should even 1 note in 300 be wrong? And is 1 in 300 so very little? There are about 1,800 letters on a page of the I. E. RECORD. If there were six printing mistakes on every page, would it not be said that the

I. E. RECORD was very badly edited? But is it only a case of 1 in 300? I have made a rough calculation of the notes in the *Kyriale*, and estimate them at about 15,000. One hundred and thirty mistakes in these would be at the rate of 1 in 116, corresponding to about fifteen printing mistakes on a page of the I. E. RECORD! So much for arithmetic.

Having, a moment before, branded the archæologists for not recognizing compositions of later origin, Father Burge next blames them for applying the same method to these as to the earlier ones, the same method to the corrupt as to the incorrupt! I have only one remark to make. If these later melodies are corrupt, why should they, even with some patching up, be embodied in the Vatican edition? Would it not be better to consign them to the dust-bin?

There is just one other objection under the 'scientific' aspect. It is that of instability. On page 328 we read: 'It is still possible that some day the libraries of Europe may disclose a MS. of the seventh or eighth centuries, and then what would happen? . . . And must the music of the Church be dependent upon every fresh discovery of archæology?' Why should the music of the Church not take advantage of the discoveries of archæology? Pius X apparently sees nothing objectionable in that. For in the final paragraph of his *Motu Proprio*, of 25th April, 1904, after expressing the hope that the Vatican edition will restore the traditional chant as far as the state of modern studies allows, he reserves significantly to himself and his successors the right of making changes. There is no danger of changes being made so frequently as to create practical difficulties. There is no fear—or perhaps I should rather say, no hope—of archæology making startling discoveries very soon. The chances of a MS. of the seventh or eighth century being found are remote in the extreme, and if one were found, it is highly improbable that it would be different from the MSS. of the ninth century. No, if the *Vaticana* had really represented the results of modern studies, it might perhaps have lasted for fifty years. As it

is, it will not outlive Dom Pothier's personal influence in Rome.

We now come to the second main point, the artistic quality of the archæological principle. Father Burge has not much to say here. He complains that Dom Mocquereau has not published what he has discovered about the *Art* of the Gregorian melodies. I suppose Dom Mocquereau knows best himself how to employ his time most usefully, and he will publish more about these matters when the proper time comes. But I might point out to Father Burge that a wealth of information about the Gregorian art of composition is contained in the third and fourth volumes of the *Paléographie Musicale*. Again, Father Burge complains that Dom Beyssac and myself did not apply any of these art canons in our criticisms of Gregorian melodies. This betrays an altogether wrong point of view. If there is question of restoring a work of art, that method is the most artistic which makes us re-constitute the work of art in its original beauty with the greatest amount of certainty. In our case the historical documents are the safest guides for this purpose. Then, having restored the work of art, we can derive from it the laws of its beauty. These laws, therefore, are dependent on the work of art, not the reverse. Only in case of doubt, when the documents fail us in a particular instance, we might apply the rules that have been found to govern similar cases. It is really surprising that anybody should advocate an æsthetic principle as the main guide in restoring Plain Chant, seeing the enormous havoc that has been wrought with the chant during the last three centuries by the application of amateur æsthetics.

The third point Father Burge raises is that the method I advocate is against the terms of reference of the Commission. Considering that I made my stand on the Pope's *Motu Proprio* of 25th April, 1904, I was naturally curious to see how Father Burge would prove that my position was opposed to the terms laid down in that same document. I was disappointed, however. Father Burge's trick is an old one, and shows no ingenuity. It is the

trick of fathering upon your adversary some absurd statement, which makes any further discussion needless. Father Burge says that we 'admit no "legitimate tradition" beyond the ninth century.' I wonder was ever a man so foolish as to hold such an opinion. The Solesmes monks or the present writer certainly never did. And this is the only thing Father Burge has to advance for showing that our principle is at variance with the Pope's terms of reference.

Father Burge, then, gives an account of what happened with the Commission, which I cannot let pass unchallenged. He says that because the archæologists could not see their way to accept the Papal instructions, it was necessary to give Dom Pothier the supreme direction of the work. Why, if the majority of the Commission were on Dom Pothier's side, as Father Burge maintains, should it have been necessary to supersede the Commission? Could not the Commission by majority vote have decided the question?

Before finishing the first part of his reply, Father Burge puts another silly question: Is Plain Chant made for man or man made for the Chant? He quotes Dom Mocquereau as saying that the Chant must be taken as it is, with its good and bad points. As a matter of fact, Dom Mocquereau does not say that at all. But let that pass. My article is growing too long in my attempts to deal with all the side-issues my opponent raises. But a word about the Pope's desire to see the use of the Chant restored to the people. Does the Pope say anywhere that the Chant should be changed so as to make it easier for the people? If we must have congregational singing at any cost, why not take up the Salvation Army hymns?

The second part of Father Burge's article is occupied with two attempts. First, he tries to show some reasons for the changes made in the Vatican *Kyriale*; secondly, he tries to prove that some of my statements as to mistakes in the *Kyriale* are erroneous. To the first I might simply reply that I never doubted that Dom Pothier had reasons for his changes. All the reformers, from Guido of Cherlieu down to the editors of the Reims-Cambrai and Cologne

editions, had reasons for their changes. But it will be instructive to look at some of these reasons. First, however, I have to point out a very grave omission Father Burge makes himself guilty of. On page 335, referring to my statement of Dom Pothier's predilection for the German tradition, he says: 'If the critic had been better informed, he would have discovered, with some surprise, that the so-called German readings of the *Kyriale* are met with in MSS. of very different origin.' And, again, on page 336: 'The critic never tires of repeating that the different corrections are not found in any MSS. To this I can only reply that in not any single case has any correction been adopted which is not justified by one or more MSS.' Why, then, does he not mention these MSS.? When I challenged him in the *Catholic Times* to quote those MSS., he got out of it by saying: 'Neither the Editor nor the readers . . . have any desire to see these notes bristling with quotations that can be of interest to the erudite alone.' Now he has filled twenty-two pages of the I. E. RECORD, and still there is not a single quotation of the alleged codices. *Hic Rhodus, hic salta*. You must quote your codices, Father Burge, or stand convicted.

Of course, the reason why he does not quote them is plain: he does not know any. Neither does the member of the Commission, who prompted him, know any. This confident assertion that they exist, is a mere game of bluff. But it will not deceive any intelligent person.

We read on page 336: 'We can hardly expect the archæologists to enter into the niceties of Gregorian art that are displayed,' etc. Niceties of Gregorian art, indeed! And it took exactly thirteen hundred and one years since the death of St. Gregory, to evolve this nicety of the Gregorian art! Imagine a literary critic finding the genius of Shakespeare in some change a twentieth-century editor introduced in one of Shakespeare's plays! Why, that literary critic would be laughed out of existence.

Referring to my statement that Dom Pothier's version of *templo* is not found in a single MS., my critic remarks: 'I feel sure this is quite an oversight on the part of the

critic, otherwise such an accusation might give rise to unpleasant rejoinders.' I do not understand the second part of this sentence, but I can assure Father Burge that there was no oversight on my part. His quotation from Guido of Arezzo is quite irrelevant. Applied to the text in question Guido's remark means that the *a*, which is printed as a Liquescent, might be sung either as a Liquescent or with fuller production. But whichever way you sing it, it remains an interpolated note, and I repeat, therefore, Dom Pothier's version is *not found in any single MS*.

We now come to the *Kyrie Fons bonitatis* mentioned already. Father Burge objects to my calling Dom Beyssac's treatment of this melody 'masterly.' How masterly it is, becomes strikingly clear when we compare it with Father Burge's treatment. In dealing with a historical question Dom Beyssac relies on historical evidence. Father Burge relies on his imagination. He tells us the story of the development of the melody, as if he had been looking on through all the centuries, but his explanation has just the value of an idle moment's fancy. If we consult the MSS., we find that there is no necessary connexion between *d* and *b* on the one hand, and between *e* and *c* on the other. The German MSS., which have invariably *c*, have invariably *d* also. On the other hand the Aquitanian MSS. have *e*, even when they have *b*. Only very few MSS. (five out of about a hundred) have *e d*, and the fact that they are of widely different origin, proves the accidental character of the change, which, as Dom Beyssac suggests, is probably due to the false analogy of the *e d* on the first syllable of *Christe*. But a funny mishap befalls Father Burge, when he speaks of a Tristropha on *b*. Father Burge, did you ever see a Tristropha on *b*? I never did, and I never heard of anybody else who did. Of course, there may be such a thing in one of the 2,500 codices that are estimated to contain Gregorian notation. But why do you keep away from the world the secret of such an interesting occurrence? But anyhow, there is no Tristropha on *b* in this melody. Where, then, did Father Burge get this interesting idea? Evidently he saw three *c*'s in the

Vatican version, and jumped at the conclusion that this must be a Tristropha. Then, having learned from his Roman correspondent that the original melody had *b* at this place, he transferred his Tristropha to *b*! There is not even a Tristropha on *c*, however. There is a *Pes stratus acc* (replacing the original *abb*) followed by a Clivis *cb*, a slightly different thing. Father Burge's mistake, by the way, shows the desirability of resuming the old, distinctive form of the Strophicus, as has been done in the Solesmes rhythmical editions of the Vatican *Kyriale*.

Another 'reason' is given for the change of *gloriam* (Ex. 12 and 13). Here, according to Father Burge and Dom Pothier, 'the variety of resources at the command of the ancient Gregorian artists were exhausted.' But is not the repetition of a melodic figure one of these resources, and have not all the greatest composers of all times made free use of this resource?

With regard to my example (14) Father Burge has misunderstood my remark. The original version had *gabagf*, thus giving a tritone with all its horrors. I shall presently say a little more about the tritone. I must insert a couple of other remarks. Father Burge says that *b* was changed into *c*, according to the traditional demand for a more decided note. On the preceding page he says similarly that *b* was changed into *c* to give more precision and vigour to the melody. Was this really the reason for the frequent changes made in the later Middle Ages? Professor Wagner has a very different interpretation. He says: 'It was the endeavour to remove or to obviate the difficulties that attach to the interval of the semitone.' I have not the slightest doubt that Wagner is right. Even in modern times untrained singers sing frequently a third *ac* for *ab* or *ab²*. Such singers represent the musical development at the stage of the pentatonic scale, which has no semitone: *acdfga*.

Again, Father Burge thinks it strange that I should speak of the difficulty presented to a modern musician by the full tone under the tonic, considering that Irish peasant singers are so fond of the 'flattened seventh.' I

have very great respect for the Irish singers, but I did not know that they should be considered modern musicians. Moreover, the 'flattened seventh' is by no means identical with the full tone under the tonic. Practically all the melodies that have the 'flattened seventh' either avoid the tone under the tonic or sharpen it. If I were to challenge Father Burge to quote a few Irish melodies of the 'Soh' mode, showing a full tone under the tonic at a cadence, he would have plenty of difficulty in finding them.


Now to the tritone. Father Burge says: 'This [the objection to the tritone] is one of the cases of "legitimate tradition."' Is it really? As I have not yet stated directly what I consider as the meaning of 'legitimate tradition,' I will do it here. A legitimate tradition, I hold, is that tradition which preserves the original intact. Any tradition which changes the original is not a legitimate tradition, but a corruption. If this does not meet Father Burge's views, let him give a definition of his own. Simply to assert that a certain tradition is a legitimate tradition will not do.

Father Burge suggests that it was 'prudence' which prevented me from calling attention to certain differences between the readings of the MSS. and the *Vaticana*. I stated distinctly, page 48 (7), of my former article, why I left aside certain cases. Father Burge might give me credit for truthfulness, anyhow. I shall show presently that I am not afraid to quote a few examples of tritones. But first let us glance at Father Burge's examples. He says his example (15) is found in some old MSS. I think I might with great safety deny this statement: I should run very little risk of being refuted. But perhaps it is better for me not to run any risks, and so I will confine myself to challenging Father Burge to produce his authority for his example (15).


Another mishap befell Father Burge in his example (18). The last five notes have dropped down one degree. Who is guilty of this gross carelessness in copying—is it the member of the Commission who 'violated the

Pontifical secret' by communicating this reading to Father Burge, or is it Father Burge? I leave it to him to explain.

To the question of the tritone itself, I quote a few examples from books edited by Dom Pothier :




(Christmas Hymn)




alle-lu-ia, alle-lu-ia

(Magn. Ant. of Low Sunday)




Quae tu cre- asti pecto-ra

(Veni Creator)




In hymnis et canti-cis

(Lauda Sion)




Ver-bum su-pernum pro-di- ens

(15) 

gestaque forti- a

(Vesper Hymn of Several Martyrs)

(16) 

o-ran-tem inve-nit

(2nd Vesper Antiphon of St. Cecilia).

Would Father Burge have all these changed? I have confined myself to simple chants, such as might be expected to be sung congregationally. If I had gone to the Schola or Solo chants, I could have quoted almost without end. But I have one more example:

(17) 

Carnem vi- dens nec cavens laque-um

If the former examples were 'horrors,' what will Father Burge call this? And this is a chant published by Dom Pothier without any necessity—it is not in our present Liturgy—but merely as a specimen of fine medieval compositions! The example is taken from the Easter Sequence, *Salve dies*, in Dom Pothier's 'Variae Preces.'

So far Father Burge has admitted that Dom Pothier did make changes, and only has tried to find some justification for them. He now proceeds to show that some of my statements as to such changes are erroneous. He makes out eleven mistakes in these statements. Suppose for a moment he was right in this, what would it mean? It would be pretty bad for me, but how would the Vatican *Kyriale* stand? There would still be about seventy arbitrary and evident changes in it—bad enough for a little book of its size. But let us examine into my supposed errors.

1st Error. 'The critic complains that in the *Gloria* of Mass VII. the editors omit the *b*² and sharpen the leading note. As a matter of fact, there are only two *b*'s in the piece, and *both of them are flattened*.' Well now, really, Father Burge, I have a grievance against you. To imagine that I could be guilty of such a transparent blunder! Why, any school-boy could see that all the *b*'s of that piece in the Vatican edition are flattened, and you think it possible that I did not see it! Surely, when my supposed mistake was so terribly gross, you might have stopped for a moment to see whether there was not something amiss. It would have been better for you, too. For it is my painful duty to point out to you that, as I distinctly stated, the piece is written in *c* in the MSS. and transposed to *f* by Dom Pothier. The *b* of the original, therefore, has become *c*, and, needless to say, there is no flat before the *c*.

2nd Error. 'In the Cantus *ad libitum*, Kyrie II., he says there are only two *Christe*. I have examined three editions, and in all I find three *Christe*.' A nice piece of logic: Three editions have three *Christe*, therefore the Vatican edition has three *Christe*! I think I must recommend our Professor of Logic to give this to his students as a typical specimen of a bad inference. If Father Burge does not mind spending a few shillings, he might procure another half dozen, or even dozen, editions, all having three *Christe*, and still the fact remains that the Vatican edition, that is, the edition that issued from the Vatican printing establishment, has only two *Christe*. Or does Father Burge really believe that I cannot count three? The explanation of the puzzle is so simple that Father Burge would have guessed it himself, if he had not been bent on finding fault with me: the reprints of the Vatican edition, with the exception of a few early ones, corrected the mistake.

3rd Error. 'In Gloria III., the MSS. give a double *d* at *Te* in *Laudamus Te*; the critic declares Dom Pothier only gives one. As a matter of fact, the editors have given the double *d*.' Very funny again! There is a long neuma

on this *T*, and in the course of it two *d*'s happen to come together. But what I wanted to convey, and what, I think, I conveyed with sufficient clearness to any unbiassed mind, was that the MSS. have two *d*'s, where Dom Pothier has only one, that is, right at the beginning of the phrase.

Next we get seven errors in a bundle. 'Seven other statements are erroneous in their assertion that "Dom Pothier's" version is unsupported by any MSS. This, as I have shown above, is altogether inaccurate.' I beg your pardon, Father Burge, you showed nothing of the kind. You made a general assertion, but the proofs for your assertion are wanting still.

And now I have to call attention to a nice piece of arithmetic. We had three 'errors' dealt with singly, and then seven in a bundle, and these together make the eleven ! Perhaps, after all, I took Father Burge too seriously when I protested against his imputing to me gross carelessness. To a man who makes $3 + 7 = 11$ it might appear a venial offence to say that there is no flat when there is a flat, or to say that there are only two *Christe* when there are three, or to say that there is only one *d* when there are two.

We are nearing the end now. But before I take up Father Burge's final thrust, I have two other small points to deal with. My opponent holds me up to ridicule for growing indignant over a version of the *Vaticana*, which he quotes under No. 21. With his usual inaccuracy he misquotes the version of the MS. I stated distinctly that the MS. has *a g a g* where Dom Pothier has *a g a*. Instead of that Father Burge changes the *f* on the second syllable of *tollis* into *g*. But apart from that, is there any reason for my showing special indignation at this example ? Not the slightest. It would be perfectly ridiculous for me to grow indignant over this case any more than over any of the other eighty or so. But neither did I. What roused my indignation was that Dom Pothier made five changes in a short little melody for which there are no variants in the MSS. at all. I feel sure Father Burge himself could have seen that, if he had wanted to do so.

Then my critic complains that I left out St. Gregory

in my list of reformers. I may modestly remark that I am not aware of any historic evidence that St. Gregory was a reformer in Church music. That he did several things for Church music is beyond reasonable doubt. But whether his work had in any way the character of reform is not proved as far as I know.

Having failed to disprove any of my statements, Father Burge finally accuses me of disloyalty. Loyalty is a peculiar thing in these matters. I wonder was Father Burge loyal during the thirty years that the Ratisbon Chant was authentic? Did he preach then from the house tops that the Ratisbon books ought to be introduced everywhere? Did he do his best to influence his brethren, the English Benedictines, to lay aside the Mechlin Chant, and to adopt the authentic version? Perhaps he did. I do not know. But one thing I know: Dom Pothier was not 'loyal' in those days. In spite of repeated declarations of the Roman authorities that the Ratisbon books contained the authentic Gregorian Chant, he published his *Liber Gradualis*, and did his best, too, to have it sung in as many places as possible. With these things fresh in our memories, is it not surprising to find people bragging about loyalty? Or look at it in another way. Suppose the Pope changed his mind over night, and made those things which Father Burge tastefully likens to a 'chamber of horrors' obligatory for the whole Church, what would Father Burge do then? Would he become disloyal, or would he suddenly change his æsthetic convictions?

He grows hot over my statement that 'this question cannot be settled by decrees.' I do not see why he gets up this indignation, unless it be for mere histrionic display. I made it perfectly clear in what sense I understood these words. I pointed out that if this question were to be settled by decrees, it would have been settled long ago. Were there not enough decrees in favour of the Ratisbon edition? And yet, as I said, with one stroke of the pen a Pope cancelled them all. And so it will be with the decrees that Dom Pothier got—or obtained, or received, or any word that will please Father Burge—for his edition.

I am not disloyal. I have no fault to find with authority. I am an ardent admirer of Pius X. I hailed with delight, and accept without reservation, his two *Motu Proprios* on Church Music. And as to the Congregation of Rites, surely we cannot expect them to examine the MSS. to see whether Dom Pothier carried out his task faithfully. My quarrel is with Dom Pothier alone, and if I feel rather angry with him, it is precisely because he has frustrated the intention of the Pope, and placed the Holy See in a very awkward position.

Father Burge concludes his article with a quotation from Pope. So I may appropriately conclude with a quotation from Pius X :

The melodies of the Church, which are called Gregorian, shall be restored in their integrity and purity.

H. BEWERUNGE.

CARDINAL LOGUE AT BOBBIO

ON the return journey from his recent visit to Rome His Eminence Cardinal Logue paid a visit to the far-famed town of Bobbio, the last home and resting place of St. Columbanus, and of many other Irish saints and scholars. His Eminence was received by the Bishop, clergy and people of Bobbio with every mark of reverence and respect not only as a Cardinal and Prince, but as the most illustrious living representative of the Church and country of St. Columbanus. On the 25th of March, a great ceremony was held in his honour, in the Cathedral of Bobbio, where the Vicar-General of the Diocese, Mgr. Bobbi, delivered an oration on the saint and on Ireland, which we find published in the local paper, *La Trebbia*, of the 6th of April.

The occasion was so interesting, the memories recalled in this discourse so important, and the sympathy with Ireland so evident and so sincere, that we think it worth while to reproduce the principal passages in the oration. It should be noted that the distinguished orator had only a few hours' notice of the task imposed on him by the Bishop of Bobbio.

[I am obliged, in the circumstances [he said], to refer you to my two former conferences on 'The Footsteps of St. Columbanus from Leinster to Bobbio,' and 'The Ideals of St. Columbanus.' Here and now I need only recall how the *gifted youth*, who took refuge in the desert during the five most critical years of his life, and the *student* who burned with ardour for the cultivation of science and letters in the monastery of Bangor, held hidden beneath the veil of modesty one of those superior minds which take in almost at a glance all the evils of the age in which they live, and one of those generous hearts that are moved to spend themselves in the effort to overcome them. Does it not look strange to us in these days that he, preceded only by the Cross, with the Gospel hung around his neck, fearing nothing and hoping nothing from men, should go forth to proclaim to rulers and subjects that if there is any code of reform in the world it is the Gospel, and that if there is any banner to be

held aloft in the supreme moments of a nation's life it is the banner which bears inscribed upon it the holy Cross. Strange, too, it seems to us that in his journeys between the sixth and the seventh centuries he should have won over to his cause thousands of followers to send forth as angels of the Lord for the salvation of Europe. More strange still does it appear that the indomitable conqueror, as he has been called, should have raised his voice, with an eloquence worthy of St. Paul, in favour of the downtrodden and oppressed, and fought for their interests from the coasts of England to the crests of the Pyrenees, of the Vosges, of the Jura, of the Alps, resting only when he found here in Bobbio the peace of the grave. Now in all that, besides the divine impulse and the movement of grace, there was—and on what more suitable occasion should it be proclaimed—the disposition and character of the nation to which he belonged.

A simple glance at history is sufficient to convince us that the sympathetic branch of the Celtic family which flourishes in the Virgin Island of the Atlantic has an innate tendency to expand; and wherever it carries its language and customs there also it brings with it the Cross of its faith and the evergreen trifolium of its banner. This national inclination reveals itself in the most striking fashion in our Apostle. Perhaps no man ever crossed through Europe with a more ardent desire of planting amongst the Frankish, German, and Latin races, the graceful forms of the true and the good, which in an epoch of universal desolation and decay were providentially preserved in Ireland.

Banished from France by King Theodoric through the evil influence of Brunehilde, after more than twenty years of apostolate, the indomitable missionary wept like a child at the thought of being driven back by force to his native land, and by his prayers obtained from Heaven unfavourable winds that sent back to the coast of France the ship that bore him homewards. When we remember the bitter struggles he went through and the storms that broke over his head, owing to the fierce ardour with which he, in a strange land, endeavoured to maintain intact and intangible certain customs of his Irish brethren in the faith, we should also bear in mind the tender affection that he bore to the land of his youth and to the monasteries in which his ardent faith was nourished. Over that land the Roman eagle had never spread his wings, and yet the faith was planted there without martyrdom and without blood. Who can wonder that that far off land should be to him the centre and the summit of his earthly affections. This sacred love of country he invoked as his supreme defence when writing with unwonted candour and frankness to the Fathers of the Synod of Macon, he said, 'Pardon me, O most holy Fathers, for if I speak it is my nation that speaks in me.'

And if, as formerly at Luxeuil, at Annegray and Fontaine, in Gaul, and at St. Gall in Switzerland, a colony of Irish monks was established by the glorious Apostle, here, in this hidden corner of Italian soil it was planted with all the forms and graces of the far-famed Bangor, and became in this southern peninsula a regular constellation of saints and the greatest university of its age.

How pleasant it is for us to return in thought to the day when the illustrious Irish exile appeared for the first time on the banks of the Trebbia, and became enamoured of our silent hills. Tradition tells us that the sun shone more brightly than usual on that memorable day, as the saint came up, up through the valley from Barberina, and, as was his custom, blessed the earth and the fields, and the waters of the river, the birds of the air, and the trees of the forest; and having arrived at the spot where this beautiful church stands to-day, kissed the earth and planted the Cross, whilst the deep silence that reigned all round was broken only by his blessed words, *Pax Tibi*, and by the answer of his companions, *In nomine Christi*. That, indeed, O people of Bobbio, was the happiest moment of our history. Under her Irish banner, Bobbio became the Bangor of northern Italy, and the lighthouse of Christian civilization throughout the Middle Ages. When we recall the names of so many monks of Celtic and Anglo-Saxon origin, of so many saints who now sleep under the arches of the Basilica alongside their first Abbot, we are compelled to recognize that for many centuries Bobbio was the second home and the second fatherland of many of Ireland's most honoured and glorious sons.

Up to the end of the thirteenth century numerous pilgrimages were made here, not only from Ireland, but from France and from Germany, to pray at the tombs of the holy Abbot and his companions. Tradition tells us that amongst these pious pilgrims one of the most illustrious was Francis of Assisi. The humble lover of poverty came to kiss the earth made holy by the great rival of St. Benedict, a patriarch like him of the 'Monks of the West.' How sweet a thought for us that the *poverello* of Assisi should one day have penetrated unobserved to the crypt of the Basilica, and there, with outstretched arms, have prostrated himself before the sepulchre of our great patron and protector!

To these pilgrimages was due, in great measure, the exceptional richness of the library of Bobbio. Books, paper, parchment, were often the most worthy gifts presented at his shrine. It is not without emotion that we read to-day the dedicatory lines in which Dungal of Pavia offered a present to his illustrious countryman:—

'Sancte Columba, tibi Scotto tuus incola Dungal
Tradidit hunc librum quo fratrū corda beentur.
Qui legis ergo, Deus prætium sit muneris, ora.'

.

Well may we lament the disappearance of that library, good reason we have to curse the evil genius of Napoleon I who dispersed it. But on what better occasion than this, in the presence of His Eminence Cardinal Logue, could we recall the fact that these parchments and books still survive in many of the libraries of Europe to the glory of St. Columbanus, and of his learned monks?

Some people, indeed, have expressed a fear lest there may have lay hidden under the ardour of the monk an ambition directed to political ends, and to the destruction of thrones already shaken. Nothing is farther from the truth. If in the case of Brunehilde he uttered fiery words of censure against the unscrupulous voluptuousness of power; if in the case of Theodoric he denounced vice under the shelter of a crown, he did so in defence of the sanctity of Christian law and of the rights of Christian liberty. As for himself hundreds of times he found glory at his feet and repelled it; he found riches thrust upon him but treated them only to a malediction. Against ambition he weighed with all the energy of his soul, keeping to the code he had drawn up for his monks, and which said, *Ne exeat verbum vande de ore monachi*.

Others, like Alexander St. Priest and Michelet, were deluded by his frankness and independence into the belief that his attitude towards the Holy See was a distant symptom which heralded the Lutheran revolt. Again, nothing further from the truth. In his works and in his aspirations he was neither a Fra Martino nor a Fra Dolcino. He had, if you will, all the energy of an Arnold of Brescia, but all the ideals and manners of a St. Bernard.

In his various contests for his Irish liturgy, for the celebrations of Easter and in the controversy on the 'Three Chapters,' he looked to Rome as his polar star. A glance at his letter to Boniface IV is enough to convince us that the Primacy of St. Peter had no more pronounced and devoted witness. In his old age he is said to have frequently looked out over the peaks of the Appenines in the direction of Rome, and stretched out his hands to embrace the great St. Gregory. That judged by rigid criticism there may be in his works a few exaggerated sentences, I am not prepared to deny; but remembering his enthusiastic character and his love of country and of liberty, it is a case, if ever, in which we may say, 'To him who has loved much, much shall be forgiven.'

The orator, then, goes into more minute details about the apostolic labours of Columbanus and his companions, and into the general spirit of his apostleship in France, Austria, Switzerland, and Italy, and then he continues:—

And, now, with all these memories fresh upon us, memories

that bind us in Bobbio to the Irish nation represented here by its illustrious Cardinal Primate, I address to him a word of reverent salutation which will be at the same time a prayer.

Your Eminence, in returning to your Primatial See of Armagh, will touch the soil of France, every inch of which has memories of him and of your countrymen. But, with the exception of Luxeuil, the grass grows on the scenes of his labours. Silence and gloom dwell around the walls of the monasteries that he founded there. The work of the great apostle of liberty has few to appreciate it in the so-called home of liberty : but when you tread once more the soil of your native land, tell your countrymen that in the distant valley of Bobbio, around the sepulchre of your saints, there is no desert, no silence, no gloom. Thirteen centuries have passed and their memory is ever fresh and young in the midst of us. You may say, indeed, that our ancient glory has passed away, that it is all over or at least under a sad eclipse, but that we still hope much from the relics that we possess. Our hopes are green as the hills of your native Ireland, as the banner of your countrymen. Say also that we love your country, the sister and in a sense the mother of our own, and that we hold in our hearts, with that of our great protector, the names of the O'Neills, O'Connors, O'Briens, and O'Connells, against the Cromwells of every age and clime, and that we wish your great Catholic island with unanimous voice, happiness, prosperity, and freedom.

There is, we understand, a new Bishop in Bobbio, who has undertaken, as one of his first labours, to repair and restore the Shrine of Columbanus, much worn and damaged by the lapse of years, and to erect some memorial over the tombs of his principal companions. Upwards of twenty Irish Saints are buried there with little or nothing to mark their graves beyond the register faithfully kept in the Diocesan Archives.

J. F. HOGAN, D.D.

Notes and Queries

THEOLOGY

FREQUENT COMMUNION

THE decree *Sacra Tridentina Synodus*¹ has put an end to controversies about the requisite dispositions for frequent and daily reception of Holy Communion. In the primitive Church the faithful, generally speaking, received Communion at every Mass; but when the days of early fervour ceased this salutary custom was not followed, though at all times the Church showed her earnest desire that her children should often approach the Sacred Table. There were decrees of General Councils and Roman Congregations recommending frequent Communion, but theologians, to a great extent, annulled the wishes of the Church by demanding, through an over-anxious reverence for the Real Presence, very exceptional dispositions. A brief statement of the provisions of the recent decree will show the dispositions which the Church deems necessary in those who frequent the sacred banquet of the Body and Blood of our Lord.

1. Frequent, even daily, Communion is open to all the faithful who are in the state of grace, and who approach the Sacred Table with right intentions.

2. This condition of mind implies that the Blessed Sacrament should be received not from habit, or vanity, or any worldly motives, but from a desire to please God, to be united to Him in the bonds of charity, and to provide against the various trials and tribulations to which flesh is heir.

3. Though it is desirable that those who frequently receive the Blessed Sacrament should be free from deliberate venial sins, still the absence of this perfection should

¹ I. E. RECORD, April, p. 376.

not prevent anyone from receiving Holy Communion daily, since the graces of the Eucharist supply the best means of acquiring perfection.

4. Though the Sacrament of the Altar produces its effects *ex opere operato*, better dispositions gain more abundant fruit; hence previous preparation and subsequent thanks to the Almighty, according to the faculties, condition, and duties of each one, are most desirable.

5. That more abundant graces be obtained, the advice of a prudent confessor ought to be sought and followed; but it is his duty to refuse Communion only to those who are not in the state of grace, or who have not right intentions in approaching the Altar.

6. Parish Priests, Confessors, and Preachers are expected to recommend the faithful to frequently receive Holy Communion in accordance with the doctrine of the Roman Catechism which, among many other useful things, says :—

It will, therefore, be the part of the pastor frequently to admonish the faithful, that, as they think it necessary every day to nurture the body, they should also not neglect every day to feed and nourish the soul with this sacrament; for the soul, it is clear, stands not less in need of spiritual, than the body, of corporal, food. And here it will be most useful to recapitulate the inestimable and divine advantages, which, as we have already shown, flow from sacramental Communion. The pastor will also cite the figure of the Manna, which it was necessary to use every day, in order to repair the strength of the body; and will add the authorities of the Fathers, which earnestly recommend the frequent participation of this sacrament; for the words, 'Thou sinnest daily; receive daily,' are not the sentiment of St. Augustine alone, but also, as diligent enquiry will easily discover, the sentiment of all the Fathers, who wrote on the subject.¹

7. Frequent Communion ought to be encouraged especially in Religious Institutions. At the same time the decree *Quemadmodum*, 17th December, 1890, remains in full force, the object of which was to repress certain abuses in regard to manifestation of conscience, and to reception of the

¹ *Catechism of the Council of Trent*, Donovan, p. 238.

Blessed Eucharist, which crept into certain Communities of nuns having simple or solemn vows, and into some lay Communities of men. The decree laid down that permissions and prohibitions in regard to the reception of Holy Communion belong alone to the ordinary or extraordinary confessors of such institutions, no power remaining in the hands of Superiors, except in the case of subjects who, since their last confession, have given serious scandal to the community, or have been guilty of grave external faults; in which cases the Superior may forbid Communion until the next confession. When this confession is made, the right of the Superior lapses, even though the confessor, for reasons which seem good to him, does not impose any public penance on the delinquent.

The decree *Sacra Tridentina Synodus* also encourages frequent Communion in clerical seminaries and in Christian colleges of every kind.

8. The rules, constitutions, or calendars of Religious Institutions, fixing certain days for Holy Communion, are directive and not preceptive. The prescribed number of Communions must be considered the minimum for religious life, more frequent Communion being recommended in accordance with the instructions of the present decree. The decree *Quemadmodum*, however, states that if subjects obtain permission from their confessor to receive Communion more frequently than is indicated in the rules, constitutions, or calendars of the Community, they shall tell their Superiors who, if they think that there are grave reasons to the contrary, shall explain these to the confessor whose judgment is final.

Superiors are to see that this decree is read for their subjects each year, during the octave of the Feast of Corpus Christi.

9. Finally, ecclesiastical writers are to cease in the future from all controversy concerning the dispositions which are necessary for frequent and daily reception of Holy Communion.

WEEKLY CONFESSION AND INDULGENCES

An important decree appears in the present number of the I. E. RECORD¹ concerning the necessity of weekly confession for gaining Indulgences. Daily Communion—even though one or two days of the week be omitted—is declared sufficient, without weekly confession, for gaining indulgences for which such confession was formerly necessary. Certain indulgences, such as those of Jubilees, will, as in the past, require special confession, notwithstanding this modification of previous legislation.

CASE OF RESTITUTION

REV. DEAR SIR,—A penitent, who was bound to make restitution, gave his confessor the money to be sent to the person to whom it was owed. The confessor lost the money. Was the penitent bound to make restitution again? Some young theologians have been discussing this question. An answer will oblige them.

P. D.

The solution of this case depends on the position which the confessor holds. Is he agent of the penitent, or of the creditor to whom restitution must be made? If of the penitent, then the creditor has not received his money either personally or by his representative, if it has been lost while in the hands of the confessor. If he is agent of the creditor, then the latter has been paid the debt and no further claim rests against the debtor.

For our part, we believe that the confessor is agent, not of the creditor, but of the penitent, because the creditor has given no commission to the confessor to act in his name. This is undoubtedly the common opinion of theologians. It is said on the other side that confessors have received the necessary commission, because creditors, if consulted, would say that they prefer restitution to be made through a confessor than through other and less safe means. The evident reply to this argument is that an interpretative

¹ See page 469.

agency is no agency. The question is not what would creditors do in certain circumstances, but what have they done? Besides, how does it appear that creditors would select the confessor as their agent? Why should creditors be interpretatively compelled to select, *at their own risk*, one way of having restitution made to them, while there are many safe means of making restitution *at the risk of the debtor*?

At the same time, seeing that some theologians of great authority, Lehmkuhl,¹ for instance, hold the view which is favourable to the penitent, he is not to be obliged to pay again if, without any fault on his part, the money has not passed from the confessor to the creditor.

J. M. HARTY.

LITURGY

THE CEREMONIES TO BE OBSERVED IN PREACHING

REV. DEAR SIR,—In my part of the country there is a difference of opinion and a want of uniformity in practice among priests about the following points. (1) On which side of the altar the notices are to be published. (2) On which side the sermon or instruction is to be delivered. I refer to occasions when the priest does not go into the pulpit, and to places where they have no pulpit. If there is any rule on the above matters, myself and others here would be very glad to know.—Yours faithfully,

SACERDOS.

We have not seen it stated anywhere that the distinction implied in our correspondent's queries really exists, and we do not think there are any grounds for it. The notices may be published—unless there is some reason to the contrary—immediately before the sermon, and, therefore, the same place will serve for both. At any rate, what applies to the delivery of the sermon will equally apply to the publication of the notices. We shall then, going somewhat beyond the limits of the proposed questions, try to answer

¹ *Theologia Moralit*, i, n, 1030, R. 3.

the following :—(1) What is the proper time for delivering the sermon in connexion with a Low Mass? (2) Where should it be delivered? and (3) What are the proper vestments to be worn on the occasion?

1. The most approved time for having the sermon at Mass is immediately after the reading of the first Gospel. 'Concio,' says Wapelhorst,¹ 'infra Missam habetur post Evangelium. Ita ab Apostolorum temporibus. At de consensu Ordinarii Sacerdos in Missa postquam se communicavit et priusquam Communionem distribuit adstantibus ad altari sermonem ad populum habere potest.'² While then it best accords with the spirit and letter of the *Ceremonial* to have the sermon immediately after the Gospel it may, with the Bishop's consent, be deferred until the Celebrant has communicated himself, or until he has distributed Communion to those present. It is rare, we think, to have the sermon intervene between the Priest's Communion and that of the faithful, and the evident inconvenience attaching to this practice would make it most undesirable unless in very exceptional cases. One such case would be where the Priest wished to deliver a very short address, or *ferverino*, to those about to receive their First Communion. Priests generally find it most convenient to preach after they have taken the Ablutions. Where the custom exists of preaching after the last Gospel, and has the tacit approval of the Ordinary, it may be continued, provided that the abuse of persons going away without waiting for the Instruction is effectively guarded against.

2. The proper place for the delivery of the Sermon is the Pulpit, or Ambo.³ Any reasonable cause, however, will justify the use of the Altar for the purpose, especially if the preacher be the Celebrant of the Mass. If the Blessed Sacrament is not reserved in the Tabernacle we think the preacher may stand in the centre of the Altar. Reverence for the Real Presence would recommend the propriety of not turning the back directly on the Tabernacle. In this

¹ *Comp. Sac. Lit.*, p. 491.

² S.R.C. Decr. 3059, n. 10.

³ *Ceremoniale Episcoporum*, l. i., c. xxii., and authors generally.

case the preacher should stand a little to one side, and the Gospel angle should be selected in preference to the Epistle. 'Quod si concio fit ad ipso Celebrante, ipse sedebit in cornu Evangelii . . .'¹ It seems congruous that the side prescribed for the singing and reading of the Gospel, should also be selected for the delivery of a sermon, the theme of which, generally speaking, is supposed to be founded on the lessons conveyed in the Gospel read in the Mass of the day.² The quotation just given has reference to a solemn Mass—this is the reason why the officiant is directed to *sit*—but analogy would suggest the selection of the same side in a Low Mass.

3. With regard to the dress proper to the preacher, various distinctions must be made. When the Celebrant himself preaches, and does so from the Altar, he may retain all the sacred vestments he wore during Mass. If he goes to the pulpit then he puts aside the chasuble and maniple on the bench or Altar at the Epistle side. Should a Priest other than the Celebrant of the Mass be the preacher, then Seculars must wear at least the soutane, surplice, and biretta, while Religious use the habit of their Order only. The wearing of the stole on these occasions is regulated outside Rome by immemorial custom. If used it should be of the colour of the Office of the day. In Rome no preacher uses the stole out of reverence for the Holy Father.³ Neither is it worn by the preacher of a funeral oration. The rochet may be used instead of the surplice by inferior Prelates—who are privileged to wear it—when they preach in their own church. When the sermon is preached before a Bishop in his own church, his blessing should be requested with the usual formula, except on the occasion of a funeral oration. The preacher, in going from the sanctuary to the pulpit, should not fail to make all the necessary salutations to the Dignitaries that may be present. When he reaches the ambo he may recite on bended knees a short prayer, such as the *Ave Maria* or *Veni Sancte*, then standing with his head uncovered, he reads the Gospel or announces his

¹ Meratus *apud* Appeltern, *Manuale Liturgicum*, v. i., p. 319.

² De Herdt, *Prax. Lit.*, v. i., p. 424; *Cerem. Eps.*, l. i., c. xxii.

³ Gardellini, *Inst. Clem.* xxxii., 5 and 6; *idem* S.R.C. Decr.

text, after which he signs himself with the sign of the Cross, assumes his biretta, and wears it throughout the discourse, except when it is necessary to make a reverence at the mention of the Sacred Name or that of the Blessed Virgin. In making reference to any Dignitaries present, he is exhorted to give them their proper titles.

THE PROPER OIL FOR USE IN SANCTUARY LAMPS

REV. DEAR SIR,—Am I correct in saying that, where pure olive oil cannot be procured owing to reasons of expense, the sanctuary lamp must be fed with at least some other purely vegetable oil? It has recently come under my observation that what is sold as vegetable oil is not the pure product of vegetables, but very often a substance manufactured, either wholly or in part, from minerals. The latter oil, I believe, can be had much cheaper than the former, and hence traders, I fear, are tempted to sell it in preference to the genuine article. In my opinion the practice is at variance with Church legislation, and I would wish to have your view also on the matter in order to call the attention of readers to its unlawfulness.—Yours, etc.

INQUIRER.

The proper oil for the Sanctuary Lamp is *pure olive oil*. Its adoption for this purpose can be traced back to the earliest days of the Christian era, and was recommended, doubtless, from motives of economy and popularity—for it was a common and cheap luminant in countries where the tree is cultivated—and also for symbolical reasons. The olive branch is regarded as the symbol of peace since the days of Noah, and the oil obtained from it may appropriately be chosen to represent Christ, Who is the King of Peace. Outside those countries where the olive-tree flourishes olive oil is very expensive, and the cost of procuring it in sufficient quantity for the Altar Lamp would press rather heavily on the slender resources of poor churches. This consideration led some French Bishops to address a request to the Congregation of Rites in the year 1864 to be permitted to substitute for pure olive oil some other vege-

table oil, not excluding even petroleum. The answer to this petition was as follows :—

Sacra porro Rituum Congregatio, etsi semper sollicita ut etiam in hac parte, quod usque ab Ecclesiae primordiis circa oleum ex olivis inductum est ob mysticas significationes retineatur; attamen silentio praeterire minime censuit rationes ab iisdem Episcopis prolatas: ac proinde exquisito prius voto alterius ex Apostolicarum Caerimoniarum Magistris . . . rescribendum censuit: *Generatim utendum esse oleo olivarum; ubi vero haberi nequit remittendum prudentiae Episcoporum ut lampades nutrantur ex aliis oleis, quantum fieri potest vegetabilibus.*

The present regulations, then, on this matter are that where olive oil cannot be conveniently procured, the Bishops may authorize the employment of some other vegetable oil, or even of petroleum should necessity require it. Each Priest, therefore, must be guided by Diocesan usage as sanctioned by the Ordinary. It would seem to be the desire of the Bishops generally that when they permit a substitute for olive oil this should be some other purely *vegetable* oil. Owing to its cheapness *colza* is commonly employed in these countries, but other vegetables, such as the *poppy* and *flax plant*, also yield a suitable oil.

We are informed that mineral oils are often palmed off as though they were the pure extract of vegetables, and that it is not at all easy to detect the fraud, especially where they are blended with a little of the pure vegetable oil. If it is found that a lamp gives off smoke, or discolours the statue before which it burns, this is an indication that the oil is of mineral origin. There is also a considerable difference in price, mineral oil of equal grade being from 6d. to 1s. cheaper than vegetable. Unless, then, there is express Episcopal sanction for the use of mineral oil, or for a blend of mineral and vegetable, the Sanctuary Lamp must be fed with some *purely* vegetable oil, and those upon whom rests the duty of procuring it, should see that they are not imposed upon by getting a spurious, instead of a genuine, article. If there is no opportunity of a chemical analysis or any other efficient test of purity, care should be taken to obtain the oil from reliable and conscientious traders.

With regard to *petroleum*, although it may be permitted in exceptional cases, we think its use should be restricted as much as possible, owing to the dangers connected with its highly volatile and inflammable character.

**WHETHER A PAINTING OF THE CRUCIFIXION MAY SERVE
AS ALTAR CROSS**

REV. DEAR SIR,—Would you kindly let me know, in the May number of the esteemed I. E. RECORD if possible, whether a painting or picture of the Crucifixion is sufficient (over the tabernacle during Holy Mass), or if a crucifix is of strict necessity.

2. Might I ask you to mention, in a few words, the conclusion to which the Sacred Congregation of Rites has come to re the age of Altar Breads, and of same for consecrated hosts, and the general opinion concerning same.

Thanking you in anticipation, I remain, yours sincerely,
ENQUIRER.

With regard to the first question it has been decided by the Congregation of Rites,¹ that a statue, or painting representing the Crucifixion and suspended immediately over the Altar, dispenses with the obligation of having the usual crucifix. In order that all doubt as to the sufficiency of such an arrangement may be eliminated, the following conditions must be fulfilled.

(a) The Saviour crucified must be the principal object represented in such a statue or picture. It will not be enough if the Crucifixion is introduced as a merely incidental or subsidiary feature in the representation. Neither will it be sufficient if the Redeemer is exhibited under any other form than that traditional delineation that is so apt to recall to the mind the dread mystery of the Cross.

(b) The picture must hold a conspicuous place in connexion with the Altar, and, therefore, be so prominent as easily to catch the eye of the Celebrant.

¹ Decr., n. 1270.

For an answer to the second question, we would refer our correspondent to the I. E. RECORD, March, 1905, where the matter is discussed at some length.

PRAYERS IN MASS 'SUB UNICA CONCLUSIONE'

REV. DEAR SIR,—Would you kindly clear up this doubt? When, as has happened here to-day (25th March), the 'Fourth Sunday of Lent' has been superseded by the 'Feast of the Annunciation,'—*first class* with a *commemoration* of the Sunday,—should the two prayers have been said *sub unica conclusione*? Relying, as I thought, on what I was told to do on an Ember Day (10th June), some thirty-three years ago, in Rome, I said them thus. But, a friend of mine, who *sang* Mass after me, made use of the two conclusions. There may be room for another question in the case; but for the present I shall thank you in my own name, and in that of some other priests, if you will kindly answer that which I have placed before you.—Yours very truly,

SCOTO-GALLUS.

P.S.—10th June being the Feast of St. Margaret, Queen of Scotland, we in the Collegio Scozzese said *her* Mass by special privilege on an Ember Day.—S. G.

The two prayers in the instance stated should be said under different conclusions. Therefore, we fear our correspondent must have either received a wrong direction, or misinterpreted the correct one. It is a general principle of the Rubrics that the first or principal prayer of the Mass is always said under its own conclusion. There are only a few cases, specially provided for, where a second *ratio* is added to the substantial prayer of the Mass and both said *sub unica conclusione*. These cases are:—

1. Where the Mass of the day is substituted, for rubrical reasons, for a Solemn Votive Mass *pro re gravi*, the prayer of the impeded Votive Mass is said *per modum unius* with the prayer of the Mass.

2. On the occasion of perpetual Adoration or Solemn Exposition of the Blessed Sacrament, when the Votive Mass of the Blessed Sacrament cannot be said, its prayer

is added, under same conclusion, to the prayer of the Mass sung at the Altar of Exposition if there is no Commemoration.

3. Outside these cases some isolated instances may occur, which are due either to a special disposition of the Rubric, or to a Papal Indult. An example would be in the conferring of Holy Orders where the *Oratio pro ordinandis* is said under one conclusion with the prayer of the Mass.

P. MORRISROE.

DOCUMENTS

PIUS X AND THE CATHOLIC INSTITUTE OF PARIS

PIUS X INSTITUTUM CATHOLICUM PARISIENSE HORTATUR AD
DISCIPLINAS TAM SACRAS QUAM PROFANAS DILIGENTER
ORDINATEQUE EXCOLENDAS

DILECTO FILIO LUDOVICO PECHENARD, PROTON. APOSTOLICO,
CATHOLICI INSTITUTI PARISIENSIS RECTORI

PIUS PP. X.

Dilecte Fili, salutem et Apostolicam benedictionem.

Solemne illud semper Ecclesiae fuit, doctrinae studia colere tuerique diligenter, idque non modo in sacris disciplinis, quamquam in his, uti par est, maxime; verum etiam in caeteris: propterea quod istae quidem non parum ad illas afferunt adiumentum. Intimo enim quodam vinculo aptae inter se et connexae utraeque sunt: utpote a Deo, *scientiarum Domino*, profectae, a quo tamquam ab unico fonte, quaecumque vera sunt, necessitate manant. Profecto Decessores Nostri omni tempore ad Apostolici muneris partes arbitrari sunt pertinere, eruditionem omne genus fovere pro viribus: nec ultima laus est Pontificum Romanorum, nobiles illas aevo medio condidisse opibusque et maximis beneficiis ornasse studiorum Universitates quas, quae nunc florent, suas quasi quasdam parentes agnoscunt. Iamvero similem Nos curam de bonarum artium studiis cum geramus, equidem grata habuimus, quae de isto, cui praesides, Instituto haud ita pridem significasti coram. Sed tamen ut melius pateat quemadmodum Nos erga illud affecti simus, has ad te visum est litteras mittere. Ac primum egregia danda laus est Venerabilibus Fratribus e Gallia Episcopis, quorum et auctoritate praecipue Institutum regitur, et providentia tuitioni ipsius studiose consulitur. Tum non mediocriter ii laudandi catholici homines, quotquot id ipsum existimant dignum, cui prolixè de facultatibus suis opulentur. Hi nimirum persuasum habent, id quod res est, plurimum interesse civitatis aequè ac religionis, sic, in magnis potissimum lyceis, institui adolescentes, ut cum solidae doctrinae praeceptis simul christianos hauriant spiritus; hodie autem ut cum maxime, oportere vulgo sacerdotes esse non solum a theo-

logia bene instructos, sed etiam a philosophia, a iure, a cognitione naturae, a litteris. Usitatum quippe est ac prope quotidianum apud homines, opinione potius quam re doctos, tela adversus fidem undique in officina scientiae conquirere. Novimus autem, quam libenter vix attinet dicere, Instituto Parisiensi, uti nunquam defuerint, ita minime in praesens desiderari decuriales doctores eiusmodi, qui et scientiae et religioni ornamento sint. Atque hi, suum exequendo munus, nostris temporibus, si unquam alias, difficile et arduum, probe meminisse videntur, quid a se officium postulet; id est, ut sanctissima sapientiae veteris principia in tuto collocent; hoc primum: deinde ut, progredientis eruditionis ratione habita, quidquid veri est recentiorum sollertia repertum, minime negligant. Enimvero has migrare et non servare leges multi consueverunt, neque ex eis tantummodo qui catholicae professioni adversantur, sed quicumque praeterea traditionem magisteriumque Ecclesiae non tanti a se fieri ostendunt, quanti debent; quique illud videntur sine ulla exceptione probare velle, quod dici solet: *cras, quod hodie falsum, habebitur verum*. Hinc illa pervulgata ratio submovendi vetera, obtrudendi nova, nullam fere ob aliam causam, nisi novitatis; tamquam doctrinae summa in fastidio quodam vetustatis ponenda sit. Verum ab ista vos ratione dehortari supervacaneum est: novimus vestri in Apostolicam Sedem obsequii diligentiam; nec vero dubitari licet, quin velitis etiam in hoc genere Romano Pontifici semper probari. Quare Institutum vestrum quod laetos ad hoc tempus fructus apud vestrates pepererit, gratulamur; idem ut bona utilitatum ac nominis incrementa capiat, valde cupimus: in eam rem omnes, qui quoquo modo ipsum participant aut iuvant, ut, quantum quisque possit, nitantur, etiam atque etiam hortamur. Auspex interea divinae opis tibi, dilecte fili, eiusque sit Apostolica benedictio, quam peculiaris quoque benevolentiae Nostrae testem peramanter vobis in Domino impertimus.

Datum Romae apud S. Petrum, die XXII Februarii anno MDCCCV, Pontificatus Nostri secundo.

PIUS PP. X.

**THE VICAR CAPITULAR AND THE DIOCESAN THRONE
AND CROZIER**

E SACRA CONGREGATIONE RITUUM

VICARIUS CAPITULARIS, QUANDO EPUM. ALIENUM INVITAT AD
MISSAM ET VESPERAS PONTIFICALI RITU CONCELEBRANDAS,
NEQUIT ILLI CONCEDERE USUM THRONI AUT BACULI PASTORALIS

A Sacra Rituum Congregatione sequentis dubii resolutio
expetita fuit, nimirum :

Utrum Vicarius Capitularis, quando aliquem Episcopum
viciniorem invitat ad Missam et Vesperas ut pontificali ritu
concelebret, possit illi concedere thronum aut saltem baculum
pastoralem ?

Et Sacra eadem Congregatio, ad relationem subscripti
Secretarii, auditio etiam suffragio Commissionis Liturgicae,
propositae quaestioni respondendum censuit :

Negative ad primam partem, prouti eruitur ex decreto generali
n. 4023 d. d. 12 Iulii 1897 : *Super iure Episcoporum dioecesano-
rum cedendi thronum alteri Episcopo*. Item *negative* ad secun-
dam ; nisi usus baculi requiratur ex Rubrica, ut in consecratione
ecclesiarum.

Atque ita rescipsit. Die 4 Novembris 1905.

A. Card. TRIPEPI, *Pro-Praef.*

L. ✠ S.

✠ D. PANICI, *Archiep. Laodicen., Secret.*

TRANSLATION OF REQUIEM MASS

E SACRA CONGREGATIONE RITUUM

BUSCODUCEN

CIRCA CELEBRATIONEM MISSAE EXEQUIALIS TRANSLATAE IN DIE
NON IMPEDITA

Quum quaedam difformitas reperiatur in interpretandis
Decretis S. R. C., nempe n. 3755, *Missae exequialis pro die
obitus* 2 Decembris 1891 ad III, et *Labacen.* 28 Aprilis (1902)
ad X, hodiernus Kalendarista dioecesis Buscoducensis in Hol-
landia, professor in Instituto surdo-mutorum parochiae *Gestel*
S. Michaelis, de consensu Rmi sui Episcopi a Sacrorum Rituum
Congregatione insequentium dubiorum solutionem humillime
expostulavit :

I. Caius mortuus feria IV in Maiori Hebdomada sepelitur

feria VI in Parasceve Domini. Quatenus est prima dies liturgice non impedita, qua eius Missa exequialis solemniter peragi potest : utrum feria IV Hebdomadae Paschalis, an vero feria II post Dominicam in Albis, in qua non occurrit duplex I vel II classis aut festum de precepto ?

II. An Missa exequialis sollemnis vel cum cantu, ob impedimentum, liturgicum ultra biduum a sepultura translata, celebrari possit in diebus duplicia II classis excludentibus ?

III. An Missa de Requie pro prima vice post obitum vel eius acceptum a locis dissitis nuntium, de qua in Decreto n. 3755 ad III, celebrari possit : 1, infra Octavam Epiphaniae ; 2, infra Octavas Nativitatis Domini et SSmi Corporis Christi in locis, ubi haec non est privilegiata ad instar Octavae Epiphaniae ?

Et Sacra eadem Congregatio, ad relationem subscripti Secretarii, exquisita etiam sententia Commissionis Liturgicae rescribendum censuit :

Ad I. Prima dies libera est in casu feria II post Dominicam in Albis, iuxta Decretum *Labacen.*, 28 Aprilis 1902 ad X.

Ad II. *Negative.*

Ad III. *Negative* ad primam partem, *Affirmative* ad secundam, excepta tamen die Octava Corporis Christi uti ex Decreto supra citato.

Atque ita rescripsit. Die 24 Novembris 1905.

A. Card. TRIPEPI, *Pro-Praef.*

L. ✠ S.

✠ D. PANICI, *Archiep. Laodicen., Secret.*

SACRED VESTMENTS AND PALL OF CHALICE AT REQUIEM MASS

E SACRA CONGREGATIONE RITUUM DUBIUM

CIRCA SACRA PARAMENTA ET PALLAM CALICIS IN MISSIS DEFUNCTORUM

I. Quum in Caeremoniali Episcoporum lib. II, cap. XI n. I legatur, 'Omnia paramenta, tam altaris, quam celebrantis, et ministrorum, librorum, et faldistorii sint nigra, et in his nullae imagines mortuorum, vel cruces albae ponantur,' quaeritur : An in dictis paramentis repraesentari possint calvaria cum ossibus decussatis defunctorum ?

II. Ex decreto S. R. C., n. 3832 *Dubiorum resolutio* 17 Iulii 1894, ad IV permittitur ut palla calicis in patre superiori sit

cooperta panno serico, aut ex auro vel argento, et acu depicto, dummodo palla linea subnexa calicem cooperiat ac pars superior non sit nigri coloris, nec cum aliquo mortis signo. Quaeritur : An huiusmodi palla subnexa possit esse linum cruce munitum et subsutum, ad modum pallae, nec amovibile ?

Et Sacra Rituum Congregatio pro solutione horum dubiorum rogata, ad relationem subscripti Secretarii, audito Commissionis Liturgicae suffragio, rescribendum censuit :

Ad I. *Negative* et servetur Caeremoniale Episcoporum *loc. cit.*

Ad II. *Negative* et palla subnexa, pro priedicta, sit linea, munda et facile amovibilis.

Atque ita rescripsit. Die 24 Novembris 1905.

A. Card. TRIPEPI, *Pro-Praef.*

L. ♣ S.

♣ D. PANICI, *Archiep. Laodicen., Secret.*

SOLUTION OF LITURGICAL QUESTIONS

E SACRA CONGREGATIONE RITUUM

TERGESTINA ET TUSTINOPOLITANA

TRIA SOLVUNTUR DUBIA

Rmus. Dnus. Franciscus Nagl, Episcopus Tergestinus et Iustinopolitanus, Sacrorum Rituum Congregationi sequentes quaestiones solvendas humillime proposuit, nimirum :

I. An fideles absolutione in articulo mortis in lingua vernacula peracta, sicuti modo pluries fit, indulgentias lucrari queant ?

II. In Missis de Requie post elevationem loco *Benedictus*, Litaniae uti ex Rituali Romano in ordine commendationis animae, vel Lauretanae, canuntur, et huiusmodi Missae fiunt lectae. Insuper in Missis cantatis de die, intonato *Credo* sacerdos prosequitur Missam ut lectam usque ad Praefationem. Quaeritur an haec tolerari possint ?

III. An sacerdos in lingua vernacula Officium divinum Breviarii Romani ex. gr. Nativitatis Domini, defunctorum, etc., cum populo peragens, vel Litanias Sanctorum in Processionibus Rogationum eadem lingua persolvens, teneatur has partes Breviarii Romani in lingua latina iterum recitare ?

Et Sacra Rituum Congregatio, ad relationem subscripti Secretarii, exquisito voto Commissionis Liturgicae, reque mature perpensa, respondendum censuit :

Ad. I. *Negative*, quia haec benedictio in articulo mortis est precatio stricto sensu liturgica.

Ad II. *Negative*, et hos abusus omnino esse eliminandos.

Ad III. *Affirmative*; nam qui ad recitationem divini Officii et cuiusque partis Breviarii Romani sunt obligati, tantum in lingua latina haec recitare debent, alias non satisfaciunt obligationi.

Atque ita rescripsit. Die 3 Iulii 1904.

A. Card. TRIPEPI, *Pro-Praef.*

L. ✠ S.

✠ D. PANICI, *Archiep. Laodicen., Secret.*

QUESTIONS ON INDULGENCES

E SACRA CONGREGATIONE INDULGENTIARUM PATAVINA

PLURA SOLVUNTUR DUBIA QUOAD INDULGENTIAS LUCRANDAS

Ad S. Congregationem Indulgentiis Sacrisque Reliquiis praepositam a Moderatore Archisodalitatis a S. Antonio, erectae in Ecclesia Eidem dicata in civitate Patavina, sequentia dubia dirimenda sunt delata:

I. An qui nomen dedit pluribus Confraternitatibus, quae gaudent indulto lucrandi indulgentias, quas Stationales appellant, eas lucrari valeat tot vicibus, quot sunt sodalitates, quibus est adscriptus?

II. Quando conceditur plenaria indulgentia pro festo alicuius Sancti, lucranda a christifidelibus in omnibus Ecclesiis alicuius Ordinis vel dioeceseos, haec indulgentia acquirere potest tot vicibus, quot visitentur Ecclesiae eiusdem Ordinis vel Dioeceseos?

III. Cum diversi Ordines, ex gr., Benedictini, Franciscuales, etc., pro uno vel altero festo gaudeant plenaria indulgentia, tributa christifidelibus visitantibus proprias Ecclesias, huiusmodi indulgentia potestne pluries acquiri, visitando singulas Ecclesias eorumdem Ordinum, praesertim si haec indulgentia dietis Ordinibus fuerit concessa a distinctis Pontificibus?

IV. Quando ad indulgentias lucrandas praescribitur visitatio Ecclesiae parochialis, haec debetne esse Ecclesia parochialis propria illius qui vult indulgentias lucrari, an alia quaecumque?

V. An sub nomine Ecclesiae parochialis propriae veniat tantummodo illa domicilii vel etiam quasi-domicilii aut morae transitoriae, uti contingit tempore itineris?

Et Emi. Patres in generali Congregatione ad Vaticanum habita, die 31 Augusti 1905, respondendum mandarunt :

Ad I^m Negative, iuxta Decretum 'Delatae saepius,' diei 7 Martii 1678.

Ad II^m Affirmative, id est acquiri potest indulgentia una vice tantum sed in singulis Ecclesiis eiusdem Ordinis seu Dioeceseos.

Ad III^m Provisum in praecedenti.

Ad IV^m Affirmative quoad 1^m partem ; *Negative* quoad 2^m.

Ad V^m Negative quoad 1^m partem ; *Affirmative* quoad 2^m et 3^m.

De quibus facta relatione SSmo. Dno. Nro. Pio PP. X, in audientia habita die 13 Septembris 1905, ab infrascripto Card. Praefecto S. Congnis. Indulgentiis Sacrisque Reliquiis praepositae, SSmus. Emorum Patrum resolutiones ratas habuit et confirmavit.

Datum Romae, ex Secretaria eiusdem S. C., die 13 Septembris 1905.

A. Card. TRIPEPI, *Praefectus*.

L. ♣ S.

♣ D. PANICI, *Archiep. Laodicen., Secret.*

**DECREE GRANTING INDULGENCES FOR DAILY COMMUNION
WITHOUT THE ONUS OF WEEKLY CONFESSION**

**DECRETUM QUO LARGITUR UT PER QUOTIDIANAM VEL FREQUENTEM
COMMUNIONEM OMNES LUCRARI POSSINT INDULGENTIAE,
ABSQUE ONERE HEBDOMADARIAE CONFESSIONIS.**

Sanctissimo Domino Nostro Pio PP. X vel maxime cordi est ut efficacius in dies propagetur, uberioresque edat virtutum omnium fructus laudabilis illa ac Deo valde accepta consuetudo, qua fideles, in statu gratiae, rectaque cum mente, ad Sacram Communionem quotidie sumendum accedant. Quamobrem supplicia plurimorum vota ab Eminentissimo viro Cardinali Casimiro Gennari delata benigne libenterque excipiens iis plane cunctis qui memoratam consuetudinem habent, aut inire exoptant, specialem merito gratiam elargire statuit. Clemens porro P.P. XIII, f.r. per decretum huius Sacri Ordinis sub die 9 Decembris 1763 omnibus Christifidelibus 'qui frequenti peccatorum Confessione animum studentes expiare, semel saltem in hebdomada ad Sacramentum Poenitentiae accedere, nisi legitime impediuntur, consueverunt, et nullius lethalis

culpa a se, post praedictam ultimam Confessionem, commissae sibi conscii sunt, indulgit ut omnes et quascumque Indulgentias consequi possint, etiam sine actuali Confessione quae caeteroquin ad eas lucrandas necessaria esset. Nihil tamen innovando circa Indulgentias Jubilaei, tam Ordinarii quam extraordinarii, aliasque ad instar Jubilaei concessas, pro quibus assequendis, sicut et alia opera injuncta, ita et Sacramentalis Confessio, tempore in earum concessione praescripto, peragatur.'

Nunc vero Beatissimus Pater Pius X omnibus Christifidelibus qui in statu gratiae et cum recta piaque mente quotidie Sancta de Altari libare consuescunt, quamvis semel aut iterum per hebdomadem a communione abstineant, praefato tamen f.r. Clementis PP. XIII. Indulto frui posse concedit, absque hebdomedariae illius Confessionis obligatione, quae ceteroquin, ad Indulgentias eo temporis intervallo decurrentes rite lucrandas necessaria extaret. Hanc insuper gratiam eodem Sanctitas Sua futuris quoque temporibus fore valituram clementer declaravit.

Contrariis quibuscumque non obstantibus. Datum Romae, e Secretaria S. Congregationis Indulgentiis Sacrisque Reliquiis praepositae, die 14 Februarii 1906.

A. Card. TRIPEPI, *Praefectus*.

L. ♣ S.

✠ D. PANICI, *Archiep. Laodicen., Secretarius*.

Praesens rescriptum exhibitum fuit Secretariae S. C. Indulgentiis Sacrisque Reliquiis praepositae. In quorum fidem, etc.

Datum Romae, ex eadem Secretaria die 16 Feb. 1906.

JOSEPHUS M. Can. COSELLI, *Substitutus*.

L. ♣ S.

NOTICES OF BOOKS

OUT OF DUE TIME. By Mrs. Wilfrid Ward. London : Longmans, Green & Co. 6s.

MRS. WILFRID WARD has succeeded in writing a very attractive novel on a subject that would scarcely seem to promise very favourable materials. Her characters move all through in an ecclesiastical orbit, and typify the representatives of various schools of thought in the recent life of the Catholic Church. Theologians, publicists, Scripture scholars, bishops, vicars-general and theological censors, Catholic priests, editors of Catholic reviews, the Roman Congregations, the Holy See, the Pope, all pass before us in the scenes of a romantic love-story. It is a reflection of the whole progressive movement of recent times.

The work is done with exquisite taste, with skill, refinement and cleverness. It is, in our opinion, one of the best books of its kind that has ever been written.

We are at a loss which most to admire, the delicacy of the sentiment, the elevation of thought, the reality of the pictures or the delineation of character of some of the principal personages. The Bishop, the Vicar-General, the priest (Father Duly), the little old consultor of the Holy Office, and Cardinal Maffei are all admirably drawn. George Sutcliffe is drawn to the life. To anybody acquainted with France and French ways the Comte d'Etranges and Marcelle will recall prototypes from which one or other of their characteristics might be very easily borrowed.

Such a book as this does honour, not only to Mrs. Wilfrid Ward but to the Church. Lady Georgiana Fullerton has found a worthy successor. Catholics will read her book with pleasure everywhere, and to Protestants it will be a revelation in more senses than one. Our best wishes to the book and our best congratulations to Mrs. Wilfrid Ward.

J. F. H.

ANTIPRISCILLIANA. Von Dr. Karl Künstle. Herder. 1905.

OF late years Priscillian, together with his heresy, has been the object of special studies. This is due partly to investigations into the origin and nature of the *Comma Joanneum*, the oldest

reference to which is found in a Tractate of Priscillian's that Schepps discovered about twenty years ago in the library of Würzburg University. Since then a great deal has been published on the subject. At one time the *Comma Joanneum* was considered to be of African, now, according to Künstle's opinion, it is of Spanish provenance. For he says that all the early writers that quote it, and all the MSS. (seventh to ninth centuries) that contain it, are Spanish. Künstle states also in his interesting brochure (*Das Comma Joanneum auf seine unterkunft untersucht*) that in its primary form the *Comma* was composed by Priscillian, and expressed his antitrinitarian notions, and that only when purged of heresy it passed into Catholic Bibles. The brochure just mentioned was, however, nothing more than an introduction to the present one, in which the many orthodox formularies employed against the Priscillianists are submitted to a most searching examination. As a work of erudition and critical acumen it would be difficult to surpass *Antipriscilliana*. It will certainly become famous in learned circles. For we must bear in mind that the great interest felt at present in Priscillian is partly due to the widespread study of the early forms of the Creed. Several scholars, including Swainson, Harnack, Ommaney, and Burn, have written on the origin and purpose of the Athanasian Creed. Burn's monograph (*Texts and Studies*, Cambridge, 1896) was the best of all. In one place (page 75), he said :—

' A further suggestion may be made, that in this rule of faith special care was taken to guard against the heresy of Priscillianism. Priscillianism was a sort of hazy Sabellianism, with a mixture of Manichean elements, and a tendency to an Apollinarian denial of the Lord's human soul.'

Künstle has now carried the inquiry into the heresy and the symbol opposed to it even further. He has shown the close connexion that exists between the *Fides Damasi*, the *Expositio fidei Catholicae*, etc., and the so-called Athanasian Creed, which he proves conclusively to have been composed in opposition to Priscillian's three heretical tenets.

R. W.

MY QUEEN AND MY MOTHER. By R. G. S. London : Art and Book Company. 4s. 6d. net.

THIS new book of devotion to our Blessed Lady will be found a great help, or profitable substitute, by those who find a diffi-

culty in the practice of formal meditation. It is a series of meditations on the invocations of the Litany of the Blessed Virgin. One excellent feature of the work is the constant use of the words of Holy Scripture in elucidating and expanding each one of the petitions of the Litany. The work is beautifully illustrated : a photographic reproduction of some famous picture precedes each meditation.

SKETCHES IN HISTORY, CHIEFLY ECCLESIASTICAL. By the Most Rev. L. C. Casertelli, Bishop of Salford.

ONE of the paradoxes of the moral world is that while men with abundant leisure and plenty of talent do nothing, men, on the other hand, whose official duties are continuous and exacting, find time for numerous works of supererogation. Whose time can be so little his own as that of the chief pastor of a diocese, and yet, how many there have been of our bishops, whose claims to remembrance and distinction are due as much to their literary work as to their purely professional labours, Were I to mention one, I should mention a dozen such names. I suppose it is that work begets a capacity for greater work, and that appetite is increased by what it feeds upon, while do-nothingism begets a capacity for doing nothing.

Those sketches appeared as articles, mostly all in the *Dublin Review*, and one of the Right Rev. author's objects in thus making them more accessible, has been, he tells us, ' that they may stimulate in some of our ecclesiastical students a taste for historical reading and study—so urgent a need at the present day.' He evidently felt that there are many ecclesiastics of undoubted talent who, were they to take to historical studies, or theological studies, or to literary studies, could, without any detriment [to [the daily discharge of routine duty, contribute] by their writings and lectures and conversations to increase the esteem and reverence] which the Catholic priesthood has always been able to win from the world. The reader of these sketches will find in them a sample of this kind of work. It is not what is called original work. The Bishop is a reviewer. He studies the best books on a subject, including, of course, the latest books ; receives in the lense of his well-trained mind their light and then projects on a comparatively small screen an instructive picture. This secondary work, the work of analysis and exposition, is a most necessary

and useful department of letters, and a worker of this rank who has discretion, sympathy, and the power of lucid expression, may become a great benefactor.

The first of these sketches is a review of a Flemish work entitled *A History and Description of Funeral and Mourning Customs among the Principal Nations*, by Dr. Isidore Bauwens, which was published in Brussels in 1888. It contains a great deal of curious information on the 'Art of Burial,' including earth-burial, water-burial, tree-burial, cremation and embalming. The next paper is on an old subject: viz., 'The Lombards, with Hodgkins,' *Italy and her Invaders*, vols. v. and vi., for a text. Here we find that the author is 'proud to think' that Lombard blood flows in his veins, and no wonder, since this fact establishes for him a kinship with Lanfranc, Anselm, Peter the Lombard and Dante Aleghieri. 'The English Pope' is the heading of the next sketch:—

'It is at least curious,' writes the Bishop, 'that what interest has been taken in Pope Adrian IV by Englishmen has been chiefly on the part of non-Catholics. The largest and most elaborate biography of him is the sumptuous volume published within the last ten years by a High Church layman (Alfred H. Tarleton); the article "Adrian IV" in *The Dictionary of National Biography*, was from the pen of the late Bishop of London, Dr. Mandell Creighton. On our side we have nothing to show but a small popular historical sketch of little over a hundred pages by Richard Raby, published as far back as 1849.'

Dr. Casertelli has done as much as it was possible to do within the limits of a review to present the Catholic view of Adrian's dramatic career. How the rejected postulant of St. Alban's in Herefordshire became Abbot of the Abbey of St. Rufus in Avignon, how the rejected Abbot became cardinal, what the Cardinal did in Scandinavia, how he became Pope, and how well he defended the privileges of his position against the 'mightiest monarch of Western Europe since Charles the Great,' are all told in a style that leaves nothing to be desired. The state of the controversy about the famous 'so-called Bull *Laudabiliter*' is stated with great clearness, the Bishop's own view being that of the minority, that at the request of John of Salisbury Adrian sent the letter *Laudabiliter* to the English king.

In Adrian VI, the subject of another of these articles, the writer had a still more congenial theme. The 'Dutch Pope'

had been a student and professor at Louvain, the author's own *Alma Mater*, and the incidents of his career are not less picturesque than are the vicissitudes in the life of the English Pope. The titles of other sketches include 'The Church and the Printing Press,' 'The English Universities and the Reformation,' 'Oxford and Louvain,' 'A Forgotten Chapter of the Second Spring,' 'The Makers of the *Dublin*,' and 'The Catholic Church in Japan.' 'The Forgotten Chapter' is a sympathetic account of the share of the Institute of Charity in the English Catholic Revival known as the 'Second Spring.' In the 'Makers of the *Dublin*' the author traces the career of the *Dublin Review* from its birth in 1836 to its latest good fortune, namely, its coming under the direction of the Younger Ward. There is no want of appreciation on the part of the author of the services which Irish talent and scholarship have rendered to the *Dublin*:—

'Vast,' he writes at page 285, 'as was the share of Cardinal Wiseman in the life and success of the *Review*, it may be doubted whether the periodical would ever have survived its early trials, but for the co-operation of that other eminent and brilliant scholar, who all through those long years was Wiseman's chief lieutenant and commander in arms, Dr. Charles Russell of Maynooth. From the literary point of view, Dr. Russell had certainly the lion's share of the actual work. His first article ("Versions of the Scriptures") contributed when he was a young professor of twenty-four, appeared in the second quarterly issue of the old series (July, 1836); his last, "The Critical History of the Sonnet," is to be found in the fifty-fourth and fifth-fifth numbers of the second series (October, 1876, and January, 1877). During the space of forty years, Dr. Russell was the most constant and most indefatigable of contributors, and the wide range of the subjects treated . . . rivalled that of Wiseman's, and gave evidence of vast erudition—the high literary skill and the versatile culture of one who may perhaps claim to have been the most gifted Catholic scholar of our times. For twenty years he contributed absolutely to every number of the *Review*, and before 1860, a very large number of issues contain not one, but several, papers from his prolific and graceful pen; in at least one instance he is credited with no less than five articles.'

O'Connell was one of the founders of the *Review*, and the author states (page 275) that 'at least one-half, often times much more of the literary matter of the original series was produced in Ireland.' An article contributed to its pages in

January, 1873, by Dr. P. Murray, on 'The Vatican Council: its Authority and Work,' was considered by Dr. Ward the best paper he had ever sent to him during the same series (page 293).

Space does not permit me to make any more detailed reference to these sketches. I must now conclude with bearing my humble testimony to the excellence of the entire work. Dr. Casertelli is, to quote one of his own phrases, a 'picturesque historian.' His matter is always interesting, his style pleasing and personal, and his sense of proportion just. These sketches are, in my opinion, eminently calculated to inspire in the youthful reader a taste for historical reading, and are at the same time a model of the best kind of popular historical exposition.

T. P. G.

CATHOLIC IDEALS IN SOCIAL LIFE. By Father Cuthbert, O.S.F.C. Second Edition. London: Art and Book Company, 1905.

THIS is an eminently readable and instructive volume of papers on social questions. Some of them had already appeared in English Catholic periodicals, but their gifted author was certainly well advised in collecting them into one volume, and we are not surprised that a second edition was called for so soon after the appearance of the first. Their object is 'to give expression to the Catholic mind, touching some of the most urgent questions of the hour in regard to social life and conduct.' The need for such an expression of Catholic ideals is a growing, or even an urgent one at the present day: material interests are absorbing or monopolizing the attention of the modern world, and making it impatient of spiritual restraints. Here, in this little book, we have great, fruitful truths told in such a simple, winning way that they go straight to the heart. And they are truths that deserve to be considered by great men and by statesmen as well as by the common, unremarkable folk,—wholesome and telling truths that would cure and cut out not a few of the evils that modern society is sick from.

There is a unity of thought and purpose running through these dozen papers, which cover 250 octavo pages, though there is a sufficient diversity in the titles, e.g., 'The Christian State,' 'Marriage,' 'The Priest and Social Reform,' 'The Responsibility of Wealth,' 'The Working-man's Apostolate.'

'The Three Radical Evils in Society at the Present Day' (Commercial Selfishness, Intemperance, Disregard for the Sanctity of Domestic Life), etc. Everywhere we find the echo of the teachings of Leo XIII, the ring of a true democratic note, and the sympathetic love for the poor so characteristic of the Order to which the author belongs. His writing is fearless and forcible when he lays bare the wrongs and crimes that are the scourge of modern society. His thought is characterized throughout by an uncommon freshness, directness, and vigour of expression. The reader is carried along by a style that is elegant, pure and pleasing. The book is full of striking passages :—

'The present age, we are reminded, is a transitional stage of existence. New modes of thought, new claims of rights, the shifting of political powers, the increased competition in trade, and the organization of the workers, have all brought about a social revolution the end of which is not yet. We are moving forward we hardly know whither : it is pre-eminently the day for the political theorist. One thing is certain : the ultra-individualism of the past is doomed. Whatever the future brings forth, the voices of the social prophets and economists will not have been heard in vain. There is some truth in the phrase : "We are all socialists now."'

And again :—

'In a truthful state of society the social entity reflects the individual entity ; if the individuals are Christians in spirit as in name, then society will be Christian ; if the individuals are pagans in their own hearts, they may submit to act on Christian principles collectively, but their collective action is a vast hypocrisy. And this is where so many attempted moral reformations fail. They begin with the external life rather than with the inner life ; they rush to create social reforms when they had more properly begun with the individual. They think to reform the moral life of the nation by acts of parliament or to take away vice by international agreement ; they would do away with wars before they have established justice in the hearts of men. . . .'

We have no hesitation in recommending this little book to all classes. In our public libraries, for educated people, for people who take an interest in social questions—as most people do nowadays—agreeable and instructive books of this kind are badly wanted.

P. C.

ENCHIRIDION SYMBOLORUM ET DEFINITIONUM. Fr.
Denzinger. Ed. IX. Herder.

THE new issue of this invaluable repertory calls for a word of notice. It is free from a few typographical errors which were to be found, even in the eighth edition, of which some altered the sense of documents. Generations of students have learned by experience the utility of Denzinger's book so well, that to speak in its praise would be superfluous. For a theologian it is an indispensable work of reference.

But as in the future new editions will assuredly be called for, it may be of use to suggest some improvements. They are, first, the addition of the *Ex quo singulari* and the *Omnium Sollicitudinum* of Benedict XIV, regarding Chinese and Malabar rites, respectively; and also of the decree regarding Anglican Orders, issued by Leo XIII. Secondly, an addition to the introductory note on n. lxxxix, *Decreta Pontificia in materia de auxiliis*. Here an omission occurs which might easily mislead beginners. The sentence in the *Enchiridion* runs, 'Innocentius enim X. decreto d. 23 Apr., 1654, declaravit, Actis Francisci Pegna et Thomae de Lemos et autographo seu exemplari assertae constitutionis Pauli V, super definitione quaestionis de auxillis ac damnationis sententiae seu sententiarum Ludovici Molinae, S.J., nullam omnino fidem esse adhibendam.' But there is a *suppressio veri* here, and the part left out is a very important part of the decree. It is here enclosed in brackets. 'Actis Francisci Begnae et Thomae de Lemos (tam pro sententia FF. Ordinis S. Dominici, quam Ludovici Molinae, aliorumque Societatis Jesu Religiosorum);' and then, 'nullam omnino esse fidem adhibendam; (neque ab alterutra parte, seu a quocumque alio allegari posse, vel debere).' See Regnon's *Bannez et Molina* (my authority for the statement). The learned writer, who is an honest man, gives the passage without omissions. If a reader who depended on Denzinger, who had never seen the decree of Innocent X, supposed, as he might very naturally do, that this portion was given in its entirety, he would be very much mistaken. He would believe that the Pope spoke only of Pegna and Lemos, and might imagine that he had cause for discrediting their respective accounts. Nothing could be farther from the truth; indeed it would be unpardonable to suspect two such ecclesiastics as the famous Auditor of the Rota and the great Thomist theologian of unfair or fraudulent

reporting. The disputants on the one side were Lemos (from beginning to end) and Alvarez ; on the other were Gregory of Valentia, Arrabul, De Salas, and Bastida. All were men of the highest reputation. The official records of the proceedings are said to be in the Vatican Archives ; they have never been published. It is obvious that only these documents of the court or the *Congregatio de Auxiliis* possess authority.

(N.B.—Many years ago—in 1879 and again in 1881—Fr. Schneemann, S.J., gave to the world an autograph note of Paul V ; whether the original was preserved in the Vatican or in the Borghese Archives, if memory speaks truly, he did not state.)

But to return to Innocent X ; what he means is, that the accounts given by those on either side are but private memoranda, and consequently do not possess any official character. He does not say that one of them is untrue. Nothing but nescience of the nature of, or of the full text of, the Papal utterance, or want of acquaintance with the history of the *Congregatio* in question, could make a person in *bona fide* think that the Pope had done so. The omission of the clause in Denzinger's *Enchiridion* might have this effect. It seems to have actually produced it in one instance, and the consequences were somewhat ludicrous. Some years ago the author of a certain treatise (a man who ought to have known better), who apparently had read the *Enchiridion*, but never had seen the relevant words of Innocent X's decree, propounded this argument with perfect seriousness :—

' It is certain that *before* the decree was issued, {the accounts written by Pegna and by Lemos possessed no official value : everybody, even the merest tyro, knew that Innocent X would not take pains to declare what people were aware of already ; he did, however, publish a decree ; there must therefore have been a reason for his solemn protest against these two narratives : the only reason there can possibly have been is this—they were untrue ; ergo, *since* the decree they are known to have no value whatever ' (!)

It is to be hoped that the omission which appears to have given occasion to this train of thought will not be allowed to remain in future editions of an otherwise invaluable work.

R. W.


LAST LETTERS OF AUBREY BEARDSLEY. Edited, with an Introductory Note, by the Rev. John Gray. London: Longmans, Green & Co.


THESE letters tell the story of the last three years of the life of the brilliant young artist, who was cut down by phthisis in 1898. The letters were obviously written without any idea of publication; many are brief and commonplace, many are interesting. The condition of the writer's health, the works he reads, and his artistic employments, his gradual approach to the Catholic Church, his reception within the fold, and the influence of the great change on his spiritual outlook are the themes of the various letters.

THE SUFFERING MAN-GOD (L'HOMME-DIEU SOUFFRANT).

By Père Seraphim, Passionist. Translated by Lilian M. Ward. Washbourne, and Benziger Brothers.

THIS is a free translation of the French original. The work of Père Seraphim is the result of fervent and mature meditation on all the phases of the Passion of our Saviour. The sixteen meditations demonstrate that the various sufferings of the Man-God reveal to the thoughtful mind a series of miracles as great and striking as those which marked His public life. Each meditation is followed by a fervent Act of Reparation.





EVOLUTION: DARWIN AND THE ABBÉ LOISY—I

IT will perhaps appear, at first sight, an unreal and merely fanciful groupment, this association of the names of Mr. Darwin the eminent naturalist and author at least in modern times of the theory of 'natural selection' and of the learned biblical scholar and critic the Abbé Loisy. But the theory of evolution by natural selection is now applied to explain not merely the origin and distribution of the various species of plants and animals and the successive formations that have appeared in the orderly development of the cosmos, but also the genesis of what I may call the different historical species or types of natural religion and the origin and growth of supernatural religion and of Catholic Christianity itself. The Abbé Loisy has led the way in applying the Darwinian hypothesis to explain the origin and evolution of the Catholic religion, and hence I associate his name with that of Mr. Darwin. I do not however purpose, in the present paper, to offer any criticism of the theory of evolution, whether applied to explain the origin of species among plants and animals or the origin and development of Catholic Christianity, but I shall confine myself to a brief comparative exposition of the theories of Darwin and the Abbé Loisy.

I

There were not wanting before Darwin naturalists who, observing the variability of individuals of the same species

in form, colour, habits, etc., the many likenesses which exist between individuals of nearly allied species, and the many links that bind the species themselves together, were led to believe that all the species of the same genus have had a common origin. Some ascribed the transformation of species to unknown laws : Lamark ascribed it to the desire and effort to satisfy some new want, to acquire some new perfection, aided by favourable circumstances ; but it was reserved for Mr. Darwin to propound the theory of ' natural selection ' as the law or method by whose slow but progressive action all past and existing species have descended from the few primitive original forms into which the Creator is said to have breathed life at the beginning of organic existence in the world.

Darwin speaks of the Creator originally breathing life into a few primitive forms or into one.

There is grandeur [he writes]¹ in this view of life with its several powers having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one ; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity from so simple a beginning, endless forms, most beautiful and most wonderful, have been and are being evolved.

Mr. Tyndall insinuates that this is merely a quotation from a celebrated divine and says he does not know what Mr. Darwin himself thought of this view of the introduction of life. ' What Mr. Darwin thinks of this view of the introduction of life,' he writes,² ' I do not know. But the anthropomorphism, which it seemed his object to set aside, is as firmly associated with the creation of a few forms as with the creation of a multitude.' And from Mr. Darwin's letters we learn that he used the term ' creation ' merely to signify that the origin of life is wholly unknown to us and does not come within the proper province of science. Writing to Mr. F. D. Hooker he says :—³

But I have long regretted that I truckled to public opinion

¹ *Origin of Species* (6th edit.), p. 429.

² *Fragments of Science*, vol. ii., p. 189.

³ *The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin*. Edited by his son Francis Darwin, vol. iii., p. 18.

and used the Pentateuchal term of creation, by which I really meant 'appeared' by some wholly unknown process. It is mere rubbish thinking at present of the origin of life; one might as well think of the origin of matter.

Assuming therefore life to have 'appeared' at its origin by some wholly unknown process, Mr. Darwin teaches that different species have not been separately created, as had been believed, but have had a common origin, and that the law or principle of the origin and permanence of new species is 'natural selection.' What then is 'natural selection'? It supposes four elements: that organisms tend to increase by propagation in geometrical ratio—an innate tendency among the descendants of any species to vary in relation to the parents and to one another—a struggle for existence—and the survival of the fittest; or it may be said that natural selection presupposes the first three conditions and consists formally in the action of nature preserving those varieties that are best adapted to all the conditions of their environment and destroying those which are imperfectly equipped for fighting with success in the struggle for existence.

Our familiarity with the larger domestic animals tends to mislead us and to impel us to deny the reality of the rapid multiplication of organisms and of the struggle for existence. We see that the number of these animals round about us undergoes no great change, and their destruction because it is continuous and regular and uniform we scarcely notice. But organisms which annually produce eggs or seeds by the thousand would require only a very short time to populate a whole region if there were no destruction. Mr. Wallace tells us¹ that if we start with a single pair of birds of one of the familiar varieties, such as the redbreast or the sparrow, and these and their descendants are allowed to live and breed unmolested by living enemies, or by hunger, or by excessive heat or cold, or by disease, their numbers will amount to more than twenty

¹ *Darwinism*, pp. 25, 26.

millions in ten years. And of the elephant Mr. Darwin writes :—¹

The elephant is reckoned the slowest breeder of all known animals . . . it will be safest to assume that it begins breeding when thirty years old, and goes on breeding till ninety years old, bringing forth six young in the interval, and surviving till one hundred years old ; if this be so, after a period of from 740 to 750 years there would be nearly nineteen million elephants alive, descended from the first pair.

Of 'innate variability' we have the most obvious evidence. In the human family itself as well as among plants and animals we can observe in the young some variation from the parental type, in form, or color, or disposition, or other characteristic, and some differences between the individual members of the young family itself. And as to the 'struggle for existence,' there is a struggle with heat and cold, with rain and drought, with famine and pestilence, with the various forms of disease, the struggle between rival claimants for food in times of want, the struggle between carnivorous animals and their victims, the struggle between weeds and the farmer's crops for a habitation on the soil, the struggle of seeds and eggs to propagate their species in spite of the efforts to destroy them or use them as food, the universal struggle of organisms to escape total extinction in death and by the propagation of the species to survive and continue their existence in their offspring.

Nature, according to the Darwinian theory, would have selected for survival at the very first struggle those individuals that had varied however slightly but advantageously from the original stock. Then rapid propagation began again, new incipient varieties appeared among the children of the second generation, the struggle for existence commenced among the new varieties, and nature again selected the fittest to survive. And so on and on these mysterious processes of nature were repeated until all the generations down to man included have appeared, new species sometimes appearing suddenly, but more generally

¹ *Ibid*, p. 51.

by slight and repeated innate variations that ultimately formed groups of organisms so far removed from all preceding species as to be definable from them by certain constant peculiarities in form or structure or function and to require to be classed as new species.

The evolution of the 'moral sense' was effected by the ordinary processes of natural selection, controlled however by something akin to the restrictions put upon nature by domestic selection. In natural selection the conditions of the environment and the agents that threaten destruction in the struggle for existence work absolutely uncontrolled and the individual survives that is best adapted to hold its ground, aggressive enough to seize a new advantageous position by killing off a neighbour, tenacious to maintain its advantage and continue its conquests, and successful in transmitting and perpetuating by offspring its inherited and acquired characteristics; but in domestic selection the conditions of the environment are put under restraint, the selector is anxious to raise a particular variety of plant, or bird, or sheep, or cattle, or horse, etc., and to secure this end he prevents a struggle for existence by controlling the conditions of the environment and forbidding the concurrence of opposing varieties. So primitive man or his lineal antecedents when climbing upwards in the scale of being fought his way in the struggle for existence under the rules of natural selection. The conditions of life fought uncontrolled, and those individuals survived in the struggle who were endowed with an aggressive and tenacious and prolific egotism that enabled its possessors to maintain their positions, to seize new opportunities by killing off opponents and to transmit their superior qualities and characteristics to their descendants. This was the non-moral period of existence, and these acts of aggression were neither moral nor immoral, but non-moral. But in the course of evolution a variety appeared endowed with an initial rudimental tendency towards a gregarious or social existence and, as an indispensable accompaniment, with a tendency to control anti-social aggressive egotism and to cultivate altruism and the

social virtues. This innate tendency was found useful in the struggle for existence against individuals, and survived and increased. And so human society was developed by evolution, and the 'moral sense' and the social commandments, 'Honor thy father and thy mother,' 'Thou shalt not kill,' 'Thou shalt not commit adultery,' 'Thou shalt not steal,' etc., have had their origin in evolution and have survived and have been transmitted to us because they are good, because they are useful and conducive to the permanent survival of society in the struggle for existence.

But evolutionists must take cognisance of the phenomenon that individuals and nations have professed and continue to profess belief in a personal supreme Being distinct from the world, in a Creator and in the creation of the world, in an essential relation of the moral sense and morality to a supreme Legislator, in a future judgment and in future rewards and punishments. How do these beliefs harmonize with evolution? Are they true? Are they good for human society?

Evolutionists would answer that these beliefs can be considered from the point of view of science or from the point of view of human faith and idealization. The existence of a Supreme Being and supreme Legislator and Creator, they would say, can neither be affirmed nor denied by the scientist, because they are outside the sphere of human knowledge; the dependence of morality from a supreme Legislator can be denied, because it is sufficiently explained by natural selection; future judgment and future rewards and punishment are completely outside the pale of absolute objective knowledge. But the unscientific man, they would say, the man of human faith and anthropomorphic ideals can imagine for himself a 'supreme Being,' a 'Creator,' and future 'rewards' and 'punishments,' and though these beliefs have no absolute or objective truth or goodness, but are absolutely bad, yet are they relatively true and good and contribute to the realization of the ends of natural selection by inducing believers to

respect and obey the moral sense, to observe the social virtues, and thus contribute to the survival of mankind and human society in the struggle for existence. Writing on the use of Anthropomorphism, Mr. Spencer says:—

The question to be answered is whether these beliefs were beneficent in their effects on those who held them; not whether they would be beneficent for us, or for perfect men; and to this question the answer must be that, while absolutely bad, they were relatively good. For is it not obvious that the savage man will be most effectually controlled by his fears of a savage deity? Must it not happen that if his nature requires great constraint, the supposed consequences of his transgression, to be a check upon him, must be proportionately terrible; and for these to be proportionately terrible must not his god be conceived as proportionately cruel and revengeful?

II

In the Darwinian theory therefore morality is primarily a relation to society, and personal utility and pleasure are only secondary and sub-ordinate considerations; an act is morally good or morally bad according as it is beneficial or injurious to society, that is, according as it assists or impedes society in its efforts to survive in the struggle for existence; and the 'moral sense' is the faculty by which we perceive or the perception itself and consciousness of the relations of our actions to the welfare of society. The 'moral sense' plays an important part also in the theological system of the Abbé Loisy as propounded in his recent books.¹ I now proceed to describe the principal features of this system, as it deals with revelation, with Christology, with the Trinity, with the Church, with the Sacraments, with the mutual relations of faith and history, and with the immutability of faith.

REVELATION²

Revelation according to the Abbé Loisy is the 'consciousness acquired by man of his relation to God.'

¹ *L'Evangile et L'Eglise* and *Autour D'un Petit Livre*.

² To keep my article within reasonable limits I have refrained from giving quotations from the Abbé Loisy. To readers who may not have his books

Mr. Mivart taught that Catholics are free to hold that when at last, in the progress of evolution, 'the time came for the advent of the human animal, that animal, possessing an essentially rational nature, might nevertheless have long existed before the circumstances of his environment rendered it possible for him to display in act his potential rationality as set before us in Adam.'¹ And according to the Abbé Loisy the beginning of divine revelation was the perception however rudimentary of the relation which should exist between self-conscious man and God present behind the world of phenomena. Revelation, unlike the natural sciences, is developed and evolved not by intellectual reasoning alone, but by reason moved by the heart and guided by the direction of the moral sense, the conditions of the environment and the parties in the struggle for existence contributing also to the development of the revelation. When therefore primitive man under pressure of the motions of his heart and of the perceptions of his moral sense and of his desire for good became conscious of the existence of God revelation began in the world. It has passed through many phases. For revelation, being endowed with vitality, is subject to the general laws of organic life, to occasional innate variations, to the struggle for existence, to the destruction of the weak and the survival of the fittest varieties or phases of revelation. Nevertheless revelation is supernatural; for it is first and principally the work of God in man, or of man with God.

Similarly Christian revelation at its origin was the perception in the mind of Christ of the peculiar relation which united himself to God, and which binds all men to their heavenly Father. It fought its way in the struggle for existence, was accepted by the disciples, and with endless variations and quasi-transformations has become the faith of the Christian world.

and who may wish to see the passages dealing with the subjects treated of in this article, I can recommend the important *brochure* of Father Billot, S.J.: *De Sacra Traditione contra novam hæresim Evolutionismi*, Auctore Ludovico Billot, S.J. (Romæ, ex typographia juvenum opificum A. S. Josepho).

¹ *The Origin of Human Reason*, p. 33.

CHRISTOLOGY

Was Christ God? Did the divine Word become man to redeem and save us? Did Christ rise from the dead? These are questions which touch the very foundations of the Christian religion. The Abbé Loisy sees in the words of St. Paul,¹ 'who being in the form of God thought it not robbery to be equal to God, but emptied himself taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men and in habit found as a man,' a distinction between two Christs, the Christ of history and the Christ of faith. The Christ of history is Christ considered according to the actual real facts of his person and life, and the Christ of faith is the unreal purely subjective conception of Christ which is presented to us in Christian idealization and symbolism.

In the order of history or in the order of objective reality Christ was not God, the divine Word did not become man to redeem and save us, Christ did not rise from the dead. It is not explicitly denied that Christ was God, or that he arose from the dead. As the agnostic neither affirms nor denies the existence of God but maintains that it is undemonstrable and unknowable, so the Abbé Loisy maintains that there is no proof to establish the divinity or the resurrection of Christ as a fact. These doctrines cannot be proved philosophically. They would belong to the object of real history if duly authenticated by divine revelation, if they were really revealed by God. But the fact of divine revelation is not established. For St. John's gospel is not historical; the passages in the Synoptics that suppose the divinity and the resurrection belong to the period of a later tradition; there is no divine tradition, or tradition of a divine revelation of these truths, and the theological argument from tradition is founded not on divine tradition, but on the tradition of the apostolic idealization of Christ as 'God,' as 'arisen from the dead,' as 'Redeemer;' and moreover the resurrection in particular and the discourses and acts of the risen Christ are incapable of

¹ *Philippians*, ii., 6, 7.

verification, as a glorified body and the words and acts of a risen person are beyond the sphere of human experimental knowledge.

But the Christ of faith? The aspirations of the religious and moral sense to a higher good which is never fully realised had determined the intellectual acceptance, by the Apostles and disciples, of the messianic claims of Christ, of his religion and exhortation to penance and moral virtue as the kingdom of God was at hand. This religion however received a rude shock in the struggle for existence from Christ's ignominious death on the cross. How was the religion of the kingdom of heaven, of penance and moral virtue to survive? From this period the natural survival and evolution of Christianity and ideal symbolic and spiritual theories about Christ and about Christianity are inseparably associated. Though Christ was dead and mouldering in the tomb the religion of the Kingdom did survive, and being a *living* religion began to develop according to the natural laws of evolution in the organic world. Simultaneously the disciples began to idealize and to represent Christ first as 'immortal' in the kingdom of the Father, then, and the transition was easy, as 'risen from the dead;' and at this stage of the evolution of Christology Christ became to the eye of faith the 'risen Christ.' The next real and objective development of Christianity arose from the impulse of St. Paul to preach the gospel to the Gentiles; and at this stage Christ was further idealized and became to the eyes of faith 'the divinely sent Redeemer of the world.' Then followed successively the idealization of Christ as the 'демиург' and as 'God;' and as in the organic world a limit is put to evolution by *the law of permanence*, so the dogmatic conception of the Christ of faith reached its final development and attained permanence after the controversies with Arius, Nestorius, Eutyches and the Monothelites.

THE TRINITY

Like the Incarnation, the doctrine of the Trinity can be considered from the point of view of history and from

the point of view of faith. There is no real or historical evidence for the Trinity according to the Abbé Loisy ; as the gospel of St. John is not historical and the text of St. Matthew, 'Go teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost,' belongs to a later tradition. The doctrine of the Trinity is not therefore contained in divine revelation. But Christianity borrowed from Greek philosophy and idealized God as three in person ; and thus the Trinity became an object of faith and survived, though it involves a philosophical contradiction, because it satisfies the religious sense that demands and finds rest in the contemplation of mysteries.

THE CHURCH

Christ, according to the Abbé Loisy, believed that the end of the world was imminent and died in that belief, and consequently he could not have thought of establishing a Church on earth or defining its constitution. The organisation of the Church sprang naturally from the necessity of social order among the primitive Christians. The one thought bequeathed by Christ to his disciples was the thought of longing for, of preparing, of expecting, of realising the kingdom. This thought remained the supreme end and purpose of the Church ; but the Church itself was a human institution, its constitution and government were subject to the law of all living organisms, and in the struggle for existence with the changeable and conflicting conditions of the world it varied and transformed itself naturally by its own internal force until it reached its final determination, so far, in the Council of the Vatican.

We must distinguish then in the development of the Church the proper object of history and the object of faith. The institution of a society by the early Christians themselves and its growth and transformations by the forces of natural law are real objective facts, and consequently the proper objects of history. Within the Christian community, as in the civil state, various offices were established in the course of the evolution of the society ;

elders (presbyteri), overseers (episcopi), pontiffs were successively instituted; congregational government was succeeded by national government, and national government in turn gave way, by force of evolution, to the existing system of imperialism and absolutism. These are facts of natural evolution. But the idealizations of the ecclesiastical and theological mind, 'that Christ is the founder of the Church,' 'that there is a divinely ordained distinction between clergy and laity,' 'that the Pope is the vicerent of Christ on earth,' 'that Christ the Spirit abides in the Church, preserving her from error and protecting her against the powers of darkness,' 'that in obeying the rules of the Church we are obeying Christ,' these idealizations alone which have no objective truth or reality are the objects of faith.

THE SACRAMENTS

As Christ at the time of His death believed that the consummation was at hand, He surely instituted no sacraments as he established no Church. Historically considered, baptism (which included confirmation) was a rite of initiation borrowed from Jewish ceremonies, and it was instituted and made obligatory by the Christian community, which also prescribed the baptismal vows and obligations of the newly initiated. In this sense the institution of baptism was an objective fact, a natural step in the evolution of the living society, and corresponds to the institution of rites of initiation to civil and social societies. Similarly the Eucharist was a social supper instituted by the community to commemorate the last supper of Christ with his disciples. And in like manner penance, the anointing of the sick, the institution of ministers and the solemnization of marriage, represent actual ceremonies introduced and developed in the natural evolution of the Christian society.

Then with the idealization of the risen Christ, of Christ the Spirit dwelling in the Church and vivifying it, began the idealization in reference to the sacraments, 'that they were instituted by Christ, 'that they confer grace,' 'that

Christ is really present in the Blessed Eucharist,' etc. These propositions have no real or objective truth, they are the object of faith, but they are outside the pale of history.

FAITH AND HISTORY

Faith, according to the Abbé Loisy, does not concern itself with the real or objective order of facts, but with the ideal, the symbolic, the mystic order, and that too in reference to the present time. Neither the Trinity, he says, nor the divinity of Christ, nor his resurrection, nor our redemption, nor the divine origin of the Church and of the sacraments can be proved to be a fact, but the Christian community at successive periods set up the ideal of the Trinity, of Christ risen from the dead, of Christ the redeemer, of Christ the demiurge, of Christ as God, of a divinely instituted Church and sacraments. These ideals alone are the objects of faith, each while it lasts, while it actually remains an ideal or a symbol of some spiritual truth. But history regards the real and objective order of facts and the ideals of the past that have been unable to maintain their position in the struggle for existence and have disappeared. Hence there never can be a conflict between faith and scientific history, as they have different objects. The same person can believe and disbelieve the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Church, the Sacraments. He can accept them by faith as ideals, and refuse as a historian to recognise in them any objective truth or reality.

THE IMMUTABILITY OF FAITH

Finally, the Abbé Loisy pleads for a change in the terms and sense of the formulae of faith to harmonize them with the conditions of modern thought. But has not the Church, he asks, defined the immutability of the sense of dogmatic definitions? Perhaps so, he says; but if so, the Church has not yet become conscious of her own evolution, nor has she a fixed theory about the philosophy of her origin, and the Church will secure peace with science only when she realizes her origin by evolution, when the idea of evolution is received officially in the Church.

It would appear to be unnecessary to agitate for a change in ecclesiastical definitions if they were understood to be mere idealist or symbolical formularies. If they need not be believed in themselves, if they are believed only as they represent some known or unknown truth concealed beneath their surface ; if for example we believe in the resurrection of Christ only as it symbolises, as it were, the survival of the Christian religion and Christian society after the Master's ignominious death on the cross, is it not immaterial whether we retain the existing formularies or adopt others ? The complaint however is not exactly with the formularies themselves, but because they are taken to represent absolute unchangeable objective truths. The complaint is that whereas, for example, episcopal jurisdiction and the primacy of the Pope and the sacraments are believed by the Abbé Loisy to have originated by evolution and to be subject to the chance of future transformations by evolution, they are taught by theologians to be absolute unchangeable divine truths.

III

We can now briefly recapitulate the broad general points of resemblance between the Darwinian theory and the system of Abbé Loisy. In the Darwinian theory, assuming the origin of life, all past and existing species, with all their characteristics, have descended from a common stock by natural selection. Nevertheless, individuals and nations, civilized and uncivilized, set up ideals of 'God,' 'creation,' 'design,' 'providence,' 'future life,' 'rewards' and 'punishments.' These have neither reality nor objective truth. And it is hoped by evolutionists that with the advance of science the language of anthropomorphic idealization will give place to language in harmony with objective and scientific truth ; that not merely plants and animals, but man himself and his moral and religious sense will be referred to the mysterious agency of the great law of natural selection.

In the system of the Abbé Loisy, assuming in man the

moral and religious sense and the desire of good, the intellect becomes conscious of a relation to God present behind the world of phenomena; and the existence of a personal supreme Being distinct from the world is explicitly recognised. Then with the preaching of moral virtue and penance by Christ as a preparation for the kingdom of the Father, the great work of Christian and Catholic evolution commenced. Everything that has had or has real and objective existence in the Church has originated by evolution. The Church has arisen by evolution: the distinction of clergy and laity is the natural work of the Christian society: papal and episcopal authority have been evolved within the society, and might be again altered or tempered by evolution: the sacraments, as real and objective sacred rites, were instituted by the society, and their number might be still further increased in the future by evolution: self-denial and mortification and trust in God have found their place within the objective sphere of evolution; but the prayer, 'Give us this day our daily bread,' understood in the rigour of its historical signification, appears subversive of social economy and as unacceptable to the critic as a prayer to St. Anthony to recover a lost purse. But simultaneously with the real objective natural evolution of Christianity the Church has been idealizing from the beginning. The 'Trinity,' the 'divinity,' 'resurrection' and 'redemptive' office of Christ are mere ideals, having no objective reality. Mere ideas or symbols also are the 'institution by Christ of the sacraments' and their 'efficacy to sanctify the recipient.' A mere idea or symbol is it to regard Christ as 'the author of the Church,' of 'the distinction between clergy and laity,' of 'the institution of the hierarchy,' of 'episcopal jurisdiction,' of 'the primacy and infallibility of the Pope.'

This incursion of the learned biblical critic into the domain of theology has created a prejudice against the advanced scholars of the biblical movement who have very important problems yet to resolve, but it raises no new problems in theology and no new difficulties to the

old problems. The necessity and existence of divine supernatural revelation remain to be proved as before, assuming divine revelation the demonstrations of the different dogmas of the Church remain unaffected by this theory, and the evolution of the hidden truths of revelation will continue its normal course in the intellectual activity of the Church under the guidance and assistance of the Holy Spirit.

DANIEL COGHLAN.

[To be continued.]

A STUDY IN THOUGHT-TRANSFERENCE

IT will generally be admitted, I think, that one of the greatest triumphs of modern scientific research is that of Wireless Telegraphy. That a message can be transmitted through thousands of miles of space without the assistance of any visible intervening medium, is a discovery which has transcended the wildest dreams of even the most extravagant theorists.

The fundamental principle underlying it—as everybody now knows—is wave motion. In this manner also are transmitted sound, light, and heat, the only difference between heat and light waves being in the intensity of the vibration.

The most elementary notions of wave motion are had from dropping a pebble in water. The action causes vibration of water from the centre till the motion reaches the bank. If many pebbles are dropped in succession, many waves are had. The same is true of sound, and may be illustrated by a very simple experiment. Take two tuning forks fixed on sounding boards, the two being exactly at the same pitch, in other words in perfect tune : if a bow is drawn across one, a wave of sound goes out, and when the motion reaches the other fork through the intervening medium of the air alone, it causes it to sound also. The same is true of heat radiation.

Electric rays have exactly similar properties. A spark discharge will cause a bell to ring at a great distance without any connection whatever, provided, of course, that the transmitter and receiver have the same relative electric tension, or to apply the simile of the tuning forks, are in perfect tune with one another. Such is the principle of the modern wireless telegraphy, as explained by scientists.

That there exists too a telegraphy between living mind which is generally known as telepathic communication or

thought transference, is a fact to which many eminent scientists and physiologists have long since borne testimony. That thought can be and is transmitted from one individual mind to another independently altogether of the will of the individuals concerned, and without any visible expression or apparent means of communication, is a phenomenon which comes within the every day experience of us all. You may term it personal magnetism, odic forces (*à la* Baron Reichenbach), hypnotism, electric wave motion, or any other name you please, but it seems to be an indisputable fact, that between temperaments which have the requisite difference of potential, which are, so to speak, in perfect tune with one another, there will frequently exist a conduction or radiation of impressions through the nerve centres by which thought is transmitted from one to another.

The belief in this extraordinary mode of reciprocal communication dates from the very earliest records which we have of human history, many being of opinion that it is but the vestige of a lost sense, which is now no longer necessary, its functions they say being usurped by the many artificial aids to communication which modern science has disclosed to us. It will generally happen in intercommunication of this kind that the mind has no cognizance of the process by which the impression is conducted to the brain, there would seem to be a kind of subconscious faculty in operation whose functions are quite independent of the ordinary senses, and which is susceptible only to an external influence of this kind. We have a familiar example in the suggestions received by a subject in a hypnotic trance. It is true, the senses as we know them, whereby human beings are made cognizant of external impressions, are five, but it is up to this undemonstrated and undemonstrable that man is not gifted with an additional sense. In fact the Society for Psychical Research has within recent years accumulated a mass of evidence which goes to prove the existence of a hitherto unsuspected faculty, and because it cannot be demonstrated with

scientific accuracy, it by no means follows that the same Being that gave us five may not have given us more.

When Baron Reichenbach, over half a century ago, startled the world by his novel theory of odic forces, he and his theory were severely handled by many obstinate adherents of the materialistic school, amongst others by Liebig, Vogt, and Schleiden. The scientific world has since come to regard the Baron as a philosopher very wise indeed in his generation. As the result of experiments performed on eight different individuals, he discovered that these persons were affected in a most remarkable manner when brought within the magnetic field of an ordinary horseshoe magnet. These eight individuals bore unanimous testimony to the appearance of a luminous flame emanating from the poles of the magnets, and when brought in contact with the poles they experienced a disagreeable sensation which in some cases amounted to positive horror, and in more than one instance the influence was such as to attract the subject from a reclining to an upright position. Let it be remarked, however, that Reichenbach's experiments were successful only on subjects gifted with a highly sensitive nature, as many subjects were found who were in no wise affected by the magnet. The Baron's investigations, however, were sufficiently conclusive and satisfactory to warrant him in proclaiming the discovery of a new physical force, and he was soon led to infer the presence of this wonderful agency in other things than magnets, and as the result of further experiments he found that the human body was itself a source of this newly-discovered faculty.

Our ordinary senses, although altogether independent of one another in their actions, are yet allied to such an extent as to aid and assist one another, and when one or more are lost, common experience teaches us that the loss is compensated for by more than ordinary acuteness of perception in the other faculties, but that the faculty of which we speak is independent in its actions of the ordinary senses is clearly evidenced by the fact that its work is frequently carried on when the operation of

our other faculties is entirely suspended. I have read recently in an article 'Work done in Sleep,' some extraordinary manifestations of this power, and amongst many marvellous instances recorded there,* it is stated that Voltaire composed the first Canto of the *Henriade* while he was asleep. 'Ideas occurred to me,' he says, 'in spite of myself, and by a process in which I had no part whatever.'

The more remarkable indications however of the existence of some such faculty are evidenced in those coincident dreams, warnings, and apparitions which coincide with an accident or the death of some distant relative or friend. We read of some extraordinary instances of this kind in the lives of some of the Saints. With phenomena of this kind, however, this article does not purpose to deal.

A very strange and remarkable fact in connection with phenomena of this kind is that the operations of this hidden faculty (whatever it may be) become more marked when the body is not in its normal condition of health, particularly in certain extreme cases of nervous debility, a fact which tends to show more conclusively that this faculty is not only independent of our ordinary senses, but requires for a perfect discharge of its functions that the operation of our other faculties should be entirely suspended. It would seem that in time of illness our ordinary mental faculties become relaxed, depending largely as they do on a healthy condition of body for the faithful discharge of their various functions, while at the same time other faculties of whose existence we had no knowledge seem to acquire undue prominence. An American writer, Mr. Butterworth, whom Proctor quotes in his book, *Rough Ways made Smooth*, gives a description of a near relative of his who was suffering from extreme nervous debility. 'She could,' he says, 'think of two things at the same time, and seemed to have very vivid impressions of what happened to her children who were away from home, and was often startled to hear that these impressions were correct, she had also a wonderful power of anticipating what one was about to say, and to read the motives

of others.' To have two trains of thought running in the mind simultaneously is as far as we can judge beyond the scope of our ordinary mental powers, and affords evidence at least of abnormal powers of mind which are not common to all. Frequently, too, we hear and read of persons who were gifted with a double consciousness, a normal and abnormal condition of mind which I should say was consequent on the alternate operations of the ordinary faculties and the extraordinary faculty. In the normal state no recollection whatever was preserved of what took place in the abnormal state, and *vice versa*, although the previous train of thought in either condition was immediately taken up and continued uninterruptedly when the person again lapsed into that condition.

The possibility of man being endowed with such a faculty has frequently been discussed by metaphysicians.

The essential attribute of a new sense [remarks Muller], is not the perception of internal objects, or influences which ordinarily do not act upon the senses, but that external causes should excite in it a new and peculiar sensation, different from all the sensations of our five senses. Such peculiar sensation will depend on the powers of the nervous system, and the possibility of the existence of such a faculty cannot *a priori* be denied.

And not only in the case of man, but also in the lower animals some such sense would seem to exist as has been frequently evidenced by the unerring instinct by which they would seem to be warned of threatening danger or disaster from an invisible enemy. The actions of this faculty then are in most cases purely reflex actions, essentially involuntary and altogether independent of the will, though generally they admit of being modified, controlled or prevented by a voluntary effort. We often wonder for example by what a singular coincidence somebody of whom we have been thinking or speaking suddenly presents himself to our view. The coincidence has found expression in a very familiar proverb. But is it not more than a coincidence? Is it not something more than mere accident or chance that conveys the impression of this particular individual figure to the brain?

From philosophy we learn that there is no such thing as chance. We are accustomed to designate as 'chance' everything the cause of which is unsuspected or unforeseen; philosophically it has no existence. In the universe all is system and gradation, because for every effect we must postulate a cause, and in the case of communication existing between living minds in the absence of any apparent mediumistic intervention the expressions recorded are sufficiently numerous and definite to preclude the possibility of mere coincidence.

In such cases, therefore, as that of which we speak, the cause would seem to be nothing more or less than the immediate though invisible, presence of this particular individual within the magnetic field of thought radiation. It is, so to speak, a sort of Siamese twin arrangement between living minds. His presence near us causes a transmission of the wave motion of thought, which sets in operation this subconscious faculty of ours, and induces, so to speak, a magnetic current which is conducted to the brain, but which is received only by a temperament of suitable reciprocal polarity. Again, many of us will have been surprised occasionally to hear a friend express an idea, which at that particular moment had occurred to our mind, and in the very exact terms in which we ourselves intended to give it expression; or it may be the fragment of a song or the snatch of a musical air which has been running in our minds to which we give no conscious expression, but which is instantly taken up by someone who doubtless has come within the radiating field of our magnetic influence.

Instances might be multiplied indefinitely showing in what a variety of forms and degrees sensibility of this kind may exhibit itself. It may exist in different forms, in different individuals, and it would seem may vary in intensity and degree according to the circumstances in which one may find himself, *e.g.*, the conductivity of the existing atmospheric conditions. I once saw a gentleman whose electrical capacity was such as to make itself felt by nearly everyone who came within a certain radius.

By a mere act of his will he could so influence them as to cause them to turn in the direction in which he happened to be, even supposing them to be quite unconscious of his presence. At any one particular instant, however, he could only so control the actions of one person—a distinct voluntary effort being required in each particular case. It was noticeable, however, that his influence made itself more felt when the weather was mild and dry, than when it was wet and foggy. Under the latter condition it was practically nil.

With purely spiritualistic phenomena, such as table turning, spirit rapping, automatic writing, apparitions, etc., etc., this article does not propose to deal. If they exist at all it is very difficult to determine how far they may be due to natural causes, and how far the preternatural element prevails. That many of these alleged phenomena are quite natural I do not for a moment doubt, and if we took the trouble to investigate the truth and to satisfy ourselves as to the conditions and limitations under which phenomena of this kind are manifested, very often we should discover them to be fraudulent deceptions and illusions practised on a too credulous public.

PATRICK SHERIDAN.

CATECHISM IN HIGHER SCHOOLS

THE legislation of the Church on the subject of catechetical instruction, and the history of her efforts to provide suitable text-books for that purpose, have been dealt with in a former Paper (I. E. RECORD, March, 1906), and they furnish the best proof of her zeal to promote the spread of religious knowledge. In that sacred cause she can never relax; for, on religious instruction depends the preservation of the faith and its transmission to future ages. Hence Pius X in his Encyclical, 15th April, 1905, urges pastors to instruct the young, and to form Confraternities of Christian Doctrine to aid in that work. He has ordered, moreover, that schools of religious knowledge be established in cities especially where universities exist. Where higher secular instruction is provided, it is meet that there also higher education in religious knowledge should not be wanting. Those who receive higher secular education in course of time become the influential and governing classes. For them elementary religious instruction is not sufficient. They have often to deal with questions of legislation, and of administration, where the principles and the interests of religion are at stake, and unless they possess a full knowledge of those principles, in spite of the most upright intentions, and the most docile spirit, they are liable to make grave mistakes.

The question, then, of higher religious instruction for those who are receiving higher secular instruction, is one of more than ordinary interest. It is a question which has engaged the attention of many minds and in many countries. It is a question, too, in which there is much to be learned from the views and the experience of others. Two French Catholic writers have treated the subject of religious instruction in higher schools. One of them, an ecclesiastic, Abbé Dementhon, in a work entitled, *Directoire de l'en-*

seignement religieux dans les maisons d'éducation,¹ treats of the organisation and method of instruction, and of the qualifications of the professor. The other, a layman, and a university professor, M. Jean Guiraud, in an article in *Le Correspondant*, 10th June, 1897, under the title, *L'Instruction religieuse dans l'enseignement secondaire*, deals with the aptitude of the professor, with the rank assigned to religious knowledge in the general plan of studies, and with the programme of religious instruction in secondary schools.

The testimony of these two writers regarding the schools of their own country may be accepted as reliable, and much may be learned from it. Both examine the question from substantially the same points of view, viz., the aptitude of the teacher, the rank assigned to religious knowledge in the general plan of studies, and the programme of religious instruction itself. Let us follow them in the study of this question, and see, first, what they say of religious instruction in higher schools in France; and second, what are the lessons of general application which their statements suggest.

I.

Secondary schools in France are divided into two classes, viz., the State establishments, called *lycées* and colleges, and the *écoles libres*, or the colleges and seminaries managed by the clergy. The number of the latter is somewhat diminished in consequence of the suppression of the religious orders; but many such establishments still exist under the direction of the secular clergy. In the State schools, though the Church has been disestablished, chaplains are still maintained for the purpose of imparting religious instruction. What, then, are the qualifications of the teachers of religious knowledge in those establishments? In the *lycées*, secular instruction is given by lay professors. Religious instruction

¹ *Directoire de l'Enseignement religieux dans les Maisons d'éducation*, par l'abbé Ch. Dementhon. Third edition. Paris, 1898.

L'Instruction religieuse dans l'Enseignement secondaire, par Jean Guiraud (*Le Correspondant*, 10 juin, 1897).

La Suppression des Pensionnats chrétiens, et l'Enseignement libre des Jeunes Filles, par Fénélon Gibon. (Reprinted from *Le Correspondant*), Paris, 1906.

is left exclusively to the chaplain. The chaplain is appointed with the concurrence of the diocesan authorities. As he is necessarily brought into relation with lay professors, who have received a university training, the person selected for that office is usually an ecclesiastic of more than average culture and attainments. From the ranks of chaplains to *lycées*, not a few have been promoted to the episcopal bench. As a general rule, therefore, the teacher of religious knowledge in the *lycées* is a man of scholarly attainments, who has obtained a degree in Arts, or Theology, and to him is confided the entire religious instruction in the establishment.


What is the position of the *écoles libres* in this respect ? Here all the professors are usually priests. They have received the professional training which the diocesan seminaries or the Catholic Institutes afford. In some respects they are less favourably circumstanced as teachers of religious knowledge than the chaplains of *lycées*. In the *lycées* the religious instruction is confined to one ; in the free colleges it is usually divided amongst several. In 1896 an inquiry was made on this point, and replies were received from 89 Catholic colleges. In 74 of these the religious instruction was apportioned amongst the professors of various classes. Fifteen establishments had a professor whose exclusive function it was to take charge of the religious instruction. In one establishment the staff shared the labour of the classes of religious knowledge amongst them, relieving each other by turns every quarter. No doubt a good professor of classics, or of mathematics, or of history, may make an excellent professor of Christian doctrine ; but it is hardly rash to affirm that other things being equal, the man who has only one work to engage his attention, is likely to do it with greatest efficiency.

In what concerns the choice and aptitude of the professor of religious knowledge, the balance seems to incline in favour of the public schools. But it is far otherwise in what concerns the place of religious knowledge in the general plan of studies. The *lycées* admit students of all creeds, or of none ; Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Atheists.

In them religious instruction is indeed provided for. But there exists a conscience clause of the widest kind. In virtue of a law of 1881, non-Catholic students are exempted altogether from attendance at religious instruction. Even Catholic students are exempted, if their parents request it. Hence attendance at the classes of religious instruction is, to a large extent, voluntary. In one *lycée*, writes M. Guiraud, out of four hundred pupils, one hundred did not attend the classes of Christian Doctrine. In another, where the number of pupils was also about four hundred only twenty were exempted from religious instruction. The voluntary character of the attendance of the pupils naturally tends to lessen the authority of the professor. Severity on his part would only serve to increase the number of absentees.

So much for the attendance. What is the amount of time set apart for Christian doctrine in the state establishment? As a general rule in each division, religious instruction is given for one hour per week; a half hour is altogether exceptional. But while the time allowed is on the whole sufficient, the rank assigned to religious instruction in the general plan of studies is far from satisfactory. It is true, premiums are awarded for excellence in that subject. But on the day of the solemn public distribution of prizes, no mention is made of the honours attained in religious knowledge. It ranks on the list of school subjects with drawing, gymnastics, or music. In a word, while religious instruction is retained in order to satisfy parents, in practice it is relegated to a position of inferiority, and its success or failure depends to a large extent on the personal qualities of the professor. Nor is the liberty of the chaplain complete. On 16th April, 1903, a ministerial circular forbade the chaplains to read or comment on the Pastorals of bishops in the chapels of *lycées* and colleges. In 1906, the present Minister of Instruction has slightly relaxed the prohibition and permits the reading of pastorals which treat of dogma or morals, but rigorously prohibits the reading of such as contain political allusions, '*Qui ont un caractère nettement politique.*'

In the free colleges religious instruction holds a more favourable place. Yet Abbé Dementhon does not hesitate to say, that, in general, religious instruction does not occupy in French Catholic establishments its due place, nor produce the results which might justly be expected. 'Even in ecclesiastical establishments,' he writes, 'not excepting the *petits séminaires*, religious instruction properly so-called, occupies too small a place. Barely one hour a week is devoted to it, and the students are disposed to look upon it as a free class (*une classe de repos*). Nor does this appreciation seem too severe. M. Guiraud, after an inquiry made in 82 free colleges, states that, in 34 establishments the time devoted to religious instruction was one hour per week; in 11 it was one hour and a half; in 21 two hours; in two establishments three hours; in four three hours and a half; and four others three hours. But in these latter instances the time of preparation was reckoned as well as that of class. All establishments of secondary education in France ambition the honour of the Baccalaureate for their students at the end of their course. This ambition, however laudable, is not without its influence on religious instruction. In some Catholic colleges, writes M. Guiraud, the class of religious instruction was discontinued after Easter; in others it was dispensed with during the whole of the second



instruction, its position with reference to secondary religious education, leaves much to be desired. Religious instruction in convent schools, he considers superior to that imparted in colleges for boys. The nuns devoted greater attention to that subject, and in the larger convents an advanced course of catechism was taught by the chaplain. But if in the past there was room for criticism, the future gives reason for serious alarm. The existence of Catholic secondary schools for boys is seriously menaced : and their pupils may eventually be driven into the public schools. One half the convents of France have been closed.¹ Of the 80,000 girls who were receiving education in convent schools, 40,000 must seek it elsewhere. Many of them will drift into the *lycées* and colleges for girls. In 1906, 41 *lycées* and 40 colleges for girls are in full exercise ; and the number of their pupils has increased since last year by 3,629 students. To some of those establishments the Bishops have declined to appoint Chaplains, and, consequently, in them there is no provision for higher religious instruction. What will be the practical fruit of the education received in them ? One who knows their working and their spirit, Mlle. Reval, writes, " Admit it or not, as you please, *lycées* for girls lead up to the socialistic idea, by emancipating the intellect of women."

Such, then, is the rank assigned to Christian Doctrine in the public and in the free schools in France. In the *lycées* the organisation of religious instruction rests with the chaplain. It belongs to him to select the text-book and to draft the programme. The Statutes of the diocese of Paris on this point may be taken as an index of the prevailing usage. They are to the following effect :—

Religious instruction shall be given in each *lycée* or college according to the order adopted in concert with the Provisor or Superior of the establishment and approved by our Vicar-General, charged with that portion of administration.

It shall comprise three divisions : instruction in preparation for first Communion, instruction which may be called of perseverance for the grammar classes, and higher instruction for the

¹ *La Suppression des Pensionnats chrétiens et l'Enseignement libre des Jeunes Filles*, par Fénelon Gibon, 1906 ; pp. 8, 23.

classes of Humanity, Rhetoric, and Philosophy. This higher instruction shall likewise be given to the pupils of the classes preparing for entrance to the great Government schools.

It is very important that by means of these three divisions religious instruction be always proportioned to the intelligence of the students, and correspond with the development of their literary and scientific studies. Chaplains shall devote the greatest attention to each of these stages of religious instruction.¹

We may take it as certain that in general a full and methodical course of religious instruction is imparted in the *lycées*. But the old maxim of Horace, 'Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurrit,' is true of professors as of other men. Originality, like genius, is irrepressible. And M. Guiraud, from his own experience, mentions instances, no doubt exceptional, where the class of religious instruction was devoted to a learned and interesting exposition of questions such as the cuneiform inscriptions, the height of the tower of Babel, or the astronomical science of the Chaldeans, or the history of the great men in various walks of life, whom the Church throughout ages has produced. All this is very interesting, but a lecture on such subjects, however erudite, does not supply the place of a systematic course of higher religious instruction.

In the free colleges the programme of religious instruction is similar to that prescribed in the Statutes of Paris. But as the classes are divided amongst several professors it is difficult to attain unity of method to the same extent as in the *lycées*. However, substantial unity is practically attained by the adoption of a text book. In forty-five establishments, writes M. Guiraud, the *Cour d'instruction religieuse*, by Mgr. Cauly, Vicar-General of Rheims, is adopted. Ten use the *Commentaire du Catéchisme* by Abbé Poey; ten make use of Schouppe's Dogmatic Catechism; a few have adopted the catechism by Gaume, or that of Guillois: while some follow the *Cours d'Apologetique* by M. Gourand. In the *lycées* and in the free schools lessons in apologetics are given to the advanced students, while the less advanced,

¹ *Statuts synodaux du Diocèse du Paris, promulgués dans le synode de 1902; p. 54.*

in addition to the text of the catechism, are taught to understand the liturgy of the Church, and made acquainted with the salient facts in sacred and in ecclesiastical history. All this instruction belongs to the department of class work. But religious formation is not the work of the class-room alone. In both classes of schools there are also religious and devotional exercises in the Church. In the ecclesiastical establishments the pupils are trained to daily practices of piety by morning prayer and a short meditation, and by spiritual reading at night prayer.

Thus the formation of heart and head go on simultaneously. But all things human are liable to imperfection, and exposed to censure, and there are not wanting persons inclined to believe that in the free schools the outcome of religious instruction has been rather to form men of pious habits than of strong convictions. Yet it is men of deep and well grounded convictions that are best fitted for the battle of life, and best able when placed in positions of influence to defend the interests of religion.

II.

The question of higher religious instruction interests Catholics in all countries, and the foregoing outline of the manner in which it is conducted in France, cannot fail to be suggestive. Every man may judge of the efficiency of religious instruction, if he takes into account the aptitude of the teacher, the rank assigned to religious knowledge, and the programme of instruction.

All priests are by vocation teachers of religion, but their efficiency in that task depends to a large extent on the preparation they have received to fit them for it. This is true in the case of elementary religious instruction, much more, in the case of that which is higher. The preparation of young priests for the work of instruction has engaged the attention of many minds, and has led to many schemes being formulated. It has been suggested that seminary students, towards the end of their course should be made to take part in Church work; or that young priests should be retained at the diocesan cathedral

for some time to learn by experience the method of pastoral work. But when it comes to practice, these schemes are difficult or impossible to carry out, and there remains hardly anything practically possible, except that those destined for the office of imparting higher religious instruction should themselves have received higher formation; and that where possible the whole of the religious instruction should be in the hands or at least under the direction of one person.

The time set apart for religious instruction, and its rank amongst educational subjects, has received attention elsewhere than in France. In the Report of the Meeting of the Catholic Educational Association, held at St. Louis in July, 1904, the following account is given of the rank assigned to religious instruction in the high school at Philadelphia :—

Every pupil has two hours a week for four years, in classes of formal religious instruction. Bible History is taught to the freshman class, and Church history to the three higher years, one hour a week. Christian doctrine, and Church ceremonial are taught for one hour a week through the first three years, while lectures are delivered weekly to the students in the fourth year, on Ethics and Christian apologetics. The class periods are opened and closed with prayer, the Angelus is said at mid-day, Mass is said once a week, and the Way of the Cross is a weekly devotion during Lent.¹

In the German public schools religious knowledge ranks with the other educational subjects. The professor of religion is on a level with the professors of other branches, and not in a position of inferiority. A French writer, M. Goyau, in an essay entitled *Formation religieuse de l'étudiant allemand* (Lille, 1898) attributes the hold which religion exercises over German students at the universities to the solidity of the religious instruction they receive in the *gymasia*, and to the importance attached to religious knowledge at the official examinations. Wherever due time is not set apart for religious instruction,

¹ Catholic Educational Association. *Report of the first Annual Meeting held at St. Louis, July, 1904*, p. 62.

where the pupils come to regard it as a *classe de repos* or where the competition for honours in secular subjects leads to its omission, it can never be efficient.

The programme, too, of religious instruction deserves attention in all countries. Many works have been written to aid teachers in drafting a programme of instruction, for first communicants, and for such as frequent the catechism of perseverance. Amongst these, Spirago's method of Christian Doctrine, by Bishop Mesmer, deserves special mention. Such a programme should comprise the text of the large catechism, the outlines of the history of the Old and New Testament, with the elements of Church history.

But works indicating a programme of religious instruction for students attending the upper classes in higher schools are difficult to find. The *Directoire de l'Enseignement religieux dans les maisons d'éducation* by the Abbé Dementhon will be found useful. Students from fifteen to eighteen years of age require something more than the elements of religious knowledge. They ought to know, not only what the Church teaches, but they ought to be able to give an account of the faith which is in them. Hence, for them a fuller course of Christian Doctrine such as that contained in Schouppe's *Dogmatic Catechism*, or in Father Gerard's *Course of Religious Instruction for Catholic Youth*, together with a fuller history of religion, is requisite.

But it may be asked what place should be assigned to apologetics in a course of higher religious instruction? If by apologetics we mean a clear exposition of doctrine, combined with solid proofs of the dogmas of religion, nothing is more necessary. But apologetics in the ordinary acceptance of the term, that is a statement of the objections of non-believers, and a refutation of them, is a method of instruction not suited to all. For two classes of persons apologetics is necessary, for those who are struggling towards the truth, and are held back by plausible objections, and for those whose faith is wavering by reason of the attacks to which it is exposed.

To the former apologetics proves that faith is not

opposed to the requirements of human reason; to the latter it demonstrates that divine truth has nothing to fear from the progress of science. But for those whose education is still incomplete, the method of exposition and dogmatic proof of the truths of religion is most appropriate. Some there may be who in their enthusiasm claim that young men should be made acquainted with the objections of Rationalists, with the method of apologetics, styled that of immanence; and that even social questions, such as the relations of Capital and Labour, Church and State, and the like should find a place in the programme of religious instruction. For young men who have passed on to universities, there is much to be said in favour of such a programme. But it is hardly appropriate to students in the higher classes of secondary schools. Speaking of Church students, the learned Bishop of Newport writes:¹—

I am distinctly of opinion that even in classes of philosophy, theology, and scripture, the placing of objections before the imaginations of the students should be most carefully restrained. I have said 'the imagination,' although we are here speaking of the intelligence—and for this reason: The mind of the ordinary student sustains little damage from the contemplation of difficult objections, so long as the imagination is not seized by them. For example, the refutation of the Pantheism of David de Dinando, or even of Spinoza may be attempted without much mental disturbance. But this is not so with the agnosticism of Huxley, or the rationalism of Martineau, or the destructive criticism of Driver, because these men are alive and can write, and can set a hundred strings vibrating, some of which are sure to pass through our own nervous system. The true method, as it seems to me, is to state objections in the terms of pure reason. This is quite sufficient for science, and will furnish the student with all that he requires. In the answers supplied the professor need by no means confine himself to pure reason . . . for we know that we have the truth, and no lawful means of securing and justifying the truth can be objected to.

For similar reasons it would not be advisable to give students access to modern books against religion or the faith, of the kind here referred to, or to allow them to disturb and defile their minds with the free speculations and hostile criticism which are met with everywhere in the countless periodicals of the day. It

¹ *Lex Levitarum*. By Most Rev. Dr. Headley, pp. 36, 37.

is not that, in itself truth cannot be relied upon to win the battle against error. But *per accidens* truth is often in a position to get the worst of it, that is to say, it may be, under given circumstances, impossible to present truth completely or adequately or convincingly. And unless an objection can be not only answered, but destroyed—as far as the nature of the case admits—there is always a danger to immature minds.

If this is true of Church students, much more in the case of those whose education is less advanced. Young men require to be well grounded in the teaching of the Church, and taught where to seek further information. If this is done the objections of unbelievers will make but little impression on them. But if their religious formation is largely emotional, their faith may be rudely shaken by the dangers to which they may be exposed while prosecuting their higher professional studies.

The place given to Christian Doctrine in higher schools is therefore a question which merits the attention of all interested in the welfare of youth. Earnest men in France have not shrunk from the study of it. In 1895, Cardinal Lecot, Archbishop of Bordeaux, addressing the Congress of the *Oeuvres de la Jeunesse*, used the following words:—

In ecclesiastical colleges the teaching of religion is almost always backward, old-fashioned, and given with indifference . . . Generally they aim first of all at competing for success with other establishments; they seek to be able to inscribe on their roll of honour the largest possible number of candidates admitted to the Baccalaureate. Hence they content themselves with teaching the catechism of perseverance in a hasty and superficial manner.¹

These are not the words of one who looks upon the French clergy as sinners, in this respect, beyond all men upon the earth. They are not a reproach but a call to duty. The injunction of Pius X on the subject of catechism and on the establishment of schools of Christian Doctrine in university cities, brings the question of religious instruction home to all.

PATRICK BOYLE, C.M.

¹ Apud Dementhon. *Directoire de l'Enseignement religieux*, vol. I., p. 29; 3rd edition.

RELIGION AS A CREDIBLE DOCTRINE

I.

RELIGION AND THE GOD OF PHILOSOPHY

MR. MALLOCK opens this part of his enquiry by insisting that an argument which proves the existence of conscious, purposive Mind is wholly useless for the theist. This is evidently untrue. The existence of such a conscious, purposive Mind as the theist demonstrates disproves Monism, and is a precious link in that chain of reasoning which leads up to the existence of the God of ethical theism.

This point apart, Mr. Mallock's first chapter on God is an effort to prove that the argument from design in the inorganic world to the existence of a conscious, purposive Mind is rendered wholly invalid by the discoveries of modern science. That the argument proves the existence of Mind, Mr. Mallock concedes; that this mind is conscious and purposive outside a number of local and temporary centres, namely, individual lives, is according to him unproved and unprovable.

Mr. Mallock explains the order and harmony of the inorganic world by the action of a self-energising something devoid alike of consciousness and of purpose. The only clue he gives as to the nature of this self-energising something—it is called Mind—is the statement that the order of the universe is a physical platitude, and that stars are bodies, which unless they moved uniformly, would not exist at all. Inorganic nature, therefore, explains itself by the forces of nature. Matter cannot exist without movement, and movement explains everything. Waiving the questions of the origin, both of the matter and of the movement, the theist maintains that matter plus movement does not account for the inorganic universe. It is not sufficient to cover a canvas with paints

of various tints to produce the Transfiguration. Only one handling of the brush, and only one guiding ideal can create a masterpiece. And so with regard to the movements and forces of the inorganic world. That world displays a wondrous order, an order capable of being produced only by very specific movement. The processes leading thereto are in their details inconceivably more intricate than any processes invented by man. A thousand millions of paths lay open to confusion and disorder! Why ever the one safe road? If no guiding principle dominates the atoms and the molecules, why do these atoms and molecules, each independent of the other, each capable of an infinity of different directions, ever follow precisely that direction which the existence of order demands. There must be some reason for that. Science tells us that matter is inert, and that in motion it is indifferent as to the precise direction of the motion. Yet science tells us that each atom, each molecule has its own peculiar rôle to play in the cosmos, and must be possessed of very definite properties to play that rôle; and that through myriad changes of time and place and circumstance, each atom does persistently play the one rôle necessary for the maintenance of universal order. Such facts demand explanation. To call these atoms, these molecules, unknown somethings, and to suppose them self-energising and self-directing without any interplay of consciousness and of purpose, is to hide facts under other names without explaining them. Man knows of but one power that can produce order amidst variety, of but one means capable of directing the operation of a multitude of forces to harmonised results—namely, the purposive action of intelligent Mind. To intelligence and to mind must be ascribed the order and the harmony of the inorganic world. Without mind, without purpose, without consciousness, man has never seen the like accomplished; therefore he must conclude to mind, to purpose, to consciousness. And mind of what calibre? Superior to man's? Certainly, for the order realised is so stupendously superior in extent and in detail to his own work that the greatest intellects can but dimly and partially

apprehend it. 'We live,' says Professor Huxley, 'in a small bright oasis of knowledge, surrounded on all sides by a vast unexplored region of impenetrable mystery. From age to age, the strenuous labour of successive generations wins a small strip from the desert, and pushes forward the boundary of knowledge,' but the known remains always finite, the unknown always infinite.

And why does Mr. Mallock reject our conclusion? Because the theistic argument derives its whole force from the assumption that mind and consciousness are coextensive, and because modern science has shown up the fallacy of this assumption. In proof of which, Mr. Mallock cites the development of the baby from unconsciousness to consciousness, the surprising facts of heredity which prove transmission of thought through long periods of unconsciousness, and an apologist's admission of the reality of the unconscious activities of the human mind. These proofs are worthless.

If Mr. Mallock would dare to maintain that the baby's early stages of consciousness—which he describes as unconsciousness—is capable of producing such order and such harmony as the scientific analysis of the inorganic world reveals, he has indeed formulated an objection to the argument. But his plea would be on the face of it senseless and absurd. Moreover, the supposition that the baby is at first unconscious is opposed to the best scientific evidence. Psychologists admit that the infant displays growth of consciousness consequent on the development of the sensory faculties, but they maintain that even during the first weeks of its life baby possesses a vague, indefinite, drowsy consciousness. As for the surprising facts of heredity, we have seen that Mr. Mallock's reading of these facts is false. Even were his reading of these facts true, the transmission of thought through long periods of unconsciousness has nothing to say to an argument that is based on the principle—order, uniform, constant and universal, amid unceasing change, postulates purposive Intelligence. And precisely, the same criticism disposes of his citation about the unconscious activities of the

mind. Has Mr. Mallock missed his way, then? No, he is evidently trying to prove that 'unconscious mind' is as capable of executing the wonderful order of the world as conscious mind. What Mr. Mallock means by 'unconscious mind' is writ large on every page of his book: for him the 'unconscious mind' is the 'self-energising unknown something,' 'the self-energising matter.' In defence of such a view, the reality of the unconscious activities of the human mind, and the growth of baby consciousness prove nothing. Thought may work unconsciously, but it must exist in that spiritual thing called mind. Baby, too, may have intervals of unconsciousness, but it has ever within it a mind, the principle of consciousness. Consciousness is not necessarily continuous, but there is a real, indivisible unity binding the series of conscious processes into an individual self. Consciousness on the admission of all scientists can never spring from such unconscious mind as Mr. Mallock describes. The chasm, wrote Tyndall, between material and mental phenomena is intellectually impassible. Mr. Mallock's contention amounts to this, that every chemical atom and molecule in the universe, every grain of sand on the seashore, and every drop of water in the ocean is possessed of that power of mind which can evolve order out of chaos! If he repudiates such teaching, he must accept the ignominy of having failed completely to account for what we see about us.

What of his effort to exclude purpose from that mind which accounts for the order of the universe? To our proof of purpose, Mr. Mallock objects that during the period of gestation the most intricate functions of maternity are being performed without any purposive intention on the part either of mother or of foetus! One feels certain that it was a mere oversight on Mr. Mallock's part not to have added—and of the father! True these functions are performed without the conscious direction of the human mind. But what right has Mr. Mallock to conclude that they are therefore performed without the conscious direction of any mind? To conclude so, is it not to contradict

human experience of all this? God, the author of all things is behind His work, and every movement of creation betrays His presence.

Mr. Mallock admitting *causa argumenti* the existence of a conscious and purposive Mind proceeds to lay down that the facts of the universe do not prove the wisdom of such a mind. Kant was awed by the sight of the starry heavens, but continues Mr. Mallock Kant's emotion belonged to a pre-scientific age. This is interesting reading in view of the historical fact that Kant when only thirty years of age anticipated in his *Theory of the Heavens* the Nebular Hypothesis which was afterwards to be the glory of La Place and Herschel. Thirty years later, Kant the philosopher of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, denied the scientific value of the argument from design. His admiration of the starry heavens was part of his thought in the later *Critique of Practical Reason*. Kant knew as well as Mr. Mallock that the stars are 'bodies which unless they moved uniformly, would not be bodies at all, and would exist neither in movement nor in rest.' But the author of the *Critique of Practical Reason* regarded that uniform movement as the result of a divine law attached to matter at the creation. Matter attracts matter in virtue of divine laws. When Kant looked at the movements of the heaven from that point of view, it is not wonderful that their immensity and their order aroused awe. That awe, however, never entered into the Königsberg philosopher's proofs of God's existence.

Mr. Mallock has not brought to light any fact that weakens the force of the argument from the order of the inorganic world. Science can discover nothing in nature itself capable of effecting that order, and we are but applying the methods of science in inferring the wisdom and purpose of the Designer from the complex purposes and adaptations revealed in the organic universe. 'Quoi ! le monde formé prouverait moins une intelligence que le monde expliqué !'

II.

SENTIENT LIFE AND ETHICAL THEISM.

Throughout this part of his work, Mr. Mallock does not contest the existence of God. He admits the existence of a personal God, he assumes that theists generally admit evolution as the process by which sentient beings came into existence, and then surveying the facts of the universe, he asserts that sentient existence and its accompanying circumstances deny any theist the right of claiming infinite wisdom, and preferential love for man for this personal God. Mr. Mallock is arguing *ad hominem* throughout this chapter, and therefore to judge of the strength of his attack, we must define precisely the theistic position. Stripped of theological technicalities and confined to the precise point at issue, the theistic doctrine is that God does not intend the final well-being of any living creature save man ; that man is to be perfectly happy, not here, but hereafter ; that for man's utility God has created the rest of the visible universe. The value of the theory of evolution need not detain us, for its acceptance or rejection throws but little light on the solution of the difficulties which Mr. Mallock raises.

His first objection is that of frustrated purpose takingly put in a comparison between God and a marksman. The seeming force of this objection arises from the fact that Mr. Mallock has unintentionally falsified the theistic position. No theist holds that God intended the perfect production and the perfect adaptation of all living things to their material surroundings.

The theistic thesis is—the order of the inorganic world, the origin of organic life, the evolution and permanence of countless living organisms, the existence of skilfully contrived organs, the adaptation of brute matter, and of the animal and vegetable kingdoms to man's need, the existence of the innumerable, ever-recurring laws of the organic world,—these and a host of other facts prove indubitably the existence of a designer of superhuman intelligence. By the application of the principle of causality,

the theist reaches the further conclusion of a self-existent Intelligence, and then reasoning on the perfections which such a Being must possess, the theist finds amongst others those of infinite wisdom and infinite goodness. Maintaining then stoutly that arguments from frustrated purpose do not weaken the conclusion drawn from so many other stupendous revelations of law and order in the universe, we admit frankly that we cannot in all cases explain this seeming waste and frustration. My mind is finite, and the mind about whose operations I am judging is confessedly infinite. Because I do not see the why, am I to conclude that there is *no* why? But rejoins Mr. Mallock, your thesis is to infer God's wisdom from the observable facts of nature! Yes, and I concluded from these to the existence of a designer of superhuman wisdom. The *infinite* wisdom of that Designer is not *directly* provable from the facts of nature. By the light of unaided reason, I can prove the superhuman designer self-existent, and from that attribute of self-existence, I deduce the *infinity* of His wisdom.

Further, all living germs that do not develop into full-grown beings are not therefore wasted. On theistic principles, the intentional sacrifice of millions of irrational creatures for man's sake is wholly reasonable.

And indeed everywhere we find irrational creatures supplying the wants of human nature. They serve mankind partly by providing nourishment, clothing, shelter and other bodily conveniences; partly by stirring up their intellects and wills to the pursuits of arts and sciences, and by leading them through the knowledge of creatures to that of the Creator; and last but not least, by affording opportunities for the practice of moral virtues, patience especially, and resignation to the inscrutable ways of the Creator.

Illustration of what our defence amounts to is afforded by a minute examination of that on which Mr. Mallock bases his whole case—the seemingly wasteful process of human conception. That God should have created or should have caused to evolve two human organisms, that He should have differentiated these organisms into sexes, that He should ordain things in such a way that spermatzoa

cells should be built up within our body, and ova cells within the other, that He should have implanted certain instincts in virtue of which despite the suggestions of egoism, the power of free-will and the onerous obligations of parentage, the propagation of the human species should be assured, that from the coalescence of human spermatozoon with the human ovum, human beings and no others should result—these and the myriad other accompanying details regarding the organisms of these spermatozoa which scientists are daily learning to be more and more intricate, and which nevertheless God ever attains with unerring accuracy, points to the existence and continual guidance of an intelligence incomparably superior to that of man's. But to produce one man, spermatozoa without number, innumerable potential souls, are wasted ! Wasted ? Yes, for they find no ovum. But was that certainly their purpose ? Who can tell us so ? What can a finite creature know of the purposes of the Infinite ? We see evident signs of superhuman intelligence and guidance at innumerable stages of the drama of human conception, and more especially in *the internal structure of each of these apparently useless spermatozoa*. Reason proves to us that this superhuman intelligence is self-existent, is infinite. A moment comes and the light fails us—is it rational to measure our intellects with the divine and to cry out 'failure ?' 'I feel,' wrote Darwin, speaking of the existence of evil, 'I feel most deeply that the whole subject is too profound for the human intellect. A dog might as well speculate on the mind of Newton.'

How much [continues Father Gerard] is there in the actions of persons much lower than Newton which to the most intelligent of animals, dogs, elephants, or monkeys, could they speculate at all, must seem wholly devoid of sense ; as for instance that men should spend such continual labour in digging and ploughing. So again, in his famous lecture on Coal, Professor Huxley depicts what might have been the reflections of a great reptile of the Carboniferous Epoch, suggested by the seemingly senseless waste of nature's powers in the production of the primeval forests, that have furnished the coal measures, to which so much of our progress and civilization is directly due.

Mr. Mallock's transference of his case from the wasted turnip seeds to the wasted spermatozoa calls for remark. Is his objection therefore stronger? In his eyes, evidently so, for he speaks of potential souls. This is mere rhetoric. There is no such thing as a potential human soul; the human soul is created by God and is, or is not. Before its union with the ovum, the human spermatozoon is just a living cell as any other cell, and the loss of millions of human spermatozoa at that stage of their existence has as little and as much to do with the very sacrament of creation, 'the being for which God died,' 'the seed whose growth will be like the kingdom of heaven,' as has the loss of the innumerable cells that results every time a child burns its finger. From all which is evident that the process of human conception raises a point to which we have no reply. At the same time, what we do see justifies us in upholding wise designs, even in those particulars in which we can not discern them.

Mr. Mallock next raises the question of the birth and sacrifice of the unfit. Here a sharp distinction must be drawn between men and animals, and between moral and physical evils. In such an imperfect world as ours, the furtherance of man's ends demands the sacrifice and the sufferings of irrational creatures, and from this point of view—we shall discuss the reason of this imperfection in the world later on—there is no necessity of justifying animal suffering. Moreover, scientists who have given their lives to the study of animal life tell us that this outcry on animal suffering is in great part mere exaggerated sentimentality. A. R. Wallace writes in his *Darwinism*, pp. 37-40 :—

There is good reason to believe that all this is greatly exaggerated, that the supposed torments and miseries of animals have little real existence, but are the reflexion of the imagined sensations of cultivated men and women in similar circumstances, and that the amount of actual suffering caused by the struggle for existence is altogether insignificant. On the whole, we conclude that the popular idea of the struggle for existence, entailing misery and pain on the animal world, is the very reverse of the truth. What it really brings about is the maximum of

life and the enjoyment of life, with the minimum of suffering and pain. Given the necessity of death and reproduction—and without these there could have been no progressive development of the organic world—and it is difficult to imagine a system by which a greater balance of happiness could have been secured. And this view was evidently that of Darwin himself, who thus concludes his chapter on the struggle for existence: 'When we reflect upon this struggle, we may console ourselves with the full belief that the war of nature is not incessant, that no fear is felt, that death is generally prompt, and that the vigorous, the healthy, and the happy survive and multiply.'

And in the *Nineteenth Century*, November, 1890, Prince Kropotkin wrote:—

How false, therefore, is the view of those who speak of the animal world as if nothing were to be seen in it but lions and hyenas, plunging their bleeding teeth into the flesh of their victims. One might as well imagine that the whole of human life is nothing but a succession of Tel-el-Kebir and Geok-tepé massacres.

Coming to the sufferings of men, the distinction between moral and physical evil robs the objection of more than half its force. 'Man's inhumanity to man makes countless thousands mourn.' Many physical evils remain. But in looking on the mystery of pain we must not forget the mystery of painlessness, and that these physical sufferings have cropped up in lives that have been long happy. Huxley speaks somewhere of the happiness of men, and rightly ridicules him who grumbles disconsolately because of a toothache which lasts one out of the twenty-four hours; and the dying Gladstone said to a sympathizing friend: 'True, I have had much pain during the last six months, but you must remember that I have been twice eighty-six times six months free from pain.' And Sir Henry Thompson after a life-time spent in contact with pain, wrote in *The Unknown God*, p. 85:—

I am now assured, by evidence which I could not resist, that all which man with his limited knowledge and experience has learned to regard as due to supreme power and wisdom, is also associated with the exercise of an absolutely beneficent influence over all living things, of every grade, which exist within its range. And the result of my labour has brought me its own

reward, by conferring emancipation from the fetters of all the creeds, and unshakable confidence in the power, the wisdom, and the beneficence which pervade and rule the universe.

There is another side to the problem of pain. 'Pain is but the prayer of a nerve for healthy blood.' Besides, physical pain is one of the strongest instruments of moral education and refinement. 'Poverty and sickness teach man most forcibly his own nothingness. . . . The blood of martyrs became the fertile seed of Christianity.' For man, 'there can be no nobility without conflict, no real happiness without sorrow as a counterpart, no sympathy without pain.'

We submit, then, that the birth and sacrifice of unfit animals is not the whole story, that so far as it is true it emphasises merely physical evils, that these evils seem necessary to prevent surplus population and to make the world habitable for man, that therefore it implies no wanton cruelty on the Creator's part.

The suffering implied in the birth and sacrifice of unfit human beings is traceable either to the abuse of free-will or to physical laws. Such suffering as follows from abuse of the gift of liberty is not to be laid to God's account. Yet, God may employ this suffering as well as that arising from purely physical causes for the higher and nobler development of man's nature here and hereafter. But, rejoins Mr. Mallock, the assumption of a hereafter is not a conclusion drawn from the observable facts of nature. We deny that, for we think Mr. Mallock's attempt to disprove the immortality of the soul was not convincing.

The world is not built, then, on cruel lines; and feeble though our intellects be, they are able to grasp the blessedness of pain. But Mr. Mallock would probably insist—why such suffering as does actually exist, why not a world of happy, ever-smiling angels? We know not. That is a Divine secret. We only know that God must have had sufficient reason for His creation of this imperfect world. To conclude that there can be no sufficient reason in God's handiwork, because we can see none, is simply the delirium of intellectual conceit. However weak, or unfit or criminal,

certain human beings have come into existence, they will on their exit be judged only for that for which they are responsible—their good or bad use of their opportunities and of that with which they started life. God in creating them has done them no injustice, for their sufferings are but preparations for higher things. Even on earth, there are better things than health and wealth and happiness—character and goodness; and these are within the reach of all suffering humanity. No need, then, that God's future be an apology for His past. In His relations with His creatures, He has ever been the God of Goodness and of Love.

Science is inexorable, then,—yes, but religion has nothing to fear. Rightly interpreted, science is the strongest proof of these three central doctrines of religion. God, loving and good, and the soul free and immortal are the apex of the universe of law and reason, precisely because that universe was fashioned by His hand to house the soul during the days of trial.

J. O'NEILL.

THE TRIAL AND EXECUTION OF FATHER QUIGLEY

AMONG the records of so-called judicial proceedings which disgraced the period of British Government and its administration of the law at the period of the Rebellion, there are few to compare with the trial and execution of Father James Quigley. History, as written for us by Froude and others, represents this unfortunate priest as 'a rabid rebel,' a man caught red-handed in the act of carrying treasonable documents from the Directory of the United Irishmen in this country to the French Directory. One has, however, only to read the bare, bald narrative of the proceedings of his unjust trial at Maidstone, even as found in *Howell's State Trials*—one has only to read, even as given there, the report of the trial to see clearly demonstrated the innocence of the unhappy man, and the failure of the prosecution to prove by legal evidence any of the charges alleged against him. It is now clear that Father Quigley had no connection with the United Irishmen, and that he carried no document from them, and that he was not their emissary. No evidence of his complicity in any Association was given, and the judge in his charge omitted to point out that fatal blot in the proofs. The circumstances attending the alleged discovery on his person of the incriminating paper indisputably show that no sane man would consciously carry about him so dangerous a document in so absolutely and palpably reckless a manner, as if courting discovery. The Attorney-General laid down the principle of law unchallenged, that the possession of a treasonable document was evidence of guilt if the person knew its contents; but he assumed possession to imply that knowledge and approval—a most dangerous and unfounded extension of the law.

The document purported to be from the Secret Com-

mittee in England to the Executive Directory of France, and it had no connection with the Irish organization, yet in every account of the trial Father Quigley is represented as if he were an agent of the Irish body. No proof was given at the trial of his connection with any organization, English or Irish, and the attempt was made to discredit the Reform movement in England by associating it with the excesses of the Revolutionists in France, but it was unsuccessful. He steadily and strenuously denied knowledge of the incriminating document all through and with his last breath. To prove his privity with the French Government a passport was produced, not found on his person, but in a fellow-prisoner Binns' trunk, and no proof of its being his was given. One of the Crown witnesses was so notorious a character that a record of his achievements is interesting. He was dismissed by one master for theft, had lodged a criminal charge against another, had given evidence at Downpatrick Assizes against a man who was hanged, and he had written to the Secretary of State offering to give evidence. It is clear he was a perjured ruffian, and that he was employed to do the job he volunteered for and did in the Quigley trial. He is the type of the Crown witness, and it was on the tainted testimony of such a man Father Quigley lost his life. This infamous character admitted that he laid informations against twenty unfortunate men in Ireland. The Crown lawyers expressed astonishment and indignation when it was stated in court by the counsel for the prisoner, that the witnesses for the prosecution were ignominiously called spies, hirelings engaged to swear away life and liberty. The Crown lawyers preferred to call those infamous instruments '*Gentlemen who have been instrumental in advancing the public justice of the country.*' Dutton, one of the spies used in the Quigley case, rose through his services in court from the position of a footman to that of quarter-master, and such tempting rewards produced their plentiful crop of witnesses to prove anything. Not a single witness at the trial was a man of reliability, or one upon whose testimony the proverbial cat would be hanged, yet through such Father Quigley

lost his life—was judicially murdered. Father Quigley did not know, and had never seen previously, several of the witnesses brought against him, and yet they swore to facts of common knowledge.

At Maidstone, in Kent, on the 21st of May, 1798, the trial of James O'Coigley (alias James Quigley, alias James John Fioey) opened. With him were Arthur O'Connor and others. O'Connor was a man of high social position, and an array of witnesses testified to his character such as were never seen in a court of justice. We find Charles James Fox, Henry Grattan, Thomas Erskine, Richard Brinsley Sheridan, the Earl of Sheffield, the Duke of Norfolk all bearing testimony for him. The prisoners were tried for high treason, and the chief proof was the document said to have been found on the person of the priest. The others were one John Binns, one John Allen, and one Jeremiah Leary. Practically the two principals were Father Quigley and Arthur O'Connor. Now, this priest was a remarkable man, and was actually noted in his own country and county for his efforts to uphold the law and to bring offenders to justice. But, unfortunately for him his zeal was necessarily directed against the lewd and lawless excesses of the Orangemen who were then, and often since, allowed by the Executive to wreck the houses, ravish the persons, and murder Catholics. Not a single one of these miscreants, for these well known crimes, was brought to justice and punished although Father Quigley actually himself prosecuted some notorious offenders, and did so at Armagh through Bernard MacNally, whom he retained special, and took from off another circuit to go to Armagh. Father Quigley actually incurred, out of his own slender means, the expenses of the prosecution. He did this in view of the failure and disinclination of the Castle to do its duty. Father Quigley did such remarkable service in the cause of law and order, that Mr. Alexander Stewart, the High Sheriff of Armagh, and a respectable Protestant, to his credit, went to Maidstone to bear testimony to the priest's character as a law-abiding and law-loving citizen.

Father Quigley was born at Kilmore in 1767, and was at the time of his untimely death only thirty-six years of age. He came from a respectable Northern farmer class. He was educated at Dundalk and subsequently on the Continent. He was as clearly and as evidently the victim of the rampant revengeful Orangeism, that with absolute impunity was making the life of a Catholic, in those days, a hell upon earth. The evidence upon which the priest was convicted, and the others strangely acquitted, was in all its main points the same—with the one exception that it was said, but not at all satisfactorily proved, that an incriminating document was found with Father Quigley of a treasonable character. But its finding and the circumstances attending it, invest the whole affair with grave suspicion. It was proved to be found by a 'Bow Street Runner,' admittedly a most unreliable class of fellow—a creature who was a cross between a low bailiff and a lower process server. He said that this treasonable document was taken by him, when no one was looking on, from out of the pocket of a top-coat which was thrown carelessly about in the tap-room of the hotel at Maidstone. It was admitted that there were numerous strangers going in and out of the particular room, and that the prisoners were not in it at the time it was found, nor indeed were proved to have been in it at all at any time. The finding of the coat was long subsequent to the arrest, and no steps were taken to prove the coat was the prisoner's, or to mark the paper for the purpose of identification, and it went through several persons' hands before it ultimately was impounded. It was admitted on cross-examination by the same witness that he (the witness) actually had warned the priest in London that he would be arrested at Gravesend, and we are asked to believe, that in face of that warning, and of the peril the priest consequently was undoubtedly in, that this intelligent man, holding such a fateful and important commission from a secret society to a foreign government, still carelessly kept the document in the pocket of a top-coat (never proved to be his), and threw that coat into a public

tap-room where any man might have searched for or stolen it.

On its face the document itself did not refer to Father Quigley as its bearer, for it was intended to be taken to France from England by the person who had been the bearer of a former address from the Secret Committee of England. The only evidence in the case of Father Quigley's being previously in France was a passport with his name said to have been found in a trunk alleged to be but never proved to belong to his fellow-prisoner Binns. But the letters were proved only by the infamous Dutton to be in Quigley's handwriting. And the document, which was in French, and which was not properly translated, stated also that the bearer was disguised as an American traveller, which the priest never was. The judge (Buller) in his charge omitted to state in Quigley's case, what he did state in O'Connor's—that it was not proved that Father Quigley was a member of any political society in any country. It was sworn that one Perkins, a witness who had warned Quigley that they would be searched again when they went to Margate, had, before they left London, searched him and found nothing. This fact was not commented upon by the judge, nor was any reference made to the dubious finding of such a traitorous paper and the suspicious circumstances thereof.

It is now clear that the paper was planted on the unfortunate priest. The judge also refrained from stating that it was the Orange excesses towards the priest and his family; 'their persecution and atrocities' that, as deposed to by Mr. Stewart at his trial, were his real motives for leaving his own country where justice denied him her protection, and the law showed itself absolutely powerless to protect him and his co-religionists. A young woman was called to give evidence as to what the prisoners said in the room of the Maidstone hotel, yet although she was so well tutored that she glibly knew all their names, she could not identify a single one of the prisoners, and yet no reflection from the Bench was passed upon her worthless and perjured testimony. The same partial judicial functionary

cruelly referred to the fact that so many witnesses to character came to testify for O'Connor and only one for the priest, never adverting to the fact that one was a poor man and the other a rich man, and that it was by a mere accident Mr. Stewart came, for he happened to be on his own private business in London, and like a man of honour, hastened of his own accord to testify to the high character and law-abiding disposition of the priest whom he so well knew in Ireland. There was actually prepared and in the hands of an officer of the court another warrant to arrest Father Quigley on another charge had he been acquitted of this charge—so doubtful was the Crown before an English jury of his real guilt.

While in Maidstone gaol awaiting his execution—which was deliberately protracted—Father Quigley was scandalously worried and harassed by emissaries of the English Government inducing him to make a confession to cover the illegality of the proceedings and promising him a *reprieve*. He was asked if he could or would swear against O'Connor's guilt, and he was denied the ministrations of a priest at first. He was promised his liberty, and tempting rewards proffered, and he was told even that his aged parents would be equally handsomely treated and compensated, and that his brother—an *officer* in the British army—would be promoted, if he would say what he knew, or thought he knew, about the United Irishmen conspiracy. If not, he was told that he would suffer the extreme penalty of the law, that his family would be persecuted, and that indelible disgrace would come to his religion which he was appealed to save from the disgrace of having one of its priests hanged. All this torture and all this persecution of the poor innocent man occurred on the eve of his execution, and all this was resorted to to worry out of him anything that would justify their proceedings. The conduct of Father Quigley at the time of his execution is thus described by an eye-witness :—

About half-past eleven o'clock he arrived at that place in a hurdle ; he had no hat on ; he was without a neck cloth and his shirt collar was open. The day was extremely sultry ; he

had been half an hour in coming from the prison, and the trampling of the horses that drew the hurdle, and of the soldiers and multitude that surrounded it had left him covered with clouds of dust, and he appeared faint from these causes. . . . He held a prayer book in his hand, and he rose and prepared to read part of the Roman service, but the clergyman who attended him stood at his side, speaking earnestly to him in a low voice, and for some minutes interfered with his devotions. He listened with patience, but with evident disapprobation of the subject of the discourse. When he began his devotions he read aloud several prayers in the Latin tongue. In a few minutes he took an orange from his pocket and afterwards a knife, but his arms being bound could not cut the orange, and beckoning to his friends he said, 'open this orange with my penknife; it has been said they would not trust me with a penknife lest I should cut my throat, but they little knew that I would not deprive myself of the glory of dying in this way.'

Even on the scaffold the clergyman who was in the prison trying to get a confession persisted in his persecution of the unhappy victim, so that he was heard to say to him several times, 'No no.' Finally he shook hands with the clergyman, and stepped out of the hurdle and spoke words of thanks to the governor, saying to him twice, 'God bless you.' **We return to the report of his execution for an account of his last moments:—**

He shook hands with Mr. Watson (governor), and then ascended the ladder with unshaken courage. As the executioner prepared the rope the man said something that was probably an apology, for Mr. Coigley answered, 'Say nothing, you know you must do your duty.' When the rope was round his neck and fastened to the tree and his arms bound behind he spoke in the following manner:—

'Mr. Sheriff' (the sheriff approached with his hat off). 'Put on your hat, sir' (Mr. Coigley said), 'put on on your hat.' The sheriff stood with his hat off till Mr. Coigley concluded his address). 'It is customary you know, sir, in cases of this sort, for a person standing in my unfortunate situation, always to say something more or less, but I do not think it requisite to say so much as I otherwise should upon the present occasion, because I have taken all pains already under my own hand to draw a regular declaration—a convincing thing it will be to the world at large—and a sketch also of my unfortunate and afflicted life. . . . I never was the bearer of any letter, paper, writing, or address, or message, either written, printed, or verbal, to the Directory of France, or to any person on their behalf, of which I am accused, nor has any person for me been such bearer. I further declare that I never was a member of

the Corresponding Society, nor of any other political society, in Great Britain, nor did I ever attend any of their meetings, public or private, so help me God. Surely if a man is to be believed at any time it is when he is going into eternity before the bar of the Heavenly Father, and Almighty God. Before Him I now solemnly declare the truth of what I am now saying. I declare it under this impression; I hope history and posterity will do me justice, but if not I go instantly before a tribunal where it is known that I speak the truth. My life is falsely and maliciously taken away by corrupt and base perjury and subornation of perjury. I have long been persecuted by the government of Ireland. The first cause was my having endeavoured to teach the people this lesson, *that no man could serve his God by persecuting his neighbour* for any opinion, and particularly for any religious opinion. I have always said if men wish to serve God on earth they should give up their persecuting spirit. This was the first cause of my persecution. The second cause of my persecution was a contested election in Ireland in which I used my endeavours to prevail on my father and brother, who were freeholders, to poll for the opposition candidates. The third and final cause of my persecution was (and it is supported by charges which have been since retracted) because I was active in procuring a long and spirited address to his Majesty to put an end to this most calamitous war, and to dismiss those who were falsely called his servants. I forgive them from my heart with pure Christian charity, every man who had a hand in my murder, for I declare it a most wicked murder. . . . God forgive those who perjured themselves. I forgive them from my heart. I have no doubt that when the clouds of prejudice and alarm shall pass away, justice will be done me, and I hope my sufferings will be a warning to jurors to be cautious how they embrue their hands in innocent blood. . . . I do recommend to you, men of Kent, in time to come, to beware how you permit any person to take advantage of you, and to guard against the snares of crown lawyers. It has been the fate of your county to shed the blood of a poor helpless innocent stranger. May God Almighty forgive all mine enemies, and I desire of you all to pray to God to grant me grace to support me in this moment, and to enable me to die in a manner worthy of my integrity. I have many sins to answer for, but they are the sins of my private life, and I am innocent of the charge for which I die. O Lord, have mercy on me, and receive my soul."

The crowd were greatly affected. 'When he declared his innocence a buzz of applause ran through the multitude, and there was even clapping of hands towards the close

of his address, many of the spectators wept, and some of the soldiers were unable to repress their tears.'

So died as clearly innocent a victim of misrule and illegality as even Irish history can furnish a parallel for. He was not fairly tried, and even on the evidence before the court, perjured and prepared as it was, there was not enough to convict him of the offence, for, as shown, it failed to substantiate clearly his complicity in the acts charged. Prejudice against his religion brought him to the dock and ultimately to the scaffold. If Father Quigley was guilty so were his companions. If he were clearly guilty, why was he worried in prison to make any sort of confession and promised his liberty if he did so? Why was his execution delayed for days when the custom then was to carry it out the next morning of the day on which the sentence was pronounced. One can find no other explanation than that the delay was intended to be used as an opportunity to force the unhappy man into a confession; to free himself by implicating others, which he nobly refused to be a party to. His death and the circumstances of his trial show conclusively that justice was not shown him, and that he was the victim of a vile conspiracy to punish men supposed to be engaged in treasonable conspiracies in Ireland, and by any means secure their conviction. Father Quigley's trial (as told in *Howell's State Trials*, vol. xxvii.) was a veritable travesty of justice. His guilt was assumed, but never legally proved, and an innocent man suffered on the occasion.

RICHARD J. KELLY.

Notes and Queries

LITURGY

PRIVILEGES OF MIDNIGHT MASS

REV. DEAR SIR,—A reply to the following questions *re* the celebration of Mass by a secular priest in a convent chapel belonging to the Sisters of Charity, and situated in his own parish, will greatly oblige :

I. Midnight Mass at Christmas :—According to the ordinary law of the Church only one Mass, and that a Solemn or *Missa Cantata* is allowed, on the feast of the Nativity, before the Aurora. By virtue of special faculties granted to the Society of St. Vincent de Paul, the priest who celebrates the Midnight Mass in one of their chapels has the privilege of celebrating his three Masses right off. But can he by virtue of the same faculties celebrate his first Mass as an " Ordinary Low Mass " ?

Does the singing of hymns on such an occasion during Mass lend solemnity enough, so that the Mass can be looked upon in any sense according to the Church's idea of solemnity as a Solemn Mass ? Must there be on such occasions at least a *Missa Cantata* or no Mass at all, before the usual hour for celebrating ?

II. The Sisters of Charity, according to their Institution, are parochial, and hence are to be considered as ordinary parishioners of the parish in which they reside. During the course of the year festivals proper to their Order occur. Is the priest of the parish, when he celebrates Mass in their chapel, bound to celebrate the Mass of their feast, although his office (the ordinary one of the day) is different ?

Is he free to celebrate the Mass in keeping with his office ?

Is he bound to celebrate the Mass in keeping with his office, if that Office is of a festival of an equal or higher right to the festival of the Order of St. Vincent de Paul, seeing that he is in his own parish.

III. How many lights is a priest allowed at Mass in celebrating such festivals in a convent chapel ?

SACERDOS.

I. The general Rubrics of the Missal¹ assume that

¹ *Rub. Gen. Miss.*, tit. xv., n. 4.

the Mass which is privileged to be celebrated immediately after midnight on Christmas Eve, should be a solemn Mass, or at least, a *Missa Cantata*. But an Apostolic Indult may be obtained for saying even a Private Mass on the occasion. We have seen the concession granted in favour of the Sisterhood mentioned by our correspondent, and having read it over we think there is nothing in it that suggests that *any* one of the three Masses permitted to be celebrated on the night preceding the Feast of the Nativity should be either Solemn or even *Cantata*. The Document makes no distinction whatever between the first Mass and the other two. Moreover, it conveys privileges, such as the faculty of saying the three Masses consecutively and distributing Communion at each, which are far greater than the permission to substitute a Low for a High Mass.

If a High Mass indeed were required in the first instance the mere singing of hymns would not impart to a Low Mass the *solemnity* contemplated by the Rubrics when they speak of a *Missa Solemnis*. This comes from the presence of a Deacon and Subdeacon, and other ceremonial accessories. The *Cantata*, if necessary, could easily be managed by a Priest, who was competent to *sing* the requisite parts, with the assistance of a few altar boys, and a choir trained to give the Responses.

II. The Community, not being bound to the choral recitation of the Divine Office, does not enjoy the privilege of a special Kalendar of its own. The Kalendar, therefore, of the institution will be the Local or Diocesan one, and in accordance with this all Masses said in the principal chapel, whether by Seculars or Regulars, must be regulated, it being understood that where the local Office is of semidouble or lower rite greater freedom is enjoyed in the selection of the Mass. Communities, however, while not having a *proper* Kalendar sometimes have the privilege obtained by Indult from the Holy See of substituting for the Mass prescribed by the Local Ordo a Mass in honour of some saint closely associated with the Order, and it is in regard to Feasts such as these that the second part of

our correspondent's question applies. He asks if the chaplain is bound to say these Masses? We think he is, not by any obligation that arises from the Rubrics, but in virtue of the obligation which he owes to the Community to which his services as Chaplain are due. The '*rationabile obsequium*' which he undertook to discharge on his appointment to the Chaplaincy embraces the saying of these Masses which the Community are privileged to have said, and which they are quite within their right in demanding. The Chaplain, then, is free to say these Masses or not as far as the Rubrics are concerned, but in duty to those whom he has to serve we believe he ought to say them.

III. We have gone into this point *in extenso* in a previous issue of the I. E. RECORD.¹ There is really no hard and fast regulation about the *maximum* number of lights that may be used on occasions like those referred to, and a good deal of latitude is allowed to custom.² Until some authoritative decision of the Congregation of Rites definitively settles the matter, perhaps the most prudent thing to do in circumstances like these is to possess one's soul in patience as long, at any rate, as there is no open violation of any direct prescription of the Rubrics.

"DE MISSA IN ALIENA ECCLÉSIA"

REV. DEAR SIR,—Will you kindly furnish me, through the I. E. RECORD, with the text of the *latest* Decree concerning the quality of the *Mass* to be said in a *private* chapel of Religiouses who have no *Ordo* proper to their Institute? In other words, ought the Chaplain to follow the *Ordo* of the diocese or his *own Ordo*, as in the case of *Regulars*?

SACERDOS.

Quite recently several questions have been asked us about matters kindred to the subject of the present query, which lead us to infer that very hazy notions still prevail about the precise nature of the new regulations,

¹ Cf. I. E. RECORD, December, 1905, pp. 550-1.

² Decr. S.C.R., nn. 3058, 3065.

De Missa in Aliena Ecclesia. As our correspondent may not have at hand the back issues of the I. E. RECORD, in which the text of the Decrees of the Congregation of Rites¹ is given and their purport explained, we believe it will be more convenient if we indicate briefly the drift of the recent legislation, and emphasize the chief points of practical importance. Up to July, 1895, when a Priest said Mass in a place where any Ordo different to his was in use, he was bound to conform the Mass in some cases to the local, and in others to his own Kalendar. The selection, which depended a good deal on the colour of the vestments prescribed by the local Directory and on other circumstances, was often rather perplexing. All this has now been changed, and a greater degree of simplicity secured. The main difference between the new and the old discipline may be said to be that, while the old respected more the person of the celebrant, the new takes into account principally the place where the Holy Sacrifice is celebrated. Its chief provisions may be thus summed up:—

All Priests, whether Secular or Regular, must for the future conform their Masses to the Ordo of the Church or Oratory—if public or semipublic—in which they celebrate, whenever the local Office is of a rite higher than a semi-double.

The conformity, therefore, between the Mass and the local Kalendar is to be observed:—(a) by all Priests, Secular and Regular alike, with this provision, that it does not extend to the *rites* peculiar to certain Religious Orders; (b) in all churches, public and semi-public oratories, but not in private, or domestic oratories; (c) as long as the local rite is *double*, or higher.

To make the Decree clear, and its scope intelligible, various points regarding it have been explained by the Congregation of Rites in answer to questions. Let us try, similarly, to ascertain its exact meaning.

1. What is meant by the local Kalendar, or Ordo?

¹ Cf. Decr. S.C.R., nn. 3862 (9th July, 1895), 3883 (8th February, 1896), 3919 (27th June, 1896), 3910 (22nd May, 1896).

² Decr. S.C.R., 9th July, 1895.

For Parochial Churches, and for all Chapels and Oratories of religious that have no *proper* Kalendar, the local Ordo will be that of the Diocese. Most religious Orders and Congregations of Men, and those Communities of Nuns that are obliged to the choral recitation of the Divine Office, have a special Ordo of their own. Then, too, the Diocesan Ordo will be modified slightly for Feasts incidental to individual churches, such as those of the Dedication, Titular, *Patronus loci*, and also for the Feasts which may be granted by the Holy See to Communities not having a *proprium* Kalendar.

2. What is meant by public, semi-public, and private Oratories, and how far does the obligation of conformity extend with regard to them?

Public Oratories are those which by a solemn blessing or consecration, have been dedicated to Divine service, and afford free and unrestricted ingress to the faithful generally. Semi-public are those which have been erected by the authority of the Ordinary and are intended to serve the wants of a small section or body of the faithful. Of such a kind are the Oratories in religious communities, institutions, orphanages, seminaries, colleges, hospitals, etc. Private or domestic are those which by an Indult of the Holy See have been erected in private houses, for the convenience of an individual and his family. In these latter, which have not been touched by the recent Decrees, the celebrant must follow his own Directory.

3. It often happens in a religious community that there may be two or more Altars erected in different parts of the house. Does the Decree of conformity apply to all? The Congregation of Rites¹ has decided in the negative, and stated that it is only the *capella principalis* that is comprehended in the Decree. We think, however, all the *altars* in this chapel are included.

4. What if the rite of the local Office is semi-double or lower? In this case the celebrant is free to say either the Mass of his own Ordo, or any other allowed by the general

¹ 26th May, 1896.

Rubrics of the Missal, or the Decrees of the Congregation of Rites.

5. The chaplain to a convent, whether a Secular or Regular, is bound to the local Ordo. What if the chaplaincy is entrusted not to an individual religious but to the *familia* to which he belongs? The Congregation of Rites¹ decided that where a religious house is entrusted not alone with the chaplaincy but with the control of a church or institution, its Kalendar—if it has a proper one—becomes the local Ordo. That this may obtain it is necessary that the house in question should have charge of the institution in some permanent sort of way and have the power to exercise a certain jurisdiction over it. The case is really no exception, because when those conditions are fulfilled, the institution passes over to the dominion, either *de jure* or *de facto*, of its immediate spiritual ruler.

We have now reached the stage at which we can give a direct answer to the question of our correspondent, which has occasioned all these observations. In the first place, we cannot understand how the chaplain, not being a Regular, has an Ordo of his own (as implied) which is different from the Diocesan. In the next, our correspondent seems to think that a Regular, if chaplain to a community of nuns having no *proper* Ordo, should follow his own Kalendar. This is not true. The Regular must follow the local Ordo just as the Secular, subject to the limitations set out in preceding paragraph. Again, our correspondent speaks of the chapel of the community as *private*. If he refers to the *capella principalis* of the Sisters, it is not private in the sense of the Decrees of the Congregation we are considering. The local Ordo in the case is that of the Diocese, and this every Priest celebrating in the principal chapel, whether he be Secular or Regular, is obliged to follow within the limits stated.

6. What is the extent of the obligation of conformity?

It extends to all Masses, whether *de sanctis* or *de beatis*, which are prescribed by the local Ordo, and to all the parts

¹ Decr. S.C.R., 15th December, 1899; cf. I. E. RECORD, 1904, p. 653.

of these Masses which are *proper* for this place. They must, in other words, be said in the same way by extern Priests as by those attached to the Church or Oratory. This does not mean that the *rites* peculiar to certain religious Orders should be observed by Secular Priests. Thus, a Secular saying Mass in a Dominican church should use the Roman Missal. If an *oratio imperata* is ordered in a certain diocese or church, this must be said by the Priest celebrating here.

P. MORRISROE.

DOCUMENTS

LETTER OF HIS HOLINESS POPE PIUS X TO THE BISHOP
OF LA ROCHELLE ON BIBLICAL CRITICISM

EPISTOLA

QUA SUMMUS PONTIFEX ILLUM AC RMUM D. AEMILIUM P. LE
CAMUS, EPISCOPUM RUPELLEN., LAUDAT, OB OPUS BIBLICUM
NUPER AB IP SO EDITUM.

PIO PAPA X.

Venerabile Fratello, salute ed Apostolica Benedizione.

Giudichiamo che la recente pubblicazione del vostro lavoro sull' *Opera degli Apostoli*, in tre volumi, non potrebbe giungere meglio a proposito, e vi siamo riconoscenti di avercene fatto omaggio.

Giacchè non è più permesso di conservare la minima illusione su un fatto ormai evidentissimo, che cioè il disprezzo, anzi l'odio contro la fede ed i costumi dei veri cristiani si accentuano tristemente ai giorni nostri, che in grandissimo numero purtroppo, Noi vediamo uomini sforzarsi di mettere in onore nella vita privata o pubblica, quanto fu l'onta dell'antichità pagana. Che si poteva immaginare di più efficace per reprimere un sì gran male che presentare ad un mondo che invecchia e va in decadenza, la descrizione della Chiesa nascente e risvegliare così nelle anime, mostrando ciò che i nostri padri hanno fatto e detto, il santo ardore che è necessario spiegare per rispondere agli attacchi diretti contro i saggi insegnamenti e le virtù della religione cristiana?

Questo è incontestabilmente lo scopo del vostro lavoro, nel quale voi studiate le origini cristiane per modo che vi dimostrate non solo uomo pieno di dottrina e di competenza chiaroveggente, ma anche completamente compenetrato di quella pietà che caratterizza i tempi antichi.

Ciò poi che nel vostro lavoro è specialmente degno di elogio, è, che nella vostra maniera di esporre i testi sacri, avete cercato di seguire, per rispetto della verità e per l'onore della dottrina cattolica, la via, dalla quale, sotto la direzione della Chiesa, non bisogna mai deviare. In quella guisa, infatti che si deve condannare la temerità di coloro, che, preoccupandosi molto più di

seguire il gusto della novità che l'insegnamento della Chiesa, non esitano a ricorrere a dei processi critici di una eccessiva libertà, conviene parimenti disapprovare l'attitudine di coloro che non osano, in alcun modo, romperla coll'esegesi scritturale vigente fino a ieri, anche quando, salva l'integrità della fede, il saggio progresso degli studi li invita coraggiosamente a farlo.

Voi camminate felicemente fra questi due estremi. Coll'esempio che voi date, provate che non v'ha nulla a temere, per i nostri Libri Santi dalla vera marcia in avanti realizzata dalla scienza critica e che anzi si può aver gran vantaggio per essi Libri, ricorrendo ai lumi apportati da quella scienza. E, difatti, ciò accade tutte le volte che si sa utilizzarlo con prudenza e saggio discernimento, come Noi constatiamo che avete fatto voi stesso. Non v'ha dunque nulla di sorprendente nel grande successo che ottenne fine dalla sua apparizione nel mondo dei sapienti, il primo volume del vostro elaborato studio, e non v'ha dubbio che gli stessi giudici competenti renderanno giustizia alla vostra opera completa.

Quanto a Noi, venerabile Fratello, vi felicitiamo di tutto cuore e facciamo i voti più ardenti che molti lettori ritraggano dal vostro tanto importante lavoro tutti quei frutti che si ha diritto di attenderne. Come pegno dei favori divini e testimonianza del Nostro affetto, impartiamo, tenerissimamente nel Signore, a voi, al vostro clero e al vostro popolo, la Nostra Apostolica Benedizione.

Dato a Roma, in San Pietro, l'II gennaio 1906, terzo anno del Nostro Pontificato.

PIO PP. X.

**DAYS ON WHICH EXEQUIAL OFFICES ARE
PROHIBITED**

RHEMEN.

QUIBUS IN FESTIS PROHIBEANTUR EXSEQUIAE DEFUNCTORUM.

Sacra Rituum Congregatio per decretum *Parentin. et Polen.* die 8 Ianuarii 1904, rescripsit dies quibus prohibentur exsequiae pro defuncto, cum effertur corpus, esse 'omnia festa quae uti primaria sub ritu duplici I classis et quidem de praecepto celebrantur; et si non sint de praecepto, illae Dominicae ad quas praefatorum festorum solemnitas transfertur.' Exorta autem

controversia de sensu quo intelligenda et dicenda sint festa de praecepto, Rmus Canonicus Calendarii Rhemensis ordinator, de consensu Rmi Dni Vicarii Capitularis, Sede vacante, a Sacra Rituum Congregatione sequentis dubii resolutionem humillime flagitavit ; nimirum :

I. An festa de praecepto illa sint in quibus, praeter obligationem a parocho adimplendam, adest quoque altera et quidem duplex obligatio parochianis imposita, nempe tum Missam audiendi, tum ab operibus servilibus cessandi ?

II. An exsequiae cum Missa, praesente corpore, fieri possint in festis suppressis, quorum solemnitas in Dominicam sequentem non transfertur ?

Et Sacra Rituum Congregatio, ad relationem subscripti Secretarii, exquisito voto Commissionis Liturgicae omnibusque sedulo perpensis, rescribendum censuit ?

Ad I. *Affirmative.*

Ad II. *Negative iuxta decretum n. 4003 Carcassonen., quaest. I ad II et III.*

Atque ita rescripsit. Die 1 Decembris 1905.

A Card. TRIPEPI, *Pro-Praefectus.*

L. ✱ S.

✱ D. PANICI, *Archiep. Laodicen., Secretarius.*

APPROVED EDITION OF THE GREGORIAN CHANT
DECRETUM SEU DECLARATIO SACRORUM RITUUM CONGREGATIONIS.

A nonnullis Editoribus proponitur subinde quaestio de modo interpretandi Dispositiones Art. II et IV Decreti seu Instructionum Sacrae Rituum Congregationis, diei 11 Augusti MCMV, circa editionem et approbationem librorum cantum liturgicum Gregorianum continentium. Ad hanc autem quaestionem solvendam eadeam Sacra Congregatio, de mandato Santissimi Domini Nostri Pii Papae X, quae sequuntur declarat :

1. Forma notularum cantus sic debet integra servari, ut omnes ex eis quae eandem habent rationem vel significationem, ac proinde in editione typica Vaticana unam enadenque figuram referunt, pariter in alia editione, quae ab Ordinario possit approbari, necessario quoad formam omnino inter se similes extent et coaequales. Ideoque signa quae forte fuerint, permittente Ordinario, superinducta, nullatenus notularum formam, vel modum quo ipsae coniunguntur, afficere debent.

2. Quamvis editio aliqua fuerit recognita, ab Ordinario vel ab ipsa Sacra Rituum Congregatione, tanquam de cetero, videlicet exceptis signis, cum typica conformis, oportet tamen ut deinceps normas supra statutas exacte servet; quatenus, inter notulas typicas et signa quae superveniunt, iam amplius confusio oriri nequeat. Contrariis non obstantibus quibuscumque. Die 14 Februarii 1906.

A. Card. TRIPEPI, S. R. C. Pro-Praefectus.

L. ✕ S.

✕ DIOMEDES PANICI, *Archiep. Laodicen.*, S. R. C. Secret.

BISHOPS' CONTROL OVER THE RINGING OF BELLS

DECRETA SS. RR. CONGREGATIONUM.

S. C. EPISCOPORUM ET REGULARIUM.

ORDINIS FRATRUM PRAEDICATORUM.

EPISCOPI FACULTATE GAUDENT LIMITANDI, ETIAM QUOAD REGULARES, DURATIONEM PULSATIONUM IN SONITU CAMPANARUM.

Beatissime Pater

Episcopus Sanctae Fidei in Republica Argentina humiliter ac reverenter exponit quod, attentis querelis sive privatim sive publice sive etiam per ephemerides excitatis ex abusu circa campanarum sonitum, necnon iure meritoque metuens auctoritatis civilis aut municipalis interventum, quem opera sui Vicarii Generalis semel vitare potuit, decretum edere statuit, vi cuius, campanarum sono diebus Dominicis, festivis aliisque anni temporibus haud prohibito, earundem campanarum usus tantummodo moderatur et limitatur. Quum vero Fratres Praedicatores, qui in hac Sanctae Fidei civitate Conventum habent, contra praefatum episcopale decretum opponant privilegium ipsis a S. Pio V Constitutione *Etsi Mendicantium* diei 16 Maii 1567 concessum, atque a resolutione S. Congr. Episcoporum et Regularium diei 11 Martii 1892 confirmatum duo sequentia dubia resolvenda proponit:

I. Utrum attentis gravibus adiunctis supra relatis, dicti Fratres Praedicatores obtemperare teneantur dispositionibus in citato episcopali decreto contentis? Et quatenus negative:

II. Quomodo se gerere debeat Ordinarius ad interventum civilis vel municipalis auctoritatis vitandum?

Sacra Congregatio Emorum. ac Rmorum. S. R. E. Cardina-

lium negotiis et consultationibus Episcoporum et Regularium praeposita, re sedulo perpensa, praefatis dubiis respondendum censuit, prout respondet :

Firmo remanente Fratrum Praedicatorum privilegio pulsandi campanus quando eis placuerit, ad tramitem Constitutionis S. Pii V Etis Mendicantium, Episcopus potest, propter specialis loci et temporum adiuncta, pulsationum durationem ad certum tempus limitare.

Romae, 15 Novembris 1905.

D. Card. FERRATA, *Praefectus.*

L. ✠ S.

PHILIPPUS GIUSTINI, *Secretarius.*

DECREE OF THE SACRED CONGREGATION OF THE COUNCIL ON STUDENTS IN SEMINARIES

DE SEMINARIORUM ALUMNIS DECRETUM

Vetvit S. Tridentina Synodus ad sacros ordines ascendere, vel ordines iam susceptos exercere eos omnes qui a suo Episcopo fuerint etiam extrajudicialiter prohibiti. Ita namque in *cap. i, Sess. 24, de reform.* statuatur :

‘Cum honestius ac tutius sit subiecto debitam Praepositis obedientiam impendendo in inferiori ministerio deservire, quam cum Praepositorum scandalo graduum altiorum appetere dignitatem ; ei qui ascensus ad sacros ordines a suo Prelato ex qua cumque causa etiam ob occultum crimen quomodolibet, etiam extrajudicialiter fuerit interdictus, aut qui a suis ordinibus seu gradibus vel dignitatibus ecclesiasticis fuerit suspensus, nulla contra ipsius Praelati voluntatem concessa licentia de se promoveri faciendo, aut ad priores ordines, gradus et dignitates sive honores, restitutio suffragetur.’

Cum vero generalis haec lex Seminariorum quoque alumnos comprehendat, si quis eorum, sive clericus sive clericatui adhuc non initiatus, e pio loco dimittatur eo quod certa vocationis signa non praebeat, aut qualitatibus ad ecclesiasticum statum requisitis non videatur instructus, hic certe deberet, iuxta grave S. Concilii monitum, sui Pastoris iudicio subesse et acquiescere.

At contra saepe contingit ut e Seminario dimissi, eorum qui praesunt iudicium parvipendentes et in sua potius opinione confisi, ad sacerdotium nihilominus ascendere studeant. Quaeritant itaque aliud Seminarium, in quod recipiantur, ubi studiorum

cursum expleant, ac denique aliquo exhibitio plus minusve sincero ac legitimo domicilii aut incardinationis titulo, ordinationem assequuntur. Sanctuarium autem ingressi haud recta via, quam saepissime fit ut Ecclesiae utilitati minime sint. Passim vero utrumque Ordinarium, et originis et ordinationis, diu fastidioseque vexant ut sibi liceat ad natale solum regredi, ibique consistere, dioecesi in qua et pro qua ordinati sunt derelicta, et alia optata, pro cuius necessitate aut utilitate minime assumpti sunt, ubi imo eorum praesentia otiosa est et quandoque etiam damnosa : unde Episcopi in graves angustias coniiciuntur.

His itaque de causis nonnullarum provinciarum Episcopi inter se convenerunt statuantes in sua seminaria neminem admittere qui ante fuerit a proprio dimissus.

Sed cum particularis haec conventio non plene neque undique sufficeret, complures Ordinarii S. Sedem rogaverunt ut generalem legem terret, qua malum radicitus tolleretur.

His itaque attentis, et omnibus ad rem mature perpensis, SSmus. D. N. Pius PP. X, cui cordi quam maxime est ecclesiasticam disciplinam integram conservare, et a sacris avertere quemlibet qui probatissimus non sit, accedente etiam voto Em. S. C. Concilii Patrum in Congregatione diei XVI mens. Decembris 1905 emisso, praesentibus litteris statuit atque decernit :

1. Ut in posterum nullus loci Ordinarius alterius dioecesis subditum sive clericum sive laicum in suum Seminarium admittat, nisi prius secretis litteris ab Episcopo Oratoris proprio exoptierit et cognoverit, utrum hic fuerit olim e suo Seminario dimissus. Quod si constiterit, omittens iudicare de causis, aut determinare utrum iuste an iniuste alius Episcopus egerit, aditum in suum Seminarium postulanti praecludat.

2. Qui vero bona fide admissi sunt, eo quod retinuerint se antea in alio seminario versatos esse et ab eo deinde dimissos, statim ut haec eorum conditio cognoscatur, admonendi sunt ut discendant. Quodsi permanere velint, et ab Ordinario id eis permittatur, eo ipsi huic dioecesi adscripti maneant, servatis tamen canonicis regulis pro eorum incardinatione et ordinatione ; sed aucti sacerdotio in dioecesim, e cuius Seminario dimissi fuerint, regredi ibique stabile domicilium habere prohibentur.

3. Pariter cum similis ferme ratio vigeat, qui dimissi ex Seminariis aliquod religiosum institutum ingrediuntur, si inde exeant postquam sacris initiati sunt, vetantur in dioecesim redire e cuius Seminario dimissi fuerint.

4. Dimissi vero ex aliquo religioso Instituto in Seminarium ne admittantur, nisi prius Episcopus secretis litteris a moderatoribus eiusdem Instituti notitias requisierit de moribus, indole et ingenio dimissorum, et constiterit nil in eis esse quod sacerdotali statui minus conveniat.

Denique meminerint Episcopi fas sibi non esse, nomine proprio manus cuiquam imponere qui subditus sibi non sit eo modo et uno ex iis titulis, qui in Constitutione *Speculatoris* Innocentii XII et in decreto S. C. Concilii quod quod incipit '*A primis*' die XX m. Iulii 1898 statuuntur. Ac pariter neminem ordinari posse qui non sit utilis aut necessarius pro ecclesia aut pio loco pro quo assumitur, iuxta praescripta a S. Tridentino Concilio in *cap.* 16, *Sess.* 23, *de reform.*

Vult autem Sanctitas Sua et statuta haec et cautelae omnes a sacris canonibus in re tam gravi adiectae, ab omnibus Ordinariis ad unguem serventur; idque ipsorum conscientiae et sollicitudini quam maxime commendat.

Praesentibus valituris contrariis quibuslibet minime obstantibus.

Datum Romae, die 22 m. Decembris 1905.

✠ VINCENTIUS Card. Episc. Praenestinus, *Praef.*
C. DE LAI, *Secretarius.*

ABSOLUTION 'IN ARTICULO MORTIS'

SS. RITUUM CONGREGATIO

TERGESTINA ET IUSTINOPOLITANA.

ABSOLUTIO IN ARTICULO MORTIS ET OFFICIUM DIVINUM LATINE RECITARI DEBENT. QUIDAM ABUSUS PROHIBENTUR.

Rmus. Dnus. Franciscus Nagl, Episcopus Tergestinus et Iustinopolitanus, Sacrorum Rituum Congregationi sequentes quaestiones solvendas humillime proposuit, nimirum:

I. An fideles, absolutione in articulo mortis in lingua vernacula peracta, sicuti modo pluries fit, indulgentias lucrari queant?

II. In Missis de Requite post elevationem loco *Benedictus*, Litaniae uti ex Rituali Romano in ordine commendationis animae, vel Laurentanae, canuntur, et huiusmodi Missae fiunt lectae. Insuper in Missis cantatis de die, intonato *Credo* sacerdos prosequitur Missam uti lectam usque ad Praefationem. Quaeritur an haec tolerari possint?

III. An sacerdos lingua vernacula Officium divinum Breviarii Romani ex. gr. Nativitatis Domini, defunctorum, etc., cum populo peragens, vel Litanias Sanctorum in Processionibus Rogationum eadem lingua persolvens, teneatur has partes Breviarii Romani in lingua latina iterum recitare ?

Et Sacra Rituum Congregatio, ad relationem subscripti Secretarii, exquisito voto Commissionis Liturgicae, reque mature perpensa, respondendum censuit :

Ad I. *Negative, quia haec benedictio in articulo mortis est precatio stricto sensu liturgica.*

Ad II. *Negative, et hos abusus omnino esse eliminandos.*

Ad III. *Affirmative ; nam qui ad recitationem divini Officii et cuiusque partis Breviarii Romani sunt obligati, tantum in lingua latina haec recitare debent, alias non satisfaciunt, obligationi.*

Atque ita rescripsit. Die 3 Iunii 1904.

A. Card. TRIPEPI, *Pro-Praefectus.*

L. ✕ S

✕ D. PANICI, *Archiep. Laodicon., Secretarius.*

ENCYCLOICAL OF HIS HOLINESS POPE PIUS X TO THE
FRENCH BISHOPS, CLERGY, AND PEOPLE

SANCTISSIMI DOMINI NOSTRI PII DIVINA PROVIDENTIAE PPAE X
AD ARCHIEPISCOPOS ET EPISCOPOS UNIVERSUMQUE CLERUM
ET POPULUM GALLIAE

DILECTIS FILIIS NOSTRIS FRANCISCO MARIAE S. R. E. PRESB.
CARD. RICHARD ARCHIEPISCOPO PARISIENSI, VICTORI LVCIANO
S. R. E. PRESB. CARD. LECOT ARCHIEPISCOPO BYRDIGALENSI,
PETRO HECTORI S. R. E. PRESB. CARDIN. COVILLIE ARCHIEPIS-
COPO LVGDVNENSI, IOSEPHO GVILELMO S. R. E. PRESB. CARD.
LABOVRE ARCHIEPISCOPO RHEDONENSI, CETERISQVE VENERA-
BILIBVS FRATRIBVS ARCHIEPISCOPIS ET EPISCOPIS ATQVE
VNIVERSO CLERO ET POPVLO GALLIAE

PIVS PAPA X.

*Venerabiles Fratres et Dilecti Filii, Salutem et Apostolicam
Benedictionem :*

Vehementer Nos esse sollicitos et praecipuo quodam dolore
angi, rerum vestrarum causa, vix attinet dicere ; quando ea
perlata lex est, quae quum pervetustam civitatis vestrae cum

Apostolica Sede necessitudinem violenter dirimit, tum vero indignam miserrimamque Ecclesiae in Gallia conditionem importat. Gravissimum sane facinus, idemque, ob ea quae civili societati allaturum est aequae ac religioni detrimenta, omnibus bonis deplorandum. Quod tamen nemini arbitramur inopinatum accidisse, qui quidem postremis temporibus, quemadmodum sese adversus Ecclesiam rei publicae moderatores gererent, attenderit. Vobis certe nec subitum accidit nec novum, Venerabiles Fratres, quibus ipsis testibus, christiana instituta plagas tam multas tamque magnas, alias ex aliis, accipere, publice. Vidistis violatam legibus christiani sanctitudinem ac stabilitatem coniugii; dimotam de scholis de valetudinariis publicis religionem; abstractos a sacra studiorum et virtutum disciplina clericos et sub arma compulsos; disiectas spoliatasque bonis religiosas Familias, earumque sodales ad inopiam plerumque redactos rerum omnium. Illa etiam decreta nostis: ut aboleretur consuetudo vetus vel auspicandi, propriiatio Deo legumlatorum ac iudicum coetus, vel ob memoriam mortis Christi lugubria induendi navibus; ut sacramentis in iure dicendis forma speciesque abrogaretur religiosae rei; ut in iudiciis, in gymnasiis, in terrestribus maritimisque copiis, in rebus denique omnibus ditionis publicae, ne quid esset aut fieret, quod significationem aliquam christianae professionis daret. Iamvero ista quidem et id genus cetera, quum ab Ecclesia sensim rem publicam seiungerent, nihil fuisse aliud apparet, nisi gradus quosdam consulto iactos ad plenum discidium lege propria induendum: id quod ipsi harum rerum auctores profiteri plus semel et prae se ferre non dubitarunt. Huic tanto malo ut occurreret Apostolica Sedes, quanto in se habuit facultatis, totum eo contulit. Nam ex una parte admonere atque hortari gubernatores Galliae non destitit, etiam atque etiam considerarent, hunc quem instituissent discessionis cursum, quanta esset incommodorum consecutura moles; ex altera autem suae in Galliam indulgentiam benevolentiaeque singularis illustria duplicavit documenta; non absurde confisa, se ita posse, qui praeerant, tamquam iniecto officii gratiaeque vinculo, retinere in declivi, atque ab inceptis demum abducere. At huiusmodi studia, officia, conata et Decessoris et Nostra recidisce ad nihilum omnia cernimus; siquidem inimica religioni vis, quod contra iura catholicae gentis vestrae ac vota recte sentientium diu contenderat expugnavi. Hoc igitur tam gravi Ecclesiae tempore, ut conscientia Nos

officit sanctissimi iubet, Apostolicam vocem tollimus, et mentem animumque Nostrum vobis, Venerabiles Fratres et dilecti Filii, patefacimus : quos quidem universos omnes semper consuevimus peculiari quadam caritate prosequi, nunc vero, uti par est, eo vel amantius complectimur.

Civitatis rationes a rationibus Ecclesiae segregari oportere, profecto falsissima, maximeque perniciosa sententia est. Primum enim, quum hoc nitatur fundamento, religionem nullo pacto debere civitati esse curae, magnam infert iniuriam Deo : qui ipse humanae societatis non minus quam hominum singulorum conditor et conservator est ; proptereaque non privatim tantummodo colatur necesse est, sed etiam publice. Deinde, quidquam esse supra naturam, non obscure negat. Etenim actionem civitatis sola vitae mortalis prosperitate metitur, in qua consistit causa proxima civilis societatis ; causam ultimam civium, quae est sempiterna beatitudo extra hanc brevitatem vitae hominibus proposita, tamquam alienam reipublicae, plane negligit. Quod contra, ad adeptionem summi illius absolutique boni, ut hic totus est fluxarum rerum ordo dispositus, ita verum est rempublicam non modo non obesse, sed prodesse oportere. Praeterea descriptionem pervertit rerum humanarum a Deo sapientissime constitutam, quae profecto utriusque societatis, religiosae et civilis, concordiam requirit. Nam, quoniam ambae, tametsi in suo quaeque genere, in eisdem tamen imperium exercent, necessitate fit, ut causae inter eas saepe existant eiusmodi, quarum cognitio et diiudicatio utriusque sit. Iamvero, nisi civitas cum Ecclesia cohaereat, facile ex illis ispis causis concertationum oritura sunt semina-utrinque acerbissimarum ; quae iudicium veri magna cum animorum anxietate, perturbent. Postremo maximum importat ipsi societati civili detrimentum ; haec enim florere aut stare diu, posthabita religione, quae summa dux ac magistra adest homini ad iura et officia sancte custodienda, non potest.

Itaque Romani Pontifices huiusmodi refellere atque improbare opiniones, quae ad dissociandam ab Ecclesia rem publicam pertinerent, quoties res tempusque tulit, non destiterunt. Nominatim Decessor illustris, Leo XIII, pluries magnificeque exposuit, quanta deberet esse, secundum christianae principia sapientiae, alterius societatis convenientia cum altera : inter quas : ' quaedam, ait, intercedat necesse est ordinata colligatio, quae quidem coniunctioni non immerito comparatur, per quam anima et corpus in homine copulantur.' Addit autem :

'Civitates non possunt, citra scelus, gerere se tamquam si Deus omnino non esset, aut curam religionis velut alienam nihilque profuturam abiicere. . . . Ecclesiam vero, quam Deus ipse constituit, ab actione vitae excludere, a legibus, ab institutione adolescentium, a societate domestica, magnus et perniciosus est error.'¹

Iamvero si contra omne ius fasque agat quaevis christiana civitas, quae Ecclesiam ab se segreget ac removeat, quam non est probandum, egisse hoc ipsum Galliam, quod sibi minime omnium licuit! Galliam dicimus, quam longo saeculorum spatio haec Apostolica Sedes praecipuo quodam ac singulari semper amore dilexerit; Galliam, cuius fortuna omnis et amplitudo nominis et gloriae religioni humanitatiue christianae cognata semper fuerit! Apte idem Pontifex: 'Illud Gallia meminerit, quae sibi cum Apostolica Sede sit, Dei providentis numine, coniunctio, actiorem esse vetustioremqe, quam ut unquam audeat dissolvere. Inde enim verissimae quaeque laudes, atque honestissima decora profecta. . . . Hanc velle turbari necessitudinem idem foret sane, ac velle de auctoritate gratiaque nationis Gallicae in populis non parum detrahi.'²

Accedit autem quod haec ipsa summae necessitudinis vincula eo sanctiora iubeat esse sollemnis pactorum fides. Nempe Apostolicam Sedem inter et Rempublicam Gallicam conventio eiusmodi intercesserat, cuius ultro et citro constaret obligatio; cuiusmodi eae plane sunt, quae inter civitates legitime contrahi consueverunt. Quare et Romanus Pontifex et rei Gallicae moderator se et suos quisque successores sponsione obstrinxere, in iis quae pacta essent, constanter permansuros. Consequabatur igitur, tu ista pactio eodem iure, ac ceterae quae inter civitates fiunt, regeretur, hoc est, iure gentium; ideoque dissolvi ab alterutro dumtaxat eorum qui pepigerant, nequequam posset. Apostolicam autem Sedem summa semper fide conditionibus stetisse, omnique tempore postulasse, ut fide pari staret eisdem civitas, nemo prudens suique iudicii homo negaverit. Ecce autem Respublica pactionem adeo sollemnem et legitimam suo tantum aribitrio rescindit; violandaque religione pactorum, nihil quidquam pensi habet, dum sese ab Ecclesiae complexu amicitiaque expediat, et insignem Apostolicae Sedi iniuriam imponere, et ius gentium frangere, et ipsam commovere graviter disciplinam socialem et politicam; siquidem nihil tam interest

¹ Epist. Enc. *Immortale Dei*, date de 1 Nov., au. MDCCCLXXXV.

² In alloc. ad peregr. Gallos, hab. die XIII. apr., an. MDCCCLXXXVIII.

humani convictus et societatis ad secure explicandas rationes popolorum mutuas, quam ut pacta publica sanctae inviolateque servantur.

Ad magnitudinem autem iniuriae, quam Apostolica Sedes accepit, accessionem non mediocrem factam esse liquet, si modus inspiciatur, quo modo Respublica pactum resolvit. Est hoc ratum similiter iure gentium atque in moribus positum institutisque civilibus, ut non ante liceat conventa inter civitates solvi, quam pars altera, quae hoc velit, alteri se id velle clare aperteque ipsi legitime denuntiarit. Iamvero hic voluntatis huiusmodi apud Apostolicam ipsam Sedem legitima, non modo denuntiatio, sed ne ulla quidem significatio intercessit. Ita non dubitarunt gubernatores Galliae adversus Apostolicam Sedem communia urbanitatis officia deserere, quae vel minimae cuique minimique momenti civitati praestari solent; neque iidem veriti sunt, quum nationis catholicae personam gererent, Pontificis, summi Ecclesiae catholicae Capitis, dignitatem potestatemque contemnere; quae quidem potestas eo maiorem ab iis verecundiam, quam civilis ulla potestas postulabat, quod aeterna animarum bona spectat, neque ullis locorum finibus circumscriptur.

Sed iam ipsam in se legem considerantibus, quae modo promulgata est, novae Nobis multoque gravioris querelae nascitur causa. Principio Respublica quum revulsis pactionis vinculis ab Ecclesia discederet, consequens omnino erat, ut eam quoque missam faceret et concessa iure communi frui libertate sineret. At nihil munus factum est: nam plura hic videmus esse constituta, quae, odiosum privilegium Ecclesiae irrogando, eam civili imperio subesse cogant. Nos vero cum graviter molesteque ferimus, quod hisce sanctionibus civilis potestas in eas res invasit, quarum iudicium et aribtrium unius est sacrae potestatis; tum etiam eoque magis dolemus, quod eadem, aequitatis iustitiaeque oblita, Ecclesiam Gallicam in conditionem ac fortunam coniecit duram incommodamque maxime, atque eam sacrosanctis ipsius iuribus adversissimam.

Nam primum huius decreta legis constitutionem ipsam offendunt, qua Christus Ecclesiam conformavit. Scriptura enim eloquitur et tradita a Patribus doctrina confirmat, Ecclesiam mysticum esse Christi corpus *pastorum* et *doctorum* auctoritate administratum;¹ id est societatem hominum in qua aliqui

¹ Ephes. iv., II. seqq.

praesunt ceteris cum plena perfectaue regendi, docendi, iudicandi potestate.¹ Est igitur haec societas, vi et natura sua, *inaequalis*; duplicem scilicet complectitur personarum ordinem, pastores et gregem, id est eos, qui in variis hierarchiae gradibus collocati sunt et multitudinem fidelium: atque hi ordines ita sunt inter se distincti, ut in sola hierarchia ius atque auctoritas resideat movendi ac dirigendi consociatos ad propositum socieatti finem; multitudinis autem officium sit, gubernari se pati, et rectorum sequi ductum obedientes. Praeclare Cyprianus Martyr: 'Dominus noster cuius praecepta metuere et servare debemus, Episcopi honorem et Ecclesiae suae rationem disponens, in Evangelio loquitur, et dicit Petro: *Ego dico tibi, quia tu es Petrus*, etc. Inde per temporum et successionum vices episcoporum ordinatio et Ecclesiae ratio decurrit, ut Ecclesia super Episcopos constituatur, et omnis actus Ecclesiae per eosdem praepositos gubernetur;' idque ait: '*divina lege fundatum*.'² Contra ea, legis huius praescripto, administratio tuitioque cultus publici non hierarchiae divinitus constitutae relinquitur, sed certae cuidam defertur consociationi civium: cui quidem forma ratioque imponitur personae legitimaе, quaeque in universo religiois cultu genere sola habetur civilibus uti instructa iuribus, ita obligationibus obstricta. Igitur ad consociationem huiusmodi templorum aedificiorumque sacrorum usus, rerum ecclesiasticarum tum moventium tum solidarum possessio respiciet; ipsi de Episcoporum, de Curionum, de Seminariorum aedibus liberum, licet ad tempus permittetur arbitrium; ipsius erit administrare bona, corrogare stipes, pecuniam et legata percipere, sacrorum causa. De hierarchia vero silentium est. Statuitur quidem, istas consociationes ita conflandas esse, quemadmodum cultus religiosi, cuius exercendi gratia instituuntur, propria disciplina ratioque vult; verumtamen cavetur, ut si qua forte de ipsarum rebus controversia inciderit, eam dumtaxat apud *Consilium Status* diiudicari oporteat. Perspicuum est igitur ipsas consociationes adeo civili potestati obnoxias esse, nihil ut in eis ecclesiasticae auctoritati loci relinquatur. Quantopere haec omnia sint Ecclesiae aliena dignitati, contraria iuribus et constitutioni divinae, nemo non videt: eo magis, quod non certis definitisque formulis, verum

¹ Matth. xviii., 18, 20; xvi., 18, 19; xviii., 17; Tit. ii., 15; II. Cor. x. 6; xii. 10 et alibi.

² St. Cyr. Epist. xxxiii. (ad xxvii. ad lapses), n. 1.

tam vagis tamque late patentibus perscripta lex est in hoc capite, ut iure sint ex eius interpretatione peiora metuenda.

Praeterea nihil hac ipsa lege inimicus libertati Ecclesiae, Etenim, si prohibentur sacri magistratus, ob interiectas consociationes quas diximus, plenam muneris sui exercere potestatem; is in easdem consociationes summa vindicatur *Consilio Status* auctoritas, eaeque parere alienissimis a iure communi statutis iubentur, ita ut difficile coalescere, difficilius queant consistere; si data divini cultus exercendi copia, multiplici exceptione minuitur; erepta Ecclesiae studio vigilantiaeque, custodia templorum Reipublicae attribuitur; ipsum coercetur Ecclesiae munus de fide ac morum sanctitate concionandi, et severiores irrogantur clericis poenae; si haec et talia sanciantur, in quibus multum etiam libido interpretandi possit, quid hic aliud agitur, quam ut Ecclesia in humili abiectaue conditione locetur, et pacificorum civium, quae quidem est pars Galliae multo maxima, per speciem conservandi publici ordinis, sanctissimum ius violetur profitendae, uti velint, religionis suae? Quamquam Civitas non comprimenda solum divini cultus professione, qua totam vim rationemque definit religionis, Ecclesiam vulnerat; sed eius etiam vel virtuti beneficae intercludendo aditus ad populum, vel actionem multipliciter debilitando. Igitur satis non habuit, praeter cetera, Ordines submovisse religiosorum, unde in sacri ministerii perfunctione, in institutione atque eruditione adolescentis aetatis, in christianae procuratione beneficentiae praeclara adiumenta suppetebant Ecclesiae: nam humanis eam opibus, id est necessario quodam ad vitam et ad munus subsidio, intervertit.

Sane, ad ea quae conquesti sumus damna et iniurias, hoc accedit, ut ista de discidio lex ius Ecclesiae sua sibi habendi bona violet atque imminuat. Etenim de patrimonii, magnam partem, possessione, probatissimis quibusque titulis quaesiti, Ecclesiam, alte iustitia reclamante, deturbat; quidquid rite constitutum sit addicta pecunia in divinum cultum aut in stata defunctorum solatia, tollit atque irritum iubet esse; quas facultates catholicorum liberalitas christianis utique scholis aut variis christianae beneficentiae institutis sustinendis destinarat, eas ad instituta laicorum transfert, ubi plerumque aliquod catholicae religionis vestigium frustra quaeras: in quo quidem patet, una cum Ecclesiae iuribus, testamenta voluntatesque apertas auctorum avertit. Quod vero per summam iniuriam edicit, quibus aedi-

ficiis Ecclesia ante pactum conventum utebatur, ea posthac civitatis ut provinciarum aut municipiorum fore, singulari Nobis est sollicitudini. Nam si consociationibus divino cultui exercendo usus templorum, ut videmus gratuitus nec definitus conceditur, concessum tamen huiusmodi tot tantisque exceptionibus extenuatur, ut reapse templorum arbitrium omne civiles magistratus obtineant. Vehementer praeterea timemus sanctitati templorum: neque enim cernimus abesse periculum, ne augusta divinae maiestatis domicilia, eademque carissima memoriae religionique Gallorum loca, profanas in manus quum deciderint, profanis ritibus polluantur. In eo autem, quod Rempublicam lex officio solvit suppeditandi annuos sacrorum sumptus, simul fidem sollemni pacto obligatam, simul iustitiam laedit gravissime. Etenim nullam dubitationem hoc habet, quod ipsa rei gestae testantur monumenta, Rempublicam Gallicam quum pacto convento sibi suscepit onus praebendi Clero unde vitam decenter ipse agere, ac publicam religionis dignitatem curare posset, non id fecisse comitatis benignitatisque gratia; verum ut eam, quam proximo tempore Ecclesiae passa esset publice direptionem bonorum, saltem ex parte aliqua sarciret. Similiter eodem convento, quum Pontifex, concordiae studens, recepit, se successoresque suos nullam molestiam exhibituros iis, ad quos direpta Ecclesiae bona pervenissent, sub ea conditione constat recepissee, ut per ipsam Rempublicam perpetuo esset honestae et Cleri et divini cultus tuitioni consultum.

Postremo, ne illud quidem silebimus, hanc legem praeterquam Ecclesiae rebus vestrae, etiam civitati non exiguo futurum damno. Neque enim potest esse dubium quin multum habitura sit facultatis ad eam labefactandam coniunctionem et conspirationem animorum, quae si desit, nulla stare aut vigere queat civitas; et quam, his maxime Europae temporibus, quisquis est in Gallia vir bonus vereque amans patriae, salvam et incolumem velle debet. Nos quidem, exemplo Decessoris, a quo exploratissimae erga nationem vestram caritatis eximiae cepimas hereditatem, quum avitae religionis tueri apud vos integritatem iurium niteremur, hoc simul spectavimus semper et contendimus, communem omnium vestrum pacem concordiamque cuius, nullum vinculum arctius quam religio, confirmare. Quapropter intelligere sine magno angore non possumus, eam auctoritate publica patratam esse rem, quae, concitatis iam populi studiis

funestarum de rebus religiosis contentionum faces adiiciendo, perturbare funditus civitatem posse videatur.

Itaque, Apostolici Nostri officii memores, quo sacrosancta Ecclesiae iura a quavis impugnatione defendere ac servare integra debemus. Nos pro suprema, quam obtinemus divinitus, auctoritate, sancitam legem, quae Rempublicam Gallicanam seorsum ab Ecclesia separat, reprobamus ac damnamus; idque ob eas quas exposuimus causas: quod maxima afficit iniuri Deum, quem sollemniter eiurat, principio declarans Rempublicam cuiusvis religiosi cultus expertem; quod naturae ius gentiumque violat et publicam pactorum fidem; quod constitutioni divinae et rationibus intimis et libertati adversatur Ecclesiae; quod iustitiam evertit, ius opprimendo domini, multiplici titulo ipsaque conventionem legitime quaesitum; quod graviter Apostolicae Sedis dignitatem ac personam Nostram, Episcoporum Ordinem, Clerum et Catholicos Gallos offendit. Propterea de rogatione, latione, promulgatione eiusdem legis vehementissime expostulamus; in eaque testamur nihil quidquam inesse momenti ad infirmanda Ecclesiae iura, nulla hominum vi ausuque mutabili.

Haec ad istius detestationem facti vobis, Venerabiles Fratres, Gallicano populo, atque adeo christiani nominis universitati edicere habuimus. Equidem molestissime, ut diximus, afficimur, mala prospicientes quae ab hac lege dilectae nationi impendent, maximeque commovemur miseriis, aerumnis, laboribus omne genus, in quibus fore vos, Venerabiles Fratres, Clerumque vestrum cernimus. Attamen, ne his tantis curis affligi Nos frangique patiamur prohibet divinae benignitatis providentiaeque cogitatio, atque exploratissima spes, nunquam fore ut Ecclesiam Iesu Christus ope praesentiaeque sua destituat. Itaque longe id abest a Nobis, ut quidquam formidemus, Ecclesiae causa. Divina est virtutis eius stabilitas atque constantia, eaque satis, opinamur, tot saeculorum experimento cognita. Nemo enim unus ignorat, asperitates rerum hac temporis diuturnitate in eam incubuisse et plurimas et maximas; atque, ubi virtutem non humana maiorem deficere necesse fuisset, Ecclesiam inde validorem semper auctioremque emerxisse. Ac de legibus in perniciem Ecclesiae conditis, hoc ferme usuvenire, historia teste, scimus, ut quas invidia conflaverit, eas postea, utpote noxias in primis civitati, prudentia resolvat: idque ipsum in Gallia haud ita veteri memoria constat contigisse. Quod insigne maiorum exemplum utinam sequi inducant animum,

qui rerum potiuntur : matereque religionem, effectricem humanitatis, fautricem prosperitatis publicae, in possessionem dignitatis libertatisque suae, omnibus plaudentibus bonis, restituant.

Interea tamen, dum opprimendi exagitandi libido dominabitur, filii Ecclesiae, si unquam alias oportet, *induti arma lucis*,¹ pro veritate ac iustitia, omni qua possunt ope nitantur. In quo vos, magistri auctoresque ceterorum, profecto, Venerabiles Fratres, omnem eam studii alacritatem, vigilantiam, constantiamque praestabitis, quae Galliae Episcoporum vetus ac spectatissima laus est. Sed hoc potissime studere vos volumus, quod maxime rem continet, ut omnium vestrum in tutandis Ecclesiae rationibus summa sit sententiarum consiliorumque consensio. Nobis quidem certum deliberatumque est, qua norma dirigendam esse in his rerum difficultatibus operam vestram arbitremur, opportune vobis praescribere ; nec dubitandum quin praescripta vos Nostra diligentissime executuri sitis. Pergite porro, ut instituistis, atque eo etiam impensius, roborare pietatem communem ; praeceptionem doctrinae christianae promovere vulgatioremque facere ; errorum fallacias, corruptelarum illecebras, tam late hodie fusas, a vestro cuiusque grege defendere ; eidem ad docendum, monendum, hortandum, solandum adesse, omina denique pastoralis caritatis officia conferre. Nec vero elaborantibus vobis non se adiutorem strenuissimum praebebit Clerus vester ; quem quidem, viris affluentem pietate, eruditione, obsequio in Apostolicam Sedem eximiis, promptum paratumque esse novimus, se totum vobis pro Ecclesia sempiternaque animarum salute dedere. Certe autem qui sunt huius Ordinis, in hac tempestate sentient sic se animatos esse oportere, quemadmodum fuisse Apostolos accepimus, *gaudentes . . . quoniam digni habili sunt pro nomine Iesu contumeliam pati.*² Itaque iura libertatemque Ecclesiae fortiter vindicabunt, omni tamen adversus quempiam asperitate remota : quin imo, caritatis memores, ut Christi ministros in primis addecet, aequitate iniuriam, lenitate contumaciam, beneficiis maleficia pensabunt.

Iam vos compellamus, catholici quotquot estis in Gallia ; vobisque vox Nostra tum testimonio effusissimae benevolentiae, qua gentem vestram dirigere non desinimus, tum in calamitosisimis rebus quae imminet, solatio sit. Hoc sibi destinasse pravas hominum sectas, cervicibus vestris impositas, imo hoc denuntiassse insigni audacia se velle, nostris : delere catholicum

¹ Rom. xiii., 12.

² Act. v., 41.

in Gallia nomen. Eam nempe contendunt extrahere radicitus ex animis vestris fidem, quae avis et maioribus gloriam, patriae prosperitatem verendamque amplitudinem peperit, vobis levamenta acrumnarum ministrat, pacem tuetur tranquillitatemque domesticam, viam munit ad beatitatem adipiscendam sine fine mansuram. In huius defensionem fidei summa vi incumbendum vobis putatis esse scilicet : sed hoc habete, ianai vos nisu laboraturos, si dissociatis viribus propulsare hostiles impetus nitemini, Abiicite igitur, si quae insident inter pos, discordiarum semina : ac date operam, ut tanta omnes conspiratione voluntatum et agendi similitudine coniuncti sitis, quanta esse decet homines, quibus una eademque est causa propugnanda, atque ea causa, pro qua quisque non invite debeat, si opus fuerit, aliquam privati iudicii iacturam facere. Omnino magna generosae virtutis exempla detis oportet, si, quantum est in vobis, vultis, ut officium est, avitam religionem a praesenti discrimine eripere : in quo benigne facientes ministris Dei, divinam peculiari modo benignitatem vobis conciliabitis.

At vobis ad patrocinium religionis digne suscipiendum, recte utiliterque sustinendum, illa esse maxima arbitremini : christianae sapientiae praeceptis vosmetipsos conformari adeo, ut ex moribus atque omni vita professio catholica eluceat ; et arctissime cum iis cohaerere, quorum propria est religiosae rei procuratio, cum sacerdotibus nimirum et Episcopis vestris et, quod caput est, cum hac Apostolica Sede, in qua, tamquam centro, catholicorum fides et conveniens fidei actio nititur. Sic ergo parati atque instructi, ad hanc pro Ecclesia propugnationem fidenter accedite ; sed videte, ut fiduciaestrae tota ratio in Deo consistat, cuius agitis causam : eius idcirco opportunitatem auxilii implorare ne cessetis. Nos vero, quamdiu ita vobis erit periclitandum, vobiscum praesentes cogitatione animoque versabimur ; laborum, curarum, dolorum participes : simulque prece atque obsecratione humili ac supplici apud Auctorem Statoremque Ecclesiae instabimus, ut respiciat Galliam miserricos, eamque tantis iactatam fluctibus celeritur, deprecante Maria Immaculata, in tranquillum redigat.

Auspiciem divinorum munerum, ac testem praecipuae, benevolentiae Nostrae, vobis, Venerabiles Fratres ac dilecti Filii, Apostolicam Benedictionem amantissime in Domino impertimus.

Datum Romae apud Sanctum Petrum, die XI Februarii anno MDCCCXVI, Pontificatus Nostri tertio.

PIVS PP. X.

NOTICES OF BOOKS

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Professor, St. Patrick's College, Maynooth. Dublin:
Browne & Nolan. 2s. net.

DR. HOGAN's pamphlet comes most opportunely. There have been of late among certain Catholics, signs of relaxing energy, indications of a reaction from the strenuous opposition to the injustice of Irish University Education. The specious suggestion so often iterated, that Catholics have all that they look for, or can in reason ask for, in Trinity College, if they will only forget their prejudices, has begun to be accepted and be believed, and with many Catholics the suggestion passes current. Dr. Hogan's pamphlet clears the air, and removes all obscurity from the issues that lie between Irish Catholics and Trinity College, and justifies, if reason, based on the logic of facts can justify anything, the traditional attitude of Catholics in refusing to accept the education offered in that institution.

Dr. Hogan has no sympathy with the advice—let the Catholic students flock into Trinity College, storm it by numbers, and in a short time they will make it their own. He sets the scheme aside as impracticable, because 'the struggle would be so protracted, the attack so bitterly contested, the odds against us so overwhelming that even were a lodgment of some kind ultimately effected in the fortress, our soldiers would come out of the engagement so demoralised that victory would scarcely be less fatal than defeat. Thirty or forty years of instruction by Protestant teachers, slowly, imperceptibly, patiently, perhaps, in many cases unconsciously, infusing into their young disciples an anti-Catholic, or even an un-Catholic spirit would do more harm to the Catholic faith in Ireland, than three hundred years of the Penal Code.'

Nor does he hope that such a radical change might be effected in the governing powers, constitution, *personnel* of Trinity College as would bring it into harmony with national requirements.

The chief object of the pamphlet is to bring before the minds of the Catholic public, the full force of the Protestant influences that are at work in Trinity College, to show how deceptive is the hope that Catholics might, if they only went there in sufficient numbers, one day get a position in the establishment commensurate with their numbers and their ability, and how completely they would be in the meantime at the mercy of the full tide of Protestantism that flows around its walls.

Dr. Hogan shows conclusively that these Protestant influences envelope the whole establishment, and permeate every part of it. Having dealt with the Divinity school and its influence on the University life, he shows in successive chapters the Protestantism, aggressive and rampant, in the Provost, Vice-Provost, Senior Fellows, in the Senate, Council, Junior Fellows, in the five Erasmus Smith Professorships, in the Professors of Ancient and Modern History, of English, of Irish, of German; in the Medical School, the School of Law, and the School of Philosophy.

From their own lips and pens Dr. Hogan demonstrates the anti-Catholicism of the governors and professors of Trinity College, and refutes the sophism so assiduously propagated, that the teaching of Trinity College is neutral and harmless to the religious susceptibilities of Catholic youth. 'Men do not speak with a double voice; and if teachers must refrain from touching questions that have divided and disturbed mankind from the beginning of the world, why call their school a University, and what is their claim to the title of Master and Doctor?'

In this singularly able pamphlet Dr. Hogan has collected a mass of evidence, such as will be found in no other volume. It is the result of much labour and research, undertaken willingly in the interests of faith and of our Catholic people. The Irish Church will acknowledge gratefully her new obligation to Dr. Hogan. The clear and graceful style, the wide reading and comprehensive scholarship of the author make the pamphlet most the readable and interesting of books.

C. M,

ILLUSTRATED STORY OF FIVE YEARS' TOUR IN AMERICA.

By the Rev. J. J. McGlade, P.P. Dublin : Gill & Son.

THIS work is the story of a journey of thirty thousand miles in quest, not directly of the Holy Grail, but of thirty thousand dollars to supply a suitable temple for the Holy Grail in the town of Omagh in Tyrone. It was suggested to the writer by some of his fellow-travellers, and the suggestion was a happy one. The result is excellent, as was, I believe, the result of the expedition with which it is associated.

Collecting money in the best of circumstances is not the pleasantest of occupations ; but if anything besides the high and holy motive that sent Father M'Glade abroad, could tend to make it at least tolerable, it would be, I imagine, the interest awakened by so many new scenes, and the literary project of recording one's impressions of them. Father M'Glade's impressions are most vivid, most picturesque, and are presented in a very attractive narrative. The story is lighted up by many flashes of verse and of humour, and by excellent illustrations of the principal buildings from Mexico to Canada, from ill-fated San Francisco to New York. Anyone, priest or layman, going to travel in America could not procure a more useful book ; and anybody not going who wishes to know how things look and how things are done out there could not do better than read Father M'Glade

J. F. H.

Seánmóirí Muirge Nuasáob. Imleabair a h-Aon. Muinntir
bhrúin agus Nuallán. 2/6 nett.

In a paper which he read before the members of the Maynooth Union last June, Dr. M. Sheehan contended that as yet we have not a living literature in the language of the Gaedhil. 'The literature of a nation,' he wrote, 'is the written record of the nation's thought. It is said to be a living literature if it form the food on which the mind of the nation feeds, if it serves as a stimulus and an inspiration to writers, and if it be enriched from year to year by notable accretions. A National literature is in a sense an organism, and, as in other organisms, growth and reproduction are the only evidences of life. That we possess a literature, and, in its early periods, a great literature, is beyond question ; but that we possess a living literature cannot, I am afraid, be established.'

It is because the League of St. Columba recognised the justice of Dr. Sheehan's contention that we are now enabled to see what a living Irish literature is like. The present volume of Sermons is not made up of discourses delivered to present-day audiences by priests who are actively engaged on the mission. Every sermon in the book was spoken by priests who were under the ban of a tyrant, and heard by an audience under circumstances unparalleled in the history of civilized nations. Every sermon was preached in the mountain fastnesses, sometimes, perhaps, in the face of a biting cold and a piercing wind, while scouts, posted all around, kept up an incessant watch for priest-hunters and their inseparable companions—blood-thirsty British soldiers. As a sacred relic of the past each sermon will be treasured by priests and people. Their value does not cease here. They were spoken by Irish-speaking priests to Irish-speaking congregations; and hence they are a part of a living native literature, through whose veins courses the blood of pure Irish idiom. The language with which the holy thoughts are dressed has not come *via* English, nor *via* French, but along a way, which it has carved for itself. It is Irish, and therefore natural, and therefore appeals to the native speaker. When the sermons were read to some fishermen on the western seaboard, a smile of recognition was seen to brighten their weather-beaten countenances, and one of them declared with enthusiasm 'That's the right sort—that is ours.'

The Columban League is right. We have had to get a living Irish literature somehow. It is, no doubt, strange, and it may be unnatural, to put the breath of life again into a thing buried for a century; but it must be done. Our present-day writers of Irish are, almost all, men whose minds have been developed through a foreign idiom. They shall never individualize our literature. We must call back the dead to assist us in the formation of a native mind.

With the editing of the work little fault can be found. The whole thing shows not only care but scholarship. It is a credit to Maynooth to have within its walls young students who are able to turn out such a learned work. There is noticeable, however, here and there, a slight want of uniformity in spelling, as also a certain tendency to retain forms long since discarded. For instance *ſ* and *ſc*—an old bone of contention—appear, to

a certain extent, indiscriminately. They appear so even in the same word. On page 81 we find 'ceirgiobal,' on page 202 'ceirgioblaib.'

It is high time to settle these discrepancies in orthography. Few will see the utility of again bringing to light freaks of nature long since stowed away, like : 'fagbail,' 'fagbail,' 'cogbail,' 'iomflán,' 'an cfaogail.' The usual forms—'fagail,' 'fagail,' 'an cfaogail,' etc., are more in conformity with modern taste. The word iobdair is accented throughout iobdair. Dinneen does not accent. I have not been able to find a single instance to back up the Maynooth usage. It is a pity that words coined from the English should be employed, when real Irish synonyms which occur elsewhere in the work, could be substituted. I refer to such importations as—'September,' 'temptáirun' 'neibeillíntaict,' 'briomáin,' 'seinearláta.

Again, would not it be well to stick to Dinneen, and use níó? Ní may be quite correct; but then there is a danger of confusion in the mind of a beginner between itself and the negative particle.

All these are, of course, only very small points; yet inasmuch as they slightly disfigure a very artistic page, it is well to single them out for correction in a future edition.

The printer deserves his own meed of praise. The type will attract any reader, as the binding will the eye. The price makes it the cheapest book of its kind in the market. Every true Gaedhil will extend to the editors his heartiest congratulations; and the hard-working priest, who has to preach in Irish, will send his benediction to the noble young levites, who have done so much for God and their country.

C. O. W.

IS IRELAND A DYING NATION? By T. O. Russell. Dublin : M. H. Gill & Son, Ltd., 1906. Price 2s.

THIS is the work of a man who seems to us to be honest and sincere. As a review of the present condition of Ireland, its hopes and prospects, and the various forces that are at work within its bosom, it is most interesting and illuminating. It is written in a thoughtful, moderate style, and at every page gives one the impression that its author is sincerely anxious to serve his country. Most of the subjects dealt with are of every-

day interest; but the treatment of them is neither commonplace nor superficial. The author has read a great deal, and is a man of vast experience. He has still hope for his country; but he is not blind to the causes of its present decay. He appeals to his Protestant countrymen to come to the rescue and to join hands with the majority in the common effort of patriotism. He touches the vital point when he says that it is the interest of outsiders to keep us in strife in order that they may profit by our divisions. With his chapter on sectarian quarrels, we are well satisfied. Coming from a Protestant writer it is fair, and even generous. If the same spirit were to prevail with his co-religionists generally Ireland would be a different country, and assuredly Protestants would not be the worse for it, either materially or otherwise. We are amongst those who hold that Catholicism in Ireland would not have much to gain by Home Rule, except in so far as it would promote the welfare of the country generally, but we think that if Catholicism would not suffer and the country at large would be greatly benefitted by it, patriotic duty should compel us to help in securing it. Mr. O'Neill Russell's book ought to have weight with his Protestant countrymen, but it can be read with benefit and pleasure by all.

J. F. H.

A LAD OF THE O'FRIELS. By Seumas MacManus. Dublin : M. H. Gill & Son, Ltd., and James Duffy & Co. 1906. Price 2s. 6d.

THIS work of Mr. MacManus has acquired well-deserved popularity; but as the first edition cost six shillings it is now brought within reach of a much greater number at the price of half-a-crown. We notice many of the characteristics of Charles Kickham in the northern writer, the same quaint humour and homely wit, the same love of his neighbours, and delight in catching up their sprightly sayings and doings, and presenting them in a vivid picture. It is only a man who loves the people who would devote himself to the idealisation of their humble joys and sorrows, as Mr. MacManus does. The work is healthy and pure, and is instinct with a Catholic spirit. His description of the pilgrimage to Lough Derg, and the equalising influence it exercises on the pilgrims is admirably done. When we are

complaining so much of the literature that comes to us from other countries, we ought to rejoice that something good and sound is done at home and give it the encouragement it deserves.

J. F. H.

MEDITATIONS ON CHRISTIAN DOGMA. By the Right Rev. James Bellord, D.D. With an Introduction by Cardinal Vaughan. 2 vols. 4to. London: Catholic Truth Society, 68, Southwark Bridge Road.

WE have been favoured with the second edition of this pious work, and we are happy to commend it to our readers as one of the most valuable meditation books that has ever been written. It is practically a presentation in English of *La Theologie Affective* of Louis Bail, of Abbeville. Cardinal Vaughan, who was a very pious and holy man, has briefly but aptly described its merits:—

‘St. Thomas and the Schoolmen [he writes] gave us theology as a pure dry light; they addressed the intellect, not the affections. This was wise and necessary. Their object was not directly ascetical or devotional, but doctrinal. They supposed that when they had illumined a man's mind and put his reason and memory into possession of the truths of theology, he would then himself meditate on them, and feed his will and his affections on the solid food of truth.’

This is what the *Meditations* admirably help us to do. There are, no doubt, some minds which prefer a less doctrinal framework for their meditations than that which was adopted by Louis Bail; but anyone who wishes to gain a knowledge of God such as He has been pleased to reveal Himself to us, to admire His wonderful perfections, and the whole economy of His goodness and mercy, and to be drawn towards Him by countless attractions, so as to become attached and united to Him, could not do better than procure this book and study it. It is an admirable meditation book, equally well suited for the religious life, the secular clergy, and the laity.

J. F. H.

IRISH EDUCATION: AS IT IS AND AS IT SHOULD BE. By “Jacques.” M. H. Gill & Son, Ltd. 1s.

THOUGH the school question is, in a manner, always with us the special attention it has attracted for some time past will render this little volume on the subject particularly interesting

just now. The new Bill, it is true, does not directly affect Irish Education, but it involves principles with which Irishmen in this country are specially concerned. The controversies it has given rise to are the best index of the fact.

In view of the radical policies sometimes advocated by way of improving Irish Education, it is refreshing to meet a man who finds some good points in the present system, and aims at improving what we have got rather than at demanding what the principles of Irish Catholics never will allow. The author of the volume before us maintains that denominational education is the only kind suitable to the Irish nation, that the existing managerial system should be continued, and that the present system generally should be taken as the basis for the improvements he advocates.

But his criticisms of the existing order of things is as severe as every sane man's must be. The multiplicity of educational boards, the swarm of officials that flourish under the name of educational authorities, the immense expense and meagre results, the want of connexion between the various grades—Primary, Secondary, Intermediate, and University—all come in for strong denunciation. The Queen's Colleges are called to account severely, and the training colleges for teachers are treated to a few uncomplimentary remarks. The main aim of the book is, however, constructive: it indicates a scheme—only one of the many possible, the author acknowledges—by which the various educational branches would be unified into a coherent system over which those best acquainted with the needs of the country would have control, and by means of which the youth of the country could pass from the National School to the University without such perceptible gaps in the progress as the present system necessitates. Some such scheme is imperative in Ireland, if the system is ever to satisfy public needs.

The author is optimistic regarding the settlement of the University Question on the basis of conference and compromise. The Government, he hints, is only waiting for a reasonable scheme to give it approval. Whether such be the case may fairly be questioned. The Government, doubtless, has discovered the pretty obvious principle that Ireland should be governed by Irish ideas, but it seems still unaware of the fact that Irishmen themselves are best able to explain what these ideas are.

We are sorry that our author has expressed no clear opinion on the recent vagaries of the National Board, and especially on the change of programme introduced some years ago into the National Schools. That paper-folding, etc., is a suitable substitute for the sound course of grammar, geography, arithmetic, etc., that used to be imparted has never appealed to us as an obvious fact; nor do we think that the conductors of the Intermediate Schools, who have to devote years to imparting elementary instruction generally associated with primary education, will be inclined to quarrel with the statement.

The book is full of information and practical suggestion, and should be carefully studied by everyone who wishes to understand the strength and weakness of the present system, or to cooperate in its improvement.

M. J. O'D.

THE YOKE OF CHRIST. Readings intended chiefly for the Sick. By the Rev. Robert Eaton, Priest of the Birmingham Oratory.

THE 'Hundred Readings,' which make up this volume, are intended for those who hunger for spiritual food, and are bodily too weak for deep meditation. 'Such persons,' says the Archbishop of Westminster, in the Preface, 'will find in these readings just what they require, and the teaching of our Divine Master will come home to them with new force to brace their failing strength and inspire fresh courage to bear their burden.'

THE CONSECRATION OF A BISHOP. By the Rev. Myles V. Ronan. Dublin, 1906. Catholic Truth Society of Ireland, 27, Lower Abbey Street. Price One Penny. With the approbation of His Grace the Archbishop of Dublin.

THIS is an exceedingly useful and practical publication. Hitherto at the consecration of bishops where any attempt was made to give the laity an intelligent interest in one of the most solemn ceremonies of the Church, the pamphlets produced were meagre and unsatisfying, having been for the most part got up in a hurry. Father Ronan has done his work carefully, and has admirably explained not only the ceremonies of the function but the symbolic and mystic signification of each one

of them. We hope that the little book will be fully availed of whenever the occasion offers, and that the priests in the locality in which a consecration is held, and in its neighbourhood, and indeed in all the parishes of the diocese, will see that the pamphlet is put in the boxes of the Catholic Truth Society for sale in time to enable the people to read it carefully beforehand, and that they will be so good as to draw the attention of their people to its existence and to its presence in the box. Father Ronan has done them a great service, and we hope it will be duly appreciated.

J. F. H.

CLERICAL MANAGERS AND THE BOARD OF NATIONAL EDUCATION. The Dungiven School Controversy. By Rev. Edward Loughrey, P.P. Dublin: James Duffy and Co., Ltd. Price 1s.

THE controversy between Father Loughrey and the Board of National Education has at least this one great result, that it has given birth to one of the most eloquent pamphlets it has ever been our good fortune to peruse. The case between Father Loughrey and the Board is clearly stated in the correspondence that passed between them; but both in the introduction to this correspondence, and in the general views on education which follow, Father Loughrey has reached a height of eloquence given to very few, and in argument and dialectics has literally pulverised the Board.

The case in dispute can be put in a nutshell. Miss Mary Jane Kilmartin, teacher of the girls' school at Dungiven, is said to have slapped a refractory, stubborn, and idle child, on the cheek with her open hand. The parents withdrew the child from the school and instituted law proceedings against the mistress. The manager, who was not consulted on these proceedings, refused to allow the child back to the school without an apology, and promise of future good conduct. The Commissioners directed Father Loughrey to allow the child back. He held firm, and was dismissed from his position as manager. Father Loughrey claims that the Commissioners outstepped their rights, and acted in violation of the rule that had hitherto been followed in such matters. They, however, were masters of the situation and clung to their decision.

The Commissioners, however, little knew the resources at the command of Father Loughrey. In this book he has let them have it for many misdeeds besides that of which he himself is the victim. He shows how 'the Board has been, after an existence of nearly one hundred years, an unmixed failure, its malicious purpose alone adhering to the skeleton.'

The so-called 'New Programme' of a few years ago he examines from an educational standpoint—'Sticklaying, tent-pegging, paper folding, baby technics, military marching of children of tender years, whose usual walking distance was four or five miles met with one howl of indignation from managers and parents.'

Father Loughrey prophesied that the programme would not stand, and suggested numerous modifications. The Commissioners stole his ideas, and adopted even his wording without acknowledgment. It is all very well, he says, for the Bishop of Kildare to be talking of moderation; but how is a man to relieve his outraged feelings?

'When Commissioner Dr. Foley [he writes] relieves himself gracefully of much wisdom and foresight to an audience charmed into observant silence, and it is to be hoped admiration for his modesty and moderation, it is pleasant to feel the fresh air blow from a burst of honest indignation from the ruined battlements of the City of the Broken Treaty.'

We can only assure our readers that this pamphlet well repays perusal.

J. F. H.

ST. COLUMBA'S. Issued by the League of St. Columba, Maynooth. Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son, Ltd. 1s. net.

THE League of St. Columba continues its good work. The number of Irish papers in its annual Record is increasing from year to year. The history and archæology of the country come next in importance. Poems, stories, descriptive essays in English and Irish light up its pages, and give a glimpse at the youthful enthusiasm that is concentrated within the hallowed old walls. A sketch giving promise of great things is that entitled, 'Maynooth Revisited,' by Parochus. The author of this sketch, J. M. G., will be heard of again. As Father O'Growney used to say, 'That man has something in him.' Mr. Morris's

paper on 'Assemblies, Sports, and Pastimes in Ancient Ireland,' is admirably done; and the papers on the 'Early Irish Church' are learned enough for any magazine. The Irish papers are descriptive, sacred, historical, and poetic. Father Yorke makes an admirable frontispiece to the whole collection, and we are sure he never felt more at home anywhere.

A. B.

LA CITÉ DE LA PAIX. D'après le témoignage de ceux qui y sont Revenus. (A French version of the 'City of Peace'). Avignon : Aubanel Frères. 2/. 25c.

WE are greatly pleased to find that one of the most notable publications of our Irish Catholic Truth Society has extended its range of success to the Continent. The various biographical sketches which make up 'The City of Peace,' and the glimpses they afford of the inner workings of souls led back by grace from Protestantism to the Church, will doubtless have a peculiar interest and value for Catholics and non-Catholics abroad—differing in kind, but hardly in degree, from the importance of their message to those who live in contact with the Protestantism of the English world.

The translation might, perhaps, have been executed in more interesting and idiomatic style. The proofs have been badly revised. A mis-spelling and a misprint occur on the *Nihil Obstat* page; and this ominous opening is too well responded to by succeeding blunders. We trust that a second edition, deserved as it is by the real merit of the book, will soon afford an opportunity of setting these details right.

THE TRADITION OF SCRIPTURE. By the Rev. William Barry, D.D. Longmans, Green & Co. 3s. 6d. net.

THE Scriptural problems raised by the modern critics have for years been attracting an amount of attention in Catholic circles. The subject is, however, so extensive, and the number of English Catholic works treating of it so few, that it is by no means easy for our Scriptural students in these countries to come to any definite conclusion regarding the points at issue. Some of them have not the time, others not the required energy; a

respectable minority have neither. What they require is a manual giving in a brief, concise form the main conclusions arrived at, and indicating to what extent the more conservative authorities are disposed to come to terms with their critical opponents. The long-looked for volume has come at last. Dr. Barry's little book of 266 pages has all the required qualifications, and will be eagerly welcomed by everyone who takes an interest in the Biblical question.

When it is stated that, within the narrow compass indicated, Dr. Barry has discussed the history of the Canon, the opinions of the leading Fathers, the question of inspiration in all its aspects, the place of Christ in the Bible, etc., and has given a synopsis of the more important literature on every single book of the Old and New Testaments, some idea may be formed of the energy, ability, and skill with which he has done his work.

His guiding principle seems to be the maxim of the golden mean. In regard to the Pentateuch, for instance, he adopts neither the old tradition nor the extreme hypothesis of Wellhausen and his friends, but maintains that the nucleus of the work is due to Moses himself, that his speeches were preserved in oral tradition, and embodied in the volume later on, that other additions came, after all, from men imbued with his spirit, and are attributable, therefore, in a sense to the Founder of the Law himself. On the question of inspiration he parts company with those who emphasize the human element but shows no disposition to applaud those who are, perhaps, sometimes inclined to over-estimate the divine. And, in regard to the Gospel of St. John, his views, though in the main differing little from the traditional, are somewhat coloured by the recent speculations of the Abbé Loisy and his German predecessors. The principle is, we believe, the correct one to employ. A system of interpretation which persistently ignores the literary work of the last century and a half is as far from the truth as the so-called critical method which undertakes to settle everything on internal evidence alone. Each system is extreme and merely signs its own death warrant.

So far, in theory, many will agree. But when it comes to practice, the unanimity ceases. If a *via media* is to be sought, which extreme is to be most clearly kept in view when determining the course? The sail between Scylla and Charybdis is far from being a holiday excursion. Though we admire the

skill with which Dr. Barry strives to do justice to every honest opinion, we shall not be surprised if many are shocked at his free treatment of Judges and Chronicles, for instance, or at his partition of Isaia's or location of Daniel in the second century B.C.

He is careful to observe that no dogmatic issue is affected by the concessions he makes to modern critical research. Catholics, we know, will not allow the statement to pass unquestioned. But the amount of truth which *all* must admit it contains, suggests the thought that, whatever mental uneasiness Higher Criticism—especially of the New Testament—may occasion Protestants who make the Bible their sole rule of faith, its effects are much more easily borne by Catholics who take their faith from the living Church, and who have always drawn attention to the fact that the Church was in existence, as a Divinely-constituted teaching authority before a single word of the New Testament was penned. When anti-Catholics are scandalised by her comparative apathy towards the newer learning they should bear in mind this important, but oft-forgotten fact.

Stress is laid—and rightly—on the principle of evolution in revelation. It solves many an enigma which drove men like Origen into explanations admirable as examples of mental gymnastics, but hardly safe precedents in sacred exegesis.

The evidence of extensive reading afforded by the volume excites our admiration. Catholic writers are, of course, awarded the greatest amount of consideration, but Protestants—like Dr. Driver—who, in addition to their critical acumen, manifest a reverence for the supernatural, are quoted with all due deference and respect. We are not sorry to see that Cheyne's somewhat erratic conclusions only provoke the Dantean phrase, 'Look and pass on.' The same phrase might be used of others to whom Dr. Barry has exhibited more courtesy.

Apart from purely critical questions, there are some statements in the work that may, perhaps, be taken exception to. Admirers of Lessius, for example, will hardly grant that the Vatican Council condemned his teaching, though it did reject, as sufficient for inspiration, subsequent approbation by *the Church* (page 223). No recognised school of theologians, we think, maintain that Divine knowledge, any more than any other Divine attributes, can be predicated of the humanity of Christ. The author's approval of the school which teaches that the

writers of the historical portions of the Pentateuch did not intend to give us strict history, does not command our sympathy. But matters like these are of minor importance: the book will stand or fall on altogether different grounds.

The aim of the author excluded original research, his only claim, indeed, to originality lies in the fact that he is the first in these countries who has, under the influence of Catholic principles, and with a view to Catholic readers, entered on an undertaking of the kind. His book is one for which Catholics will be sincerely grateful: one, too, that will add no small amount to the reputation he has already gained in other departments of literary work.

M. J. O'D.

THE SCIENCE OF THE SPIRITUAL LIFE. By Father Clare, S.J. New and enlarged edition. London: Art and Book Company. 7s. 6d. net.

WE noticed some years ago an earlier edition of Father Clare's book in this Review. The present edition is much enlarged; the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius are amplified to some 650 pages. The work will be found most valuable by those who have to make retreats without the assistance of a director.

NOTE ON DR. COFFEY'S 'THOUGHTS ON PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION': A CORRECTION

ON page 392 of the I. E. RECORD a well-known Italian priest and writer, R. Murri, was represented as partially at least, defending the *Philosophie de l'Action* and the *Méthode de l'Immanence*. Judging from his contributions to the *Cultura Sociale* I find that he has been a consistent opponent of the philosophical and apologetical views in question.

P. C.

"*Ubi Christianus, ibi et Romanus*." "As you are children of Christ, so you are subject to Rome!"
See Dublin & Portico, In Libris Armatus, Vol. 9.

The Irish Ecclesiastical Record

A Monthly Journal, under Episcopal Sanction.

Thirtieth Year] JANUARY, 1906. [Fourth Series.
 No. 457.] Vol. XIX.

The Church in 1905.

Rev. James MacCaffrey, S.T.L., Maynooth College.

'Religion as a Credible Doctrine.'

Rev. J. O'Neill, Ph.D., Darlow College.

The Catholic Church and Human Liberty.—V.

Rev. Daniel Coghlan, D.D., Maynooth College.

The Vatican Edition of Plain Chant.

Rev. H. Bewerunge, Maynooth College.

General Notes.

The Philosophy of Journalism. Augustine Everett on Universalism. The 'Mirrors' for the World. Statistics of the World.

The Editor.

Notes and Queries.

THEOLOGY.

Rev. J. M. Harty, Maynooth College.

Who is the 'Prophet Paradox' of 'Vag' ? Transference of Means to the Endings.

LITURGY.

Rev. Patrick Morrissey, Maynooth College.

Emptied Mass. Prayers of Mass during the Quarant. Ord. Lights in Church during Benediction. Meaning of 'Rubens' as Liturgical Colour. The 'Celebration' of Church Music.

Documents.

The Holiness Pope Pius X and the Pope. The Holiness Pope Pius X and the Church. The Constitution of Mount Carmel.

Notices of Books.

The Sanctity of the Mass. Recollections of William O'Brien, M.P. The Life of Count Arthur Maistre.

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1. The first part of the report is a general statement of the purpose of the study. This is followed by a brief review of the literature on the subject. The next section is a description of the methods used in the study. This is followed by a presentation of the results of the study. The final section is a discussion of the results and their implications.

2. The purpose of the study was to determine the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable. The independent variable was the amount of time spent on the task. The dependent variable was the number of errors made. The study was conducted using a between-subjects design. The subjects were divided into two groups. One group was given a 10-minute time limit, and the other group was given a 20-minute time limit. The number of errors made by each group was recorded.

3. The results of the study showed that the group with the 10-minute time limit made significantly more errors than the group with the 20-minute time limit. This suggests that increasing the time limit reduces the number of errors made. The results also showed that the number of errors made increased as the time limit increased. This suggests that the subjects were not able to maintain their performance level over time.

4. The implications of the study are that increasing the time limit can reduce the number of errors made. This suggests that time pressure can be a factor in the number of errors made. The study also suggests that the number of errors made increases as the time limit increases. This suggests that the subjects were not able to maintain their performance level over time.

